Freud with Charcot: Freud's discovery and the question of diagnosis

Although Charcot's seminal role in influencing Freud is widely stated, although Freud's trip to Paris to study with Charcot is well recognized as pivotal in his shift from neurological to psychopathological work, a key fact of the Freudian heuristic remains largely underestimated: namely, that Freud's psychopathological breakthrough, which gave birth to psychoanalysis, cannot be separated from his ‘diagnostic preoccupation’, which is a crucial and at times the first organizing principle of his earliest writings. The purpose of this article is therefore to reopen the question of diagnosis by following its development along the path leading from Charcot to Freud. The authors demonstrate that Freud's careful attention to diagnostic distinctions follows strictly in the direction of Charcot's ‘nosological method’. More importantly, the article intends to identify the precise way in which his ideas operate in Freud's own work, in order to understand how Freud reinvests them to forge his own nosological system. If the authors trace the destiny of Charcot's lessons as they reach Freud's hands, it is the importance granted to mixed neuroses in Freud's psychopathology that allows them to pinpoint the role played by the diagnostic process in the rationality of psychoanalysis.     

The empiricist as rebel: Jung,Freud, and the burdens of discipleship

However little they share in common, both Freudian and Jungian commentators have long agreed that Jung's theoretical development in the years following his psychoanalytic affiliation prompted an open “split” with Freud and the psychoanalytic movement. Careful examination of Jung's principal “rebel” works does not sustain this thesis, however, but rather indicates Jung's honest belief that his limited appropriation of certain psychoanalytic mechanisms and attendant theoretical modifications constituted full-fledged loyalty to psychoanalysis as he understood it. This perception receives significant support from the Freud-Jung correspondence which reveals Jung openly articulating the ground rules defining his loyalty to psychoanalysis as early as 1906, and Freud accepting, and even approving, his protégé's empirical reservations over the course of the next five years.     

The Freud–Ferenczi controversy in light of Emma Eckstein's circumcisio

Abstract

Emma Eckstein's circumcision trauma has been powerfully suppressed, denied, and dissociated from the history of the origins of psychoanalysis. Even though Freud did not categorize it as a trauma, he was deeply impacted by it in the period when he provided psychoanalysis with his foundation. Despite Freud's intellectual erasure of the trauma that Emma experienced, her “cut” never ceased to unconsciously break through Freud's fantasies and discourse, haunting the psychoanalytic building as a veritable ghost. Sándor Ferenczi became the recipient of what Freud could not consider in his own mind, and his revision of the “Bausteine” (building blocks) of psychoanalysis featured an attempt to heal the split embedded in the foundation of psychoanalysis.     

“This beastly science…”: On the reception of psychoanalysis by the composers of the Second Viennese School, 1908–1923

This paper explores the links between psychoanalysis and music in Vienna between the years 1908 and 1923, focusing in particular on two members of the highly influential Second Viennese School, the composers Alban Berg and Anton Webern. While there is little evidence of an actual interaction between Freud and his circle and contemporaneous musicians in Vienna, this paper discusses the direct personal and professional contact Webern and Berg had with Freud, and also with Freud's one-time colleague Alfred Adler; Berg's wife Helene also underwent psychoanalytic treatment. Both composers documented their experiences with and feelings about psychoanalysis, offering critical insights into the reception of psychoanalysis in musical circles in Vienna, and into the actual connections between psychoanalysis and Vienna's most important musical figures. This paper examines Berg and Webern in the context of Freud's Vienna, Adler's musical background and his treatment of Webern, and Berg's knowledge of psychoanalysis and strong ambivalence towards his wife's psychoanalytic treatment, and concludes by considering Berg's opera Wozzeck (1925) as an example of a musical work influenced by contemporary Viennese attitudes towards psychoanalysis.     

Women on the Couch: Genital Stimulation and the Birth of Psychoanalysis

Following Freud's emphasis on his rejection of hypnosis as leading up to the development of psychoanalysis, there has been little mention in the psychoanalytic literature of the larger context of the somatic medical treatment of hysteria within which Freud treated his hysterical patients, and which Freud himself practiced. We contend that Freud's emphasis obscured his association with massage, electrotherapy, and the procedure of genital stimulation practiced by his medical colleagues in the treatment of hysteria. We show that the history of genital stimulation—including its obfuscation, desexualization, medicalization, and co-option from traditional women healers by an exclusively male medical establishment—provides us with the background for a more sophisticated understanding of the context in which Freud developed his theories. Specifically, we examine the contribution of this understanding to Freud's theoretical emphases on autonomy and individuality, abstinence and the renunciation of gratification, penis envy, clitoral versus vaginal orgasm, mature genital sexuality, and the “repudiation of femininity” as the “bedrock” of psychoanalysis. We demonstrate that Freud's position as a Jew in an anti-Semitic milieu fueled his efforts to distance his psychoanalytic method from the more prurient practices of his day, including one his society associated with Jewish doctors and patients.     

