Autopoietic enactivism,phenomenology and the deep continuity between life and mind

In their recent book Radicalizing Enactivism. Basic minds without content, Dan Hutto and Erik Myin (H&M) make two important criticisms of what they call autopoietic enactivism (AE). These two criticisms are that AE harbours tacit representationalists commitments and that it has too liberal a conception of cognition. Taking the latter claim as its main focus, this paper explores the theoretical underpinnings of AE in order to tease out how it might respond to H&M. In so doing it uncovers some reasons which not only appear to warrant H&M’s initial claims but also seem to point to further uneasy tensions within the AE framework. The paper goes beyond H&M by tracing the roots of these criticisms and apparent tensions to phenomenology and the role it plays in AE’s distinctive conception of strong life-mind continuity. It is highlighted that this phenomenological dimension of AE contains certain unexamined anthropomorphic and anthropogenic leanings which do not sit comfortably within its wider commitment to life-mind continuity. In light of this analysis it is suggested that AE will do well to rethink this role or ultimately run the risk of remaining theoretically unstable. The paper aims to contribute to the ongoing theoretical development of AE by highlighting potential internal tensions within its framework which need to be addressed in order for it to continue to evolve as a coherent paradigm.     

Amnestic disorders and their role in cognitive theory

Amnesia refers to a disorder of memory, and classical amnesia with continuous problems in aquiring new information is the most studied type of amnesia. The integration into a memory systems model of clinical studies of classical amnesia, cognitive theory, and studies with neuroimaging methods is one of the prime success stories in modern cognitive neuroscience. The clinical spectrum of amnesia encompasses a wide range of disorders ranging from specific encoding deficits for language or visuospatial information to psychogenic amnesia with confusion and loss of memory for personal identity. Two cases are reviewed, one with selective verbal amnesia and the other with focal retrograde amnesia, presenting some puzzles and challenges to current modular thinking about memory that may lead to theoretical advances. An interactive model emphasizing the communication between brain codes and regions in memory may have promise.     

Relevance theory,pragmatic inference and cognitive architecture

Relevance Theory (RT) argues that human language comprehension processes tend to maximize “relevance,” and postulates that there is a relevance-based procedure that a hearer follows when trying to understand an utterance. Despite being highly influential, RT has been criticized for its failure to explain how speaker-related information, either the speaker’s abilities or her/his preferences, is incorporated into the hearer’s inferential, pragmatic process. An alternative proposal is that speaker-related information gains prominence due to representation of the speaker within higher level goal-directed schemata. Yet the goal-based account is still unable to explain clearly how cross-domain information, for example linguistic meaning and speaker-related knowledge, is integrated within a modular system. On the basis of RT’s cognitive requirements, together with contemporary cognitive theory, we argue that this integration is realized by utilizing working memory and that there exist conversational constraints with which the constructed utterance interpretation should be consistent. We illustrate our arguments with a computational implementation of the proposed processes within a general cognitive architecture.

Abbreviations: ACT-R Adaptive Control of Thought - RationalCOGENT Cognitive Objects within a Graphical ENvironmenTCS/SS Contention Scheduling/Supervisory SystemRBCP Relevance-Based Comprehension ProcedureRT Relevance Theory     

Cognitive theory,cognitive impairment and clinical practice

The aim of this paper is to present a practical model for investigating cognitive impairment which integrates the experimental-cogaitive-information processing-theory and the psychometric-intellectual-abilities-tradition in psychology to understanding cognitive functioning. It reviews developments in cognitive theory in terms of Processes, complex and simple, such as Intelligence and Information Processing, and Factors of attained Level and Learning ability in the Verbal and Performance modalities. The Savage Cognitive Impairment Model (SCIM) is outlined and types of cognitive impairment defined. Measures of cognitive impairment relevant to clinical practice and research are presented.     

