Self in time and language

Time has been considered a crucial factor in distinguishing between two levels of self-awareness: the “core,” or “minimal self,” and the “extended,” or “narrative self.” Herein, I focus on this last concept of the self and, in particular, on the relationship between the narrative self and language. In opposition to the claim that the narrative self is a linguistic construction, my idea is that it is created by the functioning of mental time travel, that is, the faculty of human beings to project themselves mentally backwards in time to relive, or forward to anticipate, events. Moreover, I propose that narrative language itself should be considered a product of a core brain network that includes mechanisms, such as mental time travel, mindreading, and visuo-spatial systems.     

Dissociation of short-term forgetting from the passage of time

In many theories, forgetting is closely linked to the passage of time. In the present experiments, recall in a short-term memory task was less accurate when the retention interval included a difficult arithmetic addition task, compared with an easy task. In a novel condition, the interfering task was switched from hard to easy partway through the retention interval. Recall accuracy at long retention intervals recovered from the level consistent with the hard interfering task to a more accurate level consistent with an easy interfering task. Such recovery is not in agreement with theories that link forgetting to the passage of time, such as trace decay. The reversed forgetting functions are more consistent with an account in which different levels of nonspecific retroactive interference in the retention interval just before the time of retrieval influence different levels of performance accuracy. With the uncoupling of interference levels from time, forgetting is dissociated from the passage of time.     

Space,time, and language

Cognition is heavily grounded in space. As animals that move in space, we travel both physically and mentally in space and time, reliving past events, imagining future ones, and even constructing imaginary scenarios that play out in stories. Mental exploration of space is extraordinarily flexible, allowing us to zoom, adopt different vantage points, mentally rotate, and attach objects and sense impressions to create events, whether remembered, planned, or simply invented. The properties of spatiotemporal cognition depend on a hippocampal–entorhinal circuit of place cells, grid cells and border cells, with combinations of grid-cell modules generating a vast number of potential spatial remappings. The generativity of language, often considered one of its defining properties, may therefore derive not from the nature of language itself, but rather from the generativity of spatiotemporal scenarios, with language having evolved as a means of sharing them. Much our understanding of the hippocampal–entorhinal circuit is derived from neurophysiological recording in the rat brain, implying that the spatiotemporal cognition underpinning language has a long evolutionary history.     

Influences of response-activating stimuli and passage of time on the Simon effect

Two possible explanations for an interaction between the Simon effect and the flanker-congruence effect (Hommel, 1997) were tested: (1) Direct contributions by the locations of the response-activating flankers to the Simon effect, and (2) the passage of time since the target's onset. In three experiments, little evidence for both explanations was observed. The data confirmed an assumed origin of the Simon effect at the stage of response selection. Further, the results are in line with the assumption that context stimuli contribute indirectly to the Simon effect of the target (i.e., by changing the target's relative position), and extend previous findings to show that the assumption holds for clearly response-activating context stimuli, too. Finally, the results suggest that Simon effects follow different time courses depending on whether they are induced by observer-relative or context-relative target positions.     

The loss of residual visual memories over the passage of time

There has been extensive discussion of the causes of short-term forgetting. Some accounts suggest that time plays an important role in the loss of representations, whereas other models reject this notion and explain all forgetting through interference processes. The present experiment used the recent-probes task to investigate whether residual visual information is lost over the passage of time. On each trial, three unusual target objects were displayed and followed by a probe stimulus. The task was to determine whether the probe matched any of the targets, and the next trial commenced after an intertrial interval lasting 300?ms, 3.3?s, or 8.3?s. Of critical interest were recent negative (RN) trials, on which the probe matched a target from the previous trial. These were contrasted against nonrecent negative (NRN) trials, in which the probe had not been seen in the recent past. RN trials damaged performance and slowed reaction times in comparison to NRN trials, highlighting interference. However, this interfering effect diminished as the intertrial interval was lengthened, suggesting that residual visual information is lost as time passes. This finding is difficult to reconcile with interference-based models and suggests that time plays some role in forgetting.     

Required pecking alters judgments of the passage of time by pigeons

There is evidence that how humans perceive time is affected by the activity in which they are engaged when they are judging time. In humans, typically, the more demanding the task, the faster time seems to pass. We asked whether a similar effect could be found in pigeons. Pigeons were trained to discriminate between a short-(2-sec) and a long-(10-sec) duration stimulus. Depending on the color of the stimulus (white or blue), the pigeons were required to peck (at least once per second or the trial was aborted) or to refrain from pecking (pecks aborted the trial). Once these tasks had been acquired to a high degree, probe trials involving white and blue stimuli were presented at durations between 2 and 10 sec. On trials in which the pigeons were required to peck, the point of subjective equality (i.e., the point at which pigeons are equally likely to choose the stimulus associated with long stimuli as the stimulus associated with short stimuli) was almost 1 sec longer than on trials in which the pigeons were required to refrain from pecking. In other words, on trials that required pecking, more time passed before the pigeons indicated that the probe duration was at the subjective midpoint between 2 and 10 sec than on trials that did not require pecking. This result suggests that like humans, the pigeons underestimated the passage of time when they were active or when attention to time-related cues had to be shared with attention to satisfying the response rate requirement.     

