Brentano on the dual relation of the mental

Brentano held that every mental phenomenon has an object and is conscious (the dual relation thesis). The dual relation thesis faces a number of well-known problems. The paper explores how Brentano tried to overcome these problems. In considering Brentano's responses, the paper sheds light on Brentano's theory of judgement that underpins his philosophy of mind.     

Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness

Brentano's theory of consciousness has garnered a surprising amount of attention in recent philosophy of mind (Thomasson 2000 , Caston 2002, Hossack 2002, 2006, Kriegel 2003a, 2003b, 2009, Thomas 2003 , Smith 2004 , Zahavi 2004, Drummond 2006, Textor 2006, 2013 ). Here I argue for a novel interpretation of Brentano's theory that casts it as more original than previously appreciated and yet quite plausible upon inspection. According to Brentano's theory, as interpreted here, a conscious experience of a tree is a mental state that can be simultaneously thought of, or framed, equally accurately as (i) an awareness of a tree or (ii) an awareness of an awareness of a tree.     

Voluntarism,Atonement, and Duns Scotus

The two most important concepts in Duns Scotus's (1265/6‐1308) theology of the Atonement are satisfaction and merit. Just what these amount to and how they function in his theory are heavily conditioned by two more general commitments: Scotus's voluntarism, which includes the claim that nearly all of God's relations with the created order are contingent; and his formulation of the Franciscan Thesis, which holds that fixing the sin problem is not the primary purpose of God's Incarnation in Christ and that if Adam hadn't sinned God would have become incarnate anyway. In this essay I will discuss the theoretical background of Scotus's atonement theology—his voluntarism and his version of the Franciscan Thesis—before moving on to discuss his understanding of merit and satisfaction, how these are related, and how they relate to the theoretical background. I will engage some important recent scholarly attempts to position Scotus's Atonement theology as not quite as anti‐Anselmian as history has characterized it, arguing that one of these attributes to Scotus an understanding of merit which cannot be Scotus's in fact, since it entails a restriction on divine freedom that Scotus certainly would reject.     

Psychophysical relations

Honderich proposes a picture of mind based on three theses including, centrally, the Correlation Thesis (that there are correlations of a lawlike kind between mental occurrents and physical processes). The theses are not fully compatible with ordinary convictions about the efficacy of the mental in determining actions. This paper is mainly concerned to examine the Correlation Thesis and to secure the efficacy of the mental within a materialist picture. A consideration of the possible forms that psychophysical relations might take, with due regard to neuropsychological theory and results, supports a psychophysical identity theory. Leibniz's Law can be satisfied, on a suitably informed reading of the identity statement, so as to capture the intuition that mental occurrents are identical not with physical processes simpliciter, but with the undergoing of them. If the psychophysical relation is identity, then the efficacy of the mental is secured within a materialist picture based on a natural‐kinds theory.     

Presentism and the Myth of Passage

Presentism is held by most to be the intuitive theory of time, due in large part to the view's supposed preservation of time's passage. In this paper, I strike a blow against presentism's intuitive pull by showing how the presentist, contrary to overwhelming popular belief, is unable to establish temporal change upon which the passage of time is based. I begin by arguing that the presentist's two central ontological commitments, the Present Thesis and the Change Thesis, are incompatible. The main problem is that satisfying the Change Thesis to establish passage requires the existence of more than one moment. This conflicts with the Present Thesis that only the present moment exists. The presentist's response is to appeal to surrogates to stand proxy for the past, so as to account for the difference between what does exist and what did exist. I argue that, for this surrogate strategy to be successful, the proposed surrogates must track what actually happened. I demonstrate that there is no guarantee that this is the case. As a result, the presentist's preservation of temporal change fails, which means that there is no passage in presentism. In the end, we should rethink just how intuitive presentism happens to be.     

Brentano's theory of intentionality

Chapters Five through Nine of Book Two of Brentano's 1874 Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint were republished in 1911 with a substantive Appendix of Brentano's remarks. In the Appendix Brentano makes a significant addition to his theory of intentionality. In particular, he introduces new modes within the mode of presentation itself. These new modes are needed to account for our thinking about anything in a relational structure (in recto and in obliquo modes) and for our thoughts about time (the temporal mode). I want to suggest that in the end Brentano simply takes relations to be different kinds of modes.     

