Amodal completion and relationalism

Amodal completion is usually characterized as the representation of those parts of the perceived object that we get no sensory stimulation from. In the case of the visual sense modality, for example, amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of objects we see. I argue that relationalism about perception, the view that perceptual experience is constituted by the relation to the perceived object, cannot give a coherent account of amodal completion. The relationalist has two options: construe the perceptual relation as the relation to the entire perceived object or as the relation to the unoccluded parts of the perceived object. I argue that neither of these options are viable.

     

Object-based auditory and visual attention

Theories of visual attention argue that attention operates on perceptual objects, and thus that interactions between object formation and selective attention determine how competing sources interfere with perception. In auditory perception, theories of attention are less mature and no comprehensive framework exists to explain how attention influences perceptual abilities. However, the same principles that govern visual perception can explain many seemingly disparate auditory phenomena. In particular, many recent studies of 'informational masking' can be explained by failures of either auditory object formation or auditory object selection. This similarity suggests that the same neural mechanisms control attention and influence perception across different sensory modalities.     

On the Perception of Structure

Many of the objects that we perceive have an important characteristic: When they move, they change shape. For instance, when you watch a person walk across a room, her body constantly deforms. I suggest that we exercise a type of perceptual constancy in response to changes of this sort, which I call structure constancy. In this paper I offer an account of structure constancy. I introduce the notion of compositional structure, and propose that structure constancy involves perceptually representing an object as retaining its compositional structure over time. I argue that compositional structure is represented in visual phenomenology, and I also assemble empirical evidence in support of the claim that compositional structure is recovered by the visual system. Finally, I draw out consequences of this account. I argue that structure constancy has implications for the predictive capacities of perception, and that the phenomenon places important constraints on viable accounts of both the format and reference frame of visual experience.     

Seeing absence

Intuitively, we often see absences. For example, if someone steals your laptop at a café, you may see its absence from your table. However, absence perception presents a paradox. On prevailing models of perception, we see only present objects and scenes (Marr, Gibson, Dretske). So, we cannot literally see something that is not present. This suggests that we never literally perceive absences; instead, we come to believe that something is absent cognitively on the basis of what we perceive. But this cognitive explanation does not do justice to the phenomenology. Many experiences of absence possess immediate, perceptual qualities. One may further argue that the ability to detect certain absences confers strong adaptive advantage and therefore must be as primitive and fundamental to humans as seeing positive things. I argue that we can literally see absences; in addition to representing objects, perception represents absences of objects. I present a model of seeing absence based on visual expectations and a visual matching process. The phenomenon of seeing absence can thus serve as an adequacy-test for a theory of perceptual content. If experiences of absence are possible, then we have another reason (following Siegel) to reject the view that perceptual content is restricted to colors and shapes. Furthermore, if the proposed account is correct, then we have grounds for dissociating seeing absence from other imagery-based phenomena termed “perceptual presence-in-absence” (Noë, Macpherson).     

Love and Benevolence in Hutcheson's and Hume's Theories of the Passions

In this paper I consider two related issues raised by Aristotle's treatment of hearing and sounds. The first concerns the kinds of changes Aristotle takes to occur, in both perceptual medium and sense organs, when a perceiver hears a sounding object. The second issue concerns Aristotle's views on the nature and location of the proper objects of auditory perception. I argue that Aristotle's views on these topics are not what they have sometimes been taken to be, and that when rightly understood they compare favourably in many respects with leading contemporary accounts.     

Editorial Notice

Abstract

John McDowell has claimed that the rational link between perceptions and empirical judgements allows us to perceive objects as belonging to a wider reality, one which extends beyond the objects perceived. In this way, we can be said to have a perceptual awareness of the world. I argue that McDowell's account of this perceptual awareness does not succeed. His account as it stands does not have the resources to explain how our perceptions can present objects as belonging to a wider reality, regardless of the judgements we make about that reality. I suggest that we can give a better account of this perceptual awareness of the world by appealing to transcendental phenomenology. A phenomenological study of perceptual experiences describes how they are structured by a sense of the perceived objects as belonging to a world containing other objects of possible perception. I shall outline this sense we have of the world, and argue that it allows us to perceive objects as belonging to a wider reality. Transcendental phenomenology can thus help to explain our perceptual awareness of the world.     

