Lie,truth, lie: the role of task switching in a deception context

A cornerstone of the task switching literature is the finding that task performance is typically slower and more error-prone when the task switches than when it repeats. So far, deception research has largely ignored that such cognitive switch costs should also emerge when switching between truth telling and lying, and may affect the cognitive cost of lying as reflected in higher prefrontal brain activity and slower and less accurate responding compared to truth telling. To get a grasp on the relative size of the switch costs associated with lying and truth telling, the current study had participants perform a reaction time-based deception task, in which they alternated between lying and telling the truth to yes/no questions that were related to activities performed in the lab (Experiment 1) or neutral autobiographical facts (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the error and reaction time switch costs were found to be equally large for switching from truth telling to lying and from lying to truth telling. This symmetry in switch costs can be explained from the hypothesis that lying requires a first step of truth telling, and demonstrates that task switching does not contribute to the cognitive cost of lying when the repetition/switch ratio is balanced. Theoretical and methodological implications are considered.     

PRE‐PUNISHMENT,COMMUNICATIVE THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT,AND COMPATIBILISM

Saul Smilansky holds that there is a widespread intuition to the effect that pre‐punishment – the practice of punishing individuals for crimes which they have not committed, but which we are in a position to know that they are going to commit – is morally objectionable. Smilanksy has argued that this intuition can be explained by our recognition of the importance of respecting the autonomy of potential criminals. ( Smilansky, 1994 ) More recently he has suggested that this account of the intuition only vindicates it if determinism is false, and argues that this presents a problem for compatibilists, who, he says, are committed to thinking that the truth of determinism makes no moral difference ( Smilansky, 2007 ). In this paper I argue that the intuitions Smilansky refers to can be explained and vindicated as consequences of the truth of a communicative conception of punishment. Since the viability of the communicative conception does not depend on the falsity of determinism, our intuitions about pre‐punishment do not clash with (what Smilanksy calls) compatibilism. And if the communicative theory of punishment is – as Duff (2001 ) suggests – a form of retributivism, the account also meets New's (1992 ) challenge to retributivists to explain what is wrong with pre‐punishment.     

外语焦虑、紧张情绪与认知负荷对外语说谎的影响：来自中-英双语者的证据

采用错误陈述范式探究中-英双语者用母语和外语说真话和说谎时的认知神经差异, 涉及外语焦虑、认知负荷和说谎诱发的紧张情绪。对P200和CNV观察发现：(1)中-英双语者用英语说真话的P200波幅比用母语大, 说明被试用英语说话时受外语焦虑情绪影响; (2)中-英双语者用英语说谎与说真话的P200波幅无显著差异, 但用母语说谎和讲真话的P200波幅差异显著, 说明被试用外语说谎没有用母语说谎诱发的紧张情绪大; (3)中-英双语者说谎时的CNV波幅比说真话时大, 说明被试说谎比说真话的认知负荷更大; (4)中-英双语者用英语说谎时的CNV波幅比用汉语说谎时大, 说明被试用外语说谎比用母语说谎产生了更大的认知负荷。相关分析表明, 英语熟练程度是影响中-英双语者用母语和外语说谎时的认知神经差异的重要变量。     

Practical success and the nature of truth

Philip Kitcher has argued for a causal correspondence view of truth, as against a deflationary view, on the grounds that the former is better poised than the latter to explain systematically successful patterns of action. Though Kitcher is right to focus on systematically successful action, rather than singular practical successes, he is wrong to conclude that causal correspondence theories are capable of explaining systematic success. Rather, I argue, truth bears no explanatory relation to systematic practical success. Consequently, the causal correspondence view is not in a better position to explain success than the deflationary view; theories of truth are the wrong place to look for explanations of systematic practical success.     

Adult credibility assessments of misinformed,deceptive and truthful children

This study compared how adults assess the credibility of children who either: (1) experienced a misleading suggestive interview, (2) were coached to lie or (3) experienced a non‐misleading interview. Preschool children (N = 24) were interviewed about a game they had played. One third of them spontaneously reported the truth, one third lied in response to coaching and one third spontaneously reported misinformation from a prior misleading suggestive interview. One hundred and twenty‐nine college students watched videotaped interviews of these children describing their alleged play activities and assessed their credibility. Children who had experienced misleading suggestive questioning were rated as less credible than those who were telling the truth and those who were lying. Adults could accurately detect truth‐telling children above chance, whereas accuracy was below chance detecting both lying children and children who had been misinformed. Adults were most confident of their ratings of truth‐telling children. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's and adults' conceptualization and evaluation of lying and truth‐telling

