Genotype and environment in the social interactions of wild and domestic “Norway” rats

Wild rats, Rattus norvegicus, (a) trapped as adults or (b) of the second generation in captivity (lab-wild), and domestic rats of two strains, were studied for 28 days in artificial colonies in large cages with attached nest boxes. Controls were kept in mated pairs in small cages. Each colony consisted of six males and six females. The interactions of the males in six colonies of trapped rats were highly “stressful;” 61% died; and most of the survivors lost weight and had greatly enlarged adrenals. In each colony, however, there was a male (an alpha) that gained in weight and spent much time, during the dark hours, in the open on the floor of the cage; and in three colonies there were also other males (“betas”) that gained in weight. The adrenals of alphas and betas weighed about the same as those of the controls. In one of the 12 colonies of domestic rats one male behaved like a wild male; but in the other colonies the males gained in body weight and their adrenal weights resembled those of the controls. In three colonies of lab-wild rats 22% of the males died, but there was no evidence of males of different status. The findings confirm that the “agonistic” behavior of domestic rats is usually much attenuated in comparison with that of the wild type; a number of methodologic implications are discussed.     

Defensive reactions of “wild-type” and “Domesticated” wild rats to approach and contact by a threat stimulus

Selective breeding of wild rats over many generations on the basis of low or high defensive threat and attack to human approach and contact has produced highly polarized “domesticated” and “wild-type” animals. Because the selection procedure selectively involves these two defense patterns, and these clearly differ in the two groups, it is of interest to determine if other, nonselected, defensive behaviors to threat stimuli also change. “Domesticated” and “wild-type” rats of the thirty-fifth generation were run in a fear defense test battery (F/DTB) to systematically evaluate defensive behaviors to a variety of present threat stimuli. “Domesticated” rats showed reduced avoidance and slower flight speed to an approaching experimenter, reduced jump/startle response to handelap and dorsal contact, less vocalization and boxing to vibrissae stimulation or to an anesthetized conspecific, and reduced defensiveness to an attempted pickup by the experimenter. These results indicate that selective bi-directional breeding for defensive threat and attack to human approach and contact produces group differences in a variety of defensive behaviors, and in defensiveness to stimuli other than those on which the selection was based. © 1994 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

“PURE” VERSUS “PRACTICAL” EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.     

ECONOMY OF “INVISIBLE DEBT” AND ETHICS OF “RADICAL HOSPITALITY”: Toward a Paradigm Change of Hospitality from “Gift” to “Forgiveness”

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct a Christian theology of “hospitality” through a critical reading of Jacques Derrida and Friedrich Nietzsche as well as through an in‐depth biblical and theological reflection on the ethics of hospitality. Out of this reconstructive investigation, I propose a new Christian ethics of hospitality as a radical kind. As a new paradigm, this radical hospitality is distinguished from other types in that it is no longer conceived on the model of “gift”. The new Christian ethics of hospitality is rather reconstructed on the model of “forgiveness” by critically appropriating the concept of “invisible debt” that lies between the hosting citizens and the migrants in the senses of “you owe us your presence” and “I owe you my security and success.” While the hospitality of the gift defines the relationship between the hosting citizens and the migrants as givers and givees, the new paradigm of hospitality identifies this relationship as between creditors and debtors. In this regard, a new Christian hospitality called for unto citizens of the hosting society is a radical kind that challenges them to transcend the creditor‐debtor consciousness.     

THE CLASS SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF COMPLIANCE TRAINING WITH “DO” AND “DON'T” REQUESTS: ANALOGUE ANALYSIS AND CLASSROOM APPLICATION

