Reassessing the dimensionality of the moral emotions

The dimensionality of the moral emotions was tested to examine whether theoretical distinctions between specific emotions were empirically supported. A total of 720 drink‐driving offenders indicated the degree to which they experienced feelings associated with the moral emotions, in an interview conducted after attending court or a restorative justice conference. Expected distinctions between shame and guilt were not found. Instead the principal components analysis identified three factors: shame‐guilt, embarrassment‐exposure, and unresolved shame. The results also show that shame‐guilt was related to higher feelings of empathy and lower feelings of anger/hostility. It is concluded that differences between shame and guilt may be overstated. Furthermore, it is suggested that the relationship between situational experiences of shame and the disposition to feel it may be more complicated than initially thought.     

Ideas of self and community: Ethical implications for a communitarian conception of moral autonomy

This paper attempts to construct a concept of moral autonomy thai is compatible with a relationally-based or care-based ethical theory. After critiquing the traditional liberal identification of the ethical self with an abstract rational self detached from community and historical narrative, I argue that the ethical self emerges in a dialectical relation with the community itself. Essentially, I argue for a concept of autonomy that will be analyzed as a critical perspective from within a community rather than as a privileged view from outside. Central to this argument is an understanding of the nature and role of moral conversation in the regeneration of community. The nature of that conversation is examined.     

Adolescents' self‐attributed moral emotions following a moral transgression: Relations with delinquency,confidence in moral judgment and age

The study investigates adolescents' self‐attributed moral emotions following a moral transgression by expanding research with children on the happy‐victimizer phenomenon. In a sample of 200 German adolescents from Grades 7, 9, 11, and 13 (M = 16.18 years, SD = 2.41), participants were confronted with various scenarios describing different moral rule violations and asked to judge the behaviour from a moral point of view. Subsequently, participants' strength of self‐evaluative emotional reactions was assessed as they were asked to imagine that they had committed the moral transgression by themselves. Results indicate that the intensity of self‐attributed moral emotions predicted adolescents' self‐reported delinquent behaviour even when social desirability response bias was controlled. Further, as adolescents' metacognitive understanding of moral beliefs developed, self‐attributed moral emotions and confidence in moral judgment became more closely associated. No general age‐related change in adolescents' self‐attributed moral emotions was found. Overall, the study provides evidence for a coordination process of moral judgment and moral emotion attributions that continues well beyond childhood and that corresponds with the more general notion of the formation of a moral self in adolescence.     

Moral emotions and the development of the moral self in childhood

Researchers have been emphasizing the importance of moral emotions for young children's moral self. However, the relationship between children's moral self and moral emotions has never been investigated empirically. The present study examined the relationship between children's self-representations about (im)moral behaviour and moral emotions attributions in a sample of 132 elementary-school children (M _age = 8.39 years, SD = 2.50). Participants were presented a newly developed moral self measure, along with a measure of moral emotion attributions. Two dimensions of children's moral self-concept were identified: preference for prosocial behaviour and avoidance of antisocial behaviour. Results revealed a slight decrease in preference for prosocial behaviour with age, as well as an increased correlation between preference for prosocial behaviour and moral emotion attributions. Overall, findings suggest that moral emotions do not play a pivotal role for young children's moral self-concept. Children's moral self-concept becomes increasingly coordinated with moral emotions as they approach adolescence.     

The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario

Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important implications for moral psychology, as it points toward a previously overlooked mechanism linking emotions to moral judgments.     

The moral emotions: a social-functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt

Recent research has highlighted the important role of emotion in moral judgment and decision making (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001). What is less clear is whether distinctions should be drawn among specific moral emotions. Although some have argued for differences among anger, disgust, and contempt (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), others have suggested that these terms may describe a single undifferentiated emotional response to morally offensive behavior (Nabi, 2002). In this article, we take a social-functionalist perspective, which makes the prediction that these emotions should be differentiable both in antecedent appraisals and in consequent actions and judgments. Studies 1-3 tested and found support for our predictions concerning distinctions among antecedent appraisals, including (a) a more general role for disgust than has been previously been described, (b) an effect of self-relevance on anger but not other emotions, and (c) a role for contempt in judging incompetent actions. Studies 4 and 5 tested and found support for our specific predictions concerning functional outcomes, providing evidence that these emotions are associated with different consequences. Taken together, these studies support a social-functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt and lay the foundation for future research on the negative interpersonal emotions.     

