Familiarity and attention: Does what we know affect what we notice?

Previous work on the object and word superiority effects has demonstrated that activation from stored representations can facilitate identification of items in a visual display. We predicted that activation of this sort might exogenously attract visual attention toward items that have stored representations. To test this prediction, we presented a familiar (word) and an unfamiliar (nonword) item simultaneously at unpredictable locations, and after varying delays, moved one of the stimuli. In accord with our prediction, at the shortest intervals subjects were more efficient at discriminating motion of the familiar item. Control data demonstrated that this advantage was due to a competitive interaction and not to the familiarity of the items per se.     

Why does the effect of short-SOA exogenous cuing on simple RT depend on the number of display locations?

When the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the cue and target is short (i.e., less than 200 msec) and the number of display locations is small (e.g., only two), exogenous spatial cues produce a benefit in simple response time (RT). However, several recent experiments have found significant costs in these tasks when a large number of display locations is employed (e.g., eight), even at the very short SOAs that usually produce a benefit. The present study explored the dependence of exogenous cuing on the number of display locations and found evidence that both the overall validity of the cues and the specific validity of the cue on the previous trial have strong, additive effects. When a large number of display locations is used, both of these factorswork against a benefit of exogenous cuing on simple RT, reversing the typical finding into a cost. These two effects are suggested to occur within motor and perceptual processes, respectively.     

Stereotypes of singles: are singles what we think?

Four studies examined the accuracy of the single stereotype by comparing perceptions of single and partnered targets with self‐ratings and ratings by others of single and partnered participants. Results revealed that single targets were evaluated more negatively than partnered targets in terms of a wide range of personality characteristics, overall well‐being, and satisfaction with relationships status. These findings were very robust and not qualified by target sex, participant sex, and participant relationship status. In contrast, self‐ratings of single and partnered participants were remarkably similar for all personality characteristics as well as overall well‐being, which was corroborated by ratings of participants by others. However, partnered participants were indeed more satisfied with their relationship status than single participants. When all is considered, the single stereotype is largely inaccurate. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

We talk,therefore we think? A cultural analysis of the effect of talking on thinking

The Western assumption that talking is connected to thinking is not shared in the East. The research examines how the actual psychology of individuals reflects these different cultural assumptions. In Study 1, Asian Americans and European Americans thought aloud while solving reasoning problems. Talking impaired Asian Americans' performance but not that of European Americans. Study 2 showed that participants' beliefs about talking and thinking are correlated with how talking affects performance, and suggested that cultural difference in modes of thinking can explain the difference in the effect of talking. Study 3 showed that talking impaired Asian Americans' performance because they tend to use internal speech less than European Americans. Results illuminate the importance of cultural understanding of psychology for a multicultural society.     

Does the testing effect depend on presentation modality?

We examined whether the testing effect generalizes to an auditory presentation modality. Five lists of unrelated words (Experiment 1) and related words (Experiment 2) were presented to participants, half of whom studied them visually and half studied them auditorily. Participants in the study-only condition performed a short distractor task following lists 1–4, whereas those in the testing condition completed a short distractor task and then attempted to recall each list. Both groups were subsequently tested on List 5 and on all five lists 30 min later. In both experiments, we found a testing effect for both List 5 and for the final cumulative recall test. However, the effect did not interact with study modality, despite the fact that proactive interference was greater following auditory study. These results have important implications for educational practice, suggesting that initial testing is important for materials presented in auditory as well as visual formats.     

How can we know what we need to know? Reflections on clinical judgment formation

What distinguishes a psychoanalyst from any other psychologically minded, empathic human being? This seemingly simple question goes to the heart of our profession, the way we see ourselves as competent clinicians. To understand a patient's material beyond ordinary empathy--that is, to come to a clinical judgment--we need to step out of the dyadic, countertransference situation and reflect what we've experienced in reference to our clinical theories. An analytic vignette shows how a theoretical background can be used to understand and interpret to a patient in a way that is deeply meaningful.     

Psychological universals: what are they and how can we know?

Psychological universals, or core mental attributes shared by humans everywhere, are a foundational postulate of psychology, yet explicit analysis of how to identify such universals is lacking. This article offers a conceptual and methodological framework to guide the investigation of genuine universals through empirical analysis of psychological patterns across cultures. Issues of cross-cultural generalizability of psychological processes and 3 cross-cultural research strategies to probe universals are considered. Four distinct levels of hierarchically organized universals are possible: From strongest to weakest claims for universality, they are accessibility universals, functional universals, existential universals, and nonuniversals. Finally, universals are examined in relation to the questions of levels of analysis, evolutionary explanations of psychological processes, and management of cross-cultural relations.     

