Health as a value: methodological and theoretical considerations

The concept of value placed on health is very important in several different theoretical approaches to the study of health behavior. In practice, however, health value is generally assumed to be universally high rather than being directly measured. If this assumption is incorrect, then theories that include health value have rarely been adequately tested. This paper presents a short 4-item Likert scale designed to measure the value placed on health. Norms from the utilization of this scale in five different samples are presented. Health value is found to increase with age among girls, but the increase apparently stops by late adolescence, before full adult levels of health value are achieved. Middle-aged women place a higher value on health than do middle-aged men, although no comparable sex difference appears in a sample of undergraduates. Consistent with theoretical predictions, both health locus of control beliefs and beliefs in the efficacy of certain preventive health behaviors correlate more highly with the performance of those same behaviors 5 to 9 months later among respondents who place a high value of health relative to those who do not value health so highly. However, this interaction is found only when it can be safely assumed that health is the primary value underlying the behavior. The importance of considering a variety of values in addition to health as possible motivators of preventive health behavior is stressed.     

Value conflict and post-decision consolidation

The primary goal of the present study was to investigate how the mental representations of value conflicts are restructured after a decision. A value conflict exists if a chosen alternative is less attractive than a non-chosen alternative on one important attribute when a decision is made. In order to follow up earlier field studies with no experimental control over value conflicts, the present study induced value conflicts in the laboratory. This was done through associating the more attractive of two alternatives with a smaller probability of success. The first hypothesis was that consolidation of value conflict attributes should follow the same pattern when the conflict is controlled experimentally as in earlier studies of real-life decisions. The second hypothesis was that consolidation should be weaker in a non-consequential laboratory study than in the earlier real-life studies. The third hypothesis was that stronger value conflicts (that is, value conflict on more important attributes) lead to greater consolidation effects than weaker value conflicts. The results showed that participants consolidated the value conflicts in the same way as in real-life decisions with the difference that also less important attributes were consolidated in the present study. However, the consolidation effects were not so strong that they caused advantage reversals on a conflict attribute, as in the earlier field studies with real outcomes and consequences. There was no relationship between strength of conflict and consolidation. The fact that no advantage reversals were registered leads to questions about the ecological validity of laboratory studies of non-consequential decision making.     

The Shape of a Life and Desire Satisfaction

It is widely accepted by philosophers of well‐being that the shape or narrative structure of a life is a significant determinant of its overall welfare value. Most arguments for this thesis posit agent‐independent value in certain life shapes. The desire theory of well‐being, I argue, has all of the resources needed to account for the value that many philosophers have identified in lives with certain shapes. The theory denies that there is any agent‐independent value in shapes and, indeed, allows that there can be both agent‐dependent value and agent‐dependent disvalue in the shapes commonly claimed to hold agent‐independent value.     

Tropic of Value*

The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value (value for their own sake), which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano‐inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a yet another type of reduction proposal, according to which the ultimate bearers of final value are abstract particulars (so‐called tropes) rather than abstract states or facts. While the proposal is attractive ((fone entertains the existence of tropes), it confronts serious difficulties. To recognise tropes as potential bearers of final value, along with other objects, is one thing; but to reduce the final value of concrete objects to the final value of tropes is another matter.     

儿童“期望值”判断的研究

以 7岁、9岁、12岁小学生和成人大学生为被试 ,让他们在 5种实验任务中进行期望值判断 ,以探讨儿童期望值判断的发展。结果表明 :(1) 7岁儿童就能够在简单任务中进行概率推理和正确判断事件的期望值 ;(2 )儿童对概率和价值两个维度相乘关系的认知呈现发展趋势 ,但其乘法规则的运用仍逊于成人水平。而成人期望值判断的成绩有较大的个体差异。 (3)在期望值相同的情况下 ,儿童更注重事件发生的概率而相对忽视价值     

论医学人文价值

医学的基本价值是救护生命,这是医学特有的、体现医学基本任务和基本目的的内在规定;离开了医学的基本价值,医学就不成其为医学.医学的人文价值是关爱生命,这是医学必有的、体现医学本质和终极目的的内在规定.求真、崇善、尚美、达圣是医学人文价值的本质.离开了医学的人文价值,医学就不成其为人的医学.     