Gender and Transference

Despite an early interest, Freud explicitly rejected philosophy, because of its “speculative” character. He struggled with balancing the intellectual appeal of philosophy with the certainty he hoped to find in positivist science. Putting aside the scientific status of Freud's work, the author re-examines Freud's attitude towards philosophy. Failing to recognize the assumptions of his investigations, Freud segregated psychoanalysis from philosophy on the charge that philosophers equated mind with consciousness, putatively propounded unfounded speculations, and assumed false conclusions about comprehensiveness. However, Freud never completely abandoned his initial philosophical proclivities. His own contributions to cultural history, social philosophy, notions of personal identity, and the humanistic thrust of psychoanalysis, demonstrate that he continued to address his earliest interests in philosophical questions. The author elucidates the philosophical complexity of psychoanalysis and concludes that a reconsideration of Freud's self-appraisal of his intellectual commitments is warranted.     

Interpretations of Freud's Jewishness, 1924–1974

During the first fifty years of historical and biographical commentary on Freud and the origins of psychoanalysis there were there periods of interpretation of Freud's Jewishness. During the first period, extending from the mid-1920s until the 1950, it was widely assumed, following the works of Wittels, that Freud was essentially Viennese, that his Jewishness was at most incidental. During the second period, extending until the late 1960s, Freud was believed by some, following Bakan, to be essentially Jewish, and to have concealed that important aspect of his life intentionally. During the most recent period, and especially in the early 1970s, psychoanalysis was interpreted as a compromise wrought by Freud to meet the conflicting demands of secular German and scientific modernity and Jewish and othe traditions.     

Winnicott's rejection of the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology1

In this paper, the author attempts to show how Winnicott rejected the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology, namely the concepts of Trieb(instinct/drive), psychical apparatus and libido. To that purpose, he first elucidates what metapsychology is, according to Freud. Freud describes metapsychology as a speculative superstructure of psychoanalysis in which the aforementioned concepts correspond to the dynamic, topographical and economic viewpoints. The author then presents an explanation of what metapsychology means in Winnicott's view, and examines his criticism of this kind of speculative theorization in psychoanalysis, as well as his suggested substitute for each of those basic concepts. Subsequent analysis shows that Winnicott replaced the main concepts of the metapsychological theory, which have no correlation whatsoever in the phenomenal world, with a set of other, non‐speculative concepts, thereby favouring a factual theorization.     

Fatherhood today: variations on a theme

Freud explored the concept of the unconscious in some detail in one of his papers on 'metapsychology' in 1915. But this concept is crucial to the birth of psychoanalysis more than twenty years earlier. If we look closely at one of the early cases Freud described in his 1895 book with Breuer, Studies on Hysteria, we can see how that concept was also being born. This paper focuses on the case of Elisabeth von R, to show how the distinctive psychoanalytic understanding of the unconscious was starting to be used there to make sense of her hysterical symptoms. Freud's account and the words he chooses to frame it raise a number of questions about theory and practice in psychoanalysis, which we examine here in relation to unconscious love.     

Ferenczi's “Confusion of Tongues” Theory and the Analysis of the Incest Trauma

Abstract

The tender-mother transference of Ferenczi's humanistic analytic orientation was as important an advance in pioneering times as was Kohut's selfobject transference in contemporary psychoanalysis. Ferenczi's clinical theory and method began a focus on pre-oedipal experiences, which eventually became an alternate to the oedipal theory. Freud was critical of Ferenczi's formulation, leading a successful attempt to suppress his work and remove it from mainstream psychoanalysis because he believed it was “regressive.” In actuality, Ferenczi's “Confusion of Tongues” theory and “Relaxation Therapy” were prophetic and pioneering attempts to understand and treat the incest trauma (ironically the clinical data upon which Freud founded psychoanalysis 100 years ago). In the case of Miss T., Ferenczi's ideas are applied to the contemporary analysis of the incest trauma.     

