The economics of paradox: a response to armour-garb

‘Those ice cubes melted because by melting total entropy increased and entropy increase has a very high objective chance.’ What role does the chance in this explanation play? I argue that it contributes to the explanation by entailing that the melting was almost necessary, and defend the claim that the fact that some event was almost necessary can, in the right circumstances, constitute a causal explanation of that event.     

Learning about causes from people: Observational causal learning in 24-month-old infants

How do infants and young children learn about the causal structure of the world around them? In 4 experiments we investigate whether young children initially give special weight to the outcomes of goal-directed interventions they see others perform and use this to distinguish correlations from genuine causal relations-observational causal learning. In a new 2-choice procedure, 2- to 4-year-old children saw 2 identical objects (potential causes). Activation of 1 but not the other triggered a spatially remote effect. Children systematically intervened on the causal object and predictively looked to the effect. Results fell to chance when the cause and effect were temporally reversed, so that the events were merely associated but not causally related. The youngest children (24- to 36-month-olds) were more likely to make causal inferences when covariations were the outcome of human interventions than when they were not. Observational causal learning may be a fundamental learning mechanism that enables infants to abstract the causal structure of the world. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Bayesian chance

This paper explores how the Bayesian program benefits from allowing for objective chance as well as subjective degree of belief. It applies David Lewis??s Principal Principle and David Christensen??s principle of informed preference to defend Howard Raiffa??s appeal to preferences between reference lotteries and scaling lotteries to represent degrees of belief. It goes on to outline the role of objective lotteries in an application of rationality axioms equivalent to the existence of a utility assignment to represent preferences in Savage??s famous omelet example of a rational choice problem. An example motivating causal decision theory illustrates the need for representing subjunctive dependencies to do justice to intuitive examples where epistemic and causal independence come apart. We argue to extend Lewis??s account of chance as a guide to epistemic probability to include De Finetti??s convergence results. We explore Diachronic Dutch book arguments as illustrating commitments for treating transitions as learning experiences. Finally, we explore implications for Martingale convergence results for motivating commitment to objective chances.     

Bad Luck Once Again

In a recent article in this journal, Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe sketch an account of indeterminist free will designed to avoid the luck objection that has been wielded to such effect against event‐causal libertarianism. They argue that if decision‐making is an indeterministic process and not an event or series of events, the luck objection will fail. I argue that they are wrong: the luck objection is equally successful against their account as against existing event‐causal libertarianisms. Like the event‐causal libertarianism their account is meant to supplant, the process view cannot offer a reasons explanation of the agent’s choice itself; that choice is explained by nothing except chance. The agent therefore fails to exercise freedom‐level control over it.     

From mere coincidences to meaningful discoveries

People's reactions to coincidences are often cited as an illustration of the irrationality of human reasoning about chance. We argue that coincidences may be better understood in terms of rational statistical inference, based on their functional role in processes of causal discovery and theory revision. We present a formal definition of coincidences in the context of a Bayesian framework for causal induction: a coincidence is an event that provides support for an alternative to a currently favored causal theory, but not necessarily enough support to accept that alternative in light of its low prior probability. We test the qualitative and quantitative predictions of this account through a series of experiments that examine the transition from coincidence to evidence, the correspondence between the strength of coincidences and the statistical support for causal structure, and the relationship between causes and coincidences. Our results indicate that people can accurately assess the strength of coincidences, suggesting that irrational conclusions drawn from coincidences are the consequence of overestimation of the plausibility of novel causal forces. We discuss the implications of our account for understanding the role of coincidences in theory change.     

What In Nature Is The Compulsion Of Reason?

If reason is a real causal force,operative in some, but not all ofour cognition and conation, then itought to be possible to tell anaturalistic story that distinguishes themind which is moved byreason from the mind which is movedby forces other than reason.This essay proposes some steps towardthat end. I proceed by showingthat it is possible to reconcile certainemerging psychological ideasabout the causal powers of themind/brain with a venerablephilosophical vision of reason as the facultyof norms. My accountof reason is psychologistic, social, and consistent with anevolutionary approach to mind. The account preserves thenormativity by deflating it. But I argue that onlysuch deflated normativity has any chance of beingmade naturalistically respectable.     

Children's counterfactual inferences about long and short causal chains

Recent findings on counterfactual reasoning in children have led to the claim that children's developing capacities in the domain of ‘theory of mind’ might reflect the emergence of the ability to engage in counterfactual thinking over the preschool period (e.g. Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell, 1998 ). In the study reported here, groups of 3- and 4-year old children were presented with stories describing causal chains of several events, and asked counterfactual thinking tasks involving changes to different points in the chain. The ability to draw successful counterfactual inferences depended strongly on the inferential length of the problem, and the age of the children; while 3-year-olds performed above chance on short inference counterfactuals, they performed below chance on problems involving longer inference chains. Four-year-old children were above chance on all problems. Moreover, it was found that while success on longer chain inference problems was significantly correlated with the ability to pass tests of standard false belief, there was no such relationship for short inference problems, which were significantly easier than false belief problems. These results are discussed in terms of the developmental relationships between causal knowledge, counterfactual thinking and calculating the contents of mental states.     

