A conceptual framework for establishing trust in real world intelligent systems

Intelligent information systems that contain emergent elements often encounter trust problems because results do not get sufficiently explained and the procedure itself can not be fully retraced. This is caused by a control flow depending either on stochastic elements or on the structure and relevance of the input data. Trust in such algorithms can be established by letting users interact with the system so that they can explore results and find patterns that can be compared with their expected solution. Reflecting features and patterns of human understanding of a domain against algorithmic results can create awareness of such patterns and may increase the trust that a user has in the solution. If expectations are not met, close inspection can be used to decide whether a solution conforms to the expectations or whether it goes beyond the expected. By either accepting or rejecting a solution, the user’s set of expectations evolves and a learning process for the users is established. In this paper we present a conceptual framework that reflects and supports this process. The framework is the result of an analysis of two exemplary case studies from two different disciplines with information systems that assist experts in their complex tasks.     

Realism and Objectivism in Quantum Mechanics

The present study attempts to provide a consistent and coherent account of what the world could be like, given the conceptual framework and results of contemporary quantum theory. It is suggested that standard quantum mechanics can, and indeed should, be understood as a realist theory within its domain of application. It is pointed out, however, that a viable realist interpretation of quantum theory requires the abandonment or radical revision of the classical conception of physical reality and its traditional philosophical presuppositions. It is argued, in this direction, that the conceptualization of the nature of reality, as arising out of our most basic physical theory, calls for a kind of contextual realism. Within the domain of quantum mechanics, knowledge of ??reality in itself??, ??the real such as it truly is?? independent of the way it is contextualized, is impossible in principle. In this connection, the meaning of objectivity in quantum mechanics is analyzed, whilst the important question concerning the nature of quantum objects is explored.     

Editorial Notice

Abstract

John McDowell has claimed that the rational link between perceptions and empirical judgements allows us to perceive objects as belonging to a wider reality, one which extends beyond the objects perceived. In this way, we can be said to have a perceptual awareness of the world. I argue that McDowell's account of this perceptual awareness does not succeed. His account as it stands does not have the resources to explain how our perceptions can present objects as belonging to a wider reality, regardless of the judgements we make about that reality. I suggest that we can give a better account of this perceptual awareness of the world by appealing to transcendental phenomenology. A phenomenological study of perceptual experiences describes how they are structured by a sense of the perceived objects as belonging to a world containing other objects of possible perception. I shall outline this sense we have of the world, and argue that it allows us to perceive objects as belonging to a wider reality. Transcendental phenomenology can thus help to explain our perceptual awareness of the world.     

Distributed skill functions and the meshing of knowledge structures

The scope of knowledge space theory was extended by bringing into the picture the underlying skills and capabilities that are relevant to solving the problems in a knowledge domain. A major challenge to this approach comes from the need to aggregate distributed information on (partially) overlapping domains and skill sets. The notion of a distributed skill function is introduced for formalizing the integration of several skill functions that represent the assignment of skills to problems. It is shown that their consistency is captured by the meshability of the delineated knowledge structures. This result draws upon a characterization of the meshing of finite or infinite collections of knowledge structures, which extends and generalizes previous results on the binary case. The discussion covers implications for knowledge assessment and for practical applications, such as integrating skill assignments coming from different experts or distributed resources in technology-enhanced learning.     