THE COUNTERNULL VALUE OF AN EFFECT SIZE:

We introduce a new, readily computed statistic, the counternull value of an obtained effect size, which is the nonnull magnitude of effect size that is supported by exactly the same amount of evidence as supports the null value of the effect size In other words, if the counternull value were taken as the null hypothesis, the resulting p value would be the same as the obtained p value for the actual null hypothesis Reporting the counternull, in addition to the p value, virtually eliminates two common errors (a) equating failure to reject the null with the estimation of the effect size as equal to zero and (b) takmg the rejection of a null hypothesis on the basis of a significant p value to imply a scientifically important finding In many common situations with a one-degree-of-freedom effect size, the value of the counternull is simply twice the magnitude of the obtained effect size, but the counternull is defined in general, even with multidegree-of-freedom effect sizes, and therefore can be applied when a confidence interval cannot be The use of the counternull can be especially useful in meta-analyses when evaluating the scientific importance of summary effect sizes     

Commitment and satisfaction in romantic associations: A test of the investment model

Two experiments were designed to test the adequacy of the investment model of developing relationships in predicting satisfaction with and commitment to ongoing associations. According to the investment model, attraction to and satisfaction with a relationship is a function of a comparison of the relationship outcome value (both rewards and costs) to the individual's expectations, or comparison level. Commitment to a relationship is said to be a function not only of the relationship outcome value, but also the quality of the best available alternative and the magnitude of the individual's investment in the relationship. The intrinsic or extrinsic investment of resources serves to increase commitment by increasing the costs of leaving the relationship. Thus, increases in investment size, decreases in alternative value, and increases in relationship value should increase commitment to an ongoing relationship. In Experiment 1, a role-playing study, commitment to relationships increased with intrinsic and extrinsic investment size and decreased with the value of alternatives, but was not appreciably affected by relationship costs. Satisfaction/attraction significantly increased as relationship costs decreased. In Experiment 2, a survey of ongoing romantic associations, satisfaction/attraction was predicted by relationship reward value and relationship cost value. Commitment to relationships increased as relationship reward value and investment size increased and as alternative value and relationship cost value decreased, although the effects of cost value were weak.     

Artistic Institutions, Valuable Experiences: Coming to Terms with Artistic Value

Supposing that talk of a distinctively artistic type of value is warranted, what separates it from other sorts of value? Any plausible answer must explain both what is of value and what is artistic about artistically valuable properties. Flaws with extant accounts stem from neglect of one component or the other; the account offered here, based on careful attention to actual art-critical practices, brings both together. The ??value?? component depends on the capacity of artworks to provide subjectively valuable experiences, while the ??artistic?? component relies on the specific norms constitutive of artworld institutions. Understanding artistic value in this way allows for progress on several persistent problems, including the ethical value of art, relativism in artistic value, and the proper boundaries of philosophical aesthetics.     

In Defense of Individualism

This paper offers a programmatic philosophical articulation of moral and political individualism. This individualism consists of two main components: value individualism and rights individualism. The former is the view that, for each individual, the end which is of ultimate value is his own well-being. Each individual's well-being has ultimate agent-relative value and the only ultimate values are these agent-relative values. The latter view is that individuals possess moral jurisdiction over themselves, i.e., rights of self-ownership. These rights (along with other rights individuals may come to possess) constrain the manner in which agents may pursue value. For this reason, the articulated individualism is an constrained individualism. Sketches of arguments are offered for both value and rights individualism. And it is argued that the sole legitimate function of legal/political institutions is to further delineate and protect the rights of individuals. However, the paper is also concerned to indicate why this radical moral and political individualism does not have many of the features or implications that are commonly ascribed to it. In this connection, I seek to show how this social doctrine accords with individuals' having concern for the well-being of others, with the emergence of relationships among individuals that have both instrumental and non-instrumental value, with a degree of responsibility for self and others that is often thought to be antithetical to individualism and, in general, with a flourishing of civil order.     

