NARRATIVE AND MEANING IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Differences of understanding in science and in religion can be explored via the distinction between paradigmatic and narrative modes of explanation. Although science is inclusive of the paradigmatic, I propose that in explaining the behavior of complex adaptive systems, and in the human sciences in particular, narratives may well constitute the best scientific explanations. Causal relationships may be embedded within, and expressions of higher-order constraints provided by, complex system dynamics, best understood via the temporal organization of intentionalities that constitute narrative. Complex adaptive systems, out of which intentions emerge, have behavioral trajectories that are in principle unique, contingent, and nondeterministic even in stable states and unpredictable across phase transitions. Given such unpredictability, the only explanation can be an interpretive story that retrospectively retraces the actual changes in dynamics. Without narrative, personality traits and human actions are incomprehensible. Such phenomena do not permit a reduction of purposive acts to nonpurposive elements or of reasons to the causes they constrain. Causality does not exhaust meaning. Given the role of narratives in human lives, religion and mythology provide larger stories within which individual stories make sense. Differences between narrative and historical truth suggest how we can be constituted by what we imagine ourselves to be.     

Meaning making,self‐determination theory,and the question of wisdom in personality

Self‐determination theory (SDT) has advanced the most comprehensive model of motives for human flourishing in the field of personality psychology and beyond. In this article, we evaluate SDT relative to the process of meaning making, particularly from a narrative perspective, showing what SDT can and cannot explain about the construction of self‐identity and its relation to human flourishing. On the one hand, SDT explains how subjective assessments of need fulfillment drive the process of self‐determined living. The internal motives that follow such fulfillment serve as important themes in people's life stories that predict several markers of hedonic and eudaimonic well‐being. On the other hand, SDT's focus on subjective fulfillment limits what SDT can explain about how wisdom, which is a canonical good of both eudaimonia and meaning making, helps people make sense of life's more difficult or unfulfilling events. SDT may facilitate a facet of wisdom that is more subjective and experiential but not the critical facet of wisdom defined by objectively more complex structures of interpretation.     

Humanness can be said in many ways

The recent debates on human enhancement ask the question whether enhancing our capabilities is morally desirable. In a sense, the answer is straightforward: to enhance, that is to make things better, is, by definition, a good thing. However, to enhance has a special meaning in the present debates: it consists in going beyond our "natural" capabilities. Is it then still a good thing? To answer this question, it is necessary to ask what is the value of the goods we pursue through enhancement, and this is only possible in the context of a conception of human flourishing. There exist several conceptions of human flourishing; each demands that we improve ourselves in certain directions, depending on the various excellences and on the ideal of the person they promote. But are all means permissible to this effect? Of course not. A set of normative principles is suggested in order to determine which means are permissible. The result of this is that technological and biotechnological means raise no particular problem.     

Is Folk Psychology Different?

In this paper, I seek to refute arguments for the idea that folk psychological explanation, i.e., the explanation of actions, beliefs and desires in terms of one another, should be understood as being of a different character than ordinary scientific explanations, a view defended most prominently in analytical philosophy by Donald Davidson and John McDowell. My strategy involves arguing both against the extant arguments for the idea that FP must be construed as giving such explanations, and also against the very notion of such a different kind of explanation. I argue first that the in some sense a priori and conceptual nature of folk psychological principles does not support the idea that these are other than empirical generalisations, by appeal to recent nativist ideas in cognitive science and to Lewis's conception of the meaning of theoretical terms. Second, I argue that there is no coherent sense in which folk psychological explanations can be seen as normative. Thirdly, I examine the putatively holistic character of the mental and conclude that that too fails to provide any cogent reasons for viewing folk psychological explanations as different from other kinds of explanation.     

心理传记学的研究方法思考

摘 要 当代心理学由于“本体与方法”的割裂形成科学心理学与人文心理学双峰对峙的局面,科学心理学受自然科学方法的影响而难以直面人性关怀问题;以人文心理学为研究传统的心理传记学,通过对悬疑性问题的逐层解读,直面人类心理动力系统,从而能够直面人性关怀问题。为进一步促进心理传记学的发展,对当前心理传记研究的资料筛选、研究模式、理论运用改进,以期研究者能够更好地通过史料分析进入传主生命事件的历史现场,对传主生命历程进行恰当的理论解释,从而进一步激发中国本土心理传记学发展的动力。     

A New “Essential Tension” for Rationality and Culture. What Happens if Politics Tries to Encounter Science Again

