On Scientific Ontology: Reply to Tambassi

Axiomathes - Two opposing uses of the term ‘Scientific Ontology’ reflect attitudes towards the relation between (empirical) science and philosophical ontology. On the one side we can...     

Ontology relativized: Reply to Moulines

Ontology is taken by Moulines as supervenient on science: what kinds of things there are is determined by our well-confirmed theories. But the fact is that today, science provides us with a multiplicity of well-confirmed theories, each having its own ontological commitments. The modest, ontological form of reduction advocated by Moulines (this volume) restores hope of putting some ontological order in the “huge chaotic supermarket of science”. In this paper I show that any claim on the amount of order obtained by reduction does not only always remain “temporally qualified” but, worse for the reductionist with a taste for ontological order, that the very notion of orderliness must be relativized to the capacities and interests of knowers.     

On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels

Rik Peels has ingeniously argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In this response, I defend the ??Standard View of Ignorance?? according to which they are equivalent. In the course of doing so, some important lessons will emerge concerning the nature of ignorance and its relationship to knowledge.     

How Best to Prevent Future Persons From Suffering: A Reply to Benatar

Abstract

David Benatar claims that everyone was seriously harmed by coming into existence. To spare future persons from this suffering, we should cease having children, Benatar argues, with the result that humanity would gradually go extinct. Benatar’s claim of universal serious harm is baseless. Each year, an estimated 94% of children born throughout the world do not have a serious birth defect. Furthermore, studies show that most people do not experience chronic pain. Although nearly everyone experiences acute pain and discomforts, such as thirst, these experiences have instrumental value. For example, when a person picks up a hot object, in response to the pain, the person releases the object, thereby preventing serious harm. The standard that Benatar uses to evaluate the quality of our lives is arbitrary, as I will demonstrate. His proposal that we phase humanity out of existence by ceasing to have children is misguided and an overreaction to the problem of human suffering. The ‘threshold conception of harm’, which is a targeted approach for preventing future persons from suffering, is a more sensible approach.     

On Empty Bathtubs: A Reply to Meehl

In the present state of ambiguity, negative studies of the validity of psychodiagnostic tests can easily be generated. But such studies throw little light upon the capacities of the tests and are confounded by the utilization of clinical interpretations. It would be most advisable to deal first with the central problems: the need for an integrated theory delineating tests in terms of the areas of optimum assessment and levels tapped; and, the development of realistic expectations on the part of clinicians. The studies frequently cited as throwing question upon the validity of projective tools are rejected on three grounds: the unrealistic wording of the hypotheses (i.e., are these tests valid or invalid, rather than under what circumstances and in what areas are the tests valid); the failure to consider the populations and the background experience of the clinician; and the methodological weaknesses in the designs of the studies. While the author admits that in the long run Meehl may turn out to be correct in suggesting that projective techniques have little value, at the present time Meehl's case for such a conclusion seems weak and should not serve as a deterrent for further investigations and proper utilization of projective techniques.     

On Not Changing the Problem: A Reply to Howson

Howson's critique of my essay on Hume's problem of induction levels two main charges. First, Howson claims that I have attributed to him an error that he never made, and in fact which he warned against in the very text that I cite. Secondly, Howson argues that my proposed solution to Hume's problem is flawed on technical and philosophical grounds. In response to the first charge, I explain how Howson's text justifies attributing to him the claim that the principle of induction is shown to be inconsistent by Goodman's riddle. In regards to the second, I show that Howson's objections rest on misunderstandings of formal learning theory and on conflating the problem of induction with the problem of unconceived alternatives.     

On Making the Same Choice Eternally: A Reply to Davis

In this brief reply to Stephen Davis, I argue that Davis’s separationist position, wherein those who remain eternally apart from God do so by choice, is internally contradictory in that it leads to universalism.     

On immigrant integration: Reply to Stoffman

In his critique of my argument on Canada’s immigration discourse, Daniel Stoffman raises two objections: his writings are misinterpreted and I offer no alternative to the assimiliationist view of integration. In this analysis, I show that Stoffman’s version of multiculturalism is exaggerated and his idea of culture and integration is misguided. I further show that true integration is neither about cultural conformity nor about cultural anarchism. Rather, true integration involves a democratic process which allows harmonious diversity to enrich people’s lives and permits conflicting differences to be settled lawfully and respectfully.     

On an Alleged Loophole in Causal Closure: A Reply to Gamper

Philosophia - This paper intends to critically consider the idea put forward by Johan Gamper (Philosophia 45: 631–636, 2017) that the principle of causal closure can be reconciled with the...     

On Disability and Illness. A Reply to Edwards

This paper is a reply to an article by Steven Edwards in a previous issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. In this paper Edwards discusses two types of problems which he finds to be inherent in my theory of disability, mainly as presented in my On the Nature of Health, Kluwer 1995. First, Edwards discerns a tension in my basic definition of health, a tension between my “subjectivistic” and my “objectivistic” aspirations in the definition. Second, he finds that my theory of disability does not allow for a distinction between disability due to illness or injury and disability which has no such (at least not immediate) background. In my answer to Edwards's arguments I claim that his first criticism must be due to a misunderstanding of my intentions. I find his second criticism to be more to the point. It raises important issues in the theory of health which partly concern our interpretation of the notion of illness. Edwards introduces the notion of capacity in order to separate between disability due to illness or injury and disability without such a background. In the last part of my paper I argue that this distinction, however, will not fulfil its purpose. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.