My beliefs about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic

We model three examples of beliefs that agents may have about other agents’ beliefs, and provide motivation for this conceptualization from the theory of mind literature. We assume a modal logical framework for modelling degrees of belief by partially ordered preference relations. In this setting, we describe that agents believe that other agents do not distinguish among their beliefs (‘no preferences’), that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are in part as their own (‘my preferences’), and the special case that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are exactly as their own (‘preference refinement’). This multi-agent belief interaction is frame characterizable. We provide examples for introspective agents. We investigate which of these forms of belief interaction are preserved under three common forms of belief revision.     

Reciprocal associations between young children's developing moral judgments and theory of mind

Associations between young children's developing theory of mind (ToM) and judgments of prototypical moral transgressions were examined 3 times across 1 year in 70 American middle class 2.5- to 4-year-olds. Separate path models controlling for cross-time stability in judgments, within-time associations, and children's age at Wave 1 indicated that across both 6-month intervals, children who evaluated moral acts as more wrong independent of authority had more mature ToM 6 months later; in addition, judgments of moral transgressions as less permissible at Wave 2 also led to more advanced ToM at Wave 3. Children with more advanced ToM judged that moral rules are more alterable, however, and rated moral transgressions as less deserving of punishment. Finally, more advanced ToM initially led to evaluations of moral transgressions as less independent of rules and then to judgments of moral transgressions as more independent of rules. During the preschool years, early moral judgments and theory of mind appear to develop as reciprocal, bidirectional processes.     

Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception

Understanding of another person's wrong belief requires explicit representation of the wrongness of this person's belief in relation to one's own knowledge. Three to nine year old children's understanding of two sketches was tested. In each sketch subjects observed how a protagonist put an object into a location x and then witnessed that in the absence of the protagonist the object was transferred from x to location y. Since this transfer came as a surprise they had to assume that the protagonist still believed that the object was in x. Subjects had to indicate where the protagonist will look for the object at his return. None of the 3–4-year old, 57% of 4–6-year old, and 86% of 6–9-year old children pointed correctly to location x in both sketches. Of the many cases where 4–6-year olds made an error they failed in only about 20% to remember the initial location correctly. As a test of the stability of children's representation of the protagonist's wrong belief the sketches continued with a statement about the protagonist's intention to either deceive an antagonist or truthfully inform a friend about the object's location. Independent of age, of those children who correctly thought that the protagonist would search in x, 85% of the time they also correctly thought that he would direct his antagonist to location y and his friend to location x. This shows that once children can represent a person's beliefs they can constrain their interpretation of this person's stated intentions to the person's beliefs. In a more story-like situation another group of children had to infer a deceptive plan from the depiction of a goal conflict between two story characters and one character's expedient utterance. At the age of 4–5 years children correctly judged this utterance as a lie only 28% of the time while 5–6-year olds did so 94% of the time. These results suggest that around the ages of 4 to 6 years the ability to represent the relationship between two or more person's epistemic states emerges and becomes firmly established.     

Stereotyped beliefs about desirability: implications for characterizing the child's theory of mind

A central research issue in the child's theory of mind literature is the question of whether children appreciate the subjectivity of mental phenomena. The typical research paradigm involves researchers creating a discrepancy between children's own mental states and the mental state of a protagonist, and then asking children to predict the protagonist's reaction. A prediction that fits the child's own mental state (rather than the beliefs and desires of the protagonist) is seen as an indication that the child fails to acknowledge the subjectivity of mental phenomena.Here we present two experiments involving the use of desire statements in predicting other people's emotions which demonstrate that even when one does acknowledge the subjectivity of mental states, this does not necessarily leads to ‘correct’ predictions (e.g. predictions based on the protagonist's desires). Other factors, such as cultural knowledge, might influence this process. The first experiment demonstrates that even adults, with a fully operational theory of mind, sometimes choose to disregard information about other people's desires. Their own generalized beliefs about desirability appear to be instrumental in this respect. The second experiment, on sex-stereotyped preferences for toys, demonstrates that even young children already can use generalized beliefs about desirability as a basis for their predictions of others’ emotions, even when these beliefs on desirability do not coincide with their own desires. This strategy results in a response pattern that can be easily misconceived as an indication that the child does not yet appreciate the subjectivity of desires.Two remarks are made on the basis of these experiments. First, even a so-called ‘adult’ theory of mind tends to be affected by normative considerations and is therefore more complex than straightforward desire-belief reasoning. Second, whenever normative considerations come into play, researchers should be cautious that ‘correct’ answers in theory of mind testing may not always have been based on theory of mind reasoning, and that ‘incorrect’ answers do not necessarily imply the absence of an active theory of mind.     

