Hutchesonian Inspired Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics

Francis Hutcheson's moral sense theory is the inspiration for both act utilitarianism and a contemporary virtue ethics approach that Michael Slote calls agent‐based virtue ethics. In this essay, I look at other possibilities for ethical theory that spring from Hutcheson's writings and conclude that the landscape of sentimentalist inspired ethics is richer than many realize. I begin this article with a short explanation of Hutcheson's moral sense theory. I explain that Hutcheson proposes and embraces three distinct criteria of moral evaluation, one of which is concerned with the evaluation of motives and two of which are concerned with the evaluation of acts. Act utilitarianism adopts one of the criteria of act evaluation, and Slote's agent‐based virtue ethics adopts the remaining criterion of act evaluation and the criterion of motive evaluation. Then, after pointing out what I believe are shortcomings of Slote's agent‐based virtue ethics, I propose two Hutchesonian inspired theories, each of which is a compromise between act utilitarianism and agent‐based virtue ethics. The first, which I call hypothetical agent‐based virtue ethics, adopts two of Hutcheson's three criteria and is similar structurally to a virtue ethics theory articulated by Rosalind Hursthouse and Linda Zabzebski. The second, which, for lack of a better name, I call Hutchesonian hybridism, adopts all three of Hutcheson's criteria and is a hybrid combination of Slote's actualist agent‐based virtue ethics and hypothetical agent‐based virtue ethics. I argue that both hypothetical agent‐based virtue ethics and Hutchesonian hybridism overcome the shortcomings (pointed out earlier in this essay) of Slote's actualist agent‐based virtue ethics, and that both of these theories are, therefore, worthy of further consideration.     

BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY: PAST,PRESENT, AND FUTURE. A REVIEW OF HARRY HEFT'S ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN CONTEXT

Relations between behavior analysis and ecological psychology have been strained for years, notwithstanding the occasional comment on their affinities. Harry Heft's (2001) Ecological Psychology in Context provides an occasion for reviewing anew those relations and affinities. It describes the genesis of ecological psychology in James's radical empiricism; addresses Holt's neorealism and Gestalt psychology; and synthesizes Gibson's ecological psychology and Barker's ecobehavioral science as a means for understanding everyday human behavior. Although behavior analysis is excluded from this account, Heft's book warrants a review nonetheless: It describes ecological psychology in ways that are congruent and complementary with behavior analysis (e.g., nonmediational theorizing; the provinces of natural history and natural science). After introducing modern ecological psychology, I comment on (a) Heft's admirable, albeit selective, historiography; (b) his ecological psychology—past and present—as it relates to Skinner's science and system (e.g., affordances, molar behavior); (c) his misunderstandings of Skinner's behaviorism (e.g., reductionistic, mechanistic, molecular); and (d) the theoretical status of Heft's cognitive terms and talk (i.e., in ontology, epistemology, syntax). I conclude by considering the alliance and integration of ecological psychology and behavior analysis, and their implications for unifying and transforming psychology as a life science, albeit more for the future than at present.     

Measurement and decision making at the University of Michigan in the 1950s and 1960s

This article explores the emergence of Clyde Coombs' mathematical psychology and Ward Edwards' behavioral decision research at the University of Michigan in the 1950s and 1960s. It shows why and how the mathematical psychological focus on the mathematics of measurement neatly complemented the experimental work on rational human decision making of the behavioral decision researchers. Both understood measurement as the rational decision of a human being between two or more stimuli, or values, and viewed the experimental measurement of actual human decision behavior as a key objective of psychology. For both “measurement theory in psychology [was] behavior theory.” © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Quantifying Inner Experience?—Kant's Mathematical Principles in the Context of Empirical Psychology

This paper shows why Kant's critique of empirical psychology should not be read as a scathing criticism of quantitative scientific psychology, but has valuable lessons to teach in support of it. By analysing Kant's alleged objections in the light of his critical theory of cognition, it provides a fresh look at the problem of quantifying first‐person experiences, such as emotions and sense‐perceptions. An in‐depth discussion of applying the mathematical principles, which are defined in the Critique of Pure Reason as the constitutive conditions for mathematical‐numerical experience in general, to inner sense will demonstrate why it is in principle possible to justify a quantitative structure of psychological judgments on the grounds of Kant's critical thinking. In conclusion, it will propose how Kant's critique could be used in a constructive way to develop first steps towards a transcendental foundation of psychological knowledge.     

