Rhesus monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca mulatta</Emphasis>) discriminate between knowing and not knowing and collect information as needed before acting

Humans use memory awareness to determine whether relevant knowledge is available before acting, as when we determine whether we know a phone number before dialing. Such metacognition, or thinking about thinking, can improve selection of appropriate behavior. We investigated whether rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) are capable of a simple form of metacognitive access to the contents of short-term memory. Monkeys chose among four opaque tubes, one of which concealed food. The tube containing the reward varied randomly from trial to trial. On half the trials the monkeys observed the experimenter baiting the tube, whereas on the remaining trials their view of the baiting was blocked. On each trial, monkeys were allowed a single chance to select the tube containing the reward. During the choice period the monkeys had the opportunity to look down the length of each tube, to determine if it contained food. When they knew the location of the reward, most monkeys chose without looking. In contrast, when ignorant, monkeys often made the effort required to look, thereby learning the location of the reward before choosing. Looking improved accuracy on trials on which monkeys had not observed the baiting. The difference in looking behavior between trials on which the monkeys knew, and trials on which they were ignorant, suggests that rhesus monkeys discriminate between knowing and not knowing. This result extends similar observations made of children and apes to a species of Old World monkey, suggesting that the underlying cognitive capacities may be widely distributed among primates.     

Metamemory in tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Whereas evidence for metacognition by nonhuman primates has been obtained in great apes and old world monkeys, it is weaker in new world monkeys. For instance, capuchin monkeys may fail to recognize their own knowledge of the location of invisible bait. In the present study, we tested whether tufted capuchin monkeys would flexibly change their behavior in a delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) test depending upon the strength of their memory trace of the sample. In Experiment 1, two monkeys were tested on a modified 9-alternative DMTS task with various delays on a computerized display. In some trials, the monkeys could choose whether to go for a memory test or for a simple key touch as an escape from the test. In other trials, they were forced to go for the memory test. Both monkeys escaped from the memory test more often when their matching accuracy on forced tests was lower. In one of the monkeys, the matching accuracies on chosen memory tests decreased more slowly as a function of delay length, and were higher after long delays than those on forced memory tests. This suggests that at least one capuchin monkey was able to recognize the strength of his own memory trace. Experiment 2 employed occasional no-sample tests, in which the monkeys faced the task choice without presentation of any sample for the trial. The monkey who was successful in Experiment 1 declined the memory test more often in no-sample trials than regular trials, further indicating metamemory in this individual. In Experiment 3, this successful monkey received a task, in which he was sometimes able to choose between shape MTS or texture MTS tasks. However, his matching accuracies did not differ between chosen tasks and forced tasks. Thus, the metamemory possessed by this new world monkey species may be more like a flag, showing strength of memory trace, than an elaborate representation showing details of the memory trace.     

Redundant food searches by capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella): a failure of metacognition?

This study investigated capuchin monkeys' understanding of their own visual search behavior as a means to gather information. Five monkeys were presented with three tubes that could be visually searched to determine the location of a bait. The bait's visibility was experimentally manipulated, and the monkeys' spontaneous visual searches before tube selection were analyzed. In Experiment 1, three monkeys selected the baited tube significantly above chance; however, the monkeys also searched transparent tubes. In Experiment 2, a bent tube in which food was never visible was introduced. When the bent tube was baited, the monkeys failed to deduce the bait location and responded randomly. They also continued to look into the bent tube despite not gaining any pertinent information from it. The capuchin monkeys' behavior contrasts with the efficient employment of visual search behavior reported in humans, apes and macaques. This difference is consistent with species-related variations in metacognitive abilities, although other explanations are also possible.     

