Phenomenology,Objectivity, and the Explanatory Gap

There has been much recent discussion of whether Husserlian phenomenology might be relevant to the explanatory gap—the problem of explaining how conscious experience arises from nonexperiential events or processes. However, some phenomenologists have argued that the explanatory gap is a confused problem, because it starts by assuming a false distinction between the subjective and the objective. Rather than trying to solve this problem, they claim that phenomenology should dissolve it by undermining the distinction upon which it is based. I shall argue that adopting a phenomenological approach does not provide reason to think that the explanatory gap is not a genuine problem. In assessing the assumptions underlying the gap, we must distinguish between objectivity understood as a stance we can take toward the world and objectivity as the world's having a structure independent of any experience. The explanatory gap can be understood as the problem of finding a place for consciousness in this objective structure. This does not force us to take an objective stance or reduce the methods of phenomenology to those of the natural sciences.     

Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot

Colours and consciousness both present us with metaphysical problems. But what exactly are the problems? According to standard accounts, they are roughly the following. On the one hand, we have reason to believe, about both colour and consciousness, that they are identical with some familiar natural phenomena. But on the other hand, it is hard to see how these identities could obtain. I argue that this is an adequate characterisation of our metaphysical problem of colour, but a mischaracterisation of the problem of consciousness. It mischaracterises the problem by presenting consciousness as more ‘colour-like’ than we have reason to take it to be. The real problem of consciousness is, I suggest, that almost nothing theoretically useful is known about this phenomenon at present. I also explore some implications of this perspective on the problem of consciousness. Given the shape of the problem, I argue that we can’t rule out all forms of eliminativism about consciousness. Nor can we rule out that future research will close the ‘explanatory gap’ that consciousness gives rise to.     

The Epistemic/Ontic Divide

A number of philosophers think that, while we cannot explain how the mind is physical, we can know that it is physical, nonetheless. That is, they accept both the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical and ontological physicalism. I argue that this position is unstable. Among other things, I argue that once one accepts the explanatory gap, the main argument for ontological physicalism, the argument from causation, looses its force. For if one takes physicaVnonphysical causation and ontological physicalism to be equally mysterious, as physicalists who accept the explanatory gap are inclined to do, there is little justification for accepting ontological physicalism rather than rejecting the causal closure of the physical.     

“Looking Up” and “Looking Down”: On the Dual Character of Mechanistic Explanations

Mechanistic explanation is at present the received view of scientific explanation. One of its central features is the idea that mechanistic explanations are both “downward looking” and “upward looking”: they explain by offering information about the internal constitution of the mechanism as well as the larger environment in which the mechanism is situated. That is, they offer both constitutive and contextual explanatory information. Adequate mechanistic explanations, on this view, accommodate the full range of explanatory factors both “above” and “below” the target phenomenon. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that mechanistic explanation cannot furnish both constitutive and contextual information simultaneously, because these are different types of explanation with distinctly different aims. Claims that they can, I argue, depend on several intertwined confusions concerning the nature of explanation. Particularly, such claims tend to conflate mechanistic and functional explanation, which I argue ought to be understood as distinct. Conflating them threatens to oversell the explanatory power of mechanisms and obscures the means by which they explain. I offer two broad reasons in favor of distinguishing mechanistic and functional explanation: the first concerns the direction of explanation of each, and the second concerns the type of questions to which these explanations offer answers. I suggest an alternative picture on which mechanistic explanation is understood as fundamentally constitutive, and according to which an adequate understanding of a phenomenon typically requires supplementing the mechanistic explanation with a functional explanation.     

HAVING KNOW‐HOW: INTELLECT,ACTION, AND RECENT WORK ON RYLE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE‐HOW AND KNOWLEDGE‐THAT

Stanley and Williamson reject Ryle's knowing‐how/knowing‐that distinction charging that it obstructs our understanding of human action. Incorrectly interpreting the distinction to imply that knowledge‐how is non‐propositional, they object that Ryle's argument for it is unsound and linguistic theory contradicts it. I show that they (and their interlocutors) misconstrue the distinction and Ryle's argument. Consequently, their objections fail. On my reading, Ryle's distinction pertains to, not knowledge, but an explanatory gap between explicit and implicit content, and his argument for it is sound. I defend the distinction's necessity in explaining human action and show that it propels a fruitful explanatory program.     

Explaining features of fine-grained phenomena using abstract analyses of phenomena and mechanisms: two examples from chronobiology

Explanations of biological phenomena such as cell division, protein synthesis or circadian rhythms commonly take the form of models of the responsible mechanisms. Recently philosophers of science have attempted to analyze this practice, presenting mechanisms as organized collections of parts performing operations that together produce the phenomenon. But in some cases what researchers seek to explain is not a general phenomenon, but a specific feature of a more fine-grained phenomenon. In some of these cases, it is not the model of the mechanism that performs the explanatory work. I consider a case in which the investigator offered an abstract representation of a fine-grained phenomenon to show why in had the feature in question. I consider a second case in which a researcher abstracted from the mechanism to identify a design principle that explains why the functioning mechanism exhibits a specific feature.

