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1.
BRIAN WEATHERSON 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2005,70(3):613-635
In a recent article, Adam Elga outlines a strategy for Defeating Dr Evil with Self-Locating Belief. The strategy relies on an indifference principle that is not up to the task. In general, there are two things to dislike about indifference principles: adopting one normally means confusing risk for uncertainty, and they tend to lead to incoherent views in some 'paradoxical' situations. I argue that both kinds of objection can be levelled against Elga's indifference principle. There are also some difficulties with the concept of evidence that Elga uses, and these create further difficulties for the principle. 相似文献
2.
Rohan Sud 《Philosophical Studies》2014,167(1):119-139
Adam Elga (Philosophers’ Imprint, 10(5), 1–11, 2010) presents a diachronic puzzle to supporters of imprecise credences and argues that no acceptable decision rule for imprecise credences can deliver the intuitively correct result. Elga concludes that agents should not hold imprecise credences. In this paper, I argue for a two-part thesis. First, I show that Elga’s argument is incomplete: there is an acceptable decision rule that delivers the intuitive result. Next, I repair the argument by offering a more elaborate diachronic puzzle that is more difficult for imprecise Bayesians to avoid. 相似文献
3.
Casper Storm Hansen 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2018,96(3):508-518
This paper describes a way of defending a modification of Eckhardt's [2013] solution to the Two Envelopes Paradox. The defence is based on ideas from Arntzenius, Elga, and Hawthorne [2004]. 相似文献
4.
The Sleeping Beauty problem—first presented by A. Elga in a philosophical context—has captured much attention. The problem,
we contend, is more aptly regarded as a paradox: apparently, there are cases where one ought to change one’s credence in an
event’s taking place even though one gains no new information or evidence, or alternatively, one ought to have a credence
other than 1/2 in the outcome of a future coin toss even though one knows that the coin is fair. In this paper we argue for
two claims. First, that Sleeping Beauty does gain potentially new relevant information upon waking up on Monday. Second, his
credence shift is warranted provided it accords with a calculation that is a result of conditionalization on the relevant
information: “this day is an experiment waking day” (a day within the experiment on which one is woken up). Since Sleeping
Beauty knows what days d could refer to, he can calculate the probability that the referred to waking day is a Monday or a
Tuesday providing an adequate resolution of the paradox. 相似文献
5.
Daniel Jeremy Singer 《Synthese》2014,191(14):3159-3172
The traditional solutions to the Sleeping Beauty problem say that Beauty should have either a sharp 1/3 or sharp 1/2 credence that the coin flip was heads when she wakes. But Beauty’s evidence is incomplete so that it doesn’t warrant a precise credence, I claim. Instead, Beauty ought to have a properly imprecise credence when she wakes. In particular, her representor ought to assign \(R(H\!eads)=[0,1/2]\) . I show, perhaps surprisingly, that this solution can account for the many of the intuitions that motivate the traditional solutions. I also offer a new objection to Elga’s restricted version of the principle of indifference, which an opponent may try to use to collapse the imprecision. 相似文献
6.
Christopher J. G. Meacham 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(2):245-269
This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David
Lewis, and a third account defended in this paper. It provides two reasons for preferring the third account. First, this account
does a good job of capturing the temporal continuity of our beliefs, while the accounts favored by Elga and Lewis do not.
Second, Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly counterintuitive consequences. The proposed
account also leads to counterintuitive consequences, but they’re not as bad as those of Elga’s account, and no worse than
those of Lewis’ account.
相似文献
Christopher J. G. MeachamEmail: |
7.
Nicolas Bommarito 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(3):413-419
In their paper, “I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid,” Adam Elga and Andy Egan introduce a notion of anti-expertise and argue that
it is never rational to believe oneself to be an anti-expert. I wish to deny the claim that it is never rational for agents
like us to ascribe anti-expertise to ourselves by describing cases where self-ascribed anti-expertise makes real life agents more rational. 相似文献
8.