The Role of Probability and Intentionality in Preschoolers' Causal Generalizations

Three experiments examined whether preschoolers recognize that the causal properties of objects generalize to new members of the same set given either deterministic or probabilistic data. Experiment 1 found that 3- and 4-year-olds were able to make such a generalization given deterministic data but were at chance when they observed probabilistic information. Five-year-olds reliably generalized in both situations. Experiment 2 found that 4-year-olds could make some probabilistic inferences, particularly when comparing sets that had no efficacy with sets in which some members had efficacy. Children had some difficulty discriminating between completely effective sets and stochastic ones. Experiment 3 examined whether 3- and 4-year-olds could reason about probabilistic data when provided with information about the experimenter's beliefs about causal outcomes. Children who were more successful on standard false-belief measures were more likely to respond as if the data were deterministic. These data suggest that children's probabilistic inferences develop into early elementary school, but preschoolers might have some understanding of probability when reasoning about causal generalization.     

On luck and chance: Need for control as a mediator of the attribution of events to luck

Chance and luck are regarded as two distinct causal agents that effect different results. Whereas chance is deemed utterly uncontrollable, luck elicits, at the very least, an illusion of control. Hence, need for control might be a decisive factor in determining whether an event is attributed to chance or to luck. More specifically, the greater is a person's need for control, the stronger would be that person's tendency to attribute events to luck. This proposition, along with its implications concerning effects of luck attributions on decision making, were tested in three experiments. The results showed that situational circumstances and personality dispositions that heighten individuals' need for control strengthen their tendency to attribute events and outcomes to luck. The results showed, further, that such attributions can affect the process of decision making.     

Glutamate as a transmitter in the CNS and its presumed significance in the pathogenesis of cerebral seizure forms--recent aspects

Glutamate is believed to be quantitatively the most outstanding of the excitatory transmitters in the CNS. Certain conformationally related analogues, e. g. kainate, N-methyl-D-aspartate, ibotenate, and homocysteate, act as glutamate agonists. The local or systemic administration of these "excitotoxic" compounds induces epileptiform activity pointing out new and deeper insights into the epileptic process. Additionally, the glutamate transmitter hypothesis is expected to give a chance of a causal comprehension for choreatic processes as well as for the mode of action of anticonvulsant and antispastic agents.     

Factors affecting reactions to a rape victim.

We examined the influence of the sex of the subject reacting to the rape victim, the type of rape (stranger vs. acquaintance), the location of the rape (inside vs. outside the victim's home), and the victim's attribution concerning the cause of the rape, on undergraduates' reactions to a rape victim. American undergraduates (264 women, 230 men) read a Rape Crisis Center Intake Form, watched a videotape of a rape victim (an actress) describing her psychological and behavioral reactions to the rape, and completed three questionnaires assessing their reactions to the victim. Women were more supportive of the rape victim than were men, and the stranger rape evoked more chance and characterological attributions than did the acquaintance rape. A rape outside the home evoked more chance attributions than did an "inside" rape. The rape victim was rated as having been more traumatized by the experience if she made any causal attribution than if she made no attribution at all.     

AGENT CAUSATION AND THE PROBLEM OF LUCK

Abstract: On a standard libertarian account of free will, an agent acts freely on some occasion only if there remains, until the action is performed, some chance that the agent will do something else instead right then. These views face the objection that, in such a case, it is a matter of luck whether the agent does one thing or another. This paper considers the problem of luck as it bears on agent‐causal libertarian accounts. A view of this type is defended against a recent and challenging version of the argument from luck.     

Children’s developing understanding of the relation between variable causal efficacy and mechanistic complexity

Two experiments investigated 3–4-year-olds’ ability to infer the causal mechanisms for a pair of lights. In both experiments the exterior of the two lights appeared identical. In Experiment 1, one light displayed a stable activation pattern of a single color while the other light displayed a variable pattern of activation by cycling through a series of different colors (i.e., a more varied effect). Children were asked to judge which light had a more complex internal structure. Four-year-olds were more likely to match the light with the more variable effect with a more complex internal mechanism and the light with the more stable effect with a less complex mechanism. Three-year-olds’ responses were at chance. Experiment 2 replicated this finding when the activation patterns of the two lights were described verbally but never demonstrated. Taken together, these results suggest that 4-year-olds appreciate that the variability of an object’s causal efficacy is related to the complexity of its internal mechanistic structure.     