Sequential responding and planning in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Previous experiments have assessed planning during sequential responding to computer generated stimuli by Old World nonhuman primates including chimpanzees and rhesus macaques. However, no such assessment has been made with a New World primate species. Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) are an interesting test case for assessing the distribution of cognitive processes in the Order Primates because they sometimes show proficiency in tasks also mastered by apes and Old World monkeys, but in other cases fail to match the proficiency of those other species. In two experiments, eight capuchin monkeys selected five arbitrary stimuli in distinct locations on a computer monitor in a learned sequence. In Experiment 1, shift trials occurred in which the second and third stimuli were transposed when the first stimulus was selected by the animal. In Experiment 2, mask trials occurred in which all remaining stimuli were masked after the monkey selected the first stimulus. Monkeys made more mistakes on trials in which the locations of the second and third stimuli were interchanged than on trials in which locations were not interchanged, suggesting they had already planned to select a location that no longer contained the correct stimulus. When mask trials occurred, monkeys performed at levels significantly better than chance, but their performance exceeded chance levels only for the first and the second selections on a trial. These data indicate that capuchin monkeys performed very similarly to chimpanzees and rhesus monkeys and appeared to plan their selection sequences during the computerized task, but only to a limited degree.     

I know you are not looking at me: capuchin monkeys’ (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Cebus apella</Emphasis>) sensitivity to human attentional states

The present study asked whether capuchin monkeys recognize human attentional states. The monkeys requested food from the experimenter by extending an arm (pointing) toward the baited one of two transparent cups. On regular trials the experimenter gave the food immediately to the monkeys upon pointing but on randomly inserted test trials she ignored the pointing for 5 s during which she displayed different attentional states. The monkeys looked at the experimenter's face longer when she looked at the monkeys than when she looked at the ceiling in Experiment 1, and longer when she oriented her head midway between the two cups with eyes open than when she did so with eyes closed in Experiment 2. However, the monkeys showed no differential pointing in these conditions. These results suggest that capuchins are sensitive to eye direction but this sensitivity does not lead to differential pointing trained in laboratory experiments. Furthermore, to our knowledge, this is the first firm behavioral evidence that non-human primates attend to the subtle states of eyes in a food requesting task.     

Monkeys (Macaca mulatta and Cebus apella) track, enumerate, and compare multiple sets of moving items

Despite many demonstrations of numerical competence in nonhuman animals, little is known about how well animals enumerate moving stimuli. In this series of experiments, rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) performed computerized tasks in which they had to enumerate sets of stimuli. In Experiment 1, rhesus monkeys compared two sets of moving stimuli. Experiment 2 required comparisons of a moving set and a static set. Experiment 3 included human participants and capuchin monkeys to assess all 3 species' performance and to determine whether responding was to the numerical properties of the stimulus sets rather than to some other stimulus property such as cumulative area. Experiment 4 required both monkey species to enumerate subsets of each moving array. In all experiments, monkeys performed above chance levels, and their responses were controlled by the number of items in the arrays as opposed to nonnumerical stimulus dimensions. Rhesus monkeys performed comparably to adult humans when directly compared although capuchin performance was lower.     

Do apes and children know what they have seen?

Chimpanzees and young children understand much about what other individuals have and have not seen. This study investigates what they understand about their own visual perception. Chimpanzees, orangutans, and 2.5-year-old children were presented with a finding game in which food or stickers were hidden in one of two or three tubes. We varied whether subjects saw the baiting of the tubes, whether subjects could see through the tubes, and whether there was a delay between baiting and presentation of the tubes to subjects. We measured not only whether subjects chose the correct tube but also, more importantly, whether they spontaneously looked into one or more of the tubes before choosing one. Most apes and children appropriately looked into the tubes before choosing one more often when they had not seen the baiting than when they had seen the baiting. In general, they used efficient search strategies more often than insufficient or excessive ones. Implications of subjects' search patterns for their understanding of seeing and knowing in the self are discussed. Accepted after revision: 7 January 2001 Electronic Publication     

Delaying gratification for food and tokens in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): when quantity is salient, symbolic stimuli do not improve performance

