CAN I KILL MY YOUNGER SELF? TIME TRAVEL AND THE RETROSUICIDE PARADOX

If (backward) time travel is possible, presumably so is my shooting my younger self (YS); then apparently I can kill him – I can commit retrosuicide. But if I were to kill him I would not exist to shoot him, so how can I kill him? The standard solution to this paradox understands ability as compossibility with the relevant facts and points to an equivocation about which facts are relevant: my killing YS is compossible with his proximity but not with his survival, so I can kill him if facts like his survival are irrelevant but I cannot if they are relevant. I identify a lacuna in this solution, namely its reliance without argument on the hidden assumption that my killing YS is possible: if it is impossible, it is not compossible with anything. I argue that this lacuna is important, and I sketch a different solution to the paradox.     

Reduction,externalism and immanence in Husserl and Heidegger

This paper argues that the Husserl–Heidegger relationship is systematically misunderstood when framed in terms of a distinction between internalism and externalism. Both philosophers, it is argued, employ the phenomenological reduction to immanence as a fundamental methodological instrument. After first outlining the assumptions regarding inner and outer and the individual and the social from which recent epistemological interpretations of phenomenology begin, I turn to the question of Husserl’s internalism. I argue that Husserl can only be understood as an internalist on the assumption that immanence equates with internal. This, however, is not the case as can be seen once the reduction is understood not as setting aside the existence of the world, but rather a reflection on its meaning. Turning to Heidegger, I argue that his commitment to a form of the phenomenological reduction precludes him from being either a semantic or a social externalist. The place of authenticity and the first person perspective in his work derive from his phenomenological commitments, which can be seen in his accounts of discourse and language and of falling (Verfallen). I then go on to briefly outline a more plausible basis for understanding the difference between Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenologies in terms of their respective emphases on logic and on poetics.     

Clinical Commentary

Abstract

This paper is the narrative of a first-time father with a son born seven weeks early by Caesarean section. Against the anxiety and trauma of his infant's birth and his wife's illness, another inner darker drama is being relived. Michael shows all the wounds of a battered child. He asks two awesome questions - Will I be to my son as my father was to me? Will my son be to me as I was to my father? Fearful and at first unvoiced questions, the developing interviews gave them a voice. We respected Michael's sharing of the early and fearful days and nights when his infant first came home. We sometimes found it hard to empathize with his running away to hide in work, until we understood what he was hiding from. Most poignant was his struggle with his anger and hurt with his father and his desire to understand, ‘Why?’, so that he would not be like this to his son. We saw a sensitive revelation of life being born inside him anew, as he made contact with his real infant and his psychic infant within. Of particular interest was the therapeutic use of the research interview space and the interviewer.     

Theoretical Hubris and the Willingness To Be Radical: An Open Letter to James J. Gibson

J.J. Gibson's direct perception thesis is the cornerstone of ecological psychology. Not to understand this is not to understand ecological psychology. Beginning in the summer of 1968, when I first met Gibson, and after working with him for the next year at Cornell, I underwent a conversion crisis. I came to appreciate his thesis through a few philosophical insights that I here share with the reader through an open letter to Gibson, where I seek to illuminate the reasons for my conversion from being a Miller-Chomsky psycholinguist and a Piaget devotee to a radical Gibsonian. This conversion has influenced my work even until the present. Indeed, I am still working through its implications in all that I attempt. I share this intimate portrait of my relationship to Gibson and his profound ideas in hope that others who have struggled with his thesis might be helped along their way as I was.     

Wittgenstein and logic

In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) presents the concept of order in terms of a notational iteration that is completely logical but not part of logic. Logic for him is not the foundation of mathematical concepts but rather a purely formal way of reflecting the world that at the minimum adds absolutely no content. Order for him is not based on the concepts of logic but is instead revealed through an ideal notational series. He states that logic is “transcendental”. As such it requires an ideal that his philosophical method eventually forces him to reject. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is more dialectical than transcendental.     

Reply to Psarros: Popper and Chemistry

In this article I reply to criticism of my published work by N. Psarros (Journal for the General Philosophy of Science 28: 297–305,1997). I show that I had already answered the first criticism in my published work and not overlooked his supposed refutation. However I offer a plausible argument which he could have used to strengthen his claim. Psarros cites my work on Hopkins in his opening paragraph, but then makes no further reference to it in the text. I indicated to Psarros verbally at Ilkley 1994 (and reiterate the message here) that Hopkins' work on Vitamins is the exemplar of a Popperian historical episode and must require addressing by the opponents of critical rationalism. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

An emperor without clothes: The Church's views about treatment of domestic violence

Once upon a time there was an emperor who was very vain about his elegant clothing. Two swindlers convinced him that they could make him the finest clothes he ever had, and set to work on an empty loom. Rumors of their fame began to spread, and even the emperor's high officials were convinced that the invisible garments were the finest they had ever seen. One minister even decided, “I know I'm not stupid, so it must be my fine position I'm not fit for. Some people might think that rather funny, but I must take good care they don't get to hear of it.” And then he praised the material which he couldn't see and assured them of his delight in its charming shades and its beautiful design. The emperor finally went on parade with his new garments. Crowds gathered, and they all said how magnificently clad he was. No one dared admit they couldn't see the clothes, and many concluded there was simply something wrong with them that he appeared naked. Finally a little child said, “But he hasn't got anything on!” “Goodness gracious, do you hear what the little innocent says?” one whispered to another, until finally everyone shouted at last, “He hasn't got anything on!” The emperor was embarrassed, but he drew himself up and went on with the procession still more proudly, while his chamberlains walked after him carrying the train that wasn't there.     

Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 2

In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 341–355) I have compared Aristotle’s syllogistic with Kant’s theory of “pure ratiocination”. “Ratiocinia pura” („reine Vernunftschlüsse“) is Kant’s designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called ‘perfect’. In Kant’s view they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant’s view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant’s view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle’s view concerning perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant’s logical theory. As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article published in J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357–365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 199–213 (cf. Ebert’s answer in the same issue pp. 215–231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 365–372). I shall argue, that Kant’s principle ‘nota notae est nota rei ipsius’ and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant’s logical theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations.     

Lacking <Emphasis Type="Italic">lack</Emphasis>: a reply to Joldersma

First I would like to thank Clarence Joldersma for his review of our Poststructuralism, Philosophy, Pedagogy (Marshall, 2004-PPP). In particular, I would thank him for his opening sentence: “[t]his book is a response to a lack.” It is the notion of a lack, noted again later in his review, which I wish to take up mainly in this response. Rather than defending or elaborating our particular contributions to PPP—the latter would be a great indignity to my colleagues as I would not write over them—I will take the opportunity to develop the theme of a lack, as I believe that Joldersma has raised a very important issue. But first I will respond briefly to some of Joldersma’s general and opening statements about the book, and my philosophical position in particular.

The difficulty of understanding a borderline patient

SUMMARY

For much of the time during my work with Mr A, a borderline patient whom I saw for twice-weekly psychotherapy over a period of one year. I had difficulty understanding and communicating with him. I felt despairing and impotent and that therapy was not progressing at all. A few weeks prior to termination a shift occurred and I realised that there had been some improvement in Mr A's functioning. Although I was aware that behind the polite façade was an angry, disturbed man, I felt that he was a little more in touch with reality than he had been at the beginning of the treatment.

In this paper I will focus on the factors that contributed to my difficulty in understanding and communicating with Mr A. I will also attempt to account for his apparent improvement.     

Balint's Influence on Contemporary Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice

Invited by the Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy Study Center in New York to lecture on my book Michael Balint: Le renouveau de l'Ecole de Budapest, Toulouse, Erès 2000, I first gave my personal and analytic motivations for writing this book. Then I stressed Balint's original contributions to analytical theory and practice: the object relation combined with the theory of instinct, the development of the infant, adolescent and even of old age, the basic fault, archaic defenses (such as ocnophilia and philobatism), as well as his idea about analytic treatment with its phases of regression and "new beginning". His style and his discretion in treatment and mainly the responsibility he recommended to the analysts seem to me very important not to forget. I have shown him as Ferenczi's heir and how he continued his work. His clinical approach and his style are evoked to alert contemporary analysts--who sometimes just know his method to train general practitioners through the Balint group--that they have been influenced unbeknown to them.     

Kant and the creation of freedom: a response to Terry Godlove

In his review of my book, Terry Godlove raises some robust objections to the exegesis of Kant that I present in my recent book, Kant and the Creation of Freedom: a Theological Problem (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). I respond to these criticisms in this article. Properly to locate Godlove’s exegetical objections, I dedicate the first section to setting out the arc of the argument I trace. I then set out and treat in turn Godlove’s main objections to my exegesis: that it depends upon an interpretation of transcendental idealism which makes the doctrine ‘flatly inconsistent and probably just silly’; that I neglect the most plausible account interpretation of Kant’s various statements about transcendental idealism; and that I ‘pick and choose’ supporting texts too narrowly, leading to an unbalanced presentation, which is too convenient to my thesis. I conclude with some general methodological reflections—stimulated by Godlove, but not aimed at him—about how historical philosophical texts are often treated. I express some anxieties about the principle of charity that underlies much current exegesis, and ‘rational reconstruction’ of historical texts, and I propose a case for what might be called ‘creative decomposition’ (not of the text, but of the self).     