价值观取向理论结构及实证

尝试用新的视角——取向研究视角,对价值观进行整合研究,建构一种与社会情境结合更紧密、更具概括性的价值观取向理论。价值观取向理论的假设结构模型包括四种价值观取向维度：社会取向,个人取向,积极取向和消极取向。根据理论模型编制价值观取向量表,以974名被试为研究对象,运用探索性因素分析和验证性因素分析方法对该理论模型进行实证研究。结果证明了该理论结构的存在,理论结构中各维度的因素负荷和拟合指数良好,价值观取向量表具有良好的信度和结构效度。     

How Self‐Regulation Creates Distinct Values: The Case of Promotion and Prevention Decision Making

I propose that different relations among basic components of self‐regulation produce distinct types of decision value: (a) Outcome value is produced when the consequences of a decision are relevant to the regulatory orientation of the decision maker, (b) value from fit is produced when goal pursuit means suit the regulatory orientation of the decision maker, and (c) value from proper means is produced when goal pursuit means are in agreement with established rules and normative principles. I use the regulatory focus distinction between promotion focus concerns with aspirations and accomplishments and prevention focus concerns with safety and responsibilities (Higgins, 1997, 1998) to illustrate outcome value and value from fit. Justification of a decision is used to illustrate value from proper means. I propose that decision makers are unlikely to distinguish among their experiences of these 3 types of value, and thus value from fit and value from proper means can be transferred to outcome value. I present evidence of such value transfer and consider its implications for value to the customer. I also reconsider sunk costs and the endowment effect in light of there being value beyond outcome value.     

A new interpretation of stochastic test models

A new look at latent trait models is proposed. The event of an item being solved by a person is related to the event that the momentary value of a person-specific random component is at least as large as the corresponding value of an item-specific random component. The Birnbaum logistic test model is shown to be generated by a bivariate extreme value distribution for the components. Some consequences of this interpretation are outlined.I am indebted to David Strauss for calling the extreme value distribution (1) to my attention in a random utility context. The paper also benefited from discussions with H. C. Micko, H. H. Schulze and K. F. Wender.     

主观价值计算与整合的神经机制及其影响因素

决策在人类社会发展的历程中扮演着非常重要的作用,而对其神经机制的探讨才不过几十年的时间。基于价值的决策理论,强调人们首先计算和表征事物的价值,随后比较和决策。在人脑中负责主观价值计算的神经基础有腹内侧前额叶皮层、眶额皮层以及其他脑区,而负责价值整合的脑区有腹内侧前额叶皮层、眶额皮层、背外侧前额叶皮层等。其中时间和风险的价值计算有着相同的神经基础,并且人脑可以将不同属性以及成本进行整合形成主观价值,按照曲线交互作用范式进行。通过自我控制、注意和认知调节等方法,同样可以调制人们的主观价值大小。未来需要继续强调模式分析、个体差异、老龄化和基因对价值计算的影响。     

A new archival approach to the study of values and value--behavior relations: validation of the value lexicon

The present effort employs a new archival approach to study values and value- behavior relations, which is likely to be particularly useful in applied settings. A value lexicon was developed on the basis of the Schwartz (1992) value theory to extract lexical indicators of values from texts. The convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity of this measure was established using American newspaper content from 1900 to 2000 vis-à-vis existing self-report measures of values and objective indicators of value-expressive behaviors. Results provide empirical support for the use of the value lexicon to study values and value- behavior relations. First, the value lexicon demonstrated convergence with self-report responses of values. Second, values in American newspapers were associated with objective indicators of their corresponding value-expressive behaviors compared with noncorresponding value- expressive behaviors. Third, patterns of values over this 101-year period exhibited meaningful fluctuations with major historical and political events. The discussion describes new possibilities for future research on values in many applied settings with the value lexicon. The discussion also suggests that the principles of the value lexicon could be adopted to measure other psychological constructs of interest to applied psychology.     