Autopoietic Enactivism,Phenomenology, and the Problem of Naturalism: A Neutral Monist Proposal

In this paper, I compare the original version of the enactive view—autopoietic enactivism—with Husserl’s phenomenology, regarding the issue of the relationship between consciousness and nature. I refer to this issue as the “problem of naturalism.” I show how the idea of the co-determination of subject and object of cognition, which is at the heart of autopoietic enactivism, is close to the phenomenological form of correlationism. However, I argue that there is a tension between an epistemological reading of the subject-object correlation that renounces to search for its metaphysical ground, and the enactivist focus on the biological basis of cognition, which seems to imply a view of nature as the metaphysical ground of the conscious mind. A similar problem arises in Husserl’s phenomenology in the contrast between the idea of the fundamental subject-object correlation, the concept of nature as a correlate of transcendental constitution, and the investigation of the corporeal and material grounding of consciousness. I find a way out of this problem by drawing on the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology. I argue that the investigation of the temporality of experience in genetic phenomenology leads us to investigate the metaphysical ground of the subject-object correlation, understood dynamically as co-constitution and co-origination. Then I propose to complement phenomenology and enactivism with a form of neutral monism, which conceives of the co-constitution of subject and object as grounded in a flow of fundamental, pre-phenomenal qualities.

     

Emergent representations, interaction theory and the cognitive force of metaphor

We focus here on the problem of how new representations emerge through a cognitive agent's interaction with the environment. We address this problem within a framework where representation-building mechanisms operate to create new representations against a backdrop of existing representations, and argue that novel and creative metaphors in any language provide a prime example of this phenomenon. Our approach to modeling the emergence of representation integrates ideas from three different streams of research: (1) the interaction theory of metaphor proposed by Black and others to account for the creativity of metaphors; (2) gestalt theories of perception; and (3) contemporary research supporting a constructivist and action-oriented view of perception and cognition. Combining these insights together, we outline our Gestalt projection model, and discuss three different ways in which new representations might emerge through metaphors. Finally, we propose that metaphor may be viewed as a cognitive force through which a cognitive agent asserts its creative spirit onto the environment.     

The Idea of Creation and the Theory of Autopoietic Processes

Systems theory is proposed as a major resource for reconceptualizing a Christian theology of creation. Section I outlines the principles of the theory of autopoietic systems and discusses in particular Manfred Eigen's and Stuart Kauffman's differing views of the emergence of life. Section II shows how biblical texts conceive of God's "blessing" as a divine installment and reshaping of spatio-temporal fields for creaturely self-productivity. On this double basis, Section III undertakes a constructive attempt to formulate a theology of self-productivity within a Trinitarian framework. The unity of divine self-consistency and capacity for self-relativization is seen as the clue for understanding how God not only sustains the world in general but also influences particular processes by changing the overall probability pattern of evolving systems.     

Nash equilibrium, team reasoning and cognitive hierarchy theory

This paper comments on two experiments, carried out by Colman, Pulford and Rose, which investigate the prevalence of team reasoning. I argue that because the first experiment uses 'decomposable' games, it cannot discriminate between team-reasoning and the conceptually distinct 'prosocial' orientation. In the second experiment, Colman et al. find more support for the team reasoning hypothesis than for the rival hypothesis that subjects choose Nash equilibrium strategies. I suggest that the most credible explanation of the data is that some subjects are team reasoners while others act according to cognitive hierarchy theory.     

Pragmatism,enactivism, and ecological psychology: towards a unified approach to post-cognitivism

This paper argues that it is possible to combine enactivism and ecological psychology in a single post-cognitivist research framework if we highlight the common pragmatist assumptions of both approaches. These pragmatist assumptions or starting points are shared by ecological psychology and the enactive approach independently of being historically related to pragmatism, and they are based on the idea of organic coordination, which states that the evolution and development of the cognitive abilities of an organism are explained by appealing to the history of interactions of that organism with its environment. It is argued that the idea of behavioral or organic coordination within the enactive approach gives rise to the sensorimotor abilities of the organism, while the ecological approach emphasizes the coordination at a higher-level between organism and environment through the agent’s exploratory behavior for perceiving affordances. As such, these two different processes of organic coordination can be integrated in a post-cognitivist research framework, which will be based on two levels of analysis: the subpersonal one (the neural dynamics of the sensorimotor contingencies and the emergence of enactive agency) and the personal one (the dynamics that emerges from the organism-environment interaction in ecological terms). If this proposal is on the right track, this may be a promising first step for offering a systematized and consistent post-cognitivist approach to cognition that retain the full potential of both enactivism and ecological psychology.

