Guilt, shame, and symptoms in children

The authors asked whether evidence could be found for adaptive or maladaptive aspects of guilt and shame in 5-12-year-old children (44 boys, 42 girls). Children completed semiprojective and scenario-based measures thought to assess shame, guilt, or both. Their parents (N = 83) completed the Child Behavior Checklist to assess child symptoms. Shame and projective guilt were related to symptoms; they also were associated with self-blame and attempts to minimize painful feelings. Scenario-based guilt was related to fewer symptoms in boys but to greater symptoms in girls. This measure of guilt reflected concerns with adhering to standards, expressing empathy, and taking appropriate responsibility. Discussion focuses on possible origins of differential symptom-emotion links in boys and girls as well as measurement implications.     

The Role of Innocent Guilt in Post‐Conflict Work

The phenomenon of ‘innocent guilt’ regards cases where people feel guilty without being responsible for the wrongdoing or suffering at which the guilt is directed. The aim of this article is to develop a consistent account of innocent guilt and show how it may arise in the aftermath of conflicts. In order to do this, innocent guilt is contrasted with guilt and collective guilt, and the account is substantiated by drawing on the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Emmanuel Levinas, who both consider the phenomenon of innocent guilt a necessary element in the fundamental structure of the ethical subject. These thinkers, furthermore, show a connection between guilt and possible victims of wrongdoing, rather than between guilt and personal acts of wrongdoing. Innocent guilt may thus appear in the aftermath of conflicts as an ethical and emotional response to the fact of finding oneself in a post‐conflict situation still marked by suffering. It thus reveals a fundamental need to contribute to the relieving of such suffering.     

Feeling guilty as a source of information about threat and performance

OCD patients experience increased feelings of guilt, threat and uncertainty about harm prevention. As to the relation between these phenomena, it was hypothesised that the experience of guilt acts as "information" that increases the sense of threat and decreases the sense that preventive action is effective. We tested whether state guilt is used as information about risk and prevention effects and whether people high in trait guilt do so more than others. Participants high and low in trait guilt were included. Three types of affect were experimentally induced: guilt, anxiety and a neutral affect. Then, participants estimated the likelihood and severity of a negative outcome, and the dissatisfaction with preventive performances in two OCD relevant scenarios. Relative to low-trait guilt participants, people high in trait guilt had higher ratings of risk after induction of state guilt. With regards to dissatisfaction with preventive performance, there was only a trend for high-trait guilt participants to respond stronger to state guilt. The results suggest that people with a general inclination to feel guilty use temporary feelings of guilt as information about the threat content of a situation and do so even if the source of state guilt is unrelated to the situation. Implications for the understanding of OCD are discussed.     

Shame, guilt, and depressive symptoms: a meta-analytic review

Recent theoretical and empirical work has facilitated the drawing of sharp conceptual distinctions between shame and guilt. A clear view of these distinctions has permitted development of a research literature aimed at evaluating the differential associations of shame and guilt with depressive symptoms. This study quantitatively summarized the magnitude of associations of shame and guilt with depressive symptoms. Two hundred forty-two effect sizes were obtained from 108 studies employing 22,411 participants. Shame showed significantly stronger associations with depressive symptoms (r = .43) than guilt (r = .28). However, the association of shame and depressive symptoms was statistically indistinguishable from the associations of 2 maladaptive variants of guilt and depressive symptoms (contextual-maladaptive guilt, involving exaggerated responsibility for uncontrollable events, r = .39; generalized guilt, involving "free-floating" guilt divorced from specific contexts, r = .42). Other factors also moderated the effects. External shame, which involves negative views of self as seen through the eyes of others, was associated with larger effect sizes (r = .56) than internal shame (r = .42), which involves negative views of self as seen through one's own eyes. Depressive symptom measures that invoked the term guilt yielded stronger associations between guilt and depressive symptoms (r = .33) than depressive symptom measures that did not (r = .21). Age, sex, and ethnicity (proportion of Whites to Asians) did not moderate the effects. Although these correlational data are ambiguous with respect to their causal interpretation, results suggest that shame should figure more prominently in understandings of the emotional underpinnings of depressive symptoms.     