On the autonomy of the divine

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

On the relation between moral, legal and evaluative justifications of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)

In Germany the question whether to uphold or repeal the judicial prohibition on Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) is being debated from quite different standpoints. This paper differentiates the major arguments according to their reasons as a) moral, b) evaluative (i.e. cultural/religious), and c) legal. The arguments for and against PGD can be divided by content into three groups: arguments relating to the status of the embryo, focusing on individual actions in the implementation of PGD, and relating to the foreseeable or probable consequences of PGD. In Germany, from a legal perspective, the status of the embryo does not permit the intervention of PGD; from a purely moral perspective, a prohibition on PGD does not appear defensible. It remains an open question, however, whether the moral argument permitting PGD should be restricted for evaluative (cultural) reasons. The paper discusses the species-ethical reasons, for which Jurgen Habermas sees worrisome consequences in the wake of PGD to the extent that we comprehend it as the forerunner of a 'positive eugenics'. It would so disrupt the natural preconditions of our universal morality. The question of whether to prohibit or allow PGD is not merely a question of simple moral and/or legal arguments, but demands a choice between evaluative, moral and (still to be specified) species-ethical arguments, and the question remains open.     

The paradox of group-based guilt: modes of national identification, conflict vehemence, and reactions to the in-group's moral violations

The authors examined the relationships between 2 modes of national identification (attachment to the in-group and the in-group's glorification) and reactions to the in-group's moral violations among Israeli students. Data were collected during a period of relative calm in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as during a period of great intensification of this conflict. As expected, in Study 1, the 2 modes of identification had contrasting relationships with group-based guilt: Attachment was positively related whereas glorification was negatively related to group-based guilt for in-group's past infractions. Glorification suppressed the attachment effect but not vice versa. Both relationships were mediated by the use of exonerating cognitions. In Study 2, group-based guilt for the in-group's current wrongdoings was increased by priming critical rather than conventional attachment to the in-group, suggesting a causal effect of mode of identification on the experience of negative group-based emotions.     

Intergroup relations and the attribution of emotions: control over memory for secondary emotions associated with the ingroup and outgroup

This study tested the hypothesis that people perceive their ingroup as experiencing more uniquely human secondary emotions than the outgroup. Jacoby's process-dissociation procedure was used to measure participants' controlled recognition memory for materials that associated the ingroup or outgroup with secondary or primary emotions. Conscious memory was better for associations between the outgroup and secondary emotions than for associations between the ingroup and secondary emotions. No such difference was found for primary emotions. These results suggest that people attribute more humanity to the ingroup than to the outgroup.     

On the (numerical) ranking associated with any finite binary relation

We generalize the concept of a ‘ranking associated with a linear order’ from linear orders to arbitrary finite binary relations. Using the concept of differential of an object in a binary relation as theoretical primitive, we axiomatically introduce several measurement scales, some of which include the generalized ranking as a special case. We provide a computational formula for this generalized ranking, discuss its many elegant properties and offer some illustrating examples.     

Young Humeans: the role of emotions in children's evaluation of moral reasoning abilities

Three experiments investigated whether children in grades K, 2, and 4 (n = 144) view emotional comprehension as important in solving moral dilemmas. The experiments asked whether a human or an artificially intelligent machine would be best at solving different types of problems, ranging from moral and emotional to nonmoral and pragmatic. In Experiment 1, children in all age groups indicated that a human would be superior to a computer not only at comprehending emotions, but also at solving moral dilemmas. In Experiment 2, older children also indicated that a human could solve moral dilemmas better than a 'robot' with human-like perceptual and physical abilities. Experiment 3 further demonstrated that these effects were not solely due to a bias towards humans. Thus, children as young as age 5 view emotional understanding as an important element for moral, but not for nonmoral, reasoning, suggesting that the basis for Humean intuitions emerges early in life.