The development of arithmetic principle knowledge: How do we know what learners know?

This paper reviews research on learners’ knowledge of three arithmetic principles: Commutativity, Relation to Operands, and Inversion. Studies of arithmetic principle knowledge vary along several dimensions, including the age of the participants, the context in which the arithmetic is presented, and most importantly, the type of knowledge assessment (e.g., application of procedures, evaluation of examples). The vast majority of studies utilize single-faceted knowledge assessments, which can lead to incomplete or misleading views of learners’ knowledge. Both context and type of knowledge assessment can influence conclusions about learners’ arithmetic principle knowledge. However, relatively few studies directly address the possible effects of context or type of knowledge assessment on their results. To move the field forward, research that utilizes multifaceted knowledge assessments is needed.     

Does culture influence what and how we think? Effects of priming individualism and collectivism

Do differences in individualism and collectivism influence values, self-concept content, relational assumptions, and cognitive style? On the one hand, the cross-national literature provides an impressively consistent picture of the predicted systematic differences; on the other hand, the nature of the evidence is inconclusive. Cross-national evidence is insufficient to argue for a causal process, and comparative data cannot specify if effects are due to both individualism and collectivism, only individualism, only collectivism, or other factors (including other aspects of culture). To address these issues, the authors conducted a meta-analysis of the individualism and collectivism priming literature, with follow-up moderator analyses. Effect sizes were moderate for relationality and cognition, small for self-concept and values, robust across priming methods and dependent variables, and consistent in direction and size with cross-national effects. Results lend support to a situated model of culture in which cross-national differences are not static but dynamically consistent due to the chronic and moment-to-moment salience of individualism and collectivism. Examination of the unique effects of individualism and collectivism versus other cultural factors (e.g., honor, power) awaits the availability of research that primes these factors.     

Do people keep believing because they want to? Preexisting attitudes and the continued influence of misinformation

Misinformation—defined as information that is initially assumed to be valid but is later corrected or retracted—often has an ongoing effect on people’s memory and reasoning. We tested the hypotheses that (a) reliance on misinformation is affected by people’s preexisting attitudes and (b) attitudes determine the effectiveness of retractions. In two experiments, participants scoring higher and lower on a racial prejudice scale read a news report regarding a robbery. In one scenario, the suspects were initially presented as being Australian Aboriginals, whereas in a second scenario, a hero preventing the robbery was introduced as an Aboriginal person. Later, these critical, race-related pieces of information were or were not retracted. We measured participants’ reliance on misinformation in response to inferential reasoning questions. The results showed that preexisting attitudes influence people’s use of attitude-related information but not the way in which a retraction of that information is processed.     

How do we know what we are doing? Time, intention and awareness of action

Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the "sense of agency" have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side on some trials. Participants (1) expressed their expectancy of a target shift during the upcoming movement, (2) pointed at the target as quickly and accurately as possible before returning to the start posiment to the target shift if required and (3) reproduced the spatial path of the movement they had just made, as accurately as possible, to give an indication of their awareness of the pointing movement. We analysed the spatial disparity between the initial and the reproduced movements on those with a target shift. A negative disparity value, or undershoot, suggests that motor awareness merely reflects a sluggish record of coordinated motor performance, while a positive value, or overshoot, suggests that participants' intention to point to the shifting target contributes more to their awareness of action than their actual pointing movement. Undershoot and overshoot thus measure the reconstructive (motoric) and the preconstuctive (intentional) aspects of action awareness, respectively. We found that trials on which subjects strongly expected a target shift showed greater overshoot and less undershoot than trials with lower expectancy. Conscious expectancy therefore strongly influences the experience of the detailed motor parameters of our actions. Further, a delay inserted either between the expectancy judgement and the pointing movement, or between the pointing movement and the reproduction of the movement, had no effect on visuomotor adjustment but strongly influenced action awareness. Delays during either interval boosted undershoots, suggesting increased reliance on a time-limited sensory memory for action. The experience of action is thus strongly influenced by prior thoughts and expectations, but only over a short time period. Thus, awareness of our actions is a dynamic and relatively flexible mixture of what we intend to do, and what our motor system actually does.     

Does the mortality salience effect on worldview defence depend on the cultural orientation of Chinese people?

According to the terror management theory, people tend to favour their worldview and in-group members after being reminded of death (i.e., mortality salience [MS] effect). However, inconsistent findings of the MS effect were found among Chinese people. In the present study, we examined the MS effect with Chinese samples and tested whether the effect would depend on participants' cultural orientation and relational self-esteem. In Studies 1 (N = 227) and 2 (N = 221), we examined the roles of participants' cultural orientations and relational self-esteem in their evaluations on moral transgression and/or perceived regard from people around after being primed with mortality (vs. dental pain) salience. We obtained the interaction effects of mortality salience, cultural orientations, and relational self-esteem. The implications of these results are discussed in the context of Chinese culture.     