A Just Global Economy: In Defense of Rawls

In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls does not discuss justice and the global economy at great length or in great detail. What he does say has not been well-received. The prevailing view seems to be that what Rawls says in The Law of Peoples regarding global economic justice is both inconsistent with and a betrayal of his own liberal egalitarian commitments, an unexpected and unacceptable defense of the status quo. This view is, I think, mistaken. Rawls’s position on global or international economic justice is richer, more nuanced, and generally more compelling than his critics have been willing to acknowledge. My aim in this essay is to sympathetically set out, and then defend against two common families of objection to, Rawls’s position on global or international economic justice. Objections of the first sort reject Rawls’s position as inadequately attentive to the material and economic interests of individual persons worldwide. Objections of the second sort reject it as inadequately attentive to the material and economic interests of well-ordered peoples. Throughout the paper I develop several arguments implicit in The Law of Peoples but not well-developed there as well as offer some additional arguments of my own consistent with the spirit of The Law of Peoples and Rawls’s work more generally. I conclude with some brief remarks expressing two worries I have about Rawls’s position – one concerning global public goods, the other concerning the formation of a morally adequate and effective political will within the international context under contemporary conditions. I wish to thank Alyssa Bernstein, Allen Buchanan, Samuel Freeman, John Hardwig, John Mandle, Rex Martin, Jim Nickel, Walter Riker, Kok-Chor Tan, and Leif Wenar for helpful comments or instructive conversation regarding earlier drafts of this paper.     

"He sees the development of children's concepts upon a background of sociology": Jean Piaget's honorary degree at Harvard University in 1936

In the recent memory, Jean Piaget has been known as a cognitive developmental psychologist. But in 1936 when Harvard gave him his first honorary degree, he was recognized mainly as a sociologist. Why did Harvard honor him in 1936? Who knew his work well enough to nominate him? This article will address these questions by exploring archival documents from different sources. Evidence draws our attention to a broad social and intellectual endeavor in philanthropy, other social sciences, and especially industrial research that brought Piaget across the water. This article also attempts to interpret the circumstances of the nomination process inside and outside of Harvard University by using a theory of institutional design. It suggests that embodied in Harvard's honor of Piaget in 1936 was an idealistic act in social designing for a future society.     

Self-defence Against the Innocent

Do we have the right to defend ourselves against innocent aggressors? If I amattacked in a lift by a knife-wielding lunatic, may I kill or maim him to protect my own life? On one view the insane man’s plight is his bad luck and I am under no obligation to let it be transferred to me. On the opposing view it is my bad luck to be under attack and I have no right to transfer it to an innocent man by killing him to protect myself. It is perhaps becauseneither of these opposing viewpoints is obviously preferable to the other that there is no consensus about the question. Nevertheless we can find considerations for favouring the first view over the second.     

Reply to Review Essay

I thank John Kerr for his long and detailed review of my Freud biography and note our major points of agreement and disagreement. Kerr and I both see the wisdom of placing Freud in the context of the major relationships of his life as opposed to viewing him as a self-created hero. We also note the value of using contemporary ideas and research, much of them based on the foundation that Freud erected, to loop back and understand him in new ways. I believe, more strongly than Kerr, that Freud's early traumatic losses, and the way he came to terms with them—or did not—in his self-analysis, had long-lasting effects on his character, relationships, and psychoanalytic theory and therapy. Several minor points of agreement and disagreement are also discussed.     

Who owns the data in a clinical trial?

Data gathered by investigators are used to test the validity of a specific scientific hypothesis. When the hypothesis relates to the biology of a disease or its treatment, then data sets may contain specific and identifiable medical information. Since the information in a clinical data set was gathered to test a specific hypothesis and there is usually a sponsor interested in the outcome, the issue of who owns the data is a critical one. In my opinion, data from both publicly and privately funded research should be made available, in a format that protects confidentiality and intellectual property rights, to interested and responsible parties within a reasonable period of time after publication. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an International Conference on “Conflict of Interest and its Significance in Science and Medicine” held in Warsaw, Poland on 5–6 April, 2002. J. M. Drazen is Editor-in-Chief of The New England Journal of Medicine and Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School.     

Borges and the Art of Mourning

In my reply to Susi Federici-Nebbiosi, I emphasize and elaborate on the points of agreement between us, as well as the points where our thinking differs. My primary point of difference regards the suggestion that my accepting Yossi for short-term treatment was acquiescence to his request. This is only partially true. From his point of view, I offered him a treatment substantially longer than the one he wanted, thus I was agreeing and not agreeing to his request simultaneously.

The main idea that I put forth in my paper is that we always construct our setting together with our patients and that this is, in itself, a therapeutic factor. I share Federici-Nebbiosi's observation that the setting has undergone a great deal more change in practice than is reflected in the literature, and that there is unease discussing the issue of setting. I offer some thoughts on this and express the hope that the present exchange of ideas will lead to further discussion.     

Memory and identity

Among the many topics covered in Sven Bernecker’s impressive study of memory is the relation between memory and personal identity. Bernecker uses his grammatical taxonomy of memory and causal account to defend the claim that memory does not logically presuppose personal identity and hence that circularity objections to memory-based accounts of personal identity are misplaced. In my comment I investigate these claims, suggesting that the relation between personal identity and memory is more complicated than Bernecker’s analysis suggests. In particular, I argue (1) that while he shows that some memories do not presuppose personal identity he fails to show that those that are appealed to in memory-based accounts of personal identity do not, and (2) that the features of his view that allow him to define memory without reference to personal identity also obscure important features of memory that must be part of a complete account.