Die mitgebrachte Hilfe

Based on three case reports psychotic transfer manifestations will be examined mainly with respect to their concrete quality. In the first case presented the main theme is a situative ??overpresence of concrete external reality??. For the most recent consultation the female patient appeared accompanied by a large dog and in this way initially created an oppressive scenario. During the course of the consultation this could be linked to the internal (emergency) situation of the patient and in this way the Dobermann could be transformed to ??Charly??. In the second case the concretism impressed as a totally dominating modus vivendi. The patient switched off broad areas of her emotionality and exclusively recognized concrete tangible objects and facts as the only valid reality. During the course of the treatment the ??misrepresentation of a useful object?? could be recognized as the center of this concrete world, an object from which the expectation was that it (half-heartedly) predominantly removed concrete deficiencies and therefore from which no emotional help can be expected. It will be presented how the (mental) development of the patient was additionally influenced by the schizophrenia of her father: she developed this ??concretization?? as a central ego function in order to be able to suppress an increasingly ??louder?? madness. In the third case example psychotic clefts and concinnities will be described which appear to damage the verbal thought process in an omnipotent fashion. A detailed examination shows, however, that these ??mad syntheses??, comparable with the astrophysical ??dark matter??, provide stabilizing functions of gravity.     

The Automaton Self: Defensive organisation,psychodynamics and treatment approaches

Abstract

This paper is not primarily concerned with the content of theory and what we then, in the light of this and of our own experience, say to our clients. Rather, it is concerned with the nature of this knowledge that we are using and that the client in turn uses and experiences in the counselling.

How, or the way in which, we know, defines our knowledge as much as the actual content of that knowledge. The paper delineates two fundamental ways of knowing. One is our ordinary practical and rational way of understanding reality and is usually about achieving some goal – this is what I am calling the product side of counselling: the other is concerned with our more immediate first-hand experiential knowing of ourselves and our world.

The paper opens with a definition of these two kinds of knowledge, product and process, and presents some clinical material to show how these different ways of knowing can have a real effect on the counselling. It then moves on to the question of why counselling trainings are becoming increasingly concerned with product knowledge, and ends with a discussion of how Freud himself was constantly using both ways of knowing as if they were the same, without understanding the implications of this for therapeutic practice.     

Visual Object Agnosia without Alexia or Prosopagnosia: Arguments for Separate Knowledge Stores

We review the points raised by Farah (this issue) in her discussion of the paper by Rumiati, Humphreys, Riddoch, and Bateman (1994), in which a case study was presented of a patient, Mr W., with visual object agnosia without either prosopagnosia or alexia. We reiterate the argument that Mr W. had impaired stored knowledge about the visual characteristics of objects, and that this was more severe than his deficit at a semantic level. In addition, we summarize supporting evidence from another patient (Humphreys & Rumiati, submitted), who showed the same pattern of breakdown as Mr W. We suggest that stored visual knowledge can be specific to the form of stimulus (words, objects, and faces), that these different forms of knowledge may be represented in distinct neural areas, and that agnosia can result after damage to stimulus-specific sites of knowledge representation.     

The relative efficacy of different forms of knowledge of results for the learning of a new relative timing pattern

The goal of the present study was to determine the relative efficacy of verbal and auditory knowledge of results for promoting learning of a new constrained relative timing pattern. In a series of four experiments we compared the efficiency of verbal knowledge of results to that of auditory knowledge of results. The results of all four experiments revealed that verbal knowledge of result is a very effective source of information to promote learning of a new imposed relative timing pattern. Auditory knowledge of results favoured learning of a new relative timing pattern in a very limited set of circumstances. In the present study, this was only the case when movement velocity remained constant from one segment of the task to the next and if it resulted in an unfamiliar temporal pattern. The results of all four experiments also provided evidence that movement parameterization and relative timing are independent processes that can be developed in parallel.     

Playing with reality

The authors explore the interpersonal aspects of the early development of an experience of external reality and the roots of this experience in primary intersubjectivity. They suggest some implications that this has for psychoanalytic work with the patient's experience of external reality. They argue that the external world is not an independently existing 'given', for the infant to discover, as is sometimes implicitly assumed. Infants acquire knowledge about the world not just through their own explorations of it but by using other minds as teachers. The experience of external reality is invariably shaped through subjectivities. The authors argue that at first the infant assumes that his knowledge is knowledge held by all, that what he knows is known by others and that what is known by others is accessible to him. Only slowly does the uniqueness of his own perspective differentiate so that a sense of mental self can develop. In clinical work we frequently observe the undoing of this process of differentiation, and understanding the underlying mechanisms can be helpful in managing the transference and countertransference consequences when the process has been derailed.     