Feature confirmation in object perception: Feature integration theory 26 years on from the Treisman Bartlett lecture

The Treisman Bartlett lecture, reported in the Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology in 1988, provided a major overview of the feature integration theory of attention. This has continued to be a dominant account of human visual attention to this day. The current paper provides a summary of the work reported in the lecture and an update on critical aspects of the theory as applied to visual object perception. The paper highlights the emergence of findings that pose significant challenges to the theory and which suggest that revisions are required that allow for (a) several rather than a single form of feature integration, (b) some forms of feature integration to operate preattentively, (c) stored knowledge about single objects and interactions between objects to modulate perceptual integration, (d) the application of feature-based inhibition to object files where visual features are specified, which generates feature-based spreading suppression and scene segmentation, and (e) a role for attention in feature confirmation rather than feature integration in visual selection. A feature confirmation account of attention in object perception is outlined.     

See an object,hear an object file: Object correspondence transcends sensory modality

An important task of perceptual processing is to parse incoming information into distinct units and to keep track of those units over time as the same, persisting representations. Within the study of visual perception, maintaining such persisting object representations is helped by “object files”—episodic representations that store (and update) information about objects' properties and track objects over time and motion via spatiotemporal information. Although object files are typically discussed as visual, here we demonstrate that object–file correspondence can be computed across sensory modalities. An object file can be initially formed with visual input and later accessed with corresponding auditory information, suggesting that object files may be able to operate at a multimodal level of perceptual processing.     

Representation,Presentation and the Epistemic Role of Perceptual Experience

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the representational theory of perception, on which the world is represented as being a certain way in perceptual experience, cannot explain how there can be a genuinely epistemic connection between experience and belief. I try to show that we are positively required to deny that perceptual consciousness is contentful if we want to make its fitness for epistemic duties intelligible. (So versions of the representational theory on which experience has a merely causal purchase on belief are not considered.) But my aim is not just negative. I try to defeat representationalism in such a way as to motivate a robustly presentational theory of perception. According to such a theory, perceptions are relations not between a subject and a content but between a subject and an ordinary object (such that if the relation holds at t, an appropriate subject and object must exist at t, and the object must be presented to the subject). I end by sketching an account of perceptual experience that is meant to show that, contrary to a very popular misconception, there is a way to conceive perceptual consciousness as relational and presentational (not intentional and representational) that does not succumb to the celebrated ‘myth of the Given’.     

Real Objects of Speech Perception: A Commentary on Diehl and Kluender

I agree with Diehl and Kluender (1989) that perceptual constraints guide the development of sound inventories and of phonological processes in languages. I disagree that these constraints are primary in comparison with other influences on sound inventories, such as articulatory ones. More important, I disagree that any of the evidence that Diehl and Kluender cite, indicates that objects of perception are auditory or acoustic rather than phonetic gestural. None of the evidence is persuasive; all of it is consistent with a view that perceptual objects are gestural. Viewed in a larger context-of a universal theory of perception-a theory that perceptual objects are gestural, whereas acoustic structure serves as information for gestures, is strongly promoted.     

Modularity and attention: Is the binding problem real?

Abstract

Van der Heijden rejects the feature integration theory of visual attention (Treisman, 1988, 1993; Treisman & Gelade, 1980) and proposes instead a theory relating modularity in the visual system to selection for action. His positive proposals about the relations between visual processing, intention, and selection for action are interesting, but I do not believe they are incompatible with my theory. In this paper I will focus on and question his arguments about the binding problem and the role of attention in visual perception. Van der Heijden attacks two claims that are fundamental to my theory: (1) the idea that modularity gives rise to a “binding problem” (the need to specify which of the features present characterize any particular object), and (2) the more general idea that there are limits to capacity at the level of perceptual processing. I will argue that he is wrong to reject the two claims, that the binding problem is a real one, for his model as for others, and that his account is more similar to mine than he appears to realize.     