     

Social cognitive theory of self-regulation

In social cognitive theory human behavior is extensively motivated and regulated by the ongoing exercise of self-influence. The major self-regulative mechanism operates through three principal subfunctions. These include self-monitoring of one's behavior, its determinants, and its effects; judgment of one's behavior in relation to personal standards and environmental circumstances; and affective self-reaction. Self-regulation also encompasses the self-efficacy mechanism, which plays a central role in the exercise of personal agency by its strong impact on thought, affect, motivation, and action. The same self-regulative system is involved in moral conduct although compared to the achievement domain, in the moral domain the evaluative standards are more stable, the judgmental factors more varied and complex, and the affective self-reactions more intense. In the interactionist perspective of social cognitive theory, social factors affect the operation of the self-regulative system.     

Applying cognitive theory to the testing and teaching of intelligence

This article describes how cognitive theory can be applied to the testing and teaching of intelligence. The article is divided into three main parts. The first part describes how the study of intelligence, traditionally an area that has been viewed as under the purview of differential psychology, has come squarely into the purview of cognitive psychology. The second part describes how the testing and teaching of intelligence, which in the past have been largely atheoretical, have been transformed into theoretically based enterprises guided by the theories of cognitive psychology. The last part describes a particular theory of intelligence, the triarchic theory, and how it has been applied to the problems of testing and teaching intelligence. It is concluded that cognitive psychology has given the study of intelligence a ‘new lease on life’, and that the testing and teaching of intelligence can and should be viewed as a primary focus of application for the principles of cognitive psychology.     

Relations between episodic memory, suggestibility, theory of mind, and cognitive inhibition in the preschool child

The development of episodic memory, its relation to theory of mind (ToM), executive functions (e.g., cognitive inhibition), and to suggestibility was studied. Children (n= 115) between 3 and 6 years of age saw two versions of a video film and were tested for their memory of critical elements of the videos. Results indicated similar developmental trends for all memory measures, ToM, and inhibition, but ToM and inhibition were not associated with any memory measures. Correlations involving source memory was found in relation to specific questions, whereas inhibition and ToM were significantly correlated to resistance to suggestions. A regression analysis showed that age was the main contributor to resistance to suggestions, to correct source monitoring, and to correct responses to specific questions. Inhibition was also a significant main predictor of resistance to suggestive questions, whereas the relative contribution of ToM was wiped out when an extended model was tested.     

A theory of clinical practice: the cognitive and the narrative

Today the extent of the difference between theoretical models of therapy is under discussion. There have been proposals to abandon such models altogether, or to create others, such as integrative or meta‐ theoretical models. This article proposes, through the analysis of a clinical situation, the possibility of building a theory of practice which could account for most of the aspects of the therapeutic process that remain tacit and implicit. Such a theory could help us explain what concretely happens when a therapist is doing therapy, and also how theoretical models interact with the everyday practice of therapists.     

A cognitive theory of compulsive checking

It is proposed that compulsive checking occurs when people who believe that they have a special, elevated responsibility for preventing harm, mainly to others, are unsure that the perceived threat has been reduced or removed. The intensity and duration of this checking is determined by three "multipliers": increased responsibility, probability of harm and anticipated seriousness of harm. The recurrency of the checking is promoted by a self-perpetuating mechanism, comprising four elements: paradoxical increases in responsibility and in perceived probability of harm, reduced confidence in memory and the absence of a certain end to the threat. The relation between compulsive checking and other anxiety disorders is examined and the successes and failures of past or present treatments re-considered. Experimental predictions are set out and the therapeutic implications of the construal are discussed.     

Social cognitive theory of gender development and differentiation

Human differentiation on the basis of gender is a fundamental phenomenon that affects virtually every aspect of people's daily lives. This article presents the social cognitive theory of gender role development and functioning. It specifies how gender conceptions are constructed from the complex mix of experiences and how they operate in concert with motivational and self-regulatory mechanisms to guide gender-linked conduct throughout the life course. The theory integrates psychological and sociostructural determinants within a unified conceptual structure. In this theoretical perspective, gender conceptions and roles are the product of a broad network of social influences operating interdependently in a variety of societal subsystems. Human evolution provides bodily structures and biological potentialities that permit a range of possibilities rather than dictate a fixed type of gender differentiation. People contribute to their self-development and bring about social changes that define and structure gender relationships through their agentic actions within the interrelated systems of influence.