THE COSMIC BREATH: REFLECTIONS ON THE THERMODYNAMICS OF CREATION

Abstract. This paper views such distinctions as creation and degeneration or good and evil in the Eastern sense of unity in polarity rather than in the Western sense of dual, antagonistic principles. Hence it considers the thermodynamic forces of evolution as processes of creation driven by entropy dissipation and explores the analogies this conception bears to the Hindu image of nature as the changing mist of a universal breath. Using this image, the paper examines the sense in which the second law of thermodynamics connects chance and teleology in the operations of nature and provides for a causal hierarchy in which decision and volitional behavior co-participate with the laws of nature to determine the course of evolution.     

Degree of explanation

Partial explanations are everywhere. That is, explanations citing causes that explain some but not all of an effect are ubiquitous across science, and these in turn rely on the notion of degree of explanation. I argue that current accounts are seriously deficient. In particular, they do not incorporate adequately the way in which a cause’s explanatory importance varies with choice of explanandum. Using influential recent contrastive theories, I develop quantitative definitions that remedy this lacuna, and relate it to existing measures of degree of causation. Among other things, this reveals the precise role here of chance, as well as bearing on the relation between causal explanation and causation itself.     

Competence and control orientations as predictors of test anxiety in students: Longitudinal results

Abstract

The hypothesis that domain-specific self-related cognitions (self-concept of own competence and control orientations) are predictors of text anxiety in students is tested by longitudinal data. At the beginning and at the end of a school year the following variables were measured twice in a sample of 346 secondary school students (grades six to ten): (1) self-concept of own competence in mathematics, (2) three aspects of locus of control for problem-solving behavior (internality, powerful others control, and chance control), (3) generalized locus of control of reinforcement, (4) test anxiety as well as manifest anxiety. The cross-sequential developmental gradients point toward symmetries in the development of self-related cognitions and test anxiety. The results of cross-lagged correlation analyses show that the null hypothesis (no causal relations exist between the self-related cognitions and test anxiety) can be rejected for the domain-specific aspects of (a low) self-concept of own competence and locus of control (low internality and high chance control), which are confirmed as preceding test anxiety. However, longitudinal results also show that findings of cross-sectional studies tend to overestimate the relations between self-related cognitions and test anxiety in a developmental perspective.     

Games of luck and games of chance: the effect of luck- versus chance-orientation on gambling decisions

Chance and luck are conceived as two distinct causal agents that effect different results. The present study examined the proposition that persons who habitually attribute the outcome of random events to chance (chance-oriented persons) and those who prefer to attribute such outcomes to luck (luck-oriented persons) cope differently with decision making under uncertainty. Chance-oriented persons decide according to given or estimated odds that define the decision problem. Luck-oriented persons, on the other hand, rely on self-attributions of personal luck, and ignore the probabilities of decision outcomes. The hypothesized qualitative difference between the approaches of chance- and luck-oriented persons to decision making under uncertainty was supported substantially by the findings. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Coincidence,historical repetition,and self-knowledge: Jung,Vico, and Joyce

Jung develops synchronicity as an a causal principle of connection by recounting various examples of meaningful coincidence from experience and by analysing various systems of divination, notably the I Ching. Philosophical theory of causality has given no significant attention to synchronicity; the events of synchronicity are regarded as chance. The Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) developed a doctrine of historical experience and of self-knowledge that grounds the phenomenon of synchronicity in a metaphysics. James Joyce employed Vico's conception of language and historical cycles as the basis of Joyce's final literary work, Finnegans Wake. Vico's metaphysical sense of synchronicity and Joyce's literary formulation offer a grounding of this principle in non-divinatory sources in modern Western thought, something which Jung's discussion does not provide. These philosophical and literary perspectives complement Jung's to offer an expanded context in which to recognize synchronicity and to make sense of it.     

The suppression of Modus Ponens as a case of pragmatic preconditional reasoning

The suppression of the Modus Ponens inference is described as a loss of confidence in the conclusion C of an argument “If A1 then C; If A2 then C; A1” where A2 is a requirement for C to happen. It is hypothesised that this loss of confidence is due to the derivation of the conversational implicature “there is a chance that A2 might not be satisfied”, and that different syntactic introductions of the requirement A2 (e.g., “If C then A2”) will lead to various frequencies in the derivation of this implicature, according to previous studies in the field of causal explanation. An experiment is conducted, whose results support those claims. Results are discussed in the light of the Mental Logic and Mental Model theories, as well as in the light of the pragmatic approach to uncertain reasoning.     

Abnormality, cognitive virtues, and knowledge

Causal analyses of one’s knowing that p have recently emphasized the involvement of cognitive virtues in coming to believe that p. John Greco suggests that in order to deal with Gettier-type cases, a virtue analysis of knowing should include a requirement that one’s knowing does not in a certain way involve abnormality. Yet Greco’s emphasis on statistical abnormality either renders his analysis subject to a generality problem or to objections regarding certain Gettier-type cases. When we instead consider abnormality in the sense of a causally differentiating factor in relation to a causal contrast situation, the account remains unclear concerning its application to an interesting non-Gettier-type case concerning chance. The exploration of these shortcomings casts doubt on the epistemological usefulness of the schema, ‘If you know, then there is no abnormality in your being right.’