Transleadership for Transdisciplinary Initiatives

This article shares the genesis of a new idea we called transleadership, as it is informed by Nicolescuian transdisciplinarity. While aligned with several leading edge approaches to leadership, we propose that transleadership stands out because it emerges at the convergence of seven transconcepts: complexity (emergence), logic and reality, intersubjectivity, sensemaking, tensions, power and influence, leverage, and the creation of in vivo, hybrid knowledge. Transleadership accommodates the intricate and complex process of leading a diverse collection of (often contradictory) people, ideas, and consciousness to a new space and place where transdisciplinary knowledge can be created to address wicked problems facing humanity, using transdisciplinary thinking.     

Scientific Realism Within Perspectivism and Perspectivism Within Scientific Realism

Perspectivism is often understood as a conception according to which subjective conditions inevitably affect our knowledge and, therefore, we are never confronted with reality and facts but only with interpretations. Hence, subjectivism and anti-realism are usually associated with perspectivism. The thesis of this paper is that, especially in the case of the sciences, perspectivism can be better understood as an appreciation of the cognitive attitude that consists in considering reality only from a certain ‘point of view’, in a way that can avoid subjectivism. Whereas the way of conceiving a notion is strictly subjective, the way of using it is open to intersubjective agreement, based on the practice of operations whose nature is neither mental nor linguistic. Therefore, intersubjectivity (that is a ‘weak’ sense of objectivity) is possible within perspectivism. Perspectivism can also help understand the notion of ‘scientific objects’ in a referential sense: they are those ‘things’ that become ‘objects’ of a certain science by being investigated from the ‘point of view’ of that science. They are ‘clipped out’ of things (and constitute the ‘domain of objects’ or the ‘regional ontology’ of that particular science) by means of standardized operations which turn out to be the same as those granting intersubjectivity. Therefore this ‘strong’ sense of objectivity, which is clearly realist, coincides with the ‘weak’ one. The notion of truth appears fully legitimate in the case of the sciences, being clearly defined for the regional ontology of each one of them and, since this truth can be extended in an analogical sense to the theories elaborated in each science, it follows that are real also the unobservable entities postulated by those theories.     

?Unsichtbare Wunden“

Exemplifying my own case I show what it meant to be subjected to political imprisonment and aggressive systematic manipulation in East Germany. With a timely distancing from my own trauma, psychoanalytic study and creative artistic work gave me enough room to treat victims of imprisonment and systematic aggression. This process took years with a gradual liberation from pursuing internal objects and the revival of the good, pretraumatic object. This process has risks and is not free from relapses. A case example shows how the therapist can be internalized as a good object and how distance can be gradually gained from malignant pursuing objects, which gives a final prospect for some kind of relief. In this process the author wishes not only to demonstrate but also to overcome the shadows of the past.     

What is enumerated by subitization mechanisms?

Subitization, the rapid enumeration of small numbers of objects, is often held to reflect a general ability to process three or four items simultaneously. However, questions as to which types of visual representations count as items for subitization have, thus far, received relatively little attention. In several new experiments, we instructed participants to enumerate three or four colored regions in a display. In some trials, all of these regions belonged to separate visual objects, whereas in others, two or more belonged to the same object(s). We found far slower enumeration in the latter case than in the former case, a result that cannot be attributed to Stroop interference from the number of attended objects in a display. We conclude that subitization mechanisms cannot operate on small fragments of shape and color alone, even when such fragments are easily individuated from one another. Rather, such mechanisms are compelled to operate on object representations.     