Deducing the Mind

Frank Jackson has argued that, in principle, all mental truths are deducible from all physical science truths: 'deducibility'. Jackson's defence of deducibility relies upon the method for producing naturalistic definitions of mental states championed in the analytical functionalism of himself, David Lewis, and others. Two arguments are presented. The first contends that the particular naturalistic definitions of analytical functionalism fail because they do not take account of the extraordinary kind of bodily animation displayed by human beings, which I argue is necessary to (at least one kind of) mentality; machines lacking (at least this one kind of) mentality can satisfy the naturalistic definitions of analytical functionalism. So Jackson's defence of deducibility fails as it stands. The second argument contends that no naturalistic conceptual analysis of the mental can be adequate, because understanding (certain) mental concepts requires a special kind of affective reaction here named 'personal response', while understanding naturalistic concepts does not require this- therefore no naturalistic analysis can ever capture our common-sense mental concepts. The upshot is that Jackson's defence of deducibility cannot be repaired. No defence of deducibility will work which relies upon the possibility of naturalistic conceptual analyses of mentality.     

Brentano on the individuation of mental acts

This paper aims to present and evaluate Brentano's account of the individuation of mental acts. In his early works, Brentano assimilated mental acts to tropes; however, he encountered difficulties in explaining their individuation, since the usual solutions for the individuation of tropes were not readily applicable to his theory of mental acts. In a later period, Brentano introduced into his psychology what he called the “soul,” and this allowed him to explain the individuation of mental acts. Finally, after his “reistic” turn, he excluded mental acts from his ontology, for he rejected abstracta of any kind, including abstract particulars, and admitted only things, or res (in Latin), that is, concrete particulars; in his late philosophy, there are no “thinkings,” but only “thinkers.” However, he still needed to explain what individuates different thinkers, and this was again the soul. In the conclusion, the paper critically compares the different theoretical options considered by Brentano.     

On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism*

The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey's Thesis (RT), which determines the prices an agent is rationally required to pay for a bet. Hedden (2013) argues that Ramsey's Thesis is wrong. He claims that Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) determines those prices, and it often disagrees with Ramsey's Thesis. I suggest two responses to Hedden's objection. First, we might be permissive: agents are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by RT, and they are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by MSEU. This allows us to give a revised version of the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism, which I call the Permissive Dutch Book Argument. Second, I suggest that even Hedden should admit that RT gives the correct answer in certain very limited cases, and I show that, together with MSEU, this very restricted version of RT gives a new pragmatic argument for Probabilism, which I call the Bookless Pragmatic Argument.     

Linking Sexism and Speciesism

Some feminists and animal advocates defend what I call the Linked Oppressions Thesis, according to which the oppression of women and the oppression of animals are linked causally, materially, normatively, and/or conceptually. Alasdair Cochrane offers objections to several versions of the Linked Oppressions Thesis and concludes that the Thesis should be rejected in all its forms. In this paper I defend the Thesis against Cochrane's objections as well as objections leveled by Beth Dixon, and argue that the failure of these objections illuminates the idea of linked oppressions as well as misunderstandings of the Linked Oppressions Thesis, and may provide guidance to philosophers theorizing animal rights from a feminist perspective.     

The function of language in parent‐infant psychotherapy

Parent‐infant psychotherapy, a rather new field in psychoanalysis, raises questions of how to conceptualize the clinical process. Previous publications have used semiotic concepts to account for the therapist's non‐verbal communication and investigated the countertransference, including what the baby might grasp of its variations. The present paper focuses on another argument for using verbal interventions to a baby in therapy; they present him with a symbolic order that differs from that of the parent. The qualitative difference between the parent's and the analyst's address is conceptualized by Dolto's term parler vrai. The therapeutic leverage is not the analytic interventions' lexical content but their message that words can be used to expose conflicts. Thereby, one can transform warded‐off desires into demands that can be negotiated with one's objects. The reasons why this address catches the baby's attention are discussed. A prerequisite for such attention is that the infant brain is prewired for perceiving words as a special communicative mode. Relevant neuroscientific research is reviewed in regard to this question. The presentation relies on concepts by Dolto, Lacan and Winnicott and findings from neuroscience and developmental psychology. It also briefly discusses Chomsky's linguistic concepts in relation to these therapies.     

On Aristotelianism and Structures as Parts

Aristotelian substance theory tells us that substances have structures (read: forms) as proper parts. This claim has recently been defended by Kathrin Koslicki who dubbed it the ‘Neo‐Aristotelian Thesis.’ Strangely, Aristotelianism has not yet been universally embraced by philosophers – partly because some of its claims, such as the Neo‐Aristotelian Thesis – are viewed by some as counterintuitive at best. In this paper, I argue for Aristotelianism by showing its philosophical usefulness: specifically, I put it to use in saving the metaphysical doctrine of endurantism and some central mereological doctrines (such as Transitivity) from recent attacks. This utility gives us reason to endorse Aristotelianism. Along the way, I defend Koslicki's argument for the Neo‐Aristotelian Thesis from a recent criticism, thus helping provide still more reason to endorse Aristotelianism: namely, Koslicki's vindicated argument.     