Capuchin monkeys have been tested for the capacity to delay gratification for accumulating rewards in recent studies and have exhibited variable results. Meanwhile, chimpanzees have consistently excelled at this task. However, neither species have ever been tested at accumulating symbolic tokens instead of food items, even though previous reports indicate that tokens sometimes facilitate performance in other self-control tasks. Thus, in the present study, we tested capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees for their capacity to delay gratification in a delay maintenance task, in which an experimenter presented items, one at a time, to within reach of an animal for as long as the animal refrained from taking them. In Experiment 1, we assessed how long capuchin monkeys could accumulate items in the delay maintenance task when items were food rewards or tokens exchangeable for food rewards. Monkeys accumulated more food rewards than they did tokens. In Experiment 2, we tested capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees in a similar accumulation test. Whereas capuchins again accumulated more food than tokens, all chimpanzees but one showed no difference in performance in the two conditions. These findings provide additional evidence that chimpanzees exhibit greater self-control capacity in this task than do capuchin monkeys and indicate that symbolic stimuli fail to facilitate delay maintenance when they do not abstract away from the quantitative dimension of the task. This is consistent with previous findings on the effects of symbols on self-control and illuminates what makes accumulation a particularly challenging task.     

Ordinal judgments of symbolic stimuli by capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta): the effects of differential and nondifferential reward

Ordinal learning was investigated in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). In Experiment 1, both species were presented with pairings of the Arabic numerals 0 to 9. Some monkeys were given food rewards equal to the value of the numeral selected and some were rewarded with a single pellet only for choosing the higher numeral within the pair. Both species learned to select the larger numeral, but only rhesus monkeys that were differentially rewarded performed above chance levels when presented with novel probe pairings. In Experiment 2, the monkeys were first presented with arrays of 5 familiar numerals (from the range 0 to 9) and then arrays of 5 novel letters (from the range A to J) with the same reward outcomes in place as in Experiment 1. Both species performed better with the numerals, suggesting that an ordinal sequence of all stimuli had been learned during Experiment 1, rather than a matrix of two-choice discriminations.     

Reverse-reward learning in squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus): retesting after 5 years, and assessment on qualitative transfer

Seven squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) previously trained on reverse-reward tasks were presented with the original "1-versus-4" task after a 5-year interval without reverse-reward experience (Experiment 1). None of them reliably selected the smaller food array; however, at around chance level, their performance was superior to when they were first exposed to the task almost 6 years previously, suggesting some long-term memory retention. One naive monkey consistently selected the larger array, as expected. In Experiment 2, trials consisting of 1 versus 1 piece of two qualitatively different types of food were interspersed among familiar 1-versus-4 trials. None of five monkeys tested reliably selected the less-preferred food to get the more preferred food as the reward, and one monkey scored below chance. However, when one piece of low-preference food was paired with four pieces of high-preference food (Experiment 3), all four monkeys tested avoided reaching for the latter and thereby obtained it as the reward; two monkeys obtained perfect scores on these trials. These two monkeys were trained on a specific qualitative reverse-reward pairing and then again tested on new pairings (Experiment 4), but transfer was incomplete. Compound trials that pit quantity against quality in novel ways appear taxing for squirrel monkeys, despite competence in reverse-reward on both dimensions separately.     

Visual list memory in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Memory of 3 capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella, was tested with lists of 4 travel-slide pictures and different retention intervals. They touched different areas of a video monitor to indicate whether a test picture was in a list. At short retention intervals (0 s, 1 s, 2 s), memory was good for the last list items (recency effect). At a 10-s retention interval, memory improved for 1st list items (primacy effect). At long retention intervals (20 s and 30 s), primacy effects were strong and recency effects had dissipated. The pattern of retention-interval changes was similar to rhesus monkeys, humans, and pigeons. The time course of recency dissipation was similar to rhesus monkeys. The capuchin's superior tool-use ability was discussed in relation to whether it reflects a superior general cognitive ability, such as memory. In terms of visual memory, capuchin monkeys were not shown to be superior to rhesus monkeys.     