The relationship of maternal beliefs about sex typing to maternal and young children's behavior

Possible links between maternal beliefs about children's sex-typed behavior and familial characteristics, mothers' interactions with their young children, and children's cognitive functioning were explored. One hundred and thirty-two mothers and their two-year-olds were seen; familial social class, birth order, and child gender were selection-criterion variables. Sex-typed beliefs were assessed by asking mothers to rate a number of qualities and interests as to whether or not each was more likely to occur in or be characteristic of boys or of girls, or was equally likely to be characteristic of boys and girls. Mothers rated qualities for two different age periods—toddlerhood and middle childhood. Mothers and toddlers were observed in a free play setting for 20 min. Responsivity and type of behavior emitted were assessed. The Bayley Scale of Infant Intelligence was given at 24 months. The findings were as follows: First, gender and social class were related to maternal beliefs about sex-typed characteristics. Second, maternal sex-typed beliefs were negatively related to active toy play and distal interaction, with this relationship significant for daughters but not sons. Third, daughters of low sex-typed mothers were more responsive and more likely to seek comfort than daughters of high sex-typed mothers. Fourth, daughters of mothers who had strong sex-typed beliefs had lower IQ scores at 24 months than did daughters of mothers with beliefs less strong; this relationship was not found for sons. Research on cross-sex behavior and enhanced cognitive functioning was reviewed as it relates to these findings.     

The relationship of adolescent mothers' expectations,knowledge, and beliefs to their young children's coping behavior

Developmental researchers have begun to explore parental cognitions in an effort to better understand adolescent parenthood. However, most research on adolescent mothers has failed to relate cognitions of the mother to the child's functioning. To extend the research on adolescent-parent families, we examined the association between adolescent mothers' knowledge of child development, parental expectations, and child-rearing beliefs to their infants' or toddlers' coping behavior. Trained observers rated children on the three subscales of the Early Coping Inventory–Sensorimotor, Reactive Behavior, and Self-Initiated Behavior. The findings indicated that the adolescent mothers' self-reports of their expectations for their own and their children's behaviors and emotions accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in objective ratings of the children's coping behavior in the sensorimotor and reactive behavior domains. Adolescent mothers who reported more positive, more realistic, and more mature expectations about parenting, children, and the parent-child relationship had children who were rated to display more adaptive and effective sensorimotor and reactive behavior coping capacities. An interaction between the adolescent mothers' knowledge and beliefs significantly predicted self-initiated child behaviors. Implications of the findings include the importance of exploring a “good match” in adolescent mother-child relationships.     

Communicative interactions, knowledge of a second language, and theory of mind in young children

In this study, the authors explored the effect that particular patterns of communicative interactions may have on young children's understanding of representations and the link between knowledge of a 2nd language and theory of mind. The authors tested 140 single language users and 57 dual language users (aged 3-4 years old) on a deceptive task with 3 experimental conditions. In the deceptive-context condition, an experimenter made a reference to the deceptive object. In the older peer condition, an experimenter made a reference to an older child who was actively participating in the experimental manipulations. In the deceptive-interaction condition, the experimenter made reference to his or her own deceptive interventions. The most significant finding was that knowledge of a 2nd language significantly improved young children's understanding of both mental and nonmental representations. Moreover, the results indicated that an experimenter's reference to a deceptive interaction greatly facilitated 3-year-old children's understanding of false belief.     

