The experience of altered states of consciousness in shamanic ritual: The role of pre-existing beliefs and affective factors

Much attention has been paid recently to the role of anomalous experiences in the aetiology of certain types of psychopathology, e.g. in the formation of delusions. We examine, instead, the top-down influence of pre-existing beliefs and affective factors in shaping an individual’s characterisation of anomalous sensory experiences. Specifically we investigated the effects of paranormal beliefs and alexithymia in determining the intensity and quality of an altered state of consciousness (ASC). Fifty five participants took part in a sweat lodge ceremony, a traditional shamanic ritual which was unfamiliar to them. Participants reported significant alterations in their state of consciousness, quantified using the ‘APZ’ questionnaire, a standardized measure of ASC experience. Participants endorsing paranormal beliefs compatible with shamanic mythology, and those showing difficulty identifying feelings scored higher on positive dimensions of ASC experience. Our findings demonstrate that variation in an individual’s characterisation of anomalous experiences is nuanced by pre-existing beliefs and affective factors.     

What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games

We used simple economic games to examine pro-social behavior and the lengths that people will take to avoid engaging in it. Over two studies, we found that about one-third of participants were willing to “exit” a $10 dictator game and take $9 instead. The exit option left the receiver nothing, but also ensured that the receiver never knew that a dictator game was to be played. Because most social utility models are defined over monetary outcomes, they cannot explain choosing the ($9, $0) exit outcome over the dominating $10 dictator game, since the game includes outcomes of ($10, $0) and ($9, $1). We also studied exiting using a “private” dictator game. In the private game, the receiver never knew about the game or from where any money was received. Gifts in this game were added innocuously to a payment for a separate task. Almost no dictators exited from the private game, indicating that receivers’ beliefs are the key factor in the decision to exit. When, as in the private game, the receivers’ beliefs and expectations cannot be manipulated by exit, exit is seldom taken. We conclude that giving often reflects a desire not to violate others’ expectations rather than a concern for others’ welfare per se. We discuss the implications of our results for understanding ethical decisions and for testing and modeling social preferences. An adequate specification of social preferences should include “psychological” payoffs that directly incorporate beliefs about actions into the utility function.     

Can virtue be learned? An exploration of student learning experiences in ethics courses and their implications for influencing moral character

What does it mean to teach virtue, or to learn it? We consider this question through an institutional review board (IRB) supported research study attending to student learning experiences in undergraduate ethics courses at a Catholic university with an explicit commitment to social justice. This essay draws on and interprets qualitative data concerning the outcomes of select pedagogical approaches that involve exposing students to the experiences of others: the use of narratives; participation in structured experiential learning activities; and community engagement through deep listening and facilitated dialogue. We focus our interpretation around the implications of these pedagogies in relation to student understanding of and attitudes regarding three character traits identified as “other‐regarding” virtues in theological and philosophical scholarship – altruism, compassion, and solidarity. This paper considers the implications of these pedagogies and the practical effects of different sorts of teaching strategies on students' self‐understanding as moral agents.     

Experiences of Prenatal Diagnosis of Spina Bifida or Hydrocephalus in Parents Who Decide to Continue with Their Pregnancy

The current study aimed to gain an understanding of the perspectives of those parents provided with a prenatal diagnosis of spina bifida or hydrocephalus and who decided to continue with their pregnancy. Qualitative interviews were conducted with 15 parents who learned of their unborn child’s spina bifida and/or hydrocephalus in the prenatal period. The interviewer asked parents about their experiences of receiving a prenatal diagnosis and their experience of coping throughout the remainder of the antenatal period. Parents’ reactions and experiences fell into five domains: response to diagnosis, experience of medical systems, information gathering, decision-making regarding continuation of the pregnancy following diagnosis and responses of significant others. Each of these domains is explicated. The findings derived from the current study have implications for professionals who provide support to parents during the prenatal period. Future research needs to further explore the common and unique issues for parents living in both urban and rural areas.     

Does Free Will Remain a Mystery? A Response to Van Inwagen

In this paper, I argue against Peter van Inwagen’s claim (in “Free Will Remains a Mystery”), that agent-causal views of free will could do nothing to solve the problem of free will (specifically, the problem of chanciness). After explaining van Inwagen’s argument, I argue that he does not consider all possible manifestations of the agent-causal position. More importantly, I claim that, in any case, van Inwagen appears to have mischaracterized the problem in some crucial ways. Once we are clear on the true nature of the problem of chanciness, agent-causal views do much to eradicate it.     

The brain is not single-minded about inflectional morphology: A response to the commentaries

Jaeger is supportive of our experiment and the claims we make, arguing that the weight of current evidence shows the brain making a distinction between regular and irregular inflectional morphology. Seidenberg & Arnoldussen are unsupportive, criticizing our work on theoretical and methodological grounds. Seidenberg & Arnoldussen’s major worries—that we have misunderstood connectionist theory’s predictions and have committed a “Difficulty Matching Error” in testing them—are important to consider but turn out to be groundless. At bottom, Seidenberg & Arnoldussen fail to recognize the consequences of our choice of German words, rather than English, as stimuli. Once the concept of “difficulty” is given substance in this context, it appears that in German, the brain activates more extensively when dealing with what in the connectionist universe should be, if anything, the easier stimuli, not the harder ones as suggested by Seidenberg & Arnoldussen. Thus regularity cannot be reduced to difficulty.     