Can Implicit Associations Distinguish True and False Eyewitness Memory? Development and Preliminary Testing of the IATe

Eyewitness identification has been shown to be fallible and prone to false memory. In this study we develop and test a new method to probe the mechanisms involved in the formation of false memories in this area, and determine whether a particular memory is likely to be true or false. We created a seven‐step procedure based on the Implicit Association Test to gauge implicit biases in eyewitness identification (the IATe). We show that identification errors may result from unconscious bias caused by implicit associations evoked by a given face. We also show that implicit associations between negative attributions such as guilt and eyewitnesses' final pick from a line‐up can help to distinguish between true and false memory (especially where the witness has been subject to the suggestive nature of a prior blank line‐up). Specifically, the more a witness implicitly associates an individual face with a particular crime, the more likely it is that a memory they have for that person committing the crime is false. These findings are consistent with existing findings in the memory and neuroscience literature showing that false memories can be caused by implicit associations that are outside conscious awareness. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Addressing Guilt within the Religious Community: Cyprian of Carthage,Reconciliation, and the Science of Emotion

This article looks at guilt, forgiveness, and “in-group” behavior using Cyprian of Carthage’s response to the third-century persecutions in dialogue with modern psychology and the science of guilt. Using Cyprian’s writings, we see the foundation of much of Christian behavior in regard to inclusion in a Christian community and the theology of penance. The broader issue of inclusivity and forgiveness connects to what evolutionary science presents on the issue regarding guilt and shame, and recent psychological work on achieving reconciliation and forgiveness between persons or in a community. By placing the Christian tradition into dialogue with these modern scientific studies, we find that a fruitful dialogue is possible which enriches both the religious and scientific communities.     

Autobiographical memory for shame or guilt provoking events: Association with psychological symptoms

The diagnostic criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) specify that a qualifying traumatic stressor must incite extreme peritraumatic fear, horror, or helplessness. However, research suggests that events inciting guilt or shame may be associated with PTSD. We devised a web-based survey in which non-clinical participants identified an event associated with shame or guilt and completed questionnaire measures of shame, guilt, PTSD, and depression. In addition, we assessed characteristics of memory for the event, including visual perspective and the centrality of the memory to the participant’s autobiographical narrative (CES). Shame predicted depression and PTSD symptoms. There was no association between guilt and psychological symptoms after controlling statistically for the effects of shame. CES predicted the severity of depression and PTSD symptoms. In addition, CES mediated the moderating effect of visual perspective on the relationship between emotional intensity and PTSD symptoms. Our results suggest shame is capable of eliciting the intrusive and distressing memories characteristic of PTSD. Furthermore, our results suggest aversive emotional events are associated with psychological distress when memory for those events becomes central to one’s identity and autobiographical narrative.     

Life history, sin, and disease.

On the basis of experiences in pastoral hospital care, the relationship between disease, sin, and guilt in the life of patients is explored. Against the disregard of this subject in medicine, and even in most of pastoral care, it is argued that patients' interest requires that their hidden or manifest questions be addressed, rather than their being exposed to efforts at "helping" through mere attempts at "debt clearance." Only by openly confronting sin and guilt can the patient be taken seriously in his role as subject of his disease. Theological and anthropological background considerations revealing the essence of sin as a disruption or even destruction of the Divine gift of life in its realization through a lived relationship to God and other humans are offered as evidence for this claim.     

Pseudo-Guilt: Defense,Transaction, and Resistance

The term guilt is used as an umbrella to cover a variety of feelings and phenomena. The working through of guilt feelings represents one major area of clinical work. Therefore, it is essential that the nuances and variations inherent in the term guilt be well understood. Clarity is particularly important, since the expression of other feelings may masquerade as guilt, sharing the same language and gestures.     