Six-year-olds' contradictory judgments about knowledge and beliefs

By around the age of 4 years, children acknowledge that people can have false beliefs about the world. Six-year-olds are still inclined, however, to confuse their own knowledge with that of more ignorant others. In a recent paper, Hulme, Mitchell and Wood offer a novel explanation for six-year-olds' tendency to make such errors when asked to choose a picture to put in a story character's thought bubble.     

Where to look first for children's knowledge of false beliefs

Recent research has shown that, although young children have a substantial knowledge of beliefs as internal mental states, they have considerable difficulty in understanding how a false belief can lead to an outcome which is in conflict with a desire. However, this evidence has come from tasks which assume that children follow an experimenter's "implicatures" in conversation and interpret the question "Where will a person (with the false belief) look for the object?" to mean "Where will the person look first?" rather than "Where will the person have to look (or go to look) to find the object?" In our investigation, even 3-year-olds often responded correctly when asked to predict the initial behavior of a story character with a false belief. We discuss these results in terms of the conversational worlds of children and adults.     

The cost of thinking about false beliefs: evidence from adults' performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task

Much of what we know about other people's beliefs comes non-inferentially from what people tell us. Developmental research suggests that 3-year-olds have difficulty processing such information: they suffer interference from their own knowledge of reality when told about someone's false belief (e.g., [Wellman, H. M., & Bartsch, K. (1988). Young children's reasoning about beliefs. Cognition, 30, 239-277.]). The current studies examined for the first time whether similar interference occurs in adult participants. In two experiments participants read sentences describing the real colour of an object and a man's false belief about the colour of the object, then judged the accuracy of a picture probe depicting either reality or the man's belief. Processing costs for picture probes depicting reality were consistently greater in this false belief condition than in a matched control condition in which the sentences described the real colour of one object and a man's unrelated belief about the colour of another object. A similar pattern was observed for picture probes depicting the man's belief in most cases. Processing costs were not sensitive to the time available for encoding the information presented in the sentences: costs were observed when participants read the sentences at their own pace (Experiment 1) or at a faster or a slower pace (Experiment 2). This suggests that adults' difficulty was not with encoding information about reality and a conflicting false belief, but with holding this information in mind and using it to inform a subsequent judgement.     

Gender differences in the relationship between young children's peer-related social competence and individual differences in theory of mind

In this study, the author examined the relationship between theory-of-mind understanding and preschool-aged children's peer-related social competence. One hundred eleven 3- to 5-year-old children (48 boys, 63 girls) participated in 2 theory-of-mind tasks designed to assess their understanding of false belief. Teachers rated children's peer-related social behavior in terms of prosocial behavior, aggressive or disruptive behavior, and shy or withdrawn behavior. Results indicated that, after controlling for age, theory-of-mind understanding significantly predicted aggressive or disruptive behavior for boys and prosocial behavior for girls. Theory-of-mind understanding also was related to lower scores of shy or withdrawn behavior for boys. Results are discussed in terms of the gender differences in the factors contributing to early peer competence.     

The mind has a mind of its own: Developing knowledge about mental uncontrollability

Five-year-olds, 9-year-olds, 13-year-olds, and adults were tested for their understanding that people have only limited control over their mental activity. The adolescents and adults understood much better than the children that a child who sees a shot needle while awaiting a shot will automatically think about getting a shot, and that a child who hears a strange noise will automatically wonder what it is, even if these children did not want to think or wonder about anything. There were also significant increases with age in the recognition that a person would not be able to go for three days without thinking or wondering about anything, that one sometimes has thoughts one does not want to have, and that unwanted thoughts one tries to get rid of often come back. Arguments were made for the adaptive value of learning that the mind has a mind of its own.     