Understanding of the relationship between seeing and knowing by tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

The ability of four tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) to recognize the causal connection between seeing and knowing was investigated. The subjects were trained to follow a suggestion about the location of hidden food provided by a trainer who knew where the food was (the knower) in preference to a trainer who did not (the guesser). The experimenter baited one of three opaque containers behind a cardboard screen so that the subjects could not see which of the containers hid the reward. In experiment 1, the knower appeared first in front of the apparatus and looked into each container; next, the guesser appeared but did not look into any containers. Then the knower touched the correct cup while the guesser touched one of the three randomly. The capuchin monkeys gradually learned to reach toward the cup that the knower suggested. In experiment 2, the subjects adapted to a novel variant of the task, in which the guesser touched but did not look into any of the containers. In experiment 3, the monkeys adapted again when the knower and the guesser appeared in a random order. These results suggest that capuchin monkeys can learn to recognize the relationship between seeing and knowing. Accepted after revision: 10 September 2001 Electronic Publication     

Rhesus monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca mulatta</Emphasis>) remember agency information from past events and integrate this knowledge with spatial and temporal features in working memory

The purpose of the present study was to examine whether rhesus monkeys remember information about their own agency—along with spatial, temporal and contextual properties—from a previously experienced event. In Experiment 1, rhesus monkeys (n = 4) used symbols to reliably indicate whether they had performed or observed an event on a computer screen. In Experiment 2, naïve and experienced monkeys (n = 8) reported agency information when stringent controls for perceptual and proprioceptive cues were included. In Experiment 3, five of the monkeys completed a task in which they reported agency information along with spatial and temporal features of events. Two monkeys performed this agency discrimination when they could not anticipate which memory test they would receive. There was also evidence that these features were integrated in memory. Implications of this research are discussed in relation to working memory, episodic memory and self-awareness in nonhuman animals.     

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) respond to video images of themselves

Many studies have used mirror-image stimulation in attempts to find self-recognition in monkeys. However, very few studies have presented monkeys with video images of themselves; the present study is the first to do so with capuchin monkeys. Six tufted capuchin monkeys were individually exposed to live face-on and side-on video images of themselves (experimental Phase 1). Both video screens initially elicited considerable interest. Two adult males looked preferentially at their face-on image, whereas two adult females looked preferentially at their side-on image; the latter elicited lateral movements and head-cocking. Only males showed communicative facial expressions, which were directed towards the face-on screen. In Phase 2 monkeys discriminated between real-time, face-on images and identical images delayed by 1 s, with the adult females especially preferring real-time images. In this phase both screens elicited facial expressions, shown by all monkeys. In Phase 3 there was no evidence of discrimination between previously recorded video images of self and similar images of a familiar conspecific. Although they showed no signs of explicit self-recognition, the monkeys’ behaviour strongly suggests recognition of the correspondence between kinaesthetic information and external visual effects. In species such as humans and great apes, this type of self-awareness feeds into a system that gives rise to explicit self-recognition.     

How do tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) understand causality involved in tool use?

Four tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were trained to choose from 2 hook-like tools, 1 of which successfully led to collecting food, whereas the other did not because of inappropriate spatial arrangement of the tool and the food. In Experiment 1, all of the monkeys successfully learned the basic task. The monkeys performed successfully with tools of novel colors and shapes in Experiments 2-5. These results demonstrate that the monkeys used the spatial arrangement of the tool and the food as a cue. However, they failed when there were obstacles (Experiment 6) or traps (Experiment 7) on the path along which the monkeys dragged tools. These results may suggest that capuchin monkeys understand the spatial relationship between 2 items, namely, food and the tool, but do not understand the spatial relationship among 3 items, namely, food, tool, and the environmental condition. The possible role of stimulus generalization is also considered.     

Discriminative vocal conditioning in rhesus monkeys: Evidence for volitional control?

Both emotional and volitional systems are invoked in explaining the control of human vocalizations, but vocal behavior of nonhuman primates is often believed to be totally under emotional control. Monkeys' poor performance on conditioning tasks, especially discriminative conditioning of vocalization (DCV), has been cited as evidence against volitional control. In Experiment 1, rhesus monkeys failed a DCV task in which food was given for vocalizations emitted during an arbitrary visual stimulus, but in Experiment 2, monkeys showed clear discriminative performance when an otherwise comparable shock-avoidance DCV procedure was used. This evidence that monkeys possess some degree of volitional control has implications for the relation between animal vocalizations and the origin of human speech.     