Applications,Implications, Complications: Reply to Reviews by Elkind,Gerson, and Levine

The author appreciates the careful reading and thoughtful reviews by Sue Elkind, Sam Gerson, and Howard Levine. Elkind's review particularly captures and articulates many of the key ideas in the book Building Bridges: The Negotiation of Paradox in Psychoanalysis and creatively applies concepts of negotiation, paradox, an inherently multiple “distributed self,” and metaphor in her own work consulting on treatment impasses. Gerson incisively focuses on the core idea of recognizing, accepting, and bridging differences and contradictions in personal, and national, perspectives; he also articulates an understanding of the attempt of relational analytic writers to bridge the intrapsychic and the interpersonal with due recognition of each. The author replies extensively to Levine's comparison of Pizer's work with that of Semrad and other “classical” analysts and challenges Levine's premise that a relational perspective, grounded as it is in a two-person contextual psychology, ignores or devalues interpretation, insight, free association, and autonomous mental functioning. Quoting from clinical material in his book, Pizer presents the outcome of a “relational” analysis in terms of the patient's increased access to internal “potential space,” unconscious experience, curiosity, and reflectiveness about the mental life of self and other, and an increased ability to value personal experience in relationship and in solitude.     

An Independent Theory of Clinical Technique

The history of Independent analysis in the British Psychoanalytical Society is reviewed. The Independent Tradition, as an approach to psychoanalysis, is distinguished from the organisational grouping in the British Society that is the Independent Group. The Independent Tradition emphasises what differentiates human beings rather than how they exemplify general principles. This derives from Freud through Ferenczi. Ferenczi's stress on the quality of the patient's experience, on the need for analysts to be aware of the effect on themselves of the analytic process, and on the need for restraint in interpretation are all characteristically Independent aspects of analytic technique. Later Independent thinkers have developed these themes further. Especially important is Enid Balint's idea that theory mediates the analyst's creative imagination. The analytic setting infuses ordinary human interaction with psychoanalytic awareness, and another function of theory is to imbue with psychoanalytic understanding the use of everyday language. Independent clinical technique is primarily a way of listening. Regression is accepted, and free association valued as being in itself a vehicle of psychic growth. A central idea is that the analyst is an analytic object to be made use of by the patient. Several clinical examples illustrate the functioning in practice of these concepts.     

Reliabilism,scepticism, and evidentia in Ockham

The aim of this paper is to challenge the reliabilist interpretation of William Ockham (ca. 1287–1347)'s epistemology. The discussion proceeds as follows. First, I analyse the reliabilist interpretation into two theses: (1) a negative thesis I call the Anti-Internalism Thesis, according to which, for Ockham, epistemic justification does not depend on any internal factors that are accessible by reflection; (2) a positive thesis I call the Reliability Thesis, according to which epistemic justification in Ockham depends on the reliability of a causal process through which a given judgment is produced. Secondly, I argue that the Anti-Internalism Thesis fails since Ockham's notion of evidentness (evidentia), which is at the heart of his theory of justification, strongly suggests that he posits an indispensable, internalist element of justification. Lastly, I argue that the Reliability Thesis also fails since not only can there be a reliable but inevident judgment in Ockham's framework, his emphasis on causality is best read not as talk of reliability, but as his emphasis on the relation between reason (or evidence) and what is based on reason.     

Discussion: The Analyst's Involvement in the Creative Aspect of Analysis

Recent formulations on the psychology of creativity in the analytic context, such as Albert Rothenberg's “homospacial thinking,” Arnold Modell's “unconscious metaphoric thought,” and Thomas Ogden's “transformational thinking,” are discussed. These concepts enable previously unconnected experiences to be combined within the mind, while emphasizing interpersonal imaginative processes such as identification and empathic knowledge; the dual cognitive features of these formulations permit awareness of the complexity of feelings in oneself and others, essential for psychoanalytic creativity. Further, the articles in this issue are synthesized, highlighting the importance of the analyst making creative (new and valuable) use of his or her entire life experience, feelings, attitudes, and fantasies in treatment. From this dicussion, it is evident that the analyst's creative use of self should be more systematically incorporated into psychoanalytic theory of technique.     

The Mastery of Countertransference or Mynothaur's Labyrinth

This paper considers the fundamental change introduced by Ferenczi in 1919 by proposing the use of countertransference as an instrument. Basically it reconsiders the concept of analytic neutrality; mastery of countertransference is reached through tolerating it, overcoming resistances against it, demanding a very intense involvement of the analyst, as opposed to the image of the surgeon or the mirror. The paper analyzes the implications of this position for psychoanalysis. It places these concepts in the scientific and personal context in which it was written, then follows the later developments of these ideas in Ferenczi's own work, as well as in that of some other authors, and comments on the effects of these ideas on the psychoanalytic movement. Finally it poses some questions regarding our present use of countertransference in clinical work, with two brief vignettes highlighting these points.