The experience of force: the role of haptic experience of forces in visual perception of object motion and interactions, mental simulation, and motion-related judgments

Forces are experienced in actions on objects. The mechanoreceptor system is stimulated by proximal forces in interactions with objects, and experiences of force occur in a context of information yielded by other sensory modalities, principally vision. These experiences are registered and stored as episodic traces in the brain. These stored representations are involved in generating visual impressions of forces and causality in object motion and interactions. Kinematic information provided by vision is matched to kinematic features of stored representations, and the information about forces and causality in those representations then forms part of the perceptual interpretation. I apply this account to the perception of interactions between objects and to motions of objects that do not have perceived external causes, in which motion tends to be perceptually interpreted as biological or internally caused. I also apply it to internal simulations of events involving mental imagery, such as mental rotation, trajectory extrapolation and judgment, visual memory for the location of moving objects, and the learning of perceptual judgments and motor skills. Simulations support more accurate judgments when they represent the underlying dynamics of the event simulated. Mechanoreception gives us whatever limited ability we have to perceive interactions and object motions in terms of forces and resistances; it supports our practical interventions on objects by enabling us to generate simulations that are guided by inferences about forces and resistances, and it helps us learn novel, visually based judgments about object behavior.     

Visual-auditory events: cross-modal perceptual priming and recognition memory.

Modality specificity in priming is taken as evidence for independent perceptual systems. However, Easton, Greene, and Srinivas (1997) showed that visual and haptic cross-modal priming is comparable in magnitude to within-modal priming. Where appropriate, perceptual systems might share like information. To test this, we assessed priming and recognition for visual and auditory events, within- and across- modalities. On the visual test, auditory study resulted in no priming. On the auditory priming test, visual study resulted in priming that was only marginally less than within-modal priming. The priming results show that visual study facilitates identification on both visual and auditory tests, but auditory study only facilitates performance on the auditory test. For both recognition tests, within-modal recognition exceeded cross-modal recognition. The results have two novel implications for the understanding of perceptual priming: First, we introduce visual and auditory priming for spatio-temporal events as a new priming paradigm chosen for its ecological validity and potential for information exchange. Second, we propose that the asymmetry of the cross-modal priming observed here may reflect the capacity of these perceptual modalities to provide cross-modal constraints on ambiguity. We argue that visual perception might inform and constrain auditory processing, while auditory perception corresponds to too many potential visual events to usefully inform and constrain visual perception.     

Sellars and Nonconceptual Content

In this paper I take up the question of whether Wilfrid Sellars has a notion of non‐conceptual perceptual content. The question is controversial, being one of the fault lines along which so‐called left and right Sellarsians diverge. In the paper I try to make clear what it is in Sellars' thought that leads interpreters to such disparate conclusions. My account depends on highlighting the importance of Sellars' little discussed thesis that perception involves a systematic form of mis‐categorization, one where perceivers mistake their sensory states to be properties of physical objects. I argue that the counterpart color and shape attributes of these states, which become ‘point of viewish’ when organized by the productive imagination, provides perceptual experience with its non‐conceptual representational content. I then argue that this content is not a form of the mythical Given because one can only have a non‐conceptual point of view on an object when an object is introduced into one's perceptual experience through the conceptual mis‐taking of one's sensory states. So, while Sellars has a notion of non‐conceptual representational content, it can only be salient in the context of a perceptual act that is conceptual overall.     

Perception and imagination: amodal perception as mental imagery

When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we represent the occluded parts of perceived objects by means of mental imagery. This conclusion could be thought of as a (weak) version of the Strawsonian dictum, according to which “imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself”.     