Intelligibility and comprehension of time compressed sign language narratives

A method of time compressing visual displays was devised to assess the effects of compression on the comprehension of American sign language (ASL). Two ASL narratives were visually presented to three groups of deaf ASL users. A compression group was presented narratives compressed to 50% of the duration of the normal rates. A no-compression group was presented narratives signed at normal rates. A pause group was presented compressed narratives with blank pauses inserted so that the total time per narrative was equal to that of the no-compression versions. Following each narrative, subjects completed a written comprehension task. Comprehension in both compression and pause groups was significantly lower than in the no-compression group. Pauses did not significantly affect scores relative to compression. An additional group of deaf ASL users was presented an intelligibility task in which signs taken from the narratives were presented in isolation either with or without compression. The total number of signs correctly identified was significantly lower with compression. Decrements in comprehension were best explained as the result of cumulative decrements in sign intelligibility and not as the result of decrements in available processing time.     

Re-evaluation of decision alternatives dependent upon the reversibility of a decision and the passage of time

In the present experiment subjects made a decision between two alternatives which was either reversible or irreversible. After the choice, subjects evaluated the attractiveness of both alternatives once more under different time levels. It was found that with increasing time level, re-evaluation of alternatives increased under irreversible and decreased under reversible conditions. The results are discussed in the framework of dissonance theory.     

On the effects of second language immersion on first language production

The present study was aimed at investigating how the effects of a second language (L2) immersion on first language (L1) production are modulated by lexical frequency and the cognate status of words. By means of a picture naming and a semantic fluency task, we longitudinally explored the changes in L1 performance of a group of immersed learners. Our results revealed slower naming latencies at the end than at the beginning of the immersion period but only for those pictures whose corresponding names were low frequency and non-cognates. Moreover, the semantic fluency task revealed a decrease in the percentage of non-cognate words produced at the end of the immersion period. The observed decline in the accessibility to L1 words after a short L2 immersion period is explained in terms of the general bilingual lexical access disadvantage and studies of L1 attrition in speech production. Specifically, the present findings are more in line with theoretical accounts that consider lexical difficulties to be the result of changes in the frequency of use of the L1 during a short L2 immersion period.     

On the evolution of language and generativity.

One of the properties that most conspicuously distinguishes human language from any other form of animal communication is generativity. Language with this property therefore presumably evolved with the Homo line somewhere between H. habilis and H. sapiens sapiens. Some have suggested that it emerged relatively suddenly and completely with H. sapiens sapiens, and this view is consistent with (a) linguistic estimates as to when vocal language emerged, (b) the relatively late "explosion" of manufacture and cultural artifacts such as body ornamentation and cave drawings, and (c) evidence on changes in the vocal apparatus. However, evidence on brain size and developmental patterns of growth suggests an earlier origin and a more continuous evolution. I propose that these scenarios can be reconciled if it is supposed that generative language evolved, perhaps from H. habilis on, as a system of manual gestures, but switched to a predominantly vocal system with H. sapiens sapiens. The subsequent "cultural explosion" can then be attributed to the freeing of the hands from primary involvement in language, so that they could be exploited, along with generativity, for manufacture, art, and other activities.     

On the time course of accessing meaning in a second language: An electrophysiological and behavioral investigation of translation recognition

In 2 experiments, relatively proficient Chinese-English bilinguals decided whether Chinese words were the correct translations of English words. Critical trials were those on which incorrect translations were related in lexical form or meaning to the correct translation. In Experiment 1, behavioral interference was revealed for both distractor types, but event-related potentials (ERPs) revealed a different time course for the 2 conditions. Semantic distractors elicited effects primarily on the N400 and late positive component (LPC), with a smaller N400 and a smaller LPC over the posterior scalp but a larger LPC over the anterior scalp relative to unrelated controls. In contrast, translation form distractors elicited a larger P200 and a larger LPC than did unrelated controls. To determine whether the translation form effects were enabled by the relatively long, 750-ms stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between words, a 2nd ERP experiment was conducted using a shorter, 300-ms, SOA. The behavioral results revealed interference for both types of distractors, but the ERPs again revealed different loci for the 2 effects. Taken together, the data suggest that proficient bilinguals activate 1st-language translations of words in the 2nd language after they have accessed the meaning of those words. The implications of this pattern for claims about the nature of cross-language activation when bilinguals read in 1 or both languages are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Prospective/intentional and incidental everyday memory: effects of age and passage of time

The effects of age and passage of time on incidental and prospective/intentional everyday memory were examined in this study. Seventy-nine volunteers, men and women between the ages of 23 and 93 years, were tested twice, and 33 of these volunteers were tested three times over an 18-month period. They were asked to recognize or to recall, either in writing or orally, experiences from a 3-day period in which they served as research subjects. Results demonstrated that incidental, but not prospective/intentional, memory appeared to be influenced by age and passage of time. Results imply that salience and context are important factors in aging memory performance, and that certain types of everyday retrospective reports may be reliable.