     

Skepticism and elegance: problems for the abductivist reply to Cartesian skepticism

Some philosophers argue that we are justified in rejecting skepticism because it is explanatorily inferior to more commonsense hypotheses about the world. Focusing on the work of Jonathan Vogel, I show that this “abductivist” or “inference to the best explanation” response rests on an impoverished explanatory framework which ignores the explanatory gap between an object's having certain properties and its appearing to have those properties. Once this gap is appreciated, I argue, the abductivist strategy is defeated.     

A normatively adequate credal reductivism

It is a prevalent, if not popular, thesis in the metaphysics of belief that facts about an agent’s beliefs depend entirely upon facts about that agent’s underlying credal state. Call this thesis ‘credal reductivism’ and any view that endorses this thesis a ‘credal reductivist view’. An adequate credal reductivist view will accurately predict both when belief occurs and which beliefs are held appropriately, on the basis of credal facts alone. Several well-known—and some lesser known—objections to credal reductivism turn on the inability of standard credal reductivist views to get the latter, normative, results right. This paper presents and defends a novel credal reductivist view according to which belief is a type of “imprecise credence” that escapes these objections by including an extreme credence of 1.     

The global workspace theory,the phenomenal concept strategy,and the distribution of consciousness

Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and point to an alternative strategy for defending scientific theories of consciousness, one that better reflects the ongoing scientific practice. I argue there are introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts that scientists can use to individuate the global workspace in terms of capacities that animals and humans share.     

Causes of cultural disparity: Switches,tuners, and the cognitive science of religion

Cultural disparity – the variation across cultural traits such as knowledge, skill, and belief – is a complex phenomenon, studied by a number of researchers with an expanding empirical toolkit. While there is a growing consensus as to the processes that generate cultural variation and change, general explanatory frameworks require additional tools for identifying, organizing, and relating the complex causes that underpin the production of cultural disparity. Here I develop a case study in the cognitive science of religion and demonstrate how concepts and distinctions drawn from work on contrastive explanation and manipulationist accounts of causation provide such tools for distinguishing explanatory levels, organizing causal narratives, and accounting for cross-cultural patterns.     

Rear-view perception in driving: Distance information is privileged in the selection of safe gaps

Selecting a safe gap before merging into the traffic is a crucial driving skill that relies on images provided by rear-view mirrors or, recently, camera-monitor systems. When using these visual aids, some drivers select dangerously small gaps to cut in front of faster vehicles. They may do so because they base their decision either on information about distance or object size, or on miscalculated information about time-to-passage (TTP). Previous experiments have been unable to compare the role of TTP, speed, and distance information for drivers’ gap selection, as they did not investigate them in the same experimental regime. The present experiments seek to determine the perceptual variables that guide drivers’ rearward gap selection. Using short videos of an approaching vehicle filmed from three different camera heights (low, conventional, high), a total of 61 subjects either made gap safety decisions (Experiment I), or estimated the TTP, speed, and distance of an approaching vehicle (Experiment II). An effect of camera height was found for gap selection, TTP, and distance estimation, but not for speed estimation. For the high camera position, smaller gaps were selected as safe, TTP estimates were longer, and the distance to the approaching vehicle was perceived as farther. An opposite pattern was found for the low camera. Regression analyses suggested that distance is an important player. The subjects strongly relied on distance information when estimating TTP, and perceived distance dominated subjects’ gap selection. Thus, drivers seem to employ distance-based strategies when selecting safe gaps in rear-view mirrors or monitors.     

The nature of primary consciousness. A new synthesis

While the philosophical puzzles about “life” that once confounded biology have all been solved by science, much of the “mystery of consciousness” remains unsolved due to multiple “explanatory gaps” between the brain and conscious experience. One reason for this impasse is that diverse brain architectures both within and across species can create consciousness, thus making any single neurobiological feature insufficient to explain it. We propose instead that an array of general biological features that are found in all living things, combined with a suite of special neurobiological features unique to animals with consciousness, evolved to create subjective experience. Combining philosophical, neurobiological and evolutionary approaches to consciousness, we review our theory of neurobiological naturalism that we argue closes the “explanatory gaps” between the brain and subjective experience and naturalizes the “experiential gaps” between subjectivity and third-person observation of the brain.     

The Work of Feminists is Not Yet Done: The Gender Pay Gap—a Stubborn Anachronism

Lips (2012) critiques the literature, predominantly from the United States, to assess how well human capital theory explains the gender pay gap. Her analysis shows that human capital inputs are an imperfect explanation for the gap and that social psychological influences also provide key explanations. I comment on Lips’s paper using literature from the United States and other English-speaking highly developed countries and, to a lesser extent, from European countries. I elaborate and extend her position, promoting the argument for the effect of social influences and for their interactive and incremental effects. I place the phenomenon of the gender pay gap into a societal context. I borrow from the literature for the effect of gender discrimination on women’s advancement in management to discuss explanatory influences. I extend the inference that the gender pay gap supports and maintains the lesser status of women in society and that it helps to preserve the status quo with respect to gender roles. To explain the gender pay gap, I propose that the development of an integrated theoretical framework is needed. The framework would combine the direct and interactive influences of human capital and social psychological inputs, in the context of a cumulative, incremental pattern that occurs over a person’s working life.     