The tunnel effect,Gibson's perception theory,and reflective seeing

Summary Subjects can have continuous visual experience of an object's movement across a display though the movement's middle phase takes place behind an opaque screen. The present article considers explanatory issues pertaining to this so-called, tunnel effect, with special reference to Gibson' s perception theory and the visual activity that I have been calling reflective seeing. Among the issues discussed are the following. (a) In the tunnel experiments, I suggest, there occur both persisting perception, as Michotte held, and persistence perception, as Gibson held. The subjects pick up stimulus information that allows visually experiencing the object's going out of sight at one edge of the screen and coming back into sight at another edge of the screen; the subjects have visual experience of the continued existence and movement of the object while it is out of sight. Moreover, persistence of perceptual experience is involved: when the object goes out of sight, the subjects' visual experience of its movement goes on. (b) I also argue that the tunnel effect is a phenomenon of both straightforward and reflective seeing. Adopting a phenomenal attitude, as one does when reporting one's perceptual experience, one still sees movement taking place on the other side of the screen, as one does in straightforward seeing. However, whereas straightforward seeing does not give inner awareness of visual experience, the subjects in the tunnel experiments report visually experiencing the object's movement while also visually experiencing the opaque screen in front of it as opaque. I argue that these reports, and those about the object's going out of and coming back into sight, must be based on the kind of visual experience that is part and product of reflective seeing.     

Leonardo's constraint: two opaque objects cannot be seen in the same direction

Given Leonardo's constraint that 2 opaque objects cannot be seen in the same direction, how are the regions of objects occluded to 1 eye included in perception? To answer this question, the authors presented 3-dimensional stimuli, similar to the ones that concerned Leonardo, and measured the visual directions of their monocular and binocular regions. When the distance between near and far objects was large, the nonfixated object was seen as double and blurry. Leonardo's constraint was met by seeing the near object as double and transparent or the distant object as double and superimposed. When the distance between near and far objects was small, the constraint was met by a perceptual displacement and compression of parts of the nonfixated object.     

Object-based warping: an illusory distortion of space within objects

Visual objects are high-level primitives that are fundamental to numerous perceptual functions, such as guidance of attention. We report that objects warp visual perception of space in such a way that spatial distances within objects appear to be larger than spatial distances in ground regions. When two dots were placed inside a rectangular object, they appeared farther apart from one another than two dots with identical spacing outside of the object. To investigate whether this effect was object based, we measured the distortion while manipulating the structure surrounding the dots. Object displays were constructed with a single object, multiple objects, a partially occluded object, and an illusory object. Nonobject displays were constructed to be comparable to object displays in low-level visual attributes. In all cases, the object displays resulted in a more powerful distortion of spatial perception than comparable non-object-based displays. These results suggest that perception of space within objects is warped.     

Dissolving an epistemological puzzle of time perception

Robin Le Poidevin (2007) claims that we do form perceptual beliefs regarding order and duration based on our perception of events, but neither order nor duration are by themselves objects of perception. Temporal properties are discernible only when one first perceives their bearers, and temporal relations are discernible only when one first perceives their relata. The epistemic issue remains as to whether or not our perceptual beliefs about order and duration are formed on the causal basis of an event’s objective order and duration. Le Poidevin raises this issue in the form of an epistemological puzzle of time perception, from which he derives the claim that the order and duration of events do not causally contribute to our perceptual beliefs about them. Since his view is motivated by a causal truthmaker principle for grounding knowledge, it also holds that perceptual beliefs about temporal features must be caused by the features themselves in order to count as knowledge. Given these theoretical commitments, there is a puzzle concerning how such perceptual beliefs could constitute knowledge of temporal properties. In response to Le Poidevin, I argue for an account according to which order and duration are objects of perception, causally contribute to our perceptual beliefs about them, and such beliefs are capable of counting as knowledge. I conclude by showing that, on my alternative account, the epistemological puzzle dissolves and his own solution to it fails.