Coincidence: The Grounding Problem,Object-Specifying Principles,and Some Consequences

This paper lays out the basic structure of any view involving coincident entities, in the light of the grounding problem. While the account is not novel, I highlight fundamental features, to which attention is not usually properly drawn. With this in place, I argue for a number of further claims: (1) The basic differences between coincident objects are modal differences, and any other differences between them need to be explained in terms of these differences. More specifically, the basic difference is not a difference in sort. (2) A number of recent defenses of coincidence, which share the basic structure I outline, misidentify what, in their accounts, plays the basic role of addressing (if not solving) the grounding problem. More tentatively, I argue (3) Coincident entities differ only in these modal properties, and properties they entail. In particular, they do not differ in properties like ‘being a tree,’ ‘being a statue,’ or aesthetic properties, and finally (4) in light of how the account of coincidence offered addresses the grounding problem, the grounding problem provides no reason to prefer monism to pluralism.     

Coincidence and Common Cause

According to the traditional view of the causal structure of a coincidence, the several parts of a coincidence are produced by independent causes. I argue that the traditional view is mistaken; even the several parts of a coincidence may have a common cause. This has important implications for how we think about the relationship between causation and causal explanation—and in particular, for why coincidences cannot be explained.     

Substantial Change and Spatiotemporal Coincidence

Substantial change occurs when a persisting object of some kind either begins or ceases to exist. Typically, this happens when one or more persisting objects of another kind or kinds are subjected to appropriate varieties of qualitative or relational change, as when the particles composing a lump of bronze are rearranged so as to create a statue. However, such transformations also seem to result, very often, in cases of spatiotemporal coincidence, in which two numerically distinct objects of different kinds exist in exactly the same place at the same time, such as a statue and a lump of bronze. Various attempts to resist this way of describing the results of such transformations are examined and found wanting and objections to the possibility of cases of spatiotemporal coincidence are rebutted.     

Realization, Micro-Realization, and Coincidence

Let thin properties be properties shared by coincident entities, e.g., a person and her body, and thick properties ones that are not shared. Thick properties entail sortal properties, e.g., being a person, and the associated persistence conditions. On the first account of realization defined here, the realized property and its realizers will belong to the same individual. This restricts the physical realizers of mental properties, which are thick, to thick physical properties. We also need a sense in which mental properties can be realized in thin physical properties shared by a person and her body. Defining this in turn requires defining a sense in which the instantiations of sortal properties and of thick properties are realized in micro-structural states of affairs. A fourth notion of realization is needed to allow for the possibility of coincident entities that share a sortal property, e.g., coincident persons.     

Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem

A lot of people believe that distinct objectscan occupy precisely the same place for theentire time during which they exist. Suchpeople have to provide an answer to the`grounding problem' – they have to explain howsuch things, alike in so many ways, nonethelessmanage to fall under different sortals, or havedifferent modal properties. I argue in detailthat they cannot say that there is anything invirtue of which spatio-temporally coincidentthings have those properties. However, I alsoargue that this may not be as bad as it looks,and that there is a way to make sense of theclaim that such properties are primitive.     

Why Four-Dimensionalism Explains Coincidence

In ‘Does Four-Dimensionalism Explain Coincidence?’ Mark Moyer argues that there is no reason to prefer the four-dimensionalist (or perdurantist) explanation of coincidence to the three-dimensionalist (or endurantist) explanation. I argue that Moyer's formulations of perdurantism and endurantism lead him to overlook the perdurantist's advantage. A more satisfactory formulation of these views reveals a puzzle of coincidence that Moyer does not consider, and the perdurantist's treatment of this puzzle is clearly preferable.     

Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem

It is often said that the same particles can simultaneously make up two or more material objects that differ in kind and in their mental, biological and other qualitative properties. Others wonder how objects made of the same parts in the same arrangement and surroundings could differ in these ways. I clarify this worry and show that attempts to dismiss or solve it miss its point. At most one can argue that it is a problem we can live with.     

Coincidence anticipation of young normal and handicapped children

Two coincident-timing experiments examined the role of three different target velocities and display extents and three age levels of normal and retarded children. Subjects made a ballistic response to a target moving horizontally across their visual field. In the first experiment there were generally no clear differences between normal and retarded children on the task, with subjects having difficulty for both the slow and fast target speeds. In the second experiment, with target velocity held constant, no significant differences were reported between normal and handicapped children, although the longer the subjects were allowed to view the target the more accurate they were. The data were discussed in terms of the response strategies to perform anticipatory ballistic movements. An ecological issue was raised which suggested that children as well as adults make their most accurate anticipations when confronted with velocity problems that have been experienced in their everyday world.     

Knowledge,Justification and Normative Coincidence1

Say that two goals are normatively coincident just in case one cannot aim for one goal without automatically aiming for the other. While knowledge and justification are distinct epistemic goals, with distinct achievement conditions, this paper begins from the suggestion that they are nevertheless normatively coincident—aiming for knowledge and aiming for justification are one and the same activity. A number of surprising consequences follow from this—both specific consequences about how we can ascribe knowledge and justification in lottery cases and more general consequences about the nature of justification and the relationship between justification and evidential probability. Many of these consequences turn out to be at variance with conventional, prevailing views.     