My intention is not to get into specific, detailed historical observation about the ways that led the term ‘democracy’ to take on its current meaning, in science as much as in politics, but rather to establish a comparison between the models that political science proposes and interprets as important for the existence of democracy and those that science illustrates as indicators of scientific knowledge constructed in a democratic form. The debate about the contemporary meaning of democracy has generated an extraordinary diversification of models of democracy: from technocratic conceptions of government to conceptions of social life that include widespread political participation. And it is exactly for this reason that the assumption of a specific point of view on the question we are dealing with inevitably brings with it the choice of a model suitable to describe democratic form as a form of politics without further explanation, that is, as a political system with which science measures itself as a cultural category. In this sense, we can consider the passage from the concept of democracy to that of politics and generally of science to be a peaceful one, since politics has been appointed with that set of behaviours and democratic practices (including science) that political culture demands for the social benefit. This demand can be met only on condition that structural obstacles are removed and new cultural and epistemological mediators are introduced.     

Is there a problem with mathematical psychology in the eighteenth century? A fresh look at Kant's old argument

Common opinion ascribes to Immanuel Kant the view that psychology cannot become a science properly so called, because it cannot be mathematized. It is equally common to claim that this reflects the state of the art of his times; that the quantification of the mind was not achieved during the eighteenth century, while it was so during the nineteenth century; or that Kant's so-called "impossibility claim" was refuted by nineteenth-century developments, which in turn opened one path for psychology to become properly scientific. These opinions are often connected, but they are misguided nevertheless. In Part I, I show how the issue of a quantification of the mind was discussed before Kant, and I analyze the philosophical considerations both of pessimistic and optimistic authors. This debate reveals a certain progress, although it remains ultimately undecided. In Part II, I present actual examples of measuring the mind in the eighteenth century and analyze their presuppositions. Although these examples are limited in certain ways, the common view that there was no such measurement is wrong. In Part III, I show how Kant's notorious " impossibility claim" has to be viewed against its historical background. He not only accepts actual examples of a quantitative treatment of the mind, but also takes steps toward an explanation of their possibility. Thus, he does not advance the claim that the mind as such cannot be mathematized. His claim is directed against certain philosophical assumptions about the mind, assumptions shared by a then-dominating, strongly introspectionist conception of psychology. This conception did and could not provide an explanation of the possibility of quantifying the mind. In concluding, I reflect on how this case study helps to improve the dispute over when and why psychology became a science.     

SCIENCE,RELIGION, AND THE MEANING OF LIFE AND THE UNIVERSE: “AMALGAM” NARRATIVES OF POLISH NATURAL SCIENTISTS

This article deals with phenomena occurring at the interface of the existential, the religious, and scientific inquiry. On the basis of in‐depth interviews with Polish physicists and biologists, I examine the role that science and religion play in their narrative of the meaning of the Universe and human life. I show that the narratives about meaning have a system‐related (“amalgam") character that is associated with responses to adjacent metaphysical questions, including those based on scientific knowledge. I reconstruct the typical amalgam questions of Polish scientists and come to a conclusion about the stability of religious and nonreligious amalgams in this group. Critically referring to the thesis concerning the secularizing impact of science, I conclude that science by itself does not have a destructive effect on Polish scientists’ confidence that life and the Universe are meaningful, but is rather an exacerbating factor of the existing worldview system.     

The Anthropic Principle: Life in the Universe

The anthropic principle, that the universe exists in some sense for life, has persisted in recent religious and scientific thought because it derives from cosmological fact. It has been unsuccessful in furthering our understanding of the world because its advocates tend to impose final metaphysical solutions onto what is a physical problem. We begin by outlining the weak and strong versions of the anthropic principle and reviewing the discoveries that have led to their formulation. We present the reasons some have given for ignoring the anthropic implications of these discoveries and find these reasons wanting—a real phenomenon demands real investigation. Theological and scientific solutions of the problem are then considered and criticized; these solutions provide dead ends for explanation. Finally, we pursue the path that explanation must follow and look at the physical details of the problem. It seems clear that the anthropic principle has been poorly framed. Removing the ambiguities surrounding the meaning of "life" may lead to more profitable investigations.     

The Meaning of Lives and the Meaning of Things

Meaning in life is an important aspect of human well-being and motivation. But as the notion of ‘meaning in life’ is not easily assimilated to that of semantic meaning, it is difficult to define. While meaning in life is standardly discussed in terms of meaningful ways of living, I here take the alternative approach of discussing the meaningfulness of things for agents. I claim that such meaningfulness, or significance, consists in the ways in which things invite agent-relevant responses. Meaningfulness in that sense is important for understanding, not just meaning in life for mature human beings, but also meaning for children, meaning in the arts, the continuity between ‘mere’ living and living meaningfully, and the connection between meaning in life and semantic meaning.     