Commentary on Meehl

The classic article by Meehl (1978) raises fundamental issues regarding the viability of theorizing in the “soft” psychological sciences and the weakness of statistical significance testing in appraising the validity of the field’s theories. These concerns are as valid today as they were a quarter of a century ago. Despite the lack of clear progress that has been made in terms of theory building, I raise several examples from developmental psychopathology research that reveal progress in the field’s conceptual and methodologic rigor, including the testing of genotype by environment interactions, the statistical advances driving longitudinal research, and the use of intervention and prevention trials to address questions of etiology and mechanisms related to psychopathology.     

Moral Responsibility: The Difference of Strawson,and the Difference it Should Make

P.F. Strawson’s work on moral responsibility is well-known. However, an important implication of the landmark “Freedom and Resentment” has gone unnoticed. Specifically, a natural development of Strawson’s position is that we should understand being morally responsible as having externalistically construed pragmatic criteria, not individualistically construed psychological ones. This runs counter to the contemporary ways of studying moral responsibility. I show the deficiencies of such contemporary work in relation to Strawson by critically examining the positions of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, R. Jay Wallace, and Philip Pettit for problems due to individualistic assumptions.Thanks to an audience at Carleton University for helpful discussion.     

Peirce on Education: Discussion of Peirce’s Definition of a University

I write this short essay in response to Peirce, as a feminist, pragmatist, and cultural studies scholar, in the hope that it will help to bring feminism and pragmatism together. I suggest that Peirce offers marginalized and colonized people a way to argue for the importance of their input, with his theory of fallibilism, even if he still claims a position of privilege. He also offers assistance through his concept of “a community of inquirers.” It is curious that Peirce’s definition of a university argues for a split between theory and practice that his earlier work sought to heal. Peirce opened a door to help diverse scholars be able to enter the university, and find a way to address issues of power, with his youthful connecting of theory to practice, that his more senior position draws our attention away from and seeks to hold off. Fortunately, it is too late. Peirce’s youthful pragmatism has been developed in important ways by other scholars and now serves as an example of a way to do philosophy that does connect theory to practice and does seek to address real problems in diverse peoples lives, and help to find solutions that effect change.     

Minds at rest? Social cognition as the default mode of cognizing and its putative relationship to the "default system" of the brain

The “default system” of the brain has been described as a set of regions which are ‘activated’ during rest and ‘deactivated’ during cognitively effortful tasks. To investigate the reliability of task-related deactivations, we performed a meta-analysis across 12 fMRI studies. Our results replicate previous findings by implicating medial frontal and parietal brain regions as part of the “default system”.However, the cognitive correlates of these deactivations remain unclear. In light of the importance of social cognitive abilities for human beings and their propensity to engage in such activities, we relate our results to findings from neuroimaging studies of social cognition. This demonstrates a remarkable overlap between the brain regions typically involved in social cognitive processes and the “default system”.We, henceforth, suggest that the physiological ‘baseline’ of the brain is intimately linked to a psychological ‘baseline’: human beings have a predisposition for social cognition as the default mode of cognizing which is implemented in the robust pattern of intrinsic brain activity known as the “default system”.     

Statistical significance testing, construct validity, and clinical versus actuarial judgment: an interesting (seeming) paradox

What practical implications does Meehl’s attack on significance testing have for clinical psychologists, and doesn’t Meehl contradict himself in placing so much emphasis on scientific theories in such works as “Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks” and yet advocating for actuarial judgement, which is essentially an atheoretical approach to clinical predication? This seemingly paradoxical ideology, when considered within the broader context of Meehl’s work, can be readily aligned.     

Beyond "healthy eating" and "healthy weights": harassment and the health curriculum in middle schools

In this paper we use data from interviews conducted with grades 7 and 8 girls to explore connections between body-based harassment and girls’ body modification practices. We discuss how the elementary health curricula fail to consider harassment and other cultural factors that influence the body modification practices and eating patterns of diverse girls. More specifically, we argue that the “healthy eating, healthy weights” approach of the grades 7 and 8 Ontario health curriculum has five limitations: (1) it sends contradictory messages; (2) it increases anxieties about body weight; (3) it ignores the multiple causes of eating problems; (4) it marginalizes issues most relevant to racialized girls; and (5) it ignores dilemmas associated with physical development. We conclude with suggestions for developing a curriculum on body dissatisfaction and eating disorders prevention that considers the various socio-cultural factors influencing the range of body monitoring and modifying practices taken up by girls.     