Otto Rank's art

Abstract

Otto Rank's work has had an indirect influence on much of existential‐humanistic psychology, yet his contribution has been unevenly acknowledged. Seeing Rank as a developing artist helps to put his creative contributions to psychoanalysis, post‐psychoanalytic critique, and existential‐humanistic psychotherapy, in perspective. After his separation from Freud, Rank's innovative thought blossomed; his later works have deep and lingering humanistic import. A look at convergences and divergences between Freud and Rank shows that Rank's art (of living, of theorizing, and of practicing therapy) is an uncannily familiar and inspiring model of humanistic practice in the world. The continuing relevance of Rank's ideas about art and artists is explored, and Rank is re‐introduced to humanistic psychologists who may recognize aspects of his work as consonant with their own.     

One Pilgrim's Progress Toward the Psychoanalytic Citadel

My psychoanalytic odyssey started in my childhood. My parents were avid readers of Freud and discussed his views with their friends. Our family doctor had been analyzed by Freud and spoke to my family about it on many occasions. I renewed my interest in psychoanalysis in college while studying English literature and then even more so in medical school, where we had a very inspiring department of psychiatry. My psychoanalytic training was to cross many frontiers: orthodox Freud, classical Freud, Fairbairn, Winnicott, and then Klein and Bion. I entered the field of psychoanalysis at a time when it was highly respected and virtually dominated the field of psychiatry, especially in medical schools. I have sadly watched its decline from popular favor and was even sadder to encounter its bitter divisiveness, especially in this country. Today psychoanalysis is left divisive and more variegated. Many different schools of thought have emerged that are now accorded legitimacy, fortunately. One might say that I have seen it at its best and at its worst but have not lost faith in its capacity to excite one's imagination and to inspire hope for a more evolved consciousness of self.     

Ferenczi and Groddeck: Simpatico

Sigmund Freud introduced Sandor Ferenczi to Georg Groddeck in 1917. The warm personal friendship that these two men shared for the rest of their lives was a breeding ground for many of their respective theoretical and clinical contributions. 1923 was a schismatic year in the history of psychoanalysis. Freud's appropriation of Groddeck's Das Es and its adaptation to Heinroth's tri-partite model (Freud, 1923; Poster, 1997) marked the beginning of Ego psychology. Almost simultaneously there appeared Groddeck's Book of the It (Groddeck, 1923), together with Rank and Ferenczi's The Development of Psychoanalysis (Rank and Ferenczi, 1924), and Ferenczi's Thalassa (Ferenczi, 1924). These three seminal publications set the stage for a paradigm shift (Hoffer, 2008; Rudnytsky, 2002). They were the forerunner of later developments in object relations, self-psychology, interpersonal and relational psychoanalysis. Taken together, the contributions of Groddeck and Ferenczi and Rank reinvigorated psychoanalysis, Freud's baby, with “the constructive aspect” that Groddeck told Freud had been lost in Freud's re-definition of Das Es (Groddeck, 1977, p. 13). Each of these pioneers stimulated the thinking of the others. Always an independent thinker, Groddeck was welcomed into the psychoanalytic circle by both Freud and Ferenczi. Suffering under the “crushing paternal(ism)” of Freud, Ferenczi was supported by Groddeck to carry out his own clinical experiments. Preoccupied with his own legacy and intolerant of dissent, Freud was able to maintain cordial contact with these two creative spirits and allow them to modify his own ideas.     

Fried and Freud on the Acropolis; on duality in the base of psychoanalytic thinking

Freud was conflicted in relation to his religious background. On the one hand, he was very clear on his adherence to a scientific Weltanschauung. On the other, he was fascinated by the Moses figure and one may see a Judaist structure in his way of thinking. The aim of this paper is to reflect on this conflict and the question of faith in psychoanalysis. After looking at object and method in religion and psychoanalysis, the authors go into the concept of ‘psychic reality’ and its change in the history of psychoanalysis. Through an analysis of Freud’s A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis and the function of literature, it is claimed that faith may be seen as a condition for the sense of experiential reality.     

On the Nature and Meaning of Human Finitude

This article considers the interaction between psychoanalysis and philosophy by examining the meaning of human finitude in the work of Freud and Heidegger. Although Freud and Heidegger develop radically different systems of thought, they are surprisingly close in their examination of the human attitude toward death. Freud's philosophical reflections on the nature of death are ultimately subsumed in his speculative theory of the death instinct, which is far removed from the lived experience of finitude. Heidegger's ontological account of death draws from lived experience but neglects the relational nature of finitude. Drawing on the connection between the work of Binswanger and Stolorow, I maintain that finitude is a fundamentally relational phenomenon. While philosophy can help us to understand and formulate an account of human finitude, the relational nature of psychoanalysis can help us bear the trauma associated with death.     