A program for the semantics of science

Concluding remarks Our program is ambitious, as is any attempt to match life (in our case real science) with virtue (e.g., exactness). We want our semantics to be not only simia mathematicae but also ancilla scientiae: built more geometrico and at the same time relevant, nay useful, to live science. The goal of exactness may sound arrogant but is actually modest, for the more we rigorize the more we are forced to leave out of consideration, at least for the time being. As to the service intention: we should try to be of some help to science because the latter faces semantic problems but has no tools of its own for solving them. If it had such tools scientists would not engage in spirited polemics over matters of sense and reference, as they often do. Witness the debates on whether the relativistic and quantum theories are concerned with sentient observers, whether population genetics refers to populations taken as wholes, whether psychology is actually concerned with the brain, and whether the sense of a theory is excreted by its mathematical formalism or is determined by the way the theory is tested.A semantics of science should help settle these and similar issues. Moreover it should give sound advice as to how to formulate scientific theories so as to avoid such imprecisions and ambiguities as may give rise to debates of the kind. Constructing such a semantics, both exact and relevant to science, should be more rewarding than either manufacturing neat but irrelevant theories or pursuing erratic polemics on meaning and meaning changes.

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Unique contributions of religious and science beliefs on meaning systems in a nationally representative American sample

Individuals often hold beliefs in religion and in science, but how they mutually function is not well-understood. We examined these conjoint influences by examining their relative contributions to individuals' global meaning systems. We also examined whether subgroups of participants could be identified in terms of relative influence of religious or science beliefs on their meaning systems. A nationally representative sample of 300 American adults completed online surveys. Results suggested that science beliefs and religion beliefs comprise separate but only modestly negatively correlated dimensions. Both contributed similarly to the explanation of world assumptions, but only religious beliefs generally predicted goals, values and sense of meaning in life. Latent profile analysis produced a three-profile solution: one profile of moderate science and religious beliefs represented half the sample while the remainder split evenly between predominantly religious and predominantly science beliefs. In general, across most aspects of global meaning, the religious beliefs group was higher than the science beliefs and moderate beliefs in both groups. Results of this first systematic investigation of the separate effects of beliefs in religion and in science on meaning systems suggest that the balance of these beliefs is a potentially important individual difference warranting further investigation and elaboration.     

Meaning in the lives of humans and other animals

This paper argues that contemporary philosophical literature on meaning in life has important implications for the debate about our obligations to non-human animals. If animal lives can be meaningful, then practices including factory farming and animal research might be morally worse than ethicists have thought. We argue for two theses about meaning in life: (1) that the best account of meaningful lives must take intentional action to be necessary for meaning—an individual’s life has meaning if and only if the individual acts intentionally in ways that contribute to finally valuable states of affairs; and (2) that this first thesis does not entail that only human lives are meaningful. Because non-human animals can be intentional agents of a certain sort, our account yields the verdict that many animals’ lives can be meaningful. We conclude by considering the moral implications of these theses for common practices involving animals.     

从“洪昭光热”探寻医学科普的出路、前景

洪昭光教授以及由其健康讲座所引发的"洪昭光热"引领了一种新的健康理念,不仅促进了医学健康知识的传播,更推动了医学科普走近大众、走进生活。如井喷一样的"洪昭光热"是有预热的,其主观成因和客观条件可以概括为时代背景、群众基础和社会价值。洪昭光教授找到了医学科普为大众喜闻乐见的根本——科学性、通俗性、实用性。"洪昭光热"让医学科普在引起社会民众的重视的同时,也为我们探寻医学科普的前景和出路提供了范本。     

Gandhi’s perspective on non-violence and animals: ethical theory and moral practice

Mahatma Gandhi’s profound theory of non-violence takes into account both human beings and animals. His fundamental thought on the subject of protecting animals is the outcome of a cluster of theories, including the non-violence of Jainism, the teachings of the Gitā, Sānkhya, Christianity, and Tolstoy. While retaining the literal meaning of non-violence i.e. non-killing, Gandhi attributes to it certain features that expand its scope and yet also determine its limitations. He suggests that non-violence does not merely imply non-hurting in thought and deed, but that it entails an extension of love and compassion. He identifies its limitation by unmistakably denying the possibility of absolute non-violence. He defends his stance on animals on the basis of a wide range of perspectives: religious, scientific, political, as well as economic. Gandhi demands protection of their lives (rights) and also enhancement of their welfare. This paper aims (a) to philosophically analyse Gandhi’s doctrine of non-violence; (b) to demonstrate how he offers solutions based on non-violence for resolving issues of animal exploitation such as human–animal conflict, meat-eating, experimentation on animals etc.; (c) to systematize his accounts of animals.     

