Time causes forgetting from working memory

Although forgetting in the short term is a ubiquitous phenomenon, its exact causes remain undecided. The aim of the present study was to test the temporal decay hypothesis according to which memory traces fade away with time when attention is diverted by concurrent activities. In two experiments involving complex span tasks, adults were asked to remember series of items (either letters or spatial locations) while verifying multiplications. The duration of processing was manipulated by presenting multiplications either in word (three    ×    four    =    twelve) or digit (3    ×    4    =    12) format, the former taking longer to solve, while the time available to restore memory traces after each operation was kept constant across conditions. In line with the temporal decay hypothesis, the longer solution times elicited by solving word multiplications resulted in poorer recall performance. The fact that longer processing times had a comparable effect on both verbal and visuospatial memory and that the difference between conditions remained stable from the first to the last trials makes it difficult to account for these findings by assuming that forgetting is exclusively due to representation-based interference or buildup of proactive interference.     

Reproduction,familiarity, love,and humaneness: How did confucius reveal “humaneness”?

This article draws out the subtle connections among the various sorts of categories—“sheng 生 (reproduction),” “qin 亲 (familiarity),” “ai 爱 (love),” and “ren 仁 (humaneness)”—focusing on the following: Confucius found the original significance of “reproduction” to be sympathy between males and females, and upon further study he found it extended to the.affinity of blood relations, namely “familiarity.” From “familiarity” he came to understand “love” that one generates and has for people and things beyond one’s blood relations, in other words, the empathic heart or the feeling of empathy itself. From here he anticipated rende 仁德 (the humane and virtuous) level of “fan’ai zhong 泛爱众 (universal love for all people)” or “fan’ai wanwu 泛爱万物 (universal love for all creatures).” The article further makes the point that in order to meet the conditions for the perfection of “humaneness” which has neither any excesses nor any deficiencies, Confucius ultimately developed a means, that is, “the golden mean,” which indicates that his ancient understanding of life and growth produced in Confucius a profound shift in the focus of human concern from “ming 命 (fate)” to “Dao 道 (the Way).”     

论"观物"与"观无"——儒学与现象学的一种融通

In traditional Chinese expressions, guannian 观念 (ideas) are results of guan 观 (viewing). However, viewing can be understood to have two different levels of meanings: one is “viewing things,” that is, viewing with something to view; another is “viewing nothing,” that is, viewing with nothing to view. What are viewed in “viewing things” are either physical beings—all existing things and phenomena—or the metaphysical being (for example, the “Dao as a thing”). In both cases, something is being viewed. What is viewed in “viewing nothing” is the being itself, or “nothing,” in which there is nothing to view. According to Confucianism, the existence of “nothing” manifests itself as life sentiments, especially the sentiment of love, which is the very root and source of benevolence; moreover “viewing nothing” is, in essence, a perception of life. Life sentiments or the perception of life is “the thing itself ” prior to any being or any thing. Translated by Liu Huawei from Sichuan Daxue Xuebao 四川大学学报 (Journal of Sichuan University), 2006, (4): 67–74     

郭象"独化"范畴释义

Seemingly, “independent genesis” refers to the independent existence and changes of each thing, but it is clear that there cannot be any truly “independent” things at all. Each thing in the world has to stay in connection or relationship with other things outside itself if it wants to represent its own “independence” and “genesis” in terms of form; and inevitably such connection or relationship itself has to be embodied in the internal nature of each thing. In the metaphysical thought of Guo Xiang, the former was known as the quality of “interdependence”; and the latter the characteristics of “quality” or “quality image.” Such characteristics of “quality” or “quality image” were interdependent, which constituted the essence of each thing itself as “beingness” and “beinglessness,” and thus resulted in the independent manifestation and change of things in terms of their external forms. The grasping of essence of things as “beingness” and “beinglessness” depended upon comprehension or rational intuition, and that was the realm of “profundity” in Guo Xiang’s terms. Translated by Huang Deyuan from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲哲哲哲 (Philosophical Researches), 2007, (11): 37–43     

Psychophysiological components of imagery

McGuigan’s neuromuscular model of information processing (1978a, 1978b, and 1989) was investigated by electrically recording eye movements (electro-oculograms), covert lip and preferred arm responses (electromyograms), and electroencephalograms. This model predicts that codes are generated as the lips are uniquely activated when processing words beginning with bilabial sounds like “p” or “b,” as is the right arm to words like “pencil” that refer to its use. Twelve adult female participants selected for their high imagery ratings were asked to form images to three orally presented linguistic stimuli: the letter “p,” the words “pencil” and “pasture,” and to a control stimulus, the words “go blank.” The following findings were significant beyond the 0.05 level: an increased covert lip response only to the letter “p,” increased vertical eye activity to “p” and to the word “pencil,” right arm response only to the word “pencil,” and a decreased percentage of alpha waves from the right 02 lead only to the word “pasture.” Since these covert responses uniquely occurred during specific imagery processes, it is inferred that they are components of neuromuscular circuits that function in accord with the model of information processing tested.     