Anna Mahtani 《Philosophical Studies》2017,174(1):163-183
This paper is about the standard Reflection Principle (van Fraassen in J Philos 81(5):235–256, 1984) and the Group Reflection Principle (Elga in Nous 41(3):478–502, 2007; Bovens and Rabinowicz in Episteme 8(3):281–300, 2011; Titelbaum in Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief, OUP, Oxford, 2012; Hedden in Mind 124(494):449–491, 2015). I argue that these principles are incomplete as they stand. The key point is that deference is an intensional relation, and so whether you are rationally required to defer to a person at a time can depend on how that person and that time are designated. In this paper I suggest a way of completing the Reflection Principle and Group Reflection Principle, and I argue that so completed these principles are plausible. In particular, they do not fall foul of the Sleeping Beauty case (Elga in Analysis 60(2):143–147, 2000), the Cable Guy Paradox (Hajek in Analysis 65(286):112–119, 2005), Arntzenius’ prisoner cases (Arntzenius in J Philos, 100(7):356–370, 2003), or the Puzzle of the Hats (Bovens and Rabinowicz in Episteme 8(3):281–300, 2011). 相似文献
9.
Carlo Martini 《Synthese》2013,190(15):3149-3160
In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976)), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007)). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement cannot be rationally resolved by belief updating. I suggest a solution to the puzzle which makes use of some of the principles of Hintikka’s Socratic epistemology. 相似文献
10.
Laurie T. Butler Dianne C. Berry 《British journal of psychology (London, England : 1953)》2004,95(4):467-487
Over the last two decades interest in implicit memory, most notably repetition priming, has grown considerably. During the same period, research has also focused on the mere exposure effect. Although the two areas have developed relatively independently, a number of studies has described the mere exposure effect as an example of implicit memory. Tacit in their comparisons is the assumption that the effect is more specifically a demonstration of repetition priming. Having noted that this assumption has attracted relatively little attention, this paper reviews current evidence and shows that it is by no means conclusive. Although some evidence is suggestive of a common underlying mechanism, even a modified repetition priming (perceptual fluency/attribution) framework cannot accommodate all of the differences between the two phenomena. Notwithstanding this, it seems likely that a version of this theoretical framework still offers the best hope of a comprehensive explanation for the mere exposure effect and its relationship to repetition priming. As such, the paper finishes by offering some initial guidance as to ways in which the perceptual fluency/attribution framework might be extended, as well as outlining important areas for future research. 相似文献
11.
Recognizing information as evidence is central to the development of scientific reasoning. When does information about an event come to be treated as evidence relevant to explaining the event? We asked whether this was increasingly likely to happen when an explanation becomes available that can incorporate both the event and the information into a single causal framework. In three studies, we presented participants with events for which there were two possible and plausible explanations (a baseline and one of two alternative explanations), as well as with two pieces of background information. While all explanations could account for the event, only one alternative explanation (the “target” explanation) could incorporate both the event and the background information into a single causal framework. The results indicated that information is more likely to be seen as evidentially relevant to an event when there is an explanation available that can accommodate both the event and the information into a single casual framework than when such an explanation is lacking. Furthermore, the presence of this information renders the target alternative increasingly plausible. That is, it is the interdependence of explanation or theory and evidence that allows us to realize that some information is likely to be evidential. However, for this to happen, the relation between explanation and information must be made salient, either by explicitly asking about it (as we did in Study 1) or by fleshing out the target explanation (as we did in Study 3). 相似文献
12.
In this paper hypothesis‐testing behaviour is compared to risk‐taking behaviour. It is proposed that choosing a suitable test for a given hypothesis requires making a preposterior analysis of two aspects of such a test: the probability of obtaining supporting evidence and the evidential value of this evidence. This consideration resembles the one a gambler makes when choosing among bets, each having a probability of winning and an amount to be won. A confirmatory testing strategy can be defined within this framework as a strategy directed at maximizing either the probability or the value of a confirming outcome. Previous theories on testing behaviour have focused on the human tendency to maximize the probability of a confirming outcome. In this paper, two experiments are presented in which participants tend to maximize the confirming value of the test outcome. Motivational factors enhance this tendency dependent on the context of the testing situation. Both this result and the framework are discussed in relation to other studies in the field of testing behaviour. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
13.
Nudges are psychologically informed tools designed to promote behavioral change in order to improve health and well-being. In this review, we focus on three areas of concern: theory, evidence base, ethics. We begin by discussing the problems arising from the theoretical framework that nudges are based on and propose an alternative framework that helps to classify nudges into two types (Type 1 and Type 2). We then evaluate the evidence for nudges in the health domain, drawing attention to critical empirical issues (internal and external reliability) that explain the limited evidence base for their effectiveness. The review ends with an examination of the implications of the theoretical and empirical issues we discussed with respect to current debates regarding the ethics of nudge. 相似文献
14.