Disability Rights,Prenatal Diagnosis and Eugenics: A Cross-Cultural View

This paper considers the disability rights critique of genetic testing in the context of different communities and the issue of nondirectiveness. Despite the wide usage of genetic diagnosis in Israel, no public debate has emerged there concerning disability rights and prenatal testing. The common attitude that emerged from interviews with Israeli representatives of organizations “of’’ and “for’’ people with genetic diseases and congenital disabilities can be described as a two-fold view of disability: support of genetic testing during pregnancy, and support of the disabled person after birth. This two-fold view is explained as a secular construction situated in legal, economic and cultural contexts. The paper concludes by considering the implications of the “two-fold view’’ of disability for the profession of genetic counseling. It is argued that awareness of the existence of conflicting views among clients—such as the view of the ‘disability critique’ as well as of the “two-fold view of disability’’—should strengthen the significance of nondirectiveness.     

Working with differences: Issues for research and counselling practice

This paper considers our experience within a group researching domestic violence in minoritised groups and the implications for counselling practice. Issues of race, gender and power were significant within the research team. These issues are intrinsic to minoritised women's experiences of service responses and are also a powerful, yet often unexplored, dynamic in counselling practice. We reflect on issues of ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ in terms of the research process and findings, and the impact and influence of these power roles on counselling practice. We acknowledge that it is only by retrospectively engaging with each other and our differences that we have been able to explore our parallel processes and consider their implications for counselling practice.     

A few dissents from a magnificent piece of work

Despite enthusiastic agreement with most of Meehl’s paper, I dissent on “the idiographic problem” (as based on false premises), and on the goal of refuting theoretical propositions in soft psychology with any useful certainty (its generalizations are inescapably statistical, and Popper’s paradigm does not apply). Some implications for research, especially on psychoanalytic theory, are briefly outlined.     

Individual differences in susceptibility to experimentally induced phantom sensations

We investigated individual differences in susceptibility to two vibration-induced phantom illusions, i.e. illusory arm extension and nose prolongation (“Pinocchio illusion”). Vibration was applied to the biceps brachii tendon of 32 healthy participants. Susceptibility to the illusions was quantified by vividness ratings and by ratings of the amount of illusory position changes of the arm and illusory shape changes of the nose. Participants also completed the Perceptual Aberration (PA) and the Need for Cognition (NFC) inventories. PA reflects the frequency of spontaneously experienced body schema alterations and NFC a person's tendency to cognitively structure experiences. PA was positively correlated with participants’ susceptibility to illusory arm extension and, exclusively for men, also to nose elongation. A high NFC was weakly associated with a high susceptibility for the Pinocchio illusion. By inference, these findings indicate a physiological basis of PA and a cognitive mediation of experimentally induced phantom sensations.     

Identifying g: A review of current factor analytic practices in the science of mental abilities

Factor analysis is arguably one of the most important tools in the science of mental abilities. While many studies have been conducted to make recommendations regarding “best practices” concerning its use, it is unknown the degree to which contemporary ability researchers abide by those standards. The current study sought to evaluate the typical practices of contemporary ability researchers. We analyzed articles reporting factor analyses of cognitive ability tests administered to adult samples over a 12 year period. Results suggest that, in aggregate, the science of mental abilities seems to be doing well with respect to the issues of sample size, number of indicators (relative to number of factors) and breadth of indicators. Further, our results suggest that the majority of ability researchers are using methods of factor analysis that allow for the identification of a g factor. However, 14.57% failed to use a method that allowed a common factor to emerge. These results provide insights regarding the methodological quality of the science of mental abilities, and will hopefully encourage further “introspective” research into the science of mental abilities.     

Unsafe Knowledge

Ernest Sosa has argued that if someone knows that p, then his belief that p is “safe”. and Timothy Williamson has agreed. In this paper I argue that safety, as defined by Sosa, is not a necessary condition on knowledge – that we can have unsafe knowledge. I present Sosa’s definition of safety and a counterexample to it as a necessary condition on knowledge. I also argue that Sosa’s most recent refinements to the notion of safety don’t help him to avoid the counterexample. I consider three replies on behalf of the defender of safety, and find them all wanting. Finally, I offer a tentative diagnosis of my counterexample.     

Change and continuity in early spatial development: claiming the “radical middle”

Debate over change and continuity in cognitive development has revolved around questions of qualitative transitions versus quantitative and incremental improvement. Piaget’s stage theory is the best-known example of a change/qualitative transition approach, while both nativism and empiricism have, for very different reasons, taken a continuity/quantitative increment stance. Recent proposals have, however, attempted to transcend this stark dichotomy, in a move that can be termed claiming the “radical middle.” This paper presents two examples of developmental analyses in spatial development. These two transitions are characterizable as either qualitative or quantitative, but are best thought of as both. A position of this kind allows for much more precise answers to practical questions about issues such as sensitive periods than would otherwise be possible.     

Social dynamics in the preschool

In this paper, we consider how concepts from dynamic systems (such as attractors, repellors, and self-organization) can be applied to the study of young children’s peer relationships. We also consider how these concepts can be used to explore basic issues involving early peer processes. We use the dynamical systems approach called state space grid (SSG) analysis and consider how it can be expanded beyond the study of dyads to the study of larger social groups and networks. In particular, we explore the role of homophily—that is, behavioral and sex similarity—as factors in the self-organization of young children’s social groups. A dynamic systems approach allows for consideration of peer processes difficult to assess using more traditional approaches.