The Leibniz project

A language for quantum physics is derived from set theory by replacing the classical predicate algebra (Boolean) by a certain quantum predicate algebra (rational projective), time space and the Hamilton-Schroedinger dynamics by a Feynman-like graph dynamics, and the Dirac spin operators by topological switching operators on the graph. The development is described from the basic level of elementary monadic processes to the level of the free Dirac equation. Young Men's Philanthropic League Professor of Physics. Supported by the est Foundation and the National Science Foundation.     

Leibniz on Conatus, Causation, and Freedom

Abstract: In this paper, I address the topic of free will in Leibniz with particular attention to Leibniz's concept of volition, and its analogue in his physics – his concept of force. I argue against recent commentators that Leibniz was a causal determinist, and thus a compatibilist, and I suggest that logical consistency required him to adopt compatibilism given some of the concepts at work in his physics. I conclude by pointing out that the pressures to adopt causal determinism in Leibniz's system are perhaps more severe than those facing the contemporary libertarian, pressures that stem from empirical considerations about the behavior of bodies in the physical world, and the “well‐founding” of those bodies in simple substances.     

Locke,Leibniz, language and Hans Aarsleff

This paper was written at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, where I was supported by Izaac Walton Killam Fellowship (Canada Council) supplemented by funds from the Henry Luce Foundation (I.A.S.). I thank Martha Bolton and Jonathan Bennett for correcting some mistakes in an earlier draft, and Natalie Davis for the example of Glückl.     

莱布尼兹与技术

莱布尼兹不仅是哲学家、数学家,而且还在科学技术上拥有许多重要发明.特别是他所发明的二进制,是所有计算机技术的基础.因此,把莱布尼兹看作信息时代之父并不是没有道理的.本文阐述了莱布尼兹在他的科学技术发明中所体现的系统论思想、科学工具化思想和他关于机器的比喻.作者进一步提出,在科技高度发展的今天,人作为具有自由本质的存在者,必须对自己的行动和技术后果负有责任.我们必须追问技术带来的弊端,并给予技术哲学以应有的地位.     

Leibniz,Whitehead and the Metaphysics of Causation

Medieval Thought: The Western Intellectual Tradition from Antiquity to the Thirteenth Century by Michael Haren Second Edition. Macmillan 1992. Pp. ix + 315.

Being a Philosopher: The History of a Practice by D. W. Hamlyn London and New York: Roudedge 1992. Pp. x + 187. ISBN 0–415–02968–6.

A History of Western Philosophy Vol. 3, Renaissance Philosophy by Brian B. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp. 450. Hb £30.00. Pb £8.99.

La Scepsi moderna. Interpretazioni dello scetticismo da Charron a Hume by Gianni Paganini Pp. 528. Cosenza: Edizioni Il Busento 1991. L 60,000.

A History of Modern Political Thought 185 A History of Modern Political Thought, Major Political Thinkers from Hobbes to Marx by Iain Hampsher‐Monk Oxford: Blackwell 1992 Pp. xiii + 609 Paperback, £14.99.

Malebranche and Ideas 189 Malebranche and Ideas by Steven M. Nadler New York: Oxford University Press 1992. Pp. 192. ISBN 0–19–507724–5. £35.00

Kantian Aesthetics Pursued by Anthony Savile Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 1993, ISBN 0–7486–0439–1

Philosophy and Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski by Peter Simons Kluwer 1992     

The Continuity Strategy,Human Behavior,and Behavior Analysis

The Psychological Record - In behavior analysis, continuity refers to the assumption of a similarity of behavioral principles or processes between nonhumans and humans, which is often considered to...     

Leibniz,Pufendorf, and the Possibility of Moral Self-Governance

In his On the Duties of Man and Citizen, seventeenth century natural law theorist Samuel Pufendorf argues that the source of obligation lies in ‘the command of a superior’. This so-called ‘voluntarist’ position was famously criticized by the ‘rationalist’ Gottfried Leibniz. However, I wish to highlight several neglected aspects of the debate. Leibniz implicitly proposes a solution to a central moral problem: how one can be obligated voluntarily. His answer reflects a sort of motivational internalism, whereby the ideas of justice provide some motive cause of action, and virtue provides the rest. In this way, the agent acts voluntarily by making the principles of justice the principles of her action. Secondly, I show how this argument for the principles depends implicitly on his ‘science of right’, established in his earliest writings on jurisprudence. These principles are constituent of the nature of rational substance. It then becomes clear that Leibniz had long developed a foundation for self-governance, similar to Kantian autonomy, consisting in the agent's internal moral power to act (jus) and moral necessity to act (obligation). These points are exposed through a close reading of Leibniz's criticisms of Pufendorf on the end, object and efficient cause of natural law.