共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 0 毫秒
1.
2.
In this paper we survey some main arguments for and against epistemological contextualism. We distinguish and discuss various kinds of contextualism, such as attributer contextualism (the most influential version of which is semantic, conversational, or radical contextualism); indexicalism; proto-contextualism; Wittgensteinian contextualism; subject, inferential, or issue contextualism; epistemic contextualism; and virtue contextualism. Starting with a sketch of Dretskes Relevant Alternatives Theory and Nozicks Tracking Account of Knowledge, we reconstruct the history of various forms of contextualism and the ways contextualists try to handle some notorious epistemological quandaries, especially skepticism and the lottery paradox. Then we outline the most important problems that contextualist theories face, and give overviews of their criticisms and defenses as developed in this issue. 相似文献
3.
4.
5.
6.
Kourken Michaelian 《Erkenntnis》2011,74(3):399-424
The default view in the epistemology of forgetting is that human memory would be epistemically better if we were not so susceptible
to forgetting—that forgetting is in general a cognitive vice. In this paper, I argue for the opposed view: normal human forgetting—the
pattern of forgetting characteristic of cognitively normal adult human beings—approximates a virtue located at the mean between
the opposed cognitive vices of forgetting too much and remembering too much. I argue, first, that, for any finite cognizer,
a certain pattern of forgetting is necessary if her memory is to perform its function well. I argue, second, that, by eliminating
“clutter” from her memory store, this pattern of forgetting improves the overall shape of the subject’s total doxastic state.
I conclude by reviewing work in psychology which suggests that normal human forgetting approximates this virtuous pattern
of forgetting. 相似文献
7.
Elizabeth Anderson 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2020,58(1):6-29
In arguing about justice, different sides often accept common moral principles, but reach different conclusions about justice because they disagree about facts. I argue that motivated reasoning, epistemic injustice, and ideologies of injustice support unjust institutions by entrenching distorted representations of the world. Working from a naturalistic conception of justice as a kind of social contract, I suggest some strategies for discovering what justice demands by counteracting these biases. Moral sentiments offer vital resources to this end. 相似文献
8.
9.
10.
11.
Barry Stroud 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(3):495-503
A brief discussion of the ways in which awareness of and sensitivity to the history of philosophy can contribute to epistemology
even if epistemology is understood as a distinctively philosophical and not primarily historical enterprise. 相似文献
12.
JOEL J. KUPPERMAN 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2005,70(3):659-680
Might there be knowledge of non‐instrumental values? Arguments are give for two principal claims. One is that if there is such knowledge, it typically will have features that do not entirely match those of other kinds of knowledge. It will have a closer relation to the kind of person one is or becomes, and in the way it combines features of knowing‐how with knowing‐that. There also are problems of indeterminacy of non‐instrumental value which are not commonly found in other things that we can know about. The second claim is that there is a strong prima‐facie case for holding that there is such knowledge, and that the usual arguments against this are all faulty. 相似文献
13.
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Moral epistemology (henceforth ME) has been spoken of as a subject matter in its own right by philosophers in the last few decades and yet the... 相似文献
14.
15.
Jesper Kallestrup 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2020,101(1):150-174
According to a strong assurance view of testimonial trust, a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason for the hearer to believe p. While the strong view offers a genuinely inter-personal account of testimony, it faces a problem about bootstrapping: how can trust generate epistemic reasons when trust can obtain between unreliable speakers and hearers? In contrast, a weaker assurance view holds that a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason for the hearer to believe p only if the speaker is reliable. While the weaker view offers an epistemic account of testimony, it faces a problem about redundancy: how can trust play any epistemic role when the speaker's reliability seems to pre-empt any contribution that trust may make towards such epistemic reason? This paper argues that neither horn of this dilemma is convincing once proponents of assurance views avail themselves of an epistemic distinction between reasons of rationality as a guide to reasonable belief and reasons of justification as a guide to true belief. Whereas testimonial assurance grounds rational reasons, which need not make probable the beliefs they make reasonable, testimonial reliability grounds justificatory reasons, which need not make reasonable the beliefs they make probable. 相似文献
16.
17.
The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism is designed to side-step complaints given by compatibilist critiques of the so-called Transfer Argument. I argue that while it represents an improvement over the Transfer Argument, it loses some of its plausibility when we reflect on some metalogical issues about normal modal modeling and the semantics of natural language. More specifically, the crucial principle on which the Direct Argument depends appears doubtful where context plays a role in evaluation of normative claims. 相似文献
18.
19.
In this paper I argue, first, that the most influential (and perhaps only acceptable) account of the epistemology of self-knowledge,
developed and defended at great length in Wright (1989b) and (1989c) (among other places), leaves unanswered a question about
the psychology of self-knowledge; second, that without an answer to this question about the psychology of self-knowledge,
the epistemic account cannot be considered acceptable; and third, that neither Wright's own answer, nor an interpretation-based
answer (based on a proposal from Jacobsen (1997)), will suffice as an acceptable answer to the psychological question. My
general ambition is thus to establish that more work is needed if we are to have a full account of self-knowledge in both
its epistemological and psychological aspects. I conclude by suggesting how my thesis bears on those who aim to provide an
empirical account of the cognition involved in self-knowledge.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
20.
Patrick R. Frierson 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2016,94(1):79-98
This paper shows how Maria Montessori's thought can enrich contemporary virtue epistemology. After a short overview of her ‘interested empiricist’ epistemological framework, I discuss four representative intellectual virtues: sensory acuity, physical dexterity, intellectual love, and intellectual humility. Throughout, I show how Montessori bridges the divide between reliabilist and responsibilist approaches to the virtues and how her particular treatments of virtues offer distinctive and compelling alternatives to contemporary accounts. For instance, she emphasizes how sensory acuity is a virtue for which one can be responsible, highlights the embodied nature of cognition through a focus on physical dexterity, interprets intellectual love as a way of loving the world rather than as a love that takes knowledge as its object, and presents an alternative account of intellectual humility to contemporary emphases on the interpersonal dimensions of this virtue. 相似文献