Two experiments are reported in which the relationship between compliance with “do” and “don't” requests was examined with developmentally disabled children. In Experiment 1, a multiple baseline design across subjects with counterbalanced treatment conditions was used to evaluate a compliance training program composed of four phases: (a) baseline, during which no consequences were delivered for compliance, (b) reinforcement for compliance with one targeted “do” request, (c) reinforcement for compliance with one targeted “don't” request, and (d) follow-up with reinforcement on a variable ratio schedule for compliance with any “do” or “don't” request. Results of probes conducted before and after training within each condition indicated that generalized compliance occurred only with requests of the same type as the target exemplar (“do” or “don't”). In Experiment 2, these results were replicated in a classroom setting. Following collection of baseline probe data on student compliance, a teacher training program was successfully implemented to increase reinforcement of compliance first with one “do” and subsequently with one “don't” request of a target student. Results of multiple baseline probes across “do” and “don't” requests indicated that the teacher generalized and maintained reinforcement of compliance with other requests of the same type and to other students, with a resulting increase in student compliance with the type of requests reinforced. The impact of treatment on both teacher and student behavior was socially validated via consumer ratings. Implications of these findings with respect to response class formation and compliance training programs are discussed.     

INVESTIGATING THE “SCIENCE” IN “EASTERN RELIGIONS”: A METHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY

This article explores some of the understandings of “science” that are often employed in the literature on “science and Eastern religions.” These understandings crucially shape the raging debates between the avid proponents and the keen detractors of the thesis that Eastern forms of spirituality are uniquely able to subsume the sciences into their metaphysical–axiological horizons. More specifically, the author discusses some of the proposed relations between “science” and “Eastern religions” by highlighting three themes: (a) the relation between science and metaphysics, (b) the relation between science and experience, and (c) the European origins of science. The analysis of these relations requires a methodological inquiry into some of the culturally freighted valences of “science,” “metaphysics,” and “experience.”     

MAKING IT EXPLICIT AND CLEAR: FROM “STRONG” TO “HYPER‐” INFERENTIALISM IN BRANDOM AND PEIRCE

Abstract: This article explores how Robert Brandom's original “inferentialist” philosophical framework should be positioned with respect to the classical pragmatist tradition. It is argued that Charles Peirce's original attack (in “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” and other early papers) on the use of “intuition” in nineteenth‐century philosophy of mind is in fact a form of inferentialism, and thus an antecedent relatively unexplored by Brandom in his otherwise comprehensive and illuminating “tales of the mighty dead.” However, whereas Brandom stops short at a merely “strong” inferentialism, which admits some non‐inferential mental content (although it is parasitic on the inferential and can only be “inferentially articulated”), Peirce embraces a total, that is, “hyper‐,” inferentialism. Some consequences of this difference are explored, and Peirce's more thoroughgoing position is defended.     

THE “NEGATIVE” AND “POSITIVE” ARGUMENTS OF MORAL MODERATES

According to Shelly Kagan, “ordinary” or “moderate” moralists must establish the existence of “options.” Kagan considers a “negative” and a “positive” argument, which he regards as the most promising means by which moral moderates might establish their position. He offers objections to both, and he concludes that the moderate position is indefensible. I argue that Kagan fails in his attempt to discredit the negative argument. I also argue that the positive argument is so implausible that Kagan's elaborate criticism of it is unnecessary. The positive argument is interesting nevertheless, because of why it cannot serve the moderate's purposes.     

THE PROBLEM OF “GOD” IN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION: LONERGAN'S “COMMON SENSE” (RELIGION) VERSUS “THEORY” (THEOLOGY)

The emphasis on God in American psychology of religion generates the problem of explaining divine‐versus‐natural causality in “spiritual experiences.” Especially “theistic psychology” champions divine involvement. However, its argument exposes a methodological error: to pit popular religious opinions against technical scientific conclusions. Countering such homogenizing “postmodern agnosticism,” Bernard Lonergan explained these two as different modes of thinking: “common sense” and “theory”—which resolves the problem: When theoretical science is matched with theoretical theology, “the God‐hypothesis” explains the existence of things whereas science explains their natures; and, barring miracles, God is irrelevant to natural science. A review of the field shows that the problem is pervasive; attention to “miracles”—popularly so‐named versus technically—focuses the claims of divine‐versus‐natural causality; and specifications of the meaning of spiritual, spirituality, science, worldview, and meaning itself (suffering that same ambiguity: personal import versus cognitive content) offer further clarity. The problem is not naturalism versus theism, but commonsensical versus theoretical thinking. This solution demands “hard” social science.     