The present study examined children's and adults' categorization and moral judgment of truthful and untruthful statements. 7‐, 9‐ and 11‐year‐old Chinese children and college students read stories in which story characters made truthful or untruthful statements and were asked to classify and evaluate the statements. The statements varied in terms of whether the speaker intended to help or harm a listener and whether the statement was made in a setting that called for informational accuracy or politeness. Results showed that the communicative intent and setting factors jointly influence children's categorization of lying and truth‐telling, which extends an earlier finding (Lee & Ross, 1997) to childhood. Also, we found that children's and adults' moral judgments of lying and truth‐telling were influenced by the communicative intent but not the setting factor. The present results were discussed in terms of Sweetser's (1987) folkloristic model of lying. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The ease of lying

Brain imaging studies suggest that truth telling constitutes the default of the human brain and that lying involves intentional suppression of the predominant truth response. By manipulating the truth proportion in the Sheffield lie test, we investigated whether the dominance of the truth response is malleable. Results showed that frequent truth telling made lying more difficult, and that frequent lying made lying easier. These results implicate that (1) the accuracy of lie detection tests may be improved by increasing the dominance of the truth response and that (2) habitual lying makes the lie response more dominant.     

Reasoning from Suppositions

Two experiments investigated inferences based on suppositions. In Experiment 1, the subjects decided whether suppositions about individuals' veracity were consistent with their assertions—for example, whether the supposition “Ann is telling the truth and Beth is telling a lie”, is consistent with the premises: “Ann asserts: I am telling the truth and Beth is telling the truth. Beth asserts: Ann is telling the truth”. It showed that these inferences are more difficult than ones based on factual premises: “Ann asserts: I live in Dublin and Beth lives in Dublin”. There was no difference between problems about truthtellers and liars, who always told the truth or always lied, and normals, who sometimes told the truth and sometimes lied. In Experiment 2, the subjects made inferences about factual matters set in three contexts: a truth-inducing context in which friends confided their personality characteristics, a lie-inducing context in which business rivals advertised their products, and a neutral context in which computers printed their program characteristics. Given the supposition that the individuals were lying, it was more difficult to make inferences in a truth-inducing context than in the other two contexts. We discuss the implications of our results for everyday reasoning from suppositions, and for theories of reasoning based on models or inference rules.     

Partners in Crime: How Liars in Collusion Betray Themselves1

The paradigmatic task for participants in studies on deception is to assess veracity on the basis of a single statement. However, in applied contexts, lie catchers are often faced with multiple statements (reported by one or several suspects). To appreciate this mismatch, we conducted a study where each member of 10 truth‐telling pairs and 10 lying pairs (reporting fabricated alibis) was interrogated twice about an alibi. As predicted, lying pair members were more consistent between themselves than were truth‐telling pair members, and single liars and truth tellers were equally consistent over time. Furthermore, truth tellers made more commissions than did liars. Although in line with our repeat vs. reconstruct hypothesis, these findings contrast sharply with beliefs held by professional lie catchers and recommendations found in literature on deception detection. The results are translated into an applied psycholegal context.     

Chinese children's evaluations of white lies: weighing the consequences for recipients

This research examined how Chinese children make moral judgments about lie telling and truth telling when facing a “white lie” or “politeness” dilemma in which telling a blunt truth is likely to hurt the feelings of another. We examined the possibility that the judgments of participants (7-11 years of age, N = 240) would differ as a function of the social context in which communication takes place. The expected social consequences were manipulated systematically in two studies. In Study 1, participants rated truth telling more negatively and rated lie telling more positively in a public situation where telling a blunt truth is especially likely to have negative social consequences. In Study 2, participants rated truth telling more positively and rated lie telling more negatively in a situation where accurate information is likely to be helpful for the recipient to achieve future success. Both studies showed that with increased age, children’s evaluations became significantly influenced by the social context, with the strongest effects being seen among the 11-year-olds. These results suggest that Chinese children learn to take anticipated social consequences into account when making moral judgments about the appropriateness of telling a blunt truth versus lying to protect the feelings of another.     

Liar,liar: Consistent lying decreases belief in the truth

This study investigated the effects of lying on belief ratings for autobiographical childhood events. Participants lied by trying to convince the experimenter that likely events had not happened and that unlikely events had happened. Participants consistently lied, consistently told the truth, and alternated lying and truth telling across two sessions. Results showed that consistent false assents increased belief in those false events and that consistent false denials decreased belief in those true events. False denials had a larger influence on belief than did false assents. False assents that were told first were more likely to increase in belief than were false assents told in the second session. False denials decreased belief in the true event regardless of when they were told. These results suggest that lying influences confidence ratings both by increasing belief in a lied‐about event and by decreasing belief in a true event.     

What is Said?