Contaminated Generativity: Holocaust Survivors and Their Children in Germany

This paper addresses the trauma transfer from survivors of the Shoah to the Second Generation in Germany. What does it mean for both generations to beget children after Auschwitz? This necessarily entails perceiving non-Jewish Germans and their way of dealing with history. Survivors cannot live without their memory, nor is it possible for them to conceive of a life unencumbered by this constant “contaminant”. It is not possible to integrate the persecution experiences. On the contrary, decades after liberation, dissociated elements of traumatic memories penetrate everyday experiences, thought, affect and imagination as contaminants. Occasionally, these fragments of persecution experiences, like “encapsulated memories” hidden in crypts suddenly break open and frighten the survivors themselves and even more so the people around them.     

The impact of magnitude of harm and perceived difficulty of making reparations on group‐based guilt and reparation towards victims of historical harm

The present research investigates how reading stories about past mistreatment of children who had been in institutional care affects support for reparations, perceived difficulty of reparations and group‐based guilt were investigated in two experiments. In Study 1 we showed that, when the stories increased in perceived harm, so did the perceived difficulty of making reparations whereas group‐based guilt decreased. Furthermore, both perceived difficulty of making reparations and group‐based guilt predicted support for reparation. It was suggested that these findings were due to a natural confound between the severity of harm and the difficulty of reparations. Study 2 included a direct manipulation of perceived difficulty that was intended to weaken or strengthen the ability to make reparations. This study demonstrated stronger group‐based guilt when reparations were potentially possible and not when they are impossible. Moreover, support for reparations varied as a function of perceived difficulty of reparations and group‐based guilt mediated that relationship. The research has two key implications. First, advocates of reparations as a mechanism for reconciliation and community healing need to consider the degree to which reparations are perceived to be possible and consider ways of addressing those perceptions. Second, the research provides an experimental demonstration to the power of stories about experience to bolster support for social change. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Personal memories for remote historical events: accuracy and clarity of flashbulb memories related to World War II

One hundred forty-five Danes between 72 and 89 years of age were asked for their memories of their reception of the news of the Danish occupation (April 1940) and liberation (May 1945) and for their most negative and most positive personal memories from World War II. Almost all reported memories for the invasion and liberation. Their answers to factual questions (e.g., the weather) were corroborated against objective records and compared with answers from a younger control group. The older participants were far more accurate than what could be predicted on the basis of results from test-retest studies using short delays. The "permastore" metaphor (Bahrick, 1984) provides a possible interpretation of this discrepancy. Participants with reported ties to the resistance movement had more vivid, detailed, and accurate memories than did participants without such ties. Ratings of surprise and consequentiality were unrelated to the accuracy and clarity of the memories.     

Remembering past emotions: The role of current appraisals

This research assessed the stability of memory for emotions over time, and the relationship between current appraisals and memory for emotions. A week after the televised announcement of the verdict in the criminal trial of Mr Orenthal James (O.J.) Simpson, participants were asked to describe their emotional reactions and their appraisals when they first learned of the verdict. After a delay of two months, and again after more than a year, participants recalled their initial emotional reactions and described their current appraisals of the verdict. After two months, the more participants' appraisals of Mr Simpson's innocence or guilt had changed, the less stable were their memories for the intensities of happiness and anger. After two months, and after more than a year, systematic changes in memory for happiness, anger, and surprise were found in directions consistent with current appraisals. These findings replicate and extend the findings of Levine (1997), and suggest that memories for emotional responses are partially reconstructed based on current appraisals of events.     

When emotions of others affect decisions in public good dilemmas: An instrumental view

The present research examines whether the emotional display (i.e. anger vs. guilt) of another group member affects people's decision‐making in a public good dilemma. In two experiments we investigated whether the expressed emotion is particularly informative when communicated by a group member who is highly instrumental in reaching the provision point. A first experiment demonstrated that participants were more likely to exit the group when anger as opposed to guilt was communicated, but especially when the group member displaying the emotion was able to contribute many endowments to the public good. Expected justice (based on past inferences) in the group mediated this effect, suggesting that communicated anger signals more than guilt that the group will not set out to achieve fairness. In agreement with this, a second experiment showed that when it was not possible to exit the group, participants preferred to install a democratic leader more when a wealthy group member communicated anger as opposed to guilt. Additionally, this study provided experimental evidence that a communicated emotion is only used for subsequent decision‐making when more explicit information (i.e. a promise to contribute) is absent. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Memories of uncertain origin: Dreamt or real?