That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, to the conclusion that the action is a right action. I demon‐strate that virtue ethicists distinguish “ought” from “right” and reject the assumption that “ought” implies “right.” I then show how their rejection of that assumption blocks this “right but not virtuous” objection. I conclude by showing how the thesis that “ought” does not imply “right” can clarify a further dispute in virtue ethics regarding whether “ought” implies “can.”     

“SECOND-GUESSING”

Messages received from other social actors cannot always be taken at face value. When people have reason to question such messages, it is hypothesized that they engage in a cognitive process called “second-guessing,” wherein they reevaluate the literal interpretation of the message to determine its veridicality. Should they determine that it is not veridical, they generate an alternative, potentially more plausible interpretation. We assessed the frequency and importance of situations that might provoke reinterpretation of messages. Such situations were seen as occurring frequently and were of some importance. Social actors revealed sophisticated knowledge concerning the strengths and weaknesses of information obtained about people or events outside their direct experience. They also claimed to be able to “debias”such information, winnowing a “correct” interpretation from one judged to be “incorrect.” Preliminary data suggest that naive social actors are quite good at delecting scientifically documented sources of bias and making reasonable adjustments in their judgments to correct for those biases when plausibly present.     

On “Naturalistic” Family Research

Much is made of the desirability of “naturalistic” research on the family. Indeed, experimental research is often rejected for not being “naturalistic.” The purpose of the present article is to draw out and to examine some of the assumptions underlying such a position. The assumptions behind criteria such as “real,”“relevant,” and “typical” for research topics and settings are held to be questionable, not least because they are inconsistent with a communicational, context-oriented approach to the family. Alternative assumptions more consistent with this approach are described.     

“Putin,You Suck”: Affective Sticking Points in the Czech Narrative on “Russian Hybrid Warfare”

Using the case of the Czech narrative on “Russian hybrid warfare” (RHW), this article contributes to the broader question of why narratives succeed. Building on Lacanian psychoanalysis, narrative scholarship, and affect/emotions research in International Relations, we suggest that narrative success is facilitated also by two interrelated factors: embedding in broader cultural contexts and the ability to incorporate and reproduce collectively circulating affects. We develop a methodological framework for encircling unobservable affects within discourse via “sticking points”—linguistic phenomena infused with affective investment. We outline three categories of sticking points—valued signifiers, fantasies, and biographical narratives. Utilizing the approach in our case study, we focus on a narrative based around the notion that Russia waged a “hybrid war” against “the West” and that this should be faced with quasi‐military measures, which was successful in changing the language of Czech national security. We show that this narrative incorporated a range of sticking points, which contributed to its relative success. It utilized valued signifiers, such as “the West,” “the Kremlin,” “agents,” and “occupation,” weaved them together into a fantasy of a threat to the nation's “Western” identity, and intertwined this with the biographical narratives of history as a lens for world politics and East/West geopolitics.     

Against “Transracialism”: Revisiting the Debate

This article critically reflects on some of the themes and assumptions at stake in the “transracialism” controversy, and connects them to important works in critical race theory: namely Rey Chow's notion of “coercive mimeticism” and Sara Ahmed's critique of white liberal multiculturalism. It argues that the analytic account of “race” that Tuvel draws upon in her article—Sally Haslanger's—is politically problematic, both on its own terms and in light of broader reflections on racialized and gendered power relations. In particular, I critique Haslanger's assumption that all racial identities exist on the same conceptual plane: that a single variable definition of “race” can be applied to any particular racialized group—including white and nonwhite racial identities. This erases racialized power relations, especially where, in liberal “multicultural” nations, whiteness constitutes the implied standard against which an appearance of “racial difference” is conjured. Finally, I extend my argument to the issue of treating “race” and gender analogously. Rejecting this move, I propose an alternative way of conceptualizing these as analytically distinct, yet constitutively interdependent, phenomena. In order to situate the debate historically, I consider an example of “racial transgression” from twentieth‐century China.     

