Representation of Game Algebras

We prove that every abstractly defined game algebra can be represented as an algebra of consistent pairs of monotone outcome relations over a game board. As a corollary we obtain Goranko's result that van Benthem's conjectured axiomatization for equivalent game terms is indeed complete.     

进化动机影响社会认知的一般特点及过程

进化动机影响社会认知的研究关注社会认知的起源、机能及影响。进化动机影响社会认知的一般特点有(1)特殊性, 如成功地解决求偶问题的机制不能用来解决身体危险有关的问题, (2)灵活性, 如不同类别的环境线索自动地激活与线索类别有关的社会信息。借用传统的社会认知研究方法, 研究者发现特定的线索会启动相应的进化动机(如面孔吸引力启动人们的求偶动机), 进化动机激活后就能引导人们加工有利于这种动机(或目标)实现的信息(如性别相关的风险信息等)。未来的进化动机影响社会认知的研究可以结合积极心理学(positive psychology)与具身认知(embodied cognition)的理论假设, 以产生更有价值的研究成果。     

Dostoevsky’s enigmas: An analysis of violent men

For the calculating male adult criminal, violent acts would appear largely counterproductive. Scholarly disagreements about these behaviors are substantial, although recent ethnographic reports emphasize the subjective sense of the experience. These reports have an existential aspect, focusing on the meaning of violent, anarchic acts to the identities of perpetrators. The earliest and best known existentialist writer on criminality is Fyodor Dostoevsky whose violent characters Smerdiakov, Svidrigailov, and Stavrogin, are enigmas to their fictional counterparts, much as violent American contemporaries are to authorities and the general public. Dostoevsky’s three enigmatic characters are reckless publicity seekers; like aliens in their own land, they habitually deceive, intimidate, and exploit while still considering themselves to be decent individuals. These depictions are congruent with Yochelson and Samenow’s much more recent forensic observations and reinforce an antisocial prototype. Bogg (1994) offers a behavioral communality for this class of violent men: patterns of self-aggrandizing gaming developed in childhood. The game player derives extraordinary pleasure from victories, although this orientation effectively counters socialization. From Dostoevsky’s views an existential nihilistic construct can be derived. This construct depicts the persona of an inveterate violent game player and is consistent with Durkheimian theory and with ethnographic and forensic/clinical observations. The prevention of a gaming orientation is feasible but appears to require parental skills and community resources.     

A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies

Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents’ rationality (BOR), stating that a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct beliefs about his own beliefs, (3) projective beliefs (PB), stating that i believes that j’s belief about k’s choice is the same as i’s belief about k’s choice, and (4) conditionally independent beliefs (CIB), stating that a player believes that opponents’ types choose their strategies independently. We show that, if a player satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB, then he will choose a Nash strategy (that is, a strategy that is optimal in some Nash equilibrium). We thus provide a sufficient collection of one-person conditions for Nash strategy choice. We also show that none of these seven conditions can be dropped.     

Cooperation in repeated interactions: A systematic review of Centipede game experiments, 1992–2016

Cooperation is a fundamental form of social interaction, and turn-taking reciprocity one of its most familiar manifestations. The Centipede game provides a formal model of such alternating reciprocal cooperation, but a backward induction (BI) argument appears to prove logically that instrumentally rational players would never cooperate in this way. A systematic review of experimental research reveals that human decision makers cooperate frequently in this game, except under certain extreme conditions. Several game, situational, and individual difference variables have been investigated for their influence on cooperation. The most influential are aspects of the payoff function (especially the social gain from cooperation and the risk associated with a cooperative move), the number of players, repetitions of the game, group vs. individual decisions, and players’ social value orientations (SVOs). Our review of experimental evidence suggests that other-regarding preferences, including prosocial behavioural dispositions and collective rationality, provide the most powerful explanation for cooperation.     

Attachment—Past and Present. But What About the Future?

This essay acknowledges the seminal contribution of the founders of attachment theory and research as a paradigm shift in understanding the importance of the socioemotional foundation of developmental processes. However, it is surprising that attachment theory has been treated as a closed system by its students with remarkable resistance to change and further development of theory and methodology. Especially three dimensions are identified that would help to advance attachment theory as a valid conception also for the future. The context specificity of evolutionary theorizing, the different socialization goals and parenting strategies across cultures and the new insights in infant development need to be taken into consideration in order to develop a valid theory of socioemotional development as the culturally informed solution of universal developmental tasks.

The general factor of personality: Evaluating the evidence from meta-analysis, confirmatory factor analysis and evolutionary theory

It has been argued that a general factor of personality exists and has resulted from evolutionary selection. This is based to a large extent on the results of confirmatory factor analyses on data produced from meta-analyses of correlations between Big Five factors. In this brief report, the results of Rushton and Irwing (2008) are re-examined and their conclusions are criticised. It is shown that it would be unwise to rely on the data from their meta-analysis and that there is no statistical reason to assume that there is a general factor of personality. It is also argued that evolutionary theory does not justify the search for a general factor of personality.     

Interspecific aggression among female ungulates

Interspecific aggression among captive female ungulates was investigated. Asymmetries in fighting abilities proved to be good predictors of relative levels of aggression between different pairs of species. The resource under dispute also influenced the nature of aggressive encounters. The results of this study were discussed in the light of game theory.     

Belief System Disintegration: Evolutionary Insights from Bergman’s Det sjunde inseglet

Paradigm transitions come with tremendous risk, as societies can come undone when people stop believing in the imaginary constructs that unite us. The Black Plague’s devastation resulted not only from its lethality, but from how its ensuing crisis in faith triggered evolved cognitive systems that lead to tribalism, self-destructive despair, and attacks on authorities and minorities. This article examines Bergman’s film through the lens of evolutionary theory to illustrate the mechanisms that cause people to wreck havoc when we no longer share a vision for the future. The crisis of the 1300s has been compared to challenges we face today.     

Adolescent intelligence and socio-economic wealth independently predict adult marital and reproductive behavior

Counter-intuitively, sociobiological and evolutionary theories predict a negative relationship between g and reproduction when applied to modern humans. Although existing research has documented this dysgenic trend, the association between g and socio-economic factors presents a confound that has not systematically been addressed in prior research. Based on a sample of 325,252 individuals drawn from the nationally representative Project Talent database, we examined the unique effects of g and socio-economic wealth, assessed in adolescence, on marital and reproductive behavior over the next 11 years. Results show that both g and socio-economic wealth have unique, independent negative effects on marital and reproductive behavior such that individuals of higher intelligence and higher wealth delay marriage and reproductive longer than those of lower intelligence and wealth. The effect of g was slightly stronger than that of wealth, though for both variables much of their influence was mediated by educational attainment. Consistent with sociobiological theory, these dysgenic effects were stronger among females than males.