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1.
According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational (the realists go that bit right) but its metaphysical presuppositions
are wildly implausible (the non-cognitivists got that bit right). This is the basis of Mackie’s now famous error theory: that
moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive
moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that
Mackie’s approach can be vindicated by a fictionalist account of moral discourse. And Mark Kalderon has argued that moral
fictionalism is attractive quite independently of Mackie’s error-theory. Kalderon argues that the Frege–Geach problem shows
that we need moral propositions, but that a fictionalist can and should embrace propositional content together with a non-cognitivist
account of acceptance of a moral proposition. Indeed, it is clear that any fictionalist is going to have to postulate more
than one kind of acceptance attitude. We argue that this double-approach to acceptance generates a new problem – a descendent
of Frege–Geach – which we call the acceptance–transfer problem. Although we develop the problem in the context of Kalderon’s
version of non-cognitivist fictionalism, we show that it is not the non-cognitivist aspect of Kalderon’s account that generates
the problem. A closely related problem surfaces for the more typical variants of fictionalism according to which accepting
a moral proposition is believing some closely related non-moral proposition. Fictionalists of both stripes thus have an attitude
problem.
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Graham OddieEmail: |
2.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
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Jeff WisdomEmail: |
3.
Towfic Shomar 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2008,39(2):321-349
There is confusion among scholars of Bohr as to whether he should be categorized as an instrumentalist (see Faye 1991) or a realist (see Folse 1985). I argue that Bohr is a realist, and that the confusion is due to the fact that he holds a very special view of realism,
which did not coincide with the philosophers’ views. His approach was sometimes labelled instrumentalist and other times realist,
because he was an instrumentalist on the theoretical level, but a realist on the level of models. Such a realist position
is what I call phenomenological realism. In this paper, and by taking Bohr’s debate with Einstein as a paradigm, I try to
prove that Bohr was such a realist.
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Towfic ShomarEmail: |
4.
Skeptical Theism and God’s Commands 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stephen Maitzen 《Sophia》2007,46(3):237-243
According to Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy, adherents of skeptical theism will find their sense of moral obligation undermined
in a potentially ‘appalling’ way. Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea disagree, claiming that God’s commands provide skeptical
theists with a source of moral obligation that withstands the skepticism in skeptical theism. I argue that Bergmann and Rea
are mistaken: skeptical theists cannot consistently rely on what they take to be God’s commands.
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Stephen MaitzenEmail: |
5.
The Argument from Moral Experience 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Don Loeb 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):469-484
It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality,
has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according
to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according
to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in
this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically
claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact,
we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I
take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B)
epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I
argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.
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Don LoebEmail: |
6.
A Communicative Conception of Moral Appraisal 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Jules Holroyd 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):267-278
I argue that our acts of moral appraisal should be communicative. Praise and blame should communicate, to the appraised, information
about their status and competences as moral agents; that they are recognised by the appraiser as a competent moral agent,
and thus a legitimate candidate for appraisal. I argue for this thesis by drawing on empirical data about factors that can
affect motivation. On the basis of such data, I formulate a constraint, and argue that two prominent models of moral appraisal
– a consequentialist model and Wallace’s ‘evaluative response’ model – violate this constraint. The model that I propose –
the communicative conception of appraisal – does not violate this constraint. This conception, I argue, can provide a fuller
picture of the role of appraisals in deepening agents’ commitment to moral norms. On this model, praise and blame has not
only an evaluative component, but also communicates to the agent competence affirming information.
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Jules HolroydEmail: |
7.
Christopher Hamilton 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(2):181-195
Raimond Gaita’s work in moral philosophy is unusual and important in focusing on the concept of sainthood. Drawing partly
on the work of George Orwell, and partly on the life and work of Simone Weil, as well as on further material, I argue that
Gaita’s use of this notion to help make sense of the concept of human preciousness is unconvincing, not least because he does
not properly explore the figure and psychology of the saint in any detail. I relatedly argue that the notion of human preciousness
in question is implausible and, in some ways, sentimental. I also explore Gaita’s concept of “speaking personally” in moral
philosophy, and suggest that matters here are a great deal more complicated than he supposes.
相似文献
Christopher HamiltonEmail: |
8.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
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Stewart CohenEmail: |
9.
Edmund Wall 《Philosophia》2008,36(2):237-249
10.
Michael McKenna 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(1):29-37
In “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment” Angela Smith defends her nonvoluntarist theory of moral responsibility
against the charge that any such view is shallow because it cannot capture the depth of judgments of responsibility. Only
voluntarist positions can do this since only voluntarist positions allow for control. I argue that Smith is able to deflect
the voluntarists’ criticism, but only with further resources. As a voluntarist, I also concede that Smith’s thesis has force,
and I close with a compromise position, one that allows for direct moral responsibility for the nonvoluntary, but also incorporates
a reasonable control condition.
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Michael McKennaEmail: |
11.
Adam Kadlac 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(1):35-52
This paper explores Descartes’s work with an eye towards abiding issues in moral epistemology. In so doing, I focus on the
role played by the so-called provisional morality that surfaces in “Discourse on the Method”. What I argue is that despite
the tenuousness with which it seems to be held, Descartes remained committed to the truth of this morality even in the midst
of his most strenuous philosophical reflections. Put in the contemporary epistemological terms which provide the context of
my discussion, I argue that Descartes believed in the goodness of his provisional morality as opposed to merely accepting
its maxims.