Longitudinal associations between children's understanding of emotions and theory of mind

Theory of mind competence and knowledge of emotions were studied longitudinally in a sample of preschoolers aged 3 (n=263) and 4 (n=244) years. Children were assessed using standard measures of theory of mind and emotion knowledge. Three competing hypotheses were tested regarding the developmental associations between children's theory of mind abilities and their knowledge of emotions. First, that an understanding of emotion develops early and informs children's understanding of others’ thinking. Alternatively, having a basic theory of mind may help children learn about emotions. Third, that the two domains are separate aspects of children's social cognitive skills such that each area develops independently. Results of hierarchical regressions supported the first hypothesis that early emotion understanding predicts later theory-of-mind performance, and not the reverse.     

Longitudinal associations between children's understanding of emotions and theory of mind

Theory of mind competence and knowledge of emotions were studied longitudinally in a sample of preschoolers aged 3 (n=263) and 4 (n=244) years. Children were assessed using standard measures of theory of mind and emotion knowledge. Three competing hypotheses were tested regarding the developmental associations between children's theory of mind abilities and their knowledge of emotions. First, that an understanding of emotion develops early and informs children's understanding of others' thinking. Alternatively, having a basic theory of mind may help children learn about emotions. Third, that the two domains are separate aspects of children's social cognitive skills such that each area develops independently. Results of hierarchical regressions supported the first hypothesis that early emotion understanding predicts later theory-of-mind performance, and not the reverse.     

The organization of verbs of knowing: Evidence for cultural commonality and variation in theory of mind

Cross-cultural commonality and variation in folk theories of knowing were studied by examining the organization of verbs of knowing in German and Japanese adults. German and Japanese adults performed one of two tasks: a similarity judgment task and an attribute rating task. Organizational structure was assessed for the similarity judgment task using multidimensional scaling and additive similarity tree analyses. The attribute rating task was used to describe the characteristics that organized the dimensions and clusters emerging from the scaling solutions. The folk theory of mind displayed was an information processing model with constructive components, although the constructive aspects were more salient for the Germans than for the Japanese.     

Second-order beliefs about intention and children's attributions of sociomoral judgment

Predicting how another person will evaluate the intention underlying an action involves consideration of second-order mental states. Children (ages 5-10 years) and college students (N=105) predicted an observer's belief about an actor's intention and evaluated the actor from both their own perspectives and the perspective of the observer. Younger children were more likely than older children and adults to attribute a belief to the observer that mismatched the actor's prior intention. Attributed beliefs about intention were more likely to match negative prior intentions than to match positive prior intentions and were also more likely to match prior intentions when the observer knew the actor's prior intention than when the observer did not know the actor's prior intention. The judgments attributed to the observer were based on the beliefs about intention attributed to the observer, showing use of second-order mental states to infer another's sociomoral judgments.     

Mothers' beliefs about listening: Implications for children's comprehension and conceptions of listening

Forty-four mothers offered their beliefs about listening and methods for encouraging listening in their 3- to 5-year-old children. Children's comprehension performance and conceptions of listening were also obtained. Mother perceived themselves as the primary agent responsible for children's development of basic listening competencies, such as figuring out the main point of what someone said to them, not interrupting others, and asking a question of the speaker when confused. Children who had strong comprehension skills had mothers who believed that listening is a complex set of activities, emphasized their own responsibility in ensuring that their children develop basic listening competencies, stressed comprehension processes and question asking in their conceptions of listening and in their techniques for enhancing children's listening, and began reading to their children at an early age.     

Zulu mothers' beliefs about their own and their children's intelligence

Zulu women (N = 133) were given a structural interview concerning their own and their children's multiple intelligences. The best predictor of their own self-estimated overall intelligence rating was mathematical and spatial intelligence. Mothers showed few significant differences in their estimates of their sons and daughters' overall or multiple intelligences. However, they rated their daughters' interpersonal intelligence higher than those of their sons, and their sons' bodily-kinesthetic intelligence higher than those of their daughters. The mothers believed that overall their children were about 6 IQ points more intelligent than themselves. Although mothers estimated their own spatial, inter-, and intrapersonal intelligence to be higher than those of their children, they also believed that their children had higher mathematical intelligence.