It is sometimes argued that certain sentences of natural language fail to express truth conditional contents. Standard examples include e.g. Tipper is ready and Steel is strong enough. In this paper, we provide a novel analysis of truth conditional meaning (what is said) using the notion of a question under discussion. This account (i) explains why these types of sentences are not, in fact, semantically underdetermined (yet seem truth conditionally incomplete), (ii) provides a principled analysis of the process by which natural language sentences (in general) can come to have enriched meanings in context, and (iii) shows why various alternative views, e.g. so‐called Radical Contextualism, Moderate Contextualism, and Semantic Minimalism, are partially right in their respective analyses of the problem, but also all ultimately wrong. Our analysis achieves this result using a standard truth conditional and compositional semantics and without making any assumptions about enriched logical forms, i.e. logical forms containing phonologically null expressions.     

Bad Luck Once Again

In a recent article in this journal, Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe sketch an account of indeterminist free will designed to avoid the luck objection that has been wielded to such effect against event‐causal libertarianism. They argue that if decision‐making is an indeterministic process and not an event or series of events, the luck objection will fail. I argue that they are wrong: the luck objection is equally successful against their account as against existing event‐causal libertarianisms. Like the event‐causal libertarianism their account is meant to supplant, the process view cannot offer a reasons explanation of the agent’s choice itself; that choice is explained by nothing except chance. The agent therefore fails to exercise freedom‐level control over it.     

Right and Righteous: Children's Incipient Understanding and Evaluation of True and False Statements

Two studies examined young children's early understanding and evaluation of truth telling and lying and the role that factuality plays in their judgments. Study 1 (one hundred four 2- to 5-year-olds) found that even the youngest children reliably accepted true statements and rejected false statements and that older children's ability to label true and false (T/F) statements as “truth” and “lie” emerged in tandem with their positive evaluation of true statements and “truth” and their negative evaluation of false statements and “lie.” The findings suggest that children's early preference for factuality develops into a conception of “truth” and “lie” that is linked both to factuality and moral evaluation. Study 2 (one hundred twenty-eight 3- to 5-year-olds) revealed that whereas young children exhibited good understanding of the association of T/F statements with “truth,” “lie,” “mistake,” “right,” and “wrong,” they showed little awareness of assumptions about speaker knowledge underlying “lie” and “mistake.” The results further support the primacy of factuality in children's early understanding and evaluation of truth and lies.     

Proposing,Pretending, and Propriety: A Response to Don Fallis

This note responds to criticism put forth by Don Fallis of an account of lying in terms of the Stalnakerian view of assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Fallis objects by presenting an example to show that one can lie even though one does not propose to make what one says common ground. It is argued here that this objection does not present a problem for the view of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. Responding to the objection brings out important features of this view of discourse and of assertion.     

The Prevalence of Lying in America: Three Studies of Self‐Reported Lies

This study addresses the frequency and the distribution of reported lying in the adult population. A national survey asked 1,000 U.S. adults to report the number of lies told in a 24‐hour period. Sixty percent of subjects report telling no lies at all, and almost half of all lies are told by only 5% of subjects; thus, prevalence varies widely and most reported lies are told by a few prolific liars. The pattern is replicated in a reanalysis of previously published research and with a student sample. Substantial individual differences in lying behavior have implications for the generality of truth–lie base rates in deception detection experiments. Explanations concerning the nature of lying and methods for detecting lies need to account for this variation.     

交往情景下个体对说谎的理解及其道德评价

研究探讨了个体理解交往情景下说谎／说真话概念及其道德评价上的年龄差异,以及事实成份、交往动机与交往情景因素在其中的作用。结果表明：(1)3岁到4岁是说谎概念理解的转折点;(2)除3岁儿童外,大部分被试依据事实成份来理解谎前真话;(3)从小学开始,随着年龄的增长,个体对“白谎”与直率真话的道德评价中越来越多地考虑到交往动机或情景因素。     

Dreams,Morality and the Waking World

Is it ever wrong to cheat in a dream? It has been argued that the conjunction of reasonable claims about dreams with Evaluational Internalism (the view that moral evaluation is determined by factors ‘internal’ to agency, such as intentions) entails a positive answer. This implausible result seemingly provides reason to favour an alternative theory of moral evaluation. I here argue that a wide range of Evaluational Externalist views (which base moral evaluation on factors ‘external’ to agency, such as harms produced) are similarly committed to morality in dreams. I end by identifying implications for theorising about dreams and morality.     

The Detection of Prosocial Lying by Children

The purpose of the present study was to explore the detection of prosocial lying in children. Six‐ to 11‐year‐olds and adults were videotaped telling the truth or a lie about the desirability of an object, sometimes being asked a follow‐up question (i.e., elaborative trials) and other times not (i.e., regular trials). A different group of adults and children then judged the veracity of the individuals' statements in the video clips. Adults and children performed significantly better than chance at detecting lies in the youngest age group, and children's detection performance was unrelated to their age. Child lie detectors, unlike the adults, were also able to discriminate between adults' truthful and untruthful statements in the regular trials, but misidentified adults' truthful responses as lies. They appeared to be more trusting of other children. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.