Cooperative problem solving by tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella): spontaneous division of labor, communication, and reciprocal altruism

Using an experimentally induced cooperation task, the authors investigated whether tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) share the following 3 characteristics of cooperation with humans: division of labor, communication, and reciprocal altruism. In Experiment 1, the authors trained individual monkeys to perform the necessary sequence of actions for rewards and tested them in pairs to assess whether they could solve the task by spontaneously dividing the sequence of actions. All pairs solved this task. In Experiment 2, monkeys worked in the cooperation task and a task requiring no partner help. They looked at the partner significantly longer in the former task than in the latter, but communicative intent could not be determined. In Experiment 3, only 1 of 2 participants obtained a reward on each trial. Monkeys maintained cooperation when their roles were reversed on alternate trials. Their cooperative performances demonstrated division of labor; results suggest task-related communication and reciprocal altruism.     

Learning from others’ mistakes in capuchin monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Cebus apella</Emphasis>)

We investigated whether tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) learn from others' mistakes. We prepared three kinds of transparent containers having the same appearance: one that could be opened by the lid, one that could be opened from the bottom, and one that could be opened either way. Using each of the first two one-way-open type containers, the monkeys were trained to copy the human demonstrator's action to open the container and obtain a piece of sweet potato contained therein. After this training, the demonstrator showed the monkeys an action that would open or fail to open the third, two-way-open type container. None of the monkeys reliably opened the container by spontaneously compensating for the demonstrator's failure (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, the same subjects were trained to correct their own mistakes immediately after failure, before we introduced the same test as in Experiment 1. This experience did not result in subjects using the demonstrator's failure to produce a successful action. In Experiment 3, we placed two monkeys face to face. In this situation, the second monkey was presented with the container after the first monkey failed to open it. As a result, two capuchin monkeys capitalized on the partner's failure to correctly guide his/her behavior. Thus, the monkeys monitored not only the outcome of the others' action, but also that action per se. This result suggests that not only humans and apes, but also monkeys may understand the meaning of others' actions in social learning.     

Socially learned preferences for differentially rewarded tokens in the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella)

Social learning is assumed to underlie traditions, yet evidence indicating social learning in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), which exhibit traditions, is sparse. The authors tested capuchins for their ability to learn the value of novel tokens using a previously familiar token-exchange economy. Capuchins change their preferences in favor of a token worth a high-value food reward after watching a conspecific model exchange 2 differentially rewarded tokens, yet they fail to develop a similar preference after watching tokens paired with foods in the absence of a conspecific model. They also fail to learn that the value of familiar tokens has changed. Information about token value is available in all situations, but capuchins seem to pay more attention in a social situation involving novel tokens.     

Long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) understand what conspecifics can see in a competitive situation

Visual perspective taking (VPT), an understanding of what others can see, is a prerequisite for theory of mind (ToM). While VPT in apes is proven, its presence in monkeys is much-debated. Several different paradigms have been developed to test its existence, but all face interpretational problems since results can be explained by simpler cognitive mechanisms than VPT. Therefore, we adjusted one method where two individuals compete for access to food, visible or invisible for the dominant competitor, to preclude cognitively simpler mechanisms. The subordinate long-tailed macaques tested, selected significantly more often the food item invisible than the item visible to the dominant. In most trials, subjects retrieved only one food item and preferred the invisible food item. Surprisingly, they occasionally adopted an alternative strategy to obtain both food items, by first choosing the visible, most at risk food item. Faster animals adopted this strategy proportionally more often than slower ones. Contrary to previous research, our results cannot be explained by simpler cognitive mechanisms, since behavioural reading was prevented by a one-way mirror between the competitor and the food, and accessibility was equal to both food items. This is the first unequivocal evidence of VPT in a monkey species, suggesting that this precursor to ToM is an evolutionarily conserved capacity present in monkeys, apes and humans.