列维纳斯面对康德、黑格尔、海德格尔——当代哲学关于"存在论"的争论

Levinas subverts the traditional “ontology-epistemology,” and creates a “realm of difference,” the realm of “value,” “ethic,” and “religion,” maintaining that ethics is real metaphysics. According to him, it is not that “being” contains the “other” but the other way round. In this way, the issues of ethics are promoted greatly in the realm of philosophy. Nonetheless, he does not intend to deny “ontology” completely, but reversed the relationship between “ontology (theory of truth)” and “ethics (axiology),” placing the former under the “constraint” of the latter. Different from general empirical science, philosophy focuses more on issues irrelevant to ordinary empirical objects; it does have “objects,” though. More often than not, the issues of philosophy cannot be conceptualized into “propositions”; nevertheless, it absolutely has its “theme.” As a discipline, philosophy continuously takes “being” as its “theme” and “object” of thinking. The point is that this “being” should not be understood as an “object” completely. Rather, it is still a “theme-subject.” In addition to an “object,” “being” also manifests itself in an “attribute” and a kind of “meaning” as well. In a word, it is the temporal, historical, and free “being” rather than “various beings” that is the “theme-subject” of philosophy. Translated by Zhang Lin from Wen Shi Zhe 文史哲 (Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy), 2007, (1): 61–70     

牟宗三先生以"自律道德"的理论诠释儒学之蠡测

Mou Zongsan uses the highest moral principle “autonomy” to interpret Confucius’ benevolence and Mencius’ “inherent benevolence and righteousness”, focuses on the self-rule of the will. It does not do any harm to Mencius’ learning, on the contrary, it is conducive to the communication between Chinese and Western philosophies. If we stick to Kant’s moral self autonomy and apply it to interpreting Zhu Xi’s moral theory, similarly we will discover the implications of Zhu Xi’s “autonomy” in his moral learning. Therefore, it is inappropriate for Mou Zongsan to say that Zhu Xi’s ethics belongs to the autonomous one. __________ Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2005, (6): 33–39     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Wissenschaftslogik</Emphasis>: The role of logic in the philosophy of science

Carl Hempel introduced what he called “Craig’s theorem” into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the “problem of theoretical terms.” Beginning with Hempel’s use of ‘Craig’s theorem,” I shall bring out some of the key differences between Hempel’s treatment of the “problem of theoretical terms” and Carnap’s in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap’s mature philosophy. Carnap’s treatment, in particular, is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools of mathematical logic to dissolve rather solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine.     

What <Emphasis Type="Italic">Cèyǐn zhī xīn</Emphasis> (Compassion/Familial Affection) Really Is

This essay aims to delineate Mengzi’s view of emotion by analyzing his first ethical sprout, often referred to by the Chinese term cèyǐn zhī xīn 惻隱之心.Previous scholars usually translate this term as “compassion,” “sympathy,” or “commiseration,” in the sense of the painful feeling one feels at the misfortune of others. My goal in this article is to clarify the nature of this painful feeling, and specifically I argue that (1) cèyǐn zhī xīn is primarily construing another being’s misfortune with sympathetic concern, and that (2) the painfulness of cèyǐn zhī xīn comes from this concern-based construal of the object of one’s compassion. My interpretation of cèyǐn zhī xīn as a concern-based construal is an attempt to construct an important alternative to the inclinational view of Mengzian emotions, and it could be also considered as making a crucial step toward a new interpretation of the Mengzian theory of emotional cultivation.     