Theories of adult reasoning propose that reasoning consists of two functionally distinct systems that operate under entirely
different mechanisms. This theoretical framework has been used to account for a wide range of phenomena, which now encompasses
developmental research on reasoning and problem solving. We begin this review by contrasting three main dual-system theories
of adult reasoning (Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000) with a well-established developmental account
that also incorporates a dual-system framework (Brainerd & Reyna, 2001). We use developmental studies of the formation and
application of intuitive rules in science and mathematics to evaluate the claims that these theories make. Overall, the evidence
reviewed suggests that what is crucial to understanding how children reason is the saliency of the features that are presented
within a task. By highlighting the importance of saliency as a way of understanding reasoning, we aim to provide clarity concerning
the benefits and limitations of adopting a dual-system framework to account for evidence from developmental studies of intuitive
reasoning. 相似文献
15.
Baars BJ 《Trends in cognitive sciences》2002,6(1):47-52
Consciousness might help to mobilize and integrate brain functions that are otherwise separate and independent. Evidence for this 'conscious access hypothesis' was described almost two decades ago, in a framework called global workspace theory. The theory had little impact at first, for three reasons: because consciousness was controversial; the evidence, though extensive, was indirect; and integrative theory was unfashionable. Recent neuroimaging evidence appears broadly to support the hypothesis, which has implications for perception, learning, working memory, voluntary control, attention and self systems in the brain. 相似文献
16.
A. J. Lambert 《Current psychology (New Brunswick, N.J.)》1985,4(3):239-256
The relationship between attentional selectivity and stages of processing, or levels of stimulus analysis, has been a long-running controversy for attentional theory. Although the debate between early selection and late selection theory is more than two decades old, a clear theoretical resolution is still not apparent in the literature. The aim of this review is to review evidence attending this issue, and clarify the current status of this important question. The evidence is classified in terms of five general experimental questions. It is concluded that broad versions of both early and late selection are incorrect in important respects, that the common framework within which both kinds of theory are articulated is unsound, and that the evidence requires clear theoretical acknowledgment of the multilevel nature of selective attention. 相似文献
17.
[Formula: see text] This article reviews recent work aimed at developing a new framework, based on signal detection theory, for understanding the relationship between explicit (e.g., recognition) and implicit (e.g., priming) memory. Within this framework, different assumptions about sources of memorial evidence can be framed. Application to experimental results provides robust evidence for a single-system model in preference to multiple-systems models. This evidence comes from several sources including studies of the effects of amnesia and ageing on explicit and implicit memory. The framework allows a range of concepts in current memory research, such as familiarity, recollection, fluency, and source memory, to be linked to implicit memory. More generally, this work emphasizes the value of modern computational modelling techniques in the study of learning and memory. 相似文献
18.
19.
Jessica K. Witt 《Psychonomic bulletin & review》2017,24(4):999-1021
The action-specific account of spatial perception asserts that a perceiver’s ability to perform an action, such as hitting a softball or walking up a hill, impacts the visual perception of the target object. Although much evidence is consistent with this claim, the evidence has been challenged as to whether perception is truly impacted, as opposed to the responses themselves. These challenges have recently been organized as six pitfalls that provide a framework with which to evaluate the empirical evidence. Four case studies of action-specific effects are offered as evidence that meets the framework’s high bar, and thus that demonstrates genuine perceptual effects. That action influences spatial perception is evidence that perceptual and action-related processes are intricately and bidirectionally linked. 相似文献
20.
A. J. Lambert 《Current Psychology》1985,4(3):239-256
The relationship between attentional selectivity and stages of processing, or levels of stimulus analysis, has been a long-running
controversy for attentional theory. Although the debate between early selection and late selection theory is more than two
decades old, a clear theoretical resolution is still not apparent in the literature. The aim of this review is to review evidence
attending this issue, and clarify the current status of this important question. The evidence is classified in terms of five
general experimental questions. It is concluded that broad versions of both early and late selection are incorrect in important
respects, that the common framework within which both kinds of theory are articulated is unsound, and that the evidence requires
clear theoretical acknowledgment of the multilevel nature of selective attention.
This work was supported by the U.K. Admiralty Research Establishment (Research Agreement no. 53482) 相似文献