Depletion from Self‐Regulation: A Resource‐based Account of the Effect of Value Incongruence

Value incongruence between employees and organizations has been identified as a negative work condition. An attitude‐based account suggests that value incongruence gives rise to negative attitudes toward organizations and thus causes low performance. To complement this mechanism, we propose a resource‐based account based on ego‐depletion theory, which suggests that value incongruence consumes an individual's regulatory resources and leads to low work performance. In support of this view, results from 2 survey studies and a vignette experiment reveal that value incongruence is positively associated with ego depletion, which in turn is negatively related to work performance. The mediation effect of ego depletion is independent of the attitude‐based mechanism as represented by job satisfaction and affective commitment. Consistent with the affective consistency perspective, the relationship between value incongruence and ego depletion is stronger among employees high in positive affectivity and weaker among employees high in negative affectivity. The corresponding moderated mediation analysis shows that the indirect effects of value incongruence on work performance through ego depletion vary as a function of positive and negative affectivity. This investigation unravels the self‐regulatory consequence of value incongruence and shows that the resource‐based mechanism of value incongruence operates differentially as a function of dispositional affectivity.     

Identity-Neutral and Identity-Constitutive Reasons for Preserving Nature

abstract Environmental ethicists will often say that in dealing with natural entities we need the guidance of an ethic rooted in ‘the intrinsic value of nature’. They will add that subjectivist value theories are unable to account for the normativity of intrinsic value discourse. This preoccupation with normativity explains why many environmental ethicists favour value objectivism. As I see it, value theories must address not only the problem of normativity but also the problem of motivation. In fact, my approach to the question as to which type of value theory does most justice to our intuition regarding the value of nature is primarily in terms of the motivational perspective. I argue that neither the usual objectivist theories nor their subjectivist counterparts can accommodate and explain the fact that those who agree that nature has intrinsic value may well differ in motivation to support its preservation. I suggest that such difference in kinds of motivation is related to distinct kinds of value judgement in which belief in the intrinsic value of nature is expressed. To clarify my view I discuss the subjectivist value theory of Gerald Gaus[1]. Gaus regards the distinction between personal and impersonal value judgements to be deeply embedded in his theory. His internalism about the relation between reason and motivation however, leads him to the mistaken conclusion that independent impersonal value judgements do not provide reasons for action. Next, I introduce the distinction between identity‐neutral and identity‐constitutive reasons. This distinction allows me to formulate more clearly the differences between the kinds of reasons provided by personal and impersonal value judgements. The resulting theory explains how it is that people who do not (personally) value nature may still be motivated to support nature preservation. It also explains why not everyone who endorses natural values will join movements for the preservation of nature.     

肝脾CT值分析在非酒精性脂肪肝诊断中的应用

探讨肝脾CT值分析在非酒精性脂肪肝中诊断及严重程度的关系。对163例临床明确诊断的非酒精性脂肪肝患者,分别根据肝脏cT值、肝脾CT值比值及肝脾CT值差值进行分组。结果三种评价方法对重度非酒精性脂肪肝均有较高的灵敏度及特异度,轻度非酒精性脂肪肝样本中出现28例肝脾CT比值〉1,肝脾值差值与肝脾CT值比值在对脂肪肝严重程度...     

On Pluralism,Value Disagreement and Conflict: A Phenomenological Argument for Axiological Universalism

The main question addressed in this paper is whether conflict is constitutive of the nature of value commitment, and hence necessarily implied by value pluralism. If this is the case, no resolution of value disagreements, whether on the global level or within modern multicultural societies, is possible via practical reasons, and the only solutions to inner or outer conflicts will be “political”, in the sense of a Realpolitik. Positive and negative answers to the main question are shown to express two intellectual and moral attitudes opposing each other as Gorgias and Socrates, or Rhetoric and Philosophy did in the Ancient World. In post-Nietzschean Modernity, however, most philosophers seem to take sides with Gorgias, against Socrates, as is shown on the basis of Ronald Dworkin’s solitary campaign against the many faces of value scepticism. Drawing on phenomenological axiology, this paper takes sides with Socrates by reconciling value pluralism and universalism.     

心理咨询的价值悖论与责任伦理

从责任伦理角度审视心理咨询中的价值问题,价值是一个不可悬置也不可逃避的问题。一方面,人的生存悖论与人的社会化过程失衡是人的心理失衡或心理疾病产生的主要原因;另一方面,心理咨询的宗旨是促进来访者的改变,这种改变往往意味着价值观的改变。因而改变过程中必然会出现文化及规范、咨询者价值取向及来访者已有的价值观三者间的冲突和矛盾。心理咨询中的价值之争实为价值冲突所致。对心理咨询中的价值问题的处理应该遵循普遍性原则,采取多种形式的价值介入。