论人力资本、社会资本和道德资本

人力资本、社会资本、道德资本是当前国际范围内的学术热点问题.但是三者之间并不是各不相干的,而是有着深刻的内在关联.它们的关系主要表现在:人力资本包含了社会资本和道德资本,或者反过来说,没有社会资本和道德资本的人力资本是不完全和不完善的;社会资本从社会角度丰富和深化了人力资本的内涵,而道德资本则从个体角度丰富和深化了人力资本的内涵;人力资本主要适用于经济和管理领域,而社会资本和道德资本不仅适用于经济和管理领域,而且也适用于广泛的社会领域和个人生活领域.     

社会信用体系的道德支撑与法律保障

我国社会信用危机的存在有多方面的原因:社会体制转轨导致社会秩序失范;社会转型导致道德困惑;信用法规不健全,缺少法治观念.建立社会信用体系需要从以下几方面着手:以道德观教育为切入点,构建信用体系的思想基础;建立道德建设的长效机制;信用行为应是一种"制度安排".同时,社会信用体系的构建还需要法律保障.     

Well-Being and Moral Constraints: A Modified Subjectivist Account

Philosophia - In this paper, I argue that a modified version of well-being subjectivism can avoid the standard, yet unintuitive, conclusion that morally horrible acts may contribute to an...     

Moral Risks in Social Work

ABSTRACT Social workers must often decide whether a child, at possible risk from its parents, should be removed from home. Each year some children, left at home, are abused or killed. If the procedures have been duly followed, is a bad result to be put down to incompetence or to bad luck, and, if to the latter, does that cancel moral responsibility? We examine the claim that the case is one of ‘moral luck’ and argue that the system licences greater risk than is morally justified. This is because it embodies conflicting imperatives of welfare and justice. Anyone who becomes a social worker must face a constant risk to moral integrity [1].     

Solidarity and Social Moral Rules

The value of solidarity, which is exemplified in noble groups like the Civil Rights Movement along with more mundane teams, families and marriages, is distinctive in part because people are in solidarity over, for or with regard to something, such as common sympathies, interests, values, etc. I use this special feature of solidarity to resolve a longstanding puzzle about enacted social moral rules, which is, aren’t these things just heuristics, rules of thumb or means of coordination that we ‘fetishize’ or ‘worship’ if we stubbornly insist on sticking to them when we can do more good by breaking them? I argue that when we are in a certain kind of solidarity with others, united by social moral rules that we have established among ourselves, the rules we have developed and maintain are a constitutive part of our solidary relationships with one another; and it is part of being in this sort of solidarity with our comrades that we are presumptively required to follow the social moral rules that join us together. Those in the Polish Revolution, for example, were bound by informally enforced rules about publicity, free speech and the use of violence, so following their own rules became a way of standing in a valuable sort of solidarity with one another. I explain why we can have non-instrumental reasons to follow the social moral rules that exist in our own society, improve our rules and even sometimes to break the otherwise good rules that help to unite us.     

Social Psychology,Moral Character,and Moral Fallibility*

In recent years, there has been considerable debate in the literature concerning the existence of moral character. One lesson we should take away from these debates is that the concept of character, and the role it plays in guiding our actions, is far more complex than most of us initially took it to be. Just as Gilbert Harman, for example, makes a serious mistake in insisting, plain and simply, that there is no such thing as character, defenders of character also make a mistake to the extent that they imply there is no problem raised by the psychological literature for either the concept of character or the nature of character‐based ethics. My hope for this paper is to avoid both of these mistakes by first, exploring exactly what is the concept of character that is so firmly rooted in our philosophical and everyday thinking; and second, exploring the implications of the psychological literature for this appropriately understood concept of character. In so doing, I will come to a resolution that vindicates the existence of character, while at the same time calls attention to the real and serious problem suggested by the psychological evidence. This, we will see, is a problem of moral motivation.     

道德精神的社会资源支持

道德精神是对道德的敬畏、向往和坚守的心理意识和精神态度,培育道德精神离不开社会资源的支持。其中,制度作为最基本的道德是道德的基本保障;文化资源可以为道德的坚守培土;风俗或风气作为社会道德的评判机制有助于道德权威的确立;民族事件是道德精神的集中体现,可以塑造对道德精神的崇高感。     

论道德继承

道德是符合社会之理而维持社会存在的人的行为价值和规范。道德有一般与特殊之分,一般道德的抽象性和特殊道德的具体性决定了二者继承方法的选择,即前者抽象继承,后者批判继承。历史上积累的道德价值和道德规范是道德继承的对象,此对象无论采取何种表述方式,终究可以用语言或者文字的形式表述为一个道德命题。因此,道德继承实质上是对道德命题的继承。道德命题是以善恶价值为内容、对某一道德状况或某一道德要求用逻辑语言所作的判断和陈述。它通常包括形式的或者逻辑的层面和实际的或者经验的层面,前者表征其一般意义,后者表征其特殊意义。理论上,前者采用抽象继承法,后者采用批判继承法,但实际上二者密不可分。因此,现实生活中的道德继承需兼顾两面,即采用一体两面相结合的道德继承模式。     

道德社会化探析

本文在对道德社会化几种理论进行简要评析的基础上,提出道德社会化的基本内容包括认同道德规范、明晰道德关系、形成道德人格;实现道德社会化的基本途径包括社会的道德教育和个体的道德修养.     

"道德性生产力"理念释义

道德生产力究竟是指"道德是生产力"还是指"道德的生产力",这是两个不同性质却又相互关联的问题.从伦理经济学的视角审视,将道德生产力解释为"道德性生产力"更合乎这一命题的本意,也即从伦理道德的视角对生产力进行价值分析和行为导向.道德性生产力不但是为生产主义、物质主义和经济主义提供一个系统的知识框架和有力的理论根据,而且是一种面向问题与行动的实践理性和精神实践.道德性生产力理念喻示着不能将生产力看成是完全中性的客体,它蕴含着道德属性,是富有时代性意蕴的行为价值哲学.     

论道德妥协

妥协是冲突双方A和B通过相互自愿让步以解决冲突而达成的一致,当涉及不同的道德价值和原则时,妥协成为道德妥协。道德冲突是道德妥协的必要条件。道德妥协的可欲性与道德冲突的解决和完整性密切相关。其中,完整性成为道德妥协的限度。要达成一种保护完整性的道德妥协,冲突双方要对道德冲突本身有所了解,并将他们所有的道德价值和原则都考虑进来。     

论道德能力

道德能力是一个很重要的概念。罗尔斯就把道德能力作为考察和建构现代社会的逻辑起点和价值支点,以此为基础寻求自由和平等的结合方式,安排社会的基本结构。在这里,道德能力不只是一个道德心理学的概念,更是一个道德哲学的概念。其内涵可以概括为三个层面,即合理的价值观、正义感和仁爱心、自主意识和责任感。一、合理的价值观:道德能力的实质罗尔斯把社会理解为一个公平的合作体系,对参与合作的人提出了特定的要求。他认为,合作者必须具备两种基本的道德能力,一是正义感,即一种能够了解、应用并依正义原则行事的能力;二是善观念,即具有一种…