Space perception and William James's metaphysical presuppositions

William James's overtly philosophical work may be more continuous with his psychological work than is sometimes thought. His Essays in Radical Empiricism can be understood as an explicit statement of the absolute presupposition that formed the basis of Jamesian psychology: that direct experience is primary and has to be taken at face value. An examination of James's theory of space perception suggests that, even in his early work, he presupposed the primacy of direct experience, and that later changes in his account of space perception can be understood as making his view more consistent with this presupposition. In his earlier view of space perception, James argued that sensations were directly experienced as spatial, though he accepted that spatial relations between sensations may be constructed by higher order thought. In his later view, however, James argued that spatial relations were just as directly experienced as sensations. The work of T. H. Green may have prompted James to recognize the full consequence of his ideas and to realize that taking experience at face value required that spatial relations be thought of as intrinsic to experience rather than the result of intellectual construction.     

Indirect perceptual realism and demonstratives

I defend indirect perceptual realism against two recent and related charges to it offered by A. D. Smith and P. Snowdon, both stemming from demonstrative reference involving indirect perception. The needed aspects of the theory of demonstratives are not terribly new, but their connection to these objections has not been discussed. The groundwork for my solution emerges from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role this indirectness plays in demonstrative assertions. I argue that indirectness routinely if not typically plays a justificatory role in such judgements, and not a semantic one, and that the same can be said of such judgements when considered within the indirect realist framework. The denial of this, on my analysis, is essential to the criticisms of Snowdon and Smith. The discussion is extended to include scenarios involving the sorts of misconceptions Smith employs.

Relational invariance and visual space perception: On perceptual vector analysis of the optic flow

The outlines of the theory of perceptual vector analysis in visual space and motion perception in its present state of development are presented. This theory is exclusively founded on the outcome of systematic experimental research extended over more than three decades. Some informative experiments and their results are briefly described, starting with some decisive findings reported in Johansson (1950). A fundamental difference between this approach and the traditional pictorial way of describing the proximal stimulus is that it accepts abstract mathematical relations in spatial change over time in the optic flow hitting the receptor organs as specification of the proximal stimulus rather than the traditional interpretation of cues in static images. In its present form it is able to establish functionally valid mathematical correspondence between the light-reflecting environment, geometrical transformations in the optic flow at the retina and the percept.     

On A Reductionist Analysis of William James's Philosophy of Religion

William James undertook to steer his way between a rationalistic systemthat was not empirical enough and an empirical system so materialistic that it could not account for the value commitments on which it rested. In arguing against both the absolutists (gnostics) and the empiricists (agnostics), he defined a position of pluralistic moralism that seemed equally distant from both, leaving himself vulnerable to the criticism that he had rescued morality from scientism only by reducing religion to morals. Such criticism, however, ignores distinctions James made between religion and theology and between monistic theology and dualistic theology. When these distinctions are taken into account, it becomes evident that James can be criticized for reducing religion to morality only from the point of view of either absolute monism or religious humanism and that radical empiricism not only embraces a significant number ofnonmoral religious experiences but also leaves open the possibility of belief in the particular historical God of traditional Christianity.     

Putnam's natural realism and the question of a perceptual interface

According to Hilary Putnam, natural realism is a form of direct realism in the philosophy of perception that promises to help see us past an irresolvable metaphysical dispute between realism and anti-realism. Illumination depends upon the claim that in perception that there is no interface between the cognitive powers of the mind and the causal powers of the world. In the present paper I aim to show that there is a hidden complexity in Putnam's notion of a perceptual interface. On a trivializing reading, Putnam intends only to reject a modern materialist version of the traditional ‘veil of ideas’. On a richer reading, he intends also to reject the view that the intentional content of experience is autonomous with respect to the external world. I conclude by suggesting that natural realism is not mere common sense and that its fate is tied to its ability to respond to the skeptical threats that help to motivate the traditional options of realism and antirealism.     

詹姆斯心理学的现象学转向及其理论意蕴

本文在阐明詹姆斯心理学的出发点、并考察其心理学思想的探索和突破的基础上指出,詹姆斯关于心理学的思想历程无疑经历了一个根本的转向;又结合与胡塞尔现象学的比较认为,转向之后的詹姆斯的心理学思想的潜在意义,只有借用胡塞尔现象学的思想框架和概念工具,才能得到有效的表达和进一步的发展。文章最后还暗示了詹姆斯心理学思想的现象学转向对于理解并构建心理学的学科同一性的潜在意义。     

The retrieval of ‘liveness’ in William James's Will to Believe

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Salvaging the self in a world without soul: William James's The Principles of psychology

This article explores William James's transformation of the religious soul into the secular self in The Principles of Psychology. Although James's views on the self are familiar to many historians of psychology, the article places his treatment of the self within the broader social and cultural context of a secularizing, industrializing society. There were palpable tensions and anxieties that accompanied the cultural shift, and these are particularly transparent in James's Principles. James attempted the project of secularizing the soul in order to promote a natural science of the mind but with marked ambivalence for the project, because it left out some of the moral and metaphysical questions of great interest to him.     

Sensory and perceptual interactions in weight perception

In four experiments, a multidimensional signal detection analysis was used to determine the influence of length, diameter, and mass on haptically perceived heaviness with and without vision. This analysis allowed us to test for sensory and perceptual interactions between mass and size. As in previous research, sensory interactions were apparent in all four experiments. A novel result was the appearance of perceptual interactions that became more prominent when diameter varied and when vision was allowed. Discussion focuses on how vision and the modalities of touch (i.e., haptic and dynamic) might influence which interactions appear in the data.     

Physiology as the antechamber to metaphysics: the young William James's hope for a philosophical psychology

In the 5 years before 1878, when his career in psychology was becoming established, William James wrote a series of notes and reviews assessing the work of many of the pioneers in the new field. Adopting a public and confident voice, even while he was privately still uncertain and searching, James criticized the dogmatism of positivist and idealist claims to the study of the human brain and mind. In his short writings of 1873-1877, James started to formulate his own middle path. His first steps on that path show that he did not reject either scientific or philosophic inquiry; instead, he viewed scientific knowledge as a way to understand philosophical questions more deeply. Saving his sharpest critiques for positivism, James endorsed scientific investigation without materialist assmptions. While his career in psychology was still only a hope, James treated science as a means toward humanist insight.     

Interactions between perceptual and numerical space

Interactions between numbers and space have become a major issue in numerical cognition. Neuropsychological studies suggest that the interactions occur, before response selection, at a spatially organized representation of numbers (the mental number line). Reaction time (RT) studies, on the other hand, usually point to associations between response codes that do not necessarily imply a number line. There is only one such study that has found a spationumerical interaction between perception and semantics (SNIPS) effect before response selection. Here, in Experiment 1, we isolated the SNIPS effect from other numerical effects and corroborated the prediction that it can be induced by both left and right spatial cues. In Experiment 2, we isolated the peak of the time course of the SNIPS effect and corroborated the prediction that it occurs when a cue follows a target, and not when both appear simultaneously. The results reconcile neuropsychological and RT studies and support the hypothesis that numbers are represented along a left-to-right spatially organized mental number line. [corrected]