Risky prospects and risk aversion tendencies: does competition in the classroom depend on grading practices and knowledge of peer-status?

When students are faced with the decision of whether to assist a peer, they should be sensitive to the potential risks associated with doing so. Two factors associated with risky helping behaviour in the classroom are: (1) the grading practices that are used, and (2) knowledge of a peer’s relative status. Normative (“curved”) grading creates a situation in which peer-interactions are potentially competitive, but it is only those interactions with peers of a similar status that carry the potential for assistance to be costly to oneself. In two studies, we created hypothetical scenarios in which the grading practices (normative or absolute) and peer-status proximity (proximate, distant, or unknown) were manipulated, and asked participants to report their willingness to cooperate with a peer by sharing their notes from an important lecture. We found that when normative grading was used, individuals were less willing to assist a peer when they knew that the peer’s status was proximate to their own. There was also less cooperation when peer status was unknown, under normative grading, which is consistent with a risk-aversion tendency.     

What do mind readers know and what do we know about mind readers?

In this commentary, I raise various questions about Kim and Harris's fascinating findings. I ask what kind of knowledge children expect telepathic individuals to have, who children might consider to be good mind readers, why children value telepathy, and how puzzled children are by telepathy. I suggest potential ways to address some of these questions and end by reiterating the importance of probing individual differences in scepticism and credulity.     

Consciousness and identity: who do we think we are?

This article proposes that the epistemological concerns raised by the inherent incoherence of thought requires a dialogical approach to understanding consciousness and identity. It is argued that such an approach leads to (a) a fundamentally spiritual view of self, (b) a radical view of consciousness as a non-local field that shapes the limits of our perception, and (c) a determination of the degree of gap between reality and thought's representation of it. A method of measuring this kind of consciousness is examined, and examples of insights gained through this methodology are provided. Implications of this perspective are explored, and conclusions arising from this inquiry are presented.     

How we think they see us? Valence and difficulty of retrieval as moderators of the effect of meta‐stereotype activation on intergroup orientations

Previous research indicates that meta‐stereotypes are predominantly negative. However, the valence of the meta‐stereotypes may not be the only factor accounting for the detrimental effects associated with their activation. In addition to valence, we propose that the subjective difficulty of retrieving the meta‐stereotype might critically determine whether its activation deteriorates intergroup orientations. An experimental study showed that the effect of the meta‐stereotype activation on the desire to interact with outgroup members was moderated by the interaction between the valence of the meta‐stereotype and its difficulty of retrieval. In particular, the activation of a positive meta‐stereotype deteriorated intergroup orientations when the difficulty of retrieval was high as compared with a condition in which the difficulty of retrieval was low. In sharp contrast, the activation of a negative meta‐stereotype worsened intergroup orientations when the difficulty of retrieval was low as compared with a condition in which the difficulty of retrieval was high.     

The paradox of happiness: Why are we not doing what we know makes us happy?

Achieving and maintaining happiness can be difficult, especially when people are not engaging in the activities they know facilitate it. ‘Flow’ activities require clear rules, challenge, a high investment of energy, and have been shown to promote long-term happiness better than low investment, passive activities. Do people know this? In two studies, we found that, despite recognizing that flow activities are more likely to facilitate happiness, people nevertheless participated in passive leisure significantly more often in a typical week. Participants rated passive activities as being significantly more enjoyable, requiring less effort, and being less daunting to get started than flow activities. Participants’ engagement in flow activities was significantly predicted by how enjoyable the activities were perceived to be, whereas how daunting those activities were rated predicted non-engagement. Passive activity engagement was only significantly predicted by enjoyment. Suggestions for enabling people to rise above the barriers to flow activities are offered.     

Do we know what we've learned from listening to the news?

This study investigates the relationship between knowledge acquisition and an awareness of that knowledge within the context of listening to the news, Subjects listened to a recording of a radio news program consisting of regular news items as well as editorials, manipulated to be of high or low personal relevance. They then completed a surprise memory test and rated their confidence in their answers. In contrast to many studies, the results indicated a strong positive confidence-accuracy relationship. Confidence ratings were generally a better predictor of an individual's performance than were predictions based on item difficulty. Whereas subjects reported strong and accurate feelings of knowing, they apparently lacked complementary feelings ofnot knowing. The implications of these findings and others are discussed.