The pastoral challenge of an abusive situation

This paper explores a ministerial response to congregants who have abused or neglected their child. I begin by distinguishing the three major secular responses to this kind of family problem: casework, counseling, and therapy, and go on to note how all of the above are limited in their effectiveness by the objective, causal, explanatory framework within which they operate. I suggest that a pastor can take the same family facts and help those involved to understand and respond to them concretely as they are experienced. The paper concludes with an exploration of this alternative approach within a religious vocabulary of prayer and increased inwardness.     

Scalar implicature and contrastive explanation

I argue for a subsumption of any version of Grice’s first quantity maxim posited to underlie scalar implicature, by developing the idea of implicature recovery as a kind of explanatory inference, as e.g. in science. I take the applicable model to be contrastive explanation, while following van Fraassen’s analysis of explanation as an answer to a why-question. A scalar implicature is embedded in such an answer, one that meets two probabilistic constraints: the probability of the answer, and ‘favoring’. I argue that besides having application at large, outside of linguistic interpretation, these constraints largely account not only for implicatures based on strength order, logical and otherwise, but also for unordered cases. I thus suggest that Grice’s maxim and its descendants are expressions of general explanatory constraints, as they happen to be manifested in this particular explanatory task. I conclude by briefly discussing how I accordingly view Grice’s system outside of scalar implicature.     

Epistemic Injustice and Open‐Mindedness

In this paper, I argue that recent discussions of culprit‐based epistemic injustices can be framed around the intellectual character virtue of open‐mindedness. In particular, these injustices occur because the people who commit them are closed‐minded in some respect; the injustices can therefore be remedied through the cultivation of the virtue of open‐mindedness. Describing epistemic injustices this way has two explanatory benefits: it yields a more parsimonious account of the phenomenon of epistemic injustice and it provides the underpinning of a virtue‐theoretical structure by which to explain what it is that perpetrators are culpable for and how virtues can have normative explanatory power.     

Specificity of learning: why infants fall over a veritable cliff

Nine-month-old infants were tested at the precipice of safe and risky gaps in the surface of support. Their reaching and avoidance responses were compared in two postures, an experienced sitting posture and a less familiar crawling posture. The babies avoided reaching over risky gaps in the sitting posture but fell into risky gaps while attempting to reach in the crawling posture. This dissociation between developmental changes in posture suggests that (a) each postural milestone represents a different, modularly organized control system and (b) infants' adaptive avoidance responses are based on information about their postural stability relative to the gap size. Moreover, the results belie previous accounts suggesting that avoidance of a disparity in depth of the ground surface depends on general knowledge such as fear of heights, associations between depth information and falling, or knowledge that the body cannot be supported in empty space.     

Merleau-Ponty’s Immanent Critique of Gestalt Theory

Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation of Gestalt theory in The Structure of Behavior is central to his entire corpus. Yet commentators exhibit little agreement about what lesson is to be learned from his critique, and provide little exegesis of how his argument proceeds. I fill this exegetical gap. I show that the Gestaltist’s fundamental error is to reify forms as transcendent realities, rather than treating them as phenomena of perceptual consciousness. From this, reductivist errors follow. The essay serves not only as a helpful guide through parts of The Structure of Behavior for newcomers, but also offers a corrective to recent trends in philosophy of mind. Such influential commentators as Hubert Dreyfus, Taylor Carmen, and Evan Thompson have, I argue, risked serious misunderstanding of Merleau-Ponty’s view, by mistakenly treating “circular causality” as central to Merleau-Ponty’s own acausal (dialectical) view of forms.     

Links among theory, research, and practice: cornerstones of clinical scientific progress

Discusses how explicit links among clinical theory, research, and practice are necessary if a clinical discipline is to survive in the managed care marketplace of today. Robust links among theory, research, and practice enable the elaboration of a systematic body of clinical knowledge that is practical in its deployment, effective in its methods, and compelling in its rationale. Moreover, theoretical advances are increasingly necessary, in that they allow scientists to categorize and prioritize the growing amount of empirically derived information, determine how pieces of multilevel data fit together, identify knowledge gaps, and set priorities for future studies. As shown by some of the articles in this special section, evolving theories of behavior have several characteristics in common; namely that they are developmental, transactional, contextual, adaptational, multilevel, and multidetermined. Concerns may be raised, however, as to whether current research methods are fully adequate to test these newer, more complex, multilevel theories or the clinical phenomena they seek to characterize. To address these difficulties, as well as to increase the pace of scientific advances that may result from propitious links among theory, research, and practice, I offer several recommendations to clinical psychology in general and to clinical child psychological research in particular.