Discussion - Evidence Based Psychoanalysis: An Imperative and an Opportunity

Freud published his ''On Narcissism: An Introduction'' in 1914. The writing has many levels, including, among other things, Freud's criticism of his former colleagues, Adler and Jung. Psychoanalysts received the essay with reservations. Ernest Jones, among others, expressed his concerns in his history of psychoanalysis. The aim of this study is to place Heinz Kohut's ideas about narcissism into the context of the history of ideas. Especially, the paper explores, at a theoretical level, the status of the castration complex both in self psychology and Freud's essay as well as seeks reasons why the discussion on narcissism should be continued.     

Mysticism,Reality, Illusion,and the Freudian Critique of Religion

Freud's critique of religion cannot be fully understood if his ontogenetic perspective is explored outside of his phylogenetic perspective. The former allows for illusionistic thought processes that are orthogonal to reality claims. The latter requires consideration of empirical claims to truth within a social psychological perspective. It is only the phylogenetic perspective that allows Freud to maintain that religion is delusional, whether or not it is also illusional. Freud's rejection of "as if" philosophies as exemplified by Vaihinger is based upon his refusal to allow religious truth claims to escape their empirical, social foundations. Recent efforts to revive psychological theories of religion rooted only in illusionistic thought, as exemplified in the use of Winnicott's conceptualization, must confront social psychological issues similar to those articulated within Freud's phylogenetic view. A mystical reading of Freud is suggested in which claims to truth within psychoanalysis, science, and religion can be confronted in an empirical and inherently social manner.     

The dual impact of Freud's death and Freud's death instinct theory on the history of psychoanalysis

Since I have ranged over a rather large territory in this presentation I will summarize my main points. I claim that the very way Freud created psychoanalysis made it impossible for it to continue to grow and develop as a unified movement after his death. Unlike other sciences, psychoanalysis had no way of differentiating its basic findings from what is yet to be discovered. I then reintroduced my differentiation between heretics, modifiers, and extenders, claiming that after Freud’s death there was less opportunity for heretics and more space for modifiers. I assigned a crucial role to the fact that Anna Freud did not succeed in expelling the Kleinians. In the second part of the paper I presented the view of those who made use of Freud’s death instinct theory and those who opposed it. Many analysts preferred to ignore dealing with it rather than state their opposition. My presentation was biased in favor of those who chose to work with the death instinct as a clinical reality,highlighting Ferenczi’s construction. I made the claim, so far as I know never made before, that Freud’s death instinct theory had a traumatic impact on the psychoanalytic movement because it greatly limited the belief in the curative power of our therapeutic work. After his announcement of the dual-instinct theory Freud withdrew his interest in psychoanalysis as a method of cure. By doing so he inflicted a narcissistic wound on psychoanalysis. I believe that the creativity of psychoanalysis will improve if we face this difficult chapter in our history.     

Psychoanalysis,religion, philosophy and the possibility for dialogue: Freud,Binswanger and Pfister

Abstract

This article considers the longstanding disciplinary tensions between psychoanalysis, religion, and philosophy. It argues for a cross-disciplinary understanding of human experience by examining the relationship of Sigmund Freud to his two Swiss colleagues, Ludwig Binswanger and Oskar Pfister. In contrast to Freud's avowed atheism and pronounced ambivalence on philosophy, Binswanger and Pfister both professed a strong religious sensibility and philosophical outlook. The article juxtaposes their theoretical divergences on religion and philosophy with personal interactions and correspondence. The relationship of Freud to Binswanger and Pfister is instructive for understanding the historical and contemporary interaction of psychoanalytic theory and practice with other disciplines and diverse viewpoints. The dialogical spirit that connects the three protagonists constitutes a critical engagement with learning and is essential to psychoanalysis today.     

Religious Maturity and Psychological Distress Among Older Christian Women

Hood's article on Mysticism, Reality, Illusion, and the Freudian Critique of Religion is examined from a constructivist point of view. Hood's misinterpretation of Freudian statements and of recent developments within psychoanalysis are due to an outdated conception of "reality." We suggest that Hood's use of Freud might serve an apologetic, theological purpose. Hood has written a remarkable article that, after reading and rereading, leaves us confused. Whereas, in the empirical study of religion, Hood has produced fine scholarship, we find it difficult to catch the point he wants to make with this text. One must appreciate, of course, that he claims attention for Freud's theories of religion and enters a dialogue with recent authors in the psychoanalysis of religion, but it is doubtful whether he has done justice to Freud or Freud's successors. Moreover, Hood seems to have missed the essence of the present development of constructivism and contextualism in philosophy and psychology, and his argument rings an apologetic bell.