The Power of Language and Labels: “The Mentally Ill” Versus “People With Mental Illnesses”

Undergraduate students (N = 221), adults in a community sample (N = 211), and professional counselors and counselors‐in‐training (N = 269) were given a measure of tolerance. Within each sample, half of the participants were given a version that used the term “the mentally ill” and half were given a version that used the term “people with mental illnesses.” Individuals receiving the version with the term “the mentally ill” had lower levels of tolerance. Professional counselors had the largest differences in tolerance on the basis of language.     

Development of the AAS Statement on “Suicide” and “Physician Aid in Dying”

In August 2017, the American Association of Suicidology board passed a statement titled “Suicide” is not the same as “Physician aid in dying,” which was developed partly in response to the fact that aid in dying is now legal in a number of jurisdictions. In Phase 1, eight members of the AAS who had indicated interest in this issue were asked to independently draft such a statement; the convener consolidated these drafts and comments into an initial statement. In Phase 2, five additional experts who might be expected to object were asked for their independent input; the convener consolidated these with the previous draft. No one objected to the statement altogether; extensive copyediting and rewording suggestions focused primarily on issues of overlap between “suicide” and “physician aid in dying.” The resulting document represents an effort to try to accommodate the basic concerns of all participants. The document does not speak for or against legalization of this practice, but it may have bearing on whether suicide prevention professionals have an obligation to try to prevent such deaths and whether they may serve as consultants for psychological or psychiatric evaluations as sometimes required under US state law.     

Infants of “depressed” mothers interact better with their nondepressed fathers

To determine whether infants of “depressed” mothers interact better with their nondepressed fathers, twenty-six 3- to 6-month-old infants were videotaped during face-to-face interactions with their parents. The “depressed” mother group consisted of twelve 3- to 6-month-old infants and their “depressed” mothers and nondepressed fathers. The control group was composed of 14 nondepressed mothers and nondepressed fathers and their 3- to 6-month-old infants. In the “depressed” mother group, the nondepressed fathers received better interaction ratings than the “depressed” mothers. In turn, the infants received better interaction ratings when they interacted with their nondepressed fathers than with their “depressed” mothers. In contrast, nondepressed fathers and mothers and their infants in the control group did not differ on any of their interaction ratings. These findings suggest that infants' difficult interaction behaviors noted during interactions with their “depressed” mothers may not extend to their nondepressed fathers. The data are discussed with respect to the notion that nondepressed fathers may “buffer” the effects of maternal depression on infant interaction behavior.     

Understanding the “cognitive revolution” in psychology

In this paper it is argued that the “cognitive revolution” in psychology is not best represented either as a Kuhnian “paradigm shift,” or as a movement from an instrumentalist to a realist conception of psychological theory, or as a continuous evolution out of more “liberalized” forms of behaviorism, or as a return to the form of “structuralist” psychology practiced by Wundt and Titchener. It is suggested that the move from behaviorism to cognitivism is best represented in terms of the replacement of (operationally defined) “intervening variables” by genuine “hypothetical constructs” possessing cognitive “surplus meaning,” and that the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s continued a cognitive tradition that can be traced back to the 1920s. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

When the “Stakes” are Communicative

Stakeholders seek to have their “stakes” met by organizations. Organizations assess those requests and sometimes grant stakes to stakeholders. This study examines this critical function of organizations by investigating the stakeholder communication of 66 nonprofit organizations undergoing change. Implementers' self‐reports of frequency, timing, approaches, and topics of communication with 10 stakeholder groups were examined. Results indicate that implementers generally follow a quid pro quo “matching rule” wherein stakeholders' resource importance serves as the basis on which they are awarded communicative attention. However, observance of this rule was not predictive of implementers' assessments of successful change outcomes. Further, results also show that “internal” stakeholders receive the most and earliest communication, compared to stakeholders external to the organization or near the organization's boundary, and that “information dissemination” is the most prevalent communicative approach taken.