Personal Construct Theory and Cognitive Science

Abstract

Warren (1990) claims to have formulated an argument “that personal construct psychology is not a cognitive psychology” (p. 379). Nonetheless, he presents very little in the way of logical demonstration or empirical evidence to support this conclusion. Moreover, the theoretical significance of the question posed in the title of his essay (“Is Personal Construct Psychology a Cognitive Psychology?”) is far from obvious. He asserts that “what is at dispute here is the proper characterization of a position” however, his listing several textbooks that refer to Kelly's theory as a “cognitive” approach to the study of personality does nothing at all to either clarify the specific implications of this question or explain its importance. Interestingly, in a recent introductory personality text by one of Kelly's former students (Phares, 1988), this theory is designated as a “phenomenological approach,” which is consistent with Warren's own notion that “he [Kelly] was more phenomenological than he himself believed” Kelly vigorously resisted all such attempts to classify his model in terms of the usual textbook categories (cf. Adams-Webber & Mancuso, 1983).     

Dewey Between the Lines: George Kelly and the Pragmatist Tradition

In his own somewhat sly and sardonic way, George Kelly always insisted that personal construct theory could not be assimilated into any other kind of psychology. We believe this was not an example of Kelly being difficult or protecting his turf, but that he resisted such efforts at categorization because he formulated personal construct psychology from an entirely different set of assumptions than those which have traditionally guided the construction of psychological theories. We begin by looking at the unusual life path Kelly took in order to enter the field of psychology and what it reveals about the independent turn of mind he brought to creating his own theory of personality. We then examine what we believe is the single most important influence on Kelly's thinking—the tradition of American pragmatism, in general, and the philosophy and psychology of John Dewey, in particular. We argue that Kelly embraced the pragmatic epistemological assumptions that guided Dewey's work, and that he used these assumptions to develop the only pragmatic theory of personality and psychotherapy. It is, in fact, the influence of Dewey and the pragmatists that makes personal construct psychology so different from and, at times, more difficult to understand than other, more traditional, “realist” theories, but it is also this pragmatic orientation that makes Kelly's theory such an important contribution.     

A tale of four countries: How Bowlby used his trip through Europe to write the WHO report and spread his ideas

Attachment theory, developed by child psychiatrist John Bowlby, is considered a major theory in developmental psychology. Attachment theory can be seen as resulting from Bowlby's personal experiences, his psychoanalytic education, his subsequent study of ethology, and societal developments during the 1930s and 1940s. One of those developments was the outbreak of World War II and its effects on children's psychological wellbeing. In 1950, Bowlby was appointed WHO consultant to study the needs of children who were orphaned or separated from their families for other reasons and needed care in foster homes or institutions. The resulting report is generally considered a landmark publication in psychology, although it subsequently met with methodological criticism. In this paper, by reconstructing Bowlby's visit to several European countries, on the basis of notebooks and letters, the authors shed light on the background of this report and the way Bowlby used or neglected the findings he gathered.     

Hobbes on Laughter

It has been common to read Hobbes as having an egoistic psychology, and those who have discussed his remarks about laughter (notably Heyd, Watkins and Hutcheson) have taken them to support that interpretation, dealing only rather briefly with what Hobbes actually says about laughter. I argue that Hobbes did not have an egoistic psychology, and that a more detailed consideration of his remarks about laughter, putting them in the context of other things he says, shows that they are consistent with his not having an egoistic psychology. His concern with laughter is as the expression of a passion, and specifically with a passion aroused by somebody's attempt to dishonour one, recognition of which fact changes the inferences we can reasonably draw from his remarks about laughter, given his more general claims about human nature.     

Louis Guttman's Contributions to Classical Test Theory

This article focuses on Louis Guttman's contributions to the classical theory of educational and psychological tests, one of the lesser known of his many contributions to quantitative methods in the social sciences. Guttman's work in this field provided a rigorous mathematical basis for ideas that, for many decades after Spearman's initial work, had been somewhat ambiguous and not adequately formalized. It anticipated later developments that are more widely known in education and psychology.     