How Coincidence Bears on Persistence

The ‘paradoxes of coincidence’ are generally taken as an important factor for deciding between rival views on persistence through time. In particular, the ability to deal with apparent cases of temporary coincidence is usually regarded as a good reason for favouring perdurantism (or ‘four-dimensionalism’) over endurantism (or ‘three-dimensionalism’). However, the recent work of Gilmore (2007) and McGrath (2007) challenges this standard view. For different reasons, both Gilmore and McGrath conclude that perdurantism does not really obtain support from the puzzles of temporary coincidence. In this paper, I will evaluate their arguments and defend the opposite view: that the paradoxes of coincidence do give some support to perdurantism. However, the way in which they do so is rather unexpected. As we will see, there are different ways in which coincidence scenarios may be thought to support perdurantism, some of which have not yet been sufficiently explored. Thus, my immediate goal is to explore one of those directions, bringing into focus a new argument from coincidence to perdurantism. And although I motivate my discussion by examining the arguments in the work of Gilmore and McGrath, the merits of this argument can be independently assessed. More generally, my overall purpose is to contribute to our general understanding of how the topics of coincidence and persistence bear on each other.     

Physicalism, Teleology and the Miraculous Coincidence Problem

I focus on Fodor's model of the relationship between special sciences and basic physics, and on a criticism of this model, that it implies that the causal stability of, e.g., the mental in its production of behaviour is nothing short of a miraculous coincidence. David Papineau and Graham Macdonaldendorse this criticism. But it is far less clear than they assume that Fodor's picture indeed involves coincidences, which in any case their injection of a teleological supplement cannot explain. Papineau's and Macdonald's problem is subtly different from a similar one presented by Adrian Cussins. This is no more effective against Fodor's picture, but the kind of account of the relation between the physical and the psychological which could constitute a solution to Cussins' problem is one which, for independent reasons, a physicalist of Fodor's stripe ought to provide.     

The Coincidence of Depression and High Ability in Delinquent Youth

We describe the incidence and coincidence of depression and high ability in a sample of Virginia's incarcerated delinquent youth population. Specifically, 207 incarcerated juveniles were assessed with the Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices and the Children's Depression Inventory (CDI). The data indicated there were as many high ability juveniles in detention settings as would be expected in a regular population. Results from the CDI identified 37% as at risk for clinical depression. Cross-tabulation of the data indicated a significant relationship between high ability and depression in the delinquent population. In addition, the findings indicated that the presence of depression is related to the ability level of the juvenile. That high ability delinquents may be more vulnerable to depression argues that the coincidence of these conditions requires consideration. Based upon these findings, and given the high correlation suicide has with depression, we suggest that screening for depression should be mandatory for incarcerated delinquents.     

Coincidence timing of finger, arm, and whole body movements

Two experiments investigated the effects of different types of movement responses on coincidence timing skill. The view was taken that the sensory-motor integration of the movement responses would be reflected in the accuracy and consistency of anticipation timing. A Bassin anticipation timer provided a light stimulus velocity of 3 mph for both experiments and the movements studied included a simple key press using a finger, an arm movement to a key press, and whole body movements culminating with a kick or step to a target. The experiments were modelled closely on the seminal study by Grose (1967). The results of Exp. 1 supported our prediction by demonstrating superiority of the finger task over the two larger movements for all measures of coincidence timing ability. The purpose of Exp. 2 was to compare the slightly different versions of the whole body task-that used in the first experiment and that used by Grose (1967). The results confirmed the close similarity of the two movement tasks and re-affirmed the results of Exp. 1. Exp. 2 also investigated sex effects on coincidence timing ability and, in contrast to previous evidence indicating that females perform with less accuracy and consistency than do males, no significant differences were found. Analysis of practice effects showed that, although there were no significant improvements over trial blocks in Exp. 1, there were significant improvements in Exp. 2. Comparisons with other research suggests that repeated practice in solving a coincident timing problem using whole body movements can lead to improved performance. In general, the findings are consistent with the constructs of action theory and emphasize the roles perceptual and movement variables have in defining situational constraints. Also, findings indicate that proficiency in coincidence anticipation appears to be influenced by the planning and organisation required for movement execution.     

论法家思想中的变法与定法

战国法家有变法和定法主张,它们是辩证的统一。这种辩证统一表现在以下两对概念的关系中:一是法的更改和确立;二是法的动和静。更改和确立是同一变法活动的两个环节,缺一不可;动和静则具有更为内在的意义,它们是更改和确立的根据,更改和确立则是它们的结果或目的。变法和定法是上述两对概念辩证统一关系的现实形态,与现代法律哲学所谓的法具有灵活性和稳定性的性质和表现是一致的,可以得到历史的印证。战国时期各国开展了确立成文法的变法运动,法的灵活性和稳定性的冲突也随之加剧,而这正是法家提出变法和定法主张的历史根源。     

Material Coincidence and the Cinematographic Fallacy: a Response to Olson

Eric T. Olson has argued that those who hold that two material objects can exactly coincide at a moment of time, with one of these objects constituting the other, face an insuperable difficulty in accounting for the alleged differences between the objects, such as their being of different kinds and possessing different persistence-conditions. The differences, he suggests, are inexplicable, given that the objects in question are composed of the same particles related in precisely the same way. In response, I show that the differences are not at all inexplicable once it is recognized that the conditions for a persisting object to be composed by certain particles at a moment of time must involve facts concerning other moments of time, and that the relevant facts are different for persisting objects of different kinds. Philosophers who neglect this sort of constraint on composition principles may be said to be victims of the 'cinematographic fallacy'.