"本质"的双重含义:自然科学与人文科学——黑格尔、狄尔泰、胡塞尔之间的一点链接

Early in Aristotle’s terminology, and ever since, “essence” has been conceived as having two meanings, namely “universality” and “individuality”. According to the tradition of thought that has dominated throughout the history of Western philosophy, “essence” unequivocally refers to “universality”. As a matter of fact, however, “universality” cannot cover Aristotle’s definition and formulation of “essence”: Essence is what makes a thing “happen to be this thing.” “Individuality” should be the deep meaning of “essence”. By means of an analysis of some relevant Western thoughts and a review of cultural realities, it can be concluded that the difference between the attitudes toward things of the natural sciences and the humane sciences mainly lies in the fact that the former focus on the pursuit of universal regularity, whereas the latter go after the value and significance of human life. The movement from natural things to cultural things is a process in which essence shifts from universality to individuality. It is the author’s contention that what should be stressed in the fields of human culture and society is the construction of an ideal society that is “harmonious yet not identical”, on the basis of respecting and developing individual peculiarity and otherness. Translated by Zhang Lin from Beijing daxue xuebao 北京大学学报 (Journal of Peking University), 2007, (11): 23–29     

Illness Meanings in the Context of Cancer: An Indian Perspective

Attempts at meaning-making are considered an integral part of the process of psychological adjustment following the diagnosis of a major illness. The present study aimed at examining the applicability of Lipowski’s illness meaning framework and the utility of a card-task and an interview method for the assessment of illness meanings in an Indian sample of cancer patients (n=100). ‘Challenge’, ‘value’, ‘punishment’ , ‘weakness’ and ‘enemy’ were the five categories from the Lipowski’s framework that were found to be applicable in the current study sample whereas ‘strategy’, ‘relief’ and ‘loss’ were not applicable in the sample. Five new categories of illness meanings emerged namely; ‘burden’, ‘part of life’, ‘God’s plan’, ‘fate’ and ‘low threat’. Subgroups of patients formed on the basis of four broad categories of illness meanings (positive, negative, fate and low threat) differed significantly on depression, anxiety and quality of life, supporting the convergent validity of the interview based assessment. The study highlights that the card-task for assessment of meanings has significant limitations and that Lipowski’s illness-meaning framework requires expansion to capture the breadth of illness experiences in Indian patients.     

What is Classical and Non-Classical Knowledge?

Mamardašvili’s ‘classical’ paradigm of knowledge is seen to be minimally based on extrapolations from Descartes’ classical philosophy to which Mamardašvili attributes features that rather anticipate his own post-classical ontology. The latter is oriented towards the primacy of perception as a subjective process, in which the self-conscious subject constructs the world, not as illusion, but as a ‘picture’ or ‘model’ (Wittgenstein’s Bild). By examining Mamardašvili’s definition of the ‘phenomenon’ against the␣background of Husserl’s ‘reduction’, Wittgenstein’s ‘object’ and the Freudian and post-structuralist psychoanalytic model of subjectivity, the paper arrives at the inference that Mamardašvili is essentially a post-Structuralist thinker who appropriates concepts from various critical and philosophical disciplines to construct his own multi-disciplinary theory of consciousness and perception.     

О Теории отношений построенной на теории предметов

Резюме Представленная в статье теория отношений состоит из общей теории отношений и частных теорий отношений. Выражения первой из них — осмысленны, а ее законы истинны для отношений любого типа. Пределы осмысленности выражений частных теорий отношений и истинности их законов ограничиваются отношениями определенного особого типа. От частной теории отношений отличается прикладная теория отношений. Прикладная теория отношений — это общая теория отношений, примененная к отношениям какого-нибудь особого типа и отличается она от общей теории отношений только формой переменных. Частная же теория отношений и прикладная теория отношений, касающиеся отношений того же самого особого типа, могут отличаться между собой формой постоянных, но не отличаются формой переменных.     

A New Normalization Strategy for the Implicational Fragment of Classical Propositional Logic

The introduction and elimination rules for material implication in natural deduction are not complete with respect to the implicational fragment of classical logic. A natural way to complete the system is through the addition of a new natural deduction rule corresponding to Peirce’s formula (((A → B) → A) → A). E. Zimmermann [6] has shown how to extend Prawitz’ normalization strategy to Peirce’s rule: applications of Peirce’s rule can be restricted to atomic conclusions. The aim of the present paper is to extend Seldin’s normalization strategy to Peirce’s rule by showing that every derivation Π in the implicational fragment can be transformed into a derivation Π′ such that no application of Peirce’s rule in Π′ occurs above applications of →-introduction and →-elimination. As a corollary of Seldin’s normalization strategy we obtain a form of Glivenko’s theorem for the classical {→}-fragment.     

Теоремы о дедукции от противного

Резюме Под названием теорем о дедукции от противного в статье вводятся теоремы позволяющиэ формализировать рассуждения от противного, встечающиеся в дедуктивной практике, а особенно в практике математических доказательств. В статье рассматриваются отношения между введёнными теоремами и некоторыми логическими исчислениями. Мы ограничиваемся в основном отношением упомянутых теорем к импликтивно-отиицательным исчислениям предоожений.