LIFE ON THE ISLAND

Walker Percy was both a medical doctor and a serious Catholic—a scientist and a religious believer. He thought, however, that science had become hegemonic in the twentieth century and that it was incapable of answering the most fundamental needs of human beings. He thus leveled a critique of the scientific method and its shortcomings in failing to address the individual person over against the group. In response to these shortcomings Percy postulates a religious understanding of human life, one in which man's life is understood as a pilgrimage or a search. The person who searches may not find the “object” of his search during his earthly life, but it is likely that he will come to a better understanding of himself by means of it.     

Psychoanalysis,man, and value

Psychology does not seek to correlate independent happenings, but to discern in the manifold of a unique life, or of a unique culture, the pervasive sense or meaning which the life or culture expresses. The method is appropriate to the subject: a human being is not a string of lawfully connected events but an embodied meaning, an incarnated value. Psychology is therefore less like physics than it is like the critical interpretation of a work of art. It is psychoanalytical. Some of the traditional objections to psychoanalytic theory disappear in the light of this conception. Others vanish when it is realized that the analytic situation, being personal encounter as well as interpretative analysis, to some extent creates the being it analyzes.     

Christian Bioethics: Challenges in a Secularized Europe

This article summarizes in three specific sections the key challengesfaced by Christian and, particularly Orthodox, ethics in a secularizedsociety. The first section, focusing on the task and aim ofethics, defines Orthodox ethics, which is linked with asceticism(man's attempt to keep the commandments of Christ) and aimsat overcoming death and encountering the personal God. Put differently,the purpose of Orthodox ethics is the deification of human beings.The second section defines secularization and explores its consequencesfor the theology and pastoral work of the Church. Europe isdominated by scholasticism and moralism, whereas Orthodox theology,without rejecting it, transcends such a narrow preoccupationwith our own world. Orthodoxy does not regard human beings solelyfrom the perspective of their biological existence but assiststhem in going beyond mechanistic theories and the pursuit ofhappiness. The third section briefly describes how what canbe termed "bio-theology" surpasses anthropocentric ethics withregard to the relationship between creation and grace, birthand rebirth, cloning and incarnation, transplantation and deification,and death and resurrection. The article concludes that Orthodoxtheology (a) does not reject the achievements of biotechnologyor biomedicine; (b) assists humans in overcoming mortality byfinding meaning for their existence and fullness of life, and(c) does not simply postpone death, but overcomes the fear ofdeath and leads people to deification by grace.     

Health Policies and Bioethics: A Psychosocial Perspective in Managing the Moral Question

In Western democratic society, the specificity of the bioethical debate over the life-sciences involves bringing together many different study factors. The dilemmas raised by the new scientific discoveries highlight how contemporary common sense is plagued by a profound feeling of anguish over possible future anthropological developments. One of the central problems is the social construction of consent as a psychological strategy seeking to orient public opinion toward accepting new applications of science and technology. On the one hand, the general features in the epistemological analysis of the mind-brain identity are called into question; and on the other, together with all those research directions concerned with the “meaning of life,” we enter the dimension of the complex issue inherent in the possibility of establishing if there exists something transcending thought and what it may be. In both cases a problem is raised on which the meaning of human life and the world depend, while between the two universes described by medical science and ethical-philosophical thought a window of opportunity for important psychological research is opened. In order to understand such phenomena the present article defends the theory that social psychology must adopt as its subject matter “thinking society,” that is, society characterized by discussion and reasoning on themes relevant to bioethics.     

IS SCIENCE THE ONLY WAY TO TRUTH?

Abstract. In the context of contemporary life questions, especially that of world peace, this essay first develops the view that truth is essentially scientific truth. Although religion gives insights for living, as science encompasses more and more of human experience it reinforces and modifies religious truths with its own firm knowledge. However, because of several limitations, it is concluded that science alone cannot give a complete account of humanity and the universe. For our first beliefs and principles we must look to other kinds of truth, which are in accord with scientific truth but go beyond scientific method in their justification.