The existence of a memory whose origin, real or dreamt, was uncertain was reported by just over half of an undergraduate sample of 358. Each respondent described one such memory if they had one. The memories were typically of mundane events, although 10 respondents described possible crimes. Respondents were often concerned to resolve the origin of these memories. Their plausibility, vividness, and how well the events fitted into one's life were often considered by the respondents, but where resolution occurred it was frequently based on evidence obtained from the physical or social environment. The reported qualities of the event did not correlate with whether the respondent thought it more likely to have been originally a dream or a real event.     

Memories of uncertain origin: dreamt or real?

The existence of a memory whose origin, real or dreamt, was uncertain was reported by just over half of an undergraduate sample of 358. Each respondent described one such memory if they had one. The memories were typically of mundane events, although 10 respondents described possible crimes. Respondents were often concerned to resolve the origin of these memories. Their plausibility, vividness, and how well the events fitted into one's life were often considered by the respondents, but where resolution occurred it was frequently based on evidence obtained from the physical or social environment. The reported qualities of the event did not correlate with whether the respondent thought it more likely to have been originally a dream or a real event.     

Nietzsche on guilt: Dependency,debt, and imperfection

In this paper, I offer a new way of reading Nietzsche's second essay in On the Genealogy of Morality. At the heart of my account is the claim that Nietzsche is primarily interested in a persistent or existential form of guilt in this essay and only concerned with locally reactive cases of guilt as a function of this deeper phenomenon. I argue that, for Nietzsche, this persistent form of guilt develops out of a deep feeling of indebtedness or owing that accompanies a fearful sense of dependency on the gods. When this sense of dependent indebtedness mixes with bad conscience, which arises through the shift from prehistoric tribes to state‐like communities, it becomes a moral problem; vast numbers of “slaves and serfs” (GM II.20) start to feel like they are not sufficiently honoring their dependent relationship with the gods. It is this feeling of persistent guilt that Nietzsche thinks metastasizes into Christian guilt.     

Technical Considerations in the Psychotherapy of Traumatized Individuals: A Psychoanalytic Perspective

This paper addresses two specific aspects of clinical technique in the treatment of traumatized individuals. The first aspect involves the creation of a safe holding environment as an essential step for the emergence of trauma-related memories and the containment of the affects accompanying them. Such scenarios may appear in the clinical material only through the workings of "procedural memory." It is therefore important to contain and gradually decipher repetitive patterns of behavior and feelings of shame, guilt and rage that go with them. The second aspect examines the challenges such work poses to the analyst's containing capacities, credulousness and even his or her reality testing within a clinical situation. The resulting instability of the analyst's work ego can make it hard for him or her to remain vigilant yet empathic, and emotionally attuned but analytically skeptical. The analyst's flexibility to be utilized as a transference object, developmental object and self-object remains a critical determinant of the treatment outcome under such circumstances. The paper provides clinical material to illustrate these two aspects of clinical technique.     

Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings

Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands group action according to my plural subject account of groups, however, one can argue for the appropriateness of feeling guilt just because one's group has acted badly - a feeling that often occurs. In so arguing I sketch the plural subject account of groups, group intentions and group actions: for a group to intend (in the relevant sense) is for its members to be jointly committed to intend that such-and-such as a body. Individual group members need not be directly involved in the formation of the intention in order to participate in such a joint commitment. The core concept of joint commitment is in an important way holistic, not being reducible to a set of personal commitments over which each party holds sway. Parties to a group intention so understood can reasonably see the resulting action as "ours" as opposed to "theirs" and thus appropriately respond to the action's badness with a feeling of guilt, even when they themselves are morally innocent in the matter. I label the feeling in question a feeling of "membership guilt." A number of standard philosophical claims about the nature of guilt feelings are thrown into question by my argument.