Origins of george kelly's constructivism in the work of korzybski and moreno

Although Mahoney (1988) has traced the heritage of general constructive metatheory and 7 Lelhart and Jackson (1983) have examined the influences of Kelly's Kansas environment on his developing theory, there has been relatively little investigation of the origins of Kelly's constructivism. Although Kelly (1955) was undoubtedly influenced by many philosophers and psychologists as he developed the psychology of personal constructs, the roles of these people have not been extensively investigated. However, Kelly (1955, 1969) cited, in a general way, the works of Korzybski and Moreno several times in describing the origins of his theory. Lecture notes taken by one of Kelly's students (Barry, 1948) reveal more specifically the sources (Korzybski, 1933, 1943; Moreno, 1937) that seemed influential as Kelly developed his theories. Kelly borrowed ideas of Korzybski and Moreno, among many others, in creating parts of his role therapy and personality theory. In adapting Korzybski's notion that semantic and linguistic labels are used to understand phenomena in the world, Kelly also accepted the idea that these semantic labels are indeed constructed by individuals. In adapting Moreno's spontaneous improvisation and self-presentation techniques as a way to change semantic labels, Kelly emphasized that construction processes occur and change in a social realm.     

The role of tone sensation and musical stimuli in early experimental psychology

In this article, the role of music in early experimental psychology is examined. Initially, the research of Wilhelm Wundt is considered, as tone sensation and musical elements appear as dominant factors in much of his work. It is hypothesized that this approach was motivated by an understanding of psychology that dates back to Christian Wolff 's focus on sensation in his empirical psychology of 1732. Wolff, however, had built his systematization of psychology on Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, who combined perception with mathematics,and referred to music as the area in which sensation is united with numerical exactitude. Immanuel Kant refused to accept empirical psychology as a science, whereas Johann Friedrich Herbart reintroduced the scientific basis of empirical psychology by, among other things, referring to music.     

Wollaston's Early Critics

Some of the most forceful objections to William Wollaston's moral theory come from his early critics, namely, Thomas Bott (1688–1754), Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), and John Clarke of Hull (1687–1734). These objections are little known, while the inferior objections of Hume, Bentham, and later prominent critics are familiar. This fact is regrettable. For instance, it impedes a robust understanding of eighteenth-century British ethics; also, it fosters a questionable view as to why Wollaston's theory, although at first well received, soon faded in esteem among philosophers. This paper gives Wollaston's early critics some of the attention they deserve. It reconstructs some of their objections to Wollaston's philosophy, addresses replies to those objections, and shows that despite some minor flaws, the objections succeed. A fact that becomes clear is that Wollaston's philosophy had suffered devastating criticism years before Hume wrote anything against it.     

L. L. Thurstone: A new assessment

Most psychologists have heard of Thurstone, and know him as a pioneer of mathematical psychology and factor analysis. But his appearances in history books are rare and peripheral, as a man of technical prowess rather than intellectual achievement, and at best he is seen as a link in the tradition culminating in signal detection and mathematical learning theory. Nineteen eighty-seven is the centenary of his birth, so it is a timely moment to correct this picture. Thurstone was influenced by G. H. Mead, and his work is best placed within the pragmatist movement, not as moving towards the mechanistic psychology that now dominates psychology. Viewed in this way, his true status and the reasons for his relative neglect become apparent. This is illustrated by a detailed consideration of his mathematical learning models.     

On Defining Conversational Coordination and Rapport

In 1957, Leon Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance burst on the scene and revitalized social psychology with its deft blend of cognition and motivation. For the next two decades, the theory inspired an extraordinary amount of exciting research leading to a burgeoning of knowledge about human social behavior. The theory has been referred to as "the most important single development in social psychology to date" (Jones, 1976, p. x). But, by the mid-1970s the allure of the theory began to wane as interest in the entire topic of motivation faded and the journals were all but overwhelmed by the incredible popularity of purely cognitive approaches to social psychology. Recently, social psychologists seem to have rediscovered motivation and several mini- theories have emerged blending cognition with motivation-in much the same way that Festinger did some 35 years ago. This article traces the history of these developments and attempts a synthesis of some of the newer theories with the dissonance research of the late 1950s and early 1960s.     