Knowledge and Assertion in Korean

Evidence from life science, cognitive science, and philosophy supports the hypothesis that knowledge is a central norm of the human practice of assertion. However, to date, the experimental evidence supporting this hypothesis is limited to American anglophones. If the hypothesis is correct, then such findings will not be limited to one language or culture. Instead, we should find a strong connection between knowledge and assertability across human languages and cultures. To begin testing this prediction, we conducted three experiments on Koreans in Korean. In each case, the findings replicated prior results observed in Americans and were corroborated by key findings from new replication studies on Americans using materials back‐translated from Korean. These findings support the theory that there is a core, cross‐culturally robust human practice of assertion and that, according to the rules of this practice, assertions should express knowledge.     

Mathematics,science and ontology

According to quasi-empiricism, mathematics is very like a branch of natural science. But if mathematics is like a branch of science, and science studies real objects, then mathematics should study real objects. Thus a quasi-empirical account of mathematics must answer the old epistemological question: How is knowledge of abstract objects possible? This paper attempts to show how it is possible. The second section examines the problem as it was posed by Benacerraf in ‘Mathematical Truth’ and the next section presents a way of looking at abstract objects that purports to demythologize them. In particular, it shows how we can have empirical knowledge of various abstract objects and even how we might causally interact with them. Finally, I argue that all objects are abstract objects. Abstract objects should be viewed as the most general class of objects. The arguments derive from Quine. If all objects are abstract, and if we can have knowledge of any objects, then we can have knowledge of abstract objects and the question of mathematical knowledge is solved. A strict adherence to Quine's philosophy leads to a curious combination of the Platonism of Frege with the empiricism of Mill.     

Automatic knowledge learning and case adaptation with a hybrid committee approach

When Case Based Reasoning systems are applied to real-world problems, the retrieved solutions usually require adaptations in order to be used on new contexts. Therefore, case adaptation is a desirable capability. However, case adaptation is still a challenge for this research area. In general, the acquisition of knowledge for case adaptation is harder than the acquisition of cases. This paper explores the automatic learning of adaptation knowledge and explores the use of a hybrid committee approach for automatic case adaptation.     

The use of stories as autistic objects

This paper reviews Frances Tustin's concept of the 'autistic object' and its development over the course of her writings. Clinical material from work with a 4-year-old boy is brought to suggest that the concept can usefully be extended to include such cultural artefacts as stories as well as the physical objects emphasized by Tustin. It is also emphasized that the awareness of reality which autistic objects are used to defend against refers both to internal as well as external reality. The paper argues that it is the function to which the object is put that is critical in determining whether or not it should be viewed as an autistic object.     

Führt die evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie in einen Relativismus?

This essay is a discussion of Eve-Marie Engels' view on Evolutionary Epistemology (EE). In the first part two of the main doctrines of EE are criticized: (1.) that validity of human knowledge is to be explained as the result of evolutionary adaptation; yet (2.), that human cognitive capacities had been adequate to our ancestors life conditions but fail in relevant situations of modern world. In the second part the concept of reality underlying EE's adaptational view is discussed and compared with Jean Piaget's concept of reality. Finally, it is held that some of the questions recently raised by proponents of EE, far from being new, have been dealt with already in historical epistemology.

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Diese Arbeit entstand im Rahmen des Projekts Nr. 11-2224.87 des Schweizerischen Nationalfonds.     

Reverse-engineering ‘esotericism': how to prepare a complex cultural concept for the cognitive science of religion

The article introduces a framework for preparing complex cultural concepts for the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and applies it to the field of Western esotericism. The research process (‘reverse engineering') rests on a building block approach that, after problematic categories have been deconstructed, seeks to reconstruct new scholarly objects in generic terms that can be operationalized in interdisciplinary contexts like CSR. A four-step research process is delineated, illustrated by a short discussion of previous work on ‘Gnosticism,' ‘magic,' and ‘religion,' before applying it to ‘esotericism.' It is suggested that the implicit scholarly objects of esotericism scholarship can be reconstituted in generic terms as concerned with processes of creating and disseminating ‘special knowledge.' Five definitional clusters are identified in the literature; these provide a basis for formulating research programs on the psychological and cognitive level, drawing on metarepresentational processes, event cognition, and psychological dispositions for altering experience.