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Adam KadlacEmail: |
12.
13.
Richard Garner 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):499-513
Moral anti-realism comes in two forms – noncognitivism and the error theory. The noncognitivist says that when we make moral
judgments we aren’t even trying to state moral facts. The error theorist says that when we make moral judgments we are making
statements about what is objectively good, bad, right, or wrong but, since there are no moral facts, our moral judgments are
uniformly false. This development of moral anti-realism was first seriously defended by John Mackie. In this paper I explore
a dispute among moral error theorists about how to deal with false moral judgments. The advice of the moral abolitionist is
to stop making moral judgments, but the contrary advice of the moral fictionalist is to retain moral language and moral thinking.
After clarifying the choice that arises for the moral error theorist, I argue that moral abolitionism has much to recommend
it. I discuss Mackie’s defense of moral fictionalism as well as a recent version of the same position offered by Daniel Nolan,
Greg Restall, and Caroline West. Then I second some remarks Ian Hinckfuss made in his defense of moral abolitionism and his
criticism of “the moral society.” One of the worst things about moral fictionalism is that it undermines our epistemology
by promoting a culture of deception. To deal with this problem Richard Joyce offers a “non-assertive” version of moral fictionalism
as perhaps the last option for an error theorist who hopes to avoid moral abolitionism. I discuss some of the problems facing
that form of moral fictionalism, offer some further reasons for adopting moral abolitionism in our personal lives, and conclude
with reasons for thinking that abolishing morality may be an essential step in achieving the goals well-meaning moralists
and moral fictionalists have always cherished.
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Richard GarnerEmail: |
14.
Timothy Chappell 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):255-265
I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’
moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis.
However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative
way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection
to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’
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Timothy ChappellEmail: |
15.
Per Sandin 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):153-167
This paper discusses the application of the supreme emergency doctrine from just-war theory to non-antagonistic threats. Two
versions of the doctrine are considered: Michael Walzer’s communitarian version and Brian Orend’s prudential one. I investigate
first whether the doctrines are applicable to non-antagonistic threats, and second whether they are defensible. I argue that
a version of Walzer’s doctrine seems to be applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that it is very doubtful whether the
doctrine is defensible. I also argue that Orend’s version of the doctrine is applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that
his account is not defensible, regardless of whether the threats are antagonistic or not.
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Per SandinEmail: |
16.
Anders Schinkel 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):267-277
Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed
cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only
difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue
that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of character from judgements concerning acts,
and they assume a conception of character that is untenable both from a common sense perspective and with a view to findings
from social psychology. I use especially the example of Scobie, the protagonist of Graham Greene’s novel The Heart of the Matter, to show that moral luck is real—that there are cases of moral luck that cannot be reduced to epistemic luck. The reality
of moral luck, in this example at least, lies in its impact on character and personal and moral identity.
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Anders SchinkelEmail: |
17.
Phillip Montague 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):125-131
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply
to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in
my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
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Phillip MontagueEmail: |
18.
Patricia Sheridan 《Sophia》2007,46(3):263-275
Hutcheson’s theory of morality shares far more common ground with Clarke’s morality than is generally acknowledged. In fact,
Hutcheson’s own view of his innovations in moral theory suggest that he understood moral sense theory more as an elaboration
and partial correction to Clarkean fitness theory than as an outright rejection of it. My aim in this paper will be to illuminate
what I take to be Hutcheson’s grounds for adopting this attitude toward Clarkean fitness theory. In so doing, I hope to bring
to light an otherwise unexpected continuity between moral sense theory and the moral rationalism to which it is usually opposed,
and, in so doing, draw attention to the anti-sceptical realism that lies at the heart of both accounts.
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Patricia SheridanEmail: |
19.
Elizabeth Brake 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):243-254
This paper develops a Kantian account of the moral assessment of institutions. The problem I address is this: while a deontological
theory may find that some legal institutions are required by justice, it is not obvious how such a theory can assess institutions
not strictly required (or prohibited) by justice. As a starting-point, I consider intuitions that in some cases it is desirable
to attribute non-consequentialist moral value to institutions not required by justice. I will argue that neither consequentialist
nor virtue-ethical accounts account for these intuitions, suggesting that a distinctive deontological account is needed. The
account I give is drawn from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals; I distinguish it from Kantian views of institutions developed by Barbara Herman and Onora O’Neill. Throughout, I use marriage
as an example.
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Elizabeth BrakeEmail: |
20.
Emotional expressions of moral value 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Julie Tannenbaum 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):43-57
In “Moral Luck” Bernard Williams describes a lorry driver who, through no fault of his own, runs over a child, and feels “agent-regret.”
I believe that the driver’s feeling is moral since the thought associated with this feeling is a negative moral evaluation
of his action. I demonstrate that his action is not morally inadequate with respect his moral obligations. However, I show
that his negative evaluation is nevertheless justified since he acted in way that does not live up to his moral values. I
then use this distinctive negative moral evaluation to distinguish agent-regret from guilt and mere regret.
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Julie TannenbaumEmail: |