Effects of Theodore Millon's Teaching,Mentorship, Theory,and Scientific Contributions on Health Psychology and Behavioral Medicine Research and Practice

This article summarizes the impact of Theodore Millon's work on the disciplines of health psychology and behavioral medicine over the past 5 decades spanning from the late 1960s to present. The article is written from my perspectives as a graduate student mentored by Millon on through my faculty career as a collaborator in test construction and empirical validation research. Several of the most recent entries in this summary reflect projects that were ongoing at the time of his passing, revealing the innovation and visionary spirit that he demonstrated up until the end of his life. Considering that this summary is restricted to Millon's contributions to the disciplines of health psychology and behavioral medicine, this work comprises only a small portion of his larger contribution to the field of psychology and the areas of personality theory and psychological assessment more broadly.     

Platonic Number in the Parmenides and Metaphysics XIII

I argue here that a properly Platonic theory of the nature of number is still viable today. By properly Platonic, I mean one consistent with Plato's own theory, with appropriate extensions to take into account subsequent developments in mathematics. At Parmenides 143a-4a the existence of numbers is proven from our capacity to count, whereby I establish as Plato's the theory that numbers are originally ordinal, a sequence of forms differentiated by position. I defend and interpret Aristotle's report of a Platonic distinction between form and mathematical numbers, arguing that mathematical numbers alone are cardinals, by reference to certain non-technical features of a set-theoretical approach and other considerations in philosophy of mathematics. Finally I respond to the objections that such a conception of number was unavailable in antiquity and that this theory is contradicted by Aristotle's report in Metaph . XIII that Platonic numbers are collections of units. I argue that Aristotle reveals his own misinterpretation of the terms in which Plato's theory was expressed.     

The concept of suggestion in the early history of advertising psychology

As early as 1896, experimental psychologists began studying the mental proccesses involved in advertising. The first psychological theory of advertising maintained, in effect, that the consumer was a nonrational, suggestible creature under the hypnotic influence of the advertising copywriter. Walter Dill Scott was the major proponent of this theory, and it was largely through his writings that advertising men learned about the psychology of suggestion. Scott's theory was consistent with a growing trend in the advertising profession toward viewing consumer behavior as irrational. Scott's efforts might also be viewed as part of the trend in the advertising profession toward seeking a scientific basis for copywriting theory and practice.     

Imaginal action: towards a Jungian conception of enactment,and an extraverted counterpart to active imagination

This theoretical paper considers the fashion in which Jung's psychology radically challenges modern assumptions concerning the nature of subjectivity. With an eye for the clinical implications of Jung's late work, the author introduces the idea of imaginal action. In order to explain what is meant by this, the paper begins by exploring how Jung's thinking demonstrates an underlying bias towards introversion. It is argued that while Jung's interest in synchronicity ultimately resulted in his developing a worldview that might address the introverted biases of his psychology, the clinical implications of this shift have not been sufficiently clarified. With reference to some short examples from experience, the author outlines a conception of relational synchronicity wherein the intrapsychic emerges non‐projectively within the interpersonal field itself. Comparing and contrasting these occurrences to the more introverted practice of active imagination, it is claimed that such a notion is implicit in Jung's work and is needed as a corrective to his emphasis on interiority. The author suggests that imaginal action might be conceived as a distinctly Jungian approach to the psychoanalytic notion of enactment. It is also shown how the idea outlined might find further support from recent developments in the field of transpersonal psychology.     

Hutcheson on Natural Religion

Recent scholars have examined the important role of English Deism in the formation of a modern naturalistic approach to the study of human religiosity. Despite the volume of important studies of various aspects of his thought, the role of Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) in this development has been overlooked. The aim of this paper is to show how Hutcheson develops his own account of the origins of religion, consonant with his more well-known theories in aesthetics and moral philosophy, that diverges sharply from the then-prevailing Deist views. Hutcheson pioneers a psychological account of religion that anticipates the work of nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars in important ways. At the same time, Hutcheson incorporates his account of the origins of religion into an overall vision of human flourishing.