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1.
Martin Montminy 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):341-356
Some authors have recently claimed that relativism about knowledge sentences accommodates the context sensitivity of our use
of such sentences as well as contextualism, while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of contextualism regarding our
inter-contextual judgments, that is, our judgments about knowledge claims made in other contexts. I argue that relativism,
like contextualism, involves an error theory regarding a certain class of inter-contextual judgments.
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Martin MontminyEmail: |
2.
Jonathan Ichikawa 《Philosophical Studies》2009,146(3):435-443
I criticize Timothy Williamson’s characterization of thought experiments on which the central judgments are judgments of contingent
counterfactuals. The fragility of these counterfactuals makes them too easily false, and too difficult to know.
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Jonathan IchikawaEmail: |
3.
R. Lanier Anderson 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):91-108
Martin offers an intriguing account of nineteenth century challenges to the traditional theory of judgment as a synthesis
of subject and predicate (the synthesis theory)—criticisms motivated largely by the problem posed by existential judgments,
which need not have two terms at all. Such judgments led to a theory of “thetic” judgments, whose essential feature is to
“posit” something, rather than to combine terms (as in synthetic judgment). I argue, however, that Kant’s official definition
of judgment already implicitly recognizes the importance of positing, and that its (otherwise confusing) abstract generality
actually affords Kant’s own logic an adequate way to accommodate existential judgments within the traditional synthesis theory.
Preservation of a synthetic account of judgment is also found to be independently important for Kant’s larger aims in the
theory of cognition.
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R. Lanier AndersonEmail: |
4.
Rolf Loeber Dustin A. Pardini Alison Hipwell Magda Stouthamer-Loeber Kate Keenan Mark A. Sembower 《Journal of abnormal child psychology》2009,37(6):777-791
Relatively little is known about the factor structure of disruptive behavior among preadolescent girls. The present study
reports on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of disruptive girl behavior over four successive data waves as rated
by parents and teachers in a large, representative community sample of girls (N = 2,451). Five factors were identified from parent ratings (oppositional behavior/conduct problems, inattention, hyperactivity/impulsivity,
relational aggression, and callous-unemotional behaviors), and four factors were identified derived from teacher ratings (oppositional
behavior/conduct problems/callous-unemotional behaviors, inattention, hyperactivityimpulsivity, and relational aggression).
There was a high degree of consistency of items loading on equivalent factors across parent and teacher ratings. Year-to-year
stability of factors between ages five and 12 was high for parent ratings (ICC = 0.70 to 0.88), and slightly lower for teacher
ratings (ICC = 0.56 to 0.83). These findings are discussed in terms of possible adjustment to the criteria for children's
disruptive behavior disorders found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders.
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Rolf Loeber (Corresponding author)Email: |
Dustin A. PardiniEmail: |
Alison HipwellEmail: |
Magda Stouthamer-LoeberEmail: |
Kate KeenanEmail: |
Mark A. SembowerEmail: |
5.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
相似文献
Stewart CohenEmail: |
6.
In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this
special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology,
connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.
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Bernd BuldtEmail: |
Benedikt L?we (Corresponding author)Email: |
Thomas MüllerEmail: |
7.
Robert Pasnau 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):353-369
When objects are illuminated, the light they reflect does not simply bounce off their surface. Rather, that light is entirely
reabsorbed and then reemitted, as the result of a complex microphysical event near the surface of the object. If we are to
be physicalists regarding color, then we should analyze colors in terms of that event, just as we analyze heat in terms of
molecular motion, and sound in terms of vibrations. On this account, colors are not standing properties of objects, but events,
or (more cautiously) properties associated with events. Accordingly, objects in the dark are no more colored than a turned-off
stove is hot. Such an account requires rejecting some of what folk ordinarily say about color, but this is the most coherent
version of color physicalism.
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Robert PasnauEmail: |
8.
Hans Sluga 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):109-119
Wayne Martin’s Theories of Judgment marks a significant advance in the philosophical analysis of judgment. He understands that the domain of judgment is so large
that it allows only a selective treatment. We can expand Martin’s insight by acknowledging that this domain is, in fact, hypercomplex
and therefore unsurveyable in Wittgenstein’s sense. Martin’s treatment of judgments can, however, be extended in a number
of directions. Of particular importance is it to understand the linguistic aspect of theoretical judgments, the challenges
to the synthetic conception of judgment constituted not only by existential, but also by impersonal and negative judgments,
and the exploration of the links between the notions of judgment and truth.
相似文献
Hans SlugaEmail: |
9.
Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the (KK) principle (roughly, that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows that p) should be rejected. We analyze Williamson’s argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly
stated this premise no longer supports the argument against (KK). After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we
reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge
from prior knowledge by deduction.
相似文献
Levi Spectre (Corresponding author)Email: |
10.
Rebecca Roman Hanrahan 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):281-306
David Chalmers supports his contention that there is a possible world populated by our zombie twins by arguing for the assumption
that conceivability entails possibility. But, I argue, the modal epistemology he sets forth, ‘modal rationalism,’ ignores
the problem of incompleteness and relies on an idealized notion of conceivability. As a consequence, this epistemology can’t
justify our quotidian judgments of possibility, let alone those judgments that concern the mind/body connection. Working from
the analogy that the imagination is to the possible as perception is to the actual, I set forth a competing epistemology,
‘modal empiricism.’ This epistemology survives the incompleteness objection and allows some of our everyday modal judgments
to be justified. But this epistemology can’t justify the claim that Zombie World is possible, which leaves Chalmers’s property
dualism without the support it needs.
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Rebecca Roman HanrahanEmail: |
11.
Garry Young 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):341-360
Over recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in arguments favouring intellectualism—the view that Ryle’s epistemic
distinction is invalid because knowing how is in fact nothing but a species of knowing that. The aim of this paper is to challenge
intellectualism by introducing empirical evidence supporting a form of knowing how that resists such a reduction. In presenting
a form of visuomotor pathology known as visual agnosia, I argue that certain actions performed by patient DF can be distinguished
from a mere physical ability because they are (1) intentional and (2) knowledge-based; yet these actions fail to satisfy the
criteria for propositional knowledge. It is therefore my contention that there exists a form of intentional action that not
only constitutes a genuine claim to knowledge but, in being irreducible to knowing that, resists the intellectualist argument
for exhaustive epistemic reduction.
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Garry YoungEmail: |
12.
Leo Iacono 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(3):423-436
In Beyond Rigidity, Soames attempts to defend Millianism by articulating a novel account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing
names. Soames uses this account both to respond to the objection that Millianism unintuitively allows the unrestricted substitution
of coreferential names in propositional attitude contexts, and to generate a positive argument for Millianism. I argue that
the positive argument fails, and that Soames’s account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing names is inconsistent
with Millianism.
相似文献
Leo IaconoEmail: |
13.
According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational (the realists go that bit right) but its metaphysical presuppositions
are wildly implausible (the non-cognitivists got that bit right). This is the basis of Mackie’s now famous error theory: that
moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive
moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that
Mackie’s approach can be vindicated by a fictionalist account of moral discourse. And Mark Kalderon has argued that moral
fictionalism is attractive quite independently of Mackie’s error-theory. Kalderon argues that the Frege–Geach problem shows
that we need moral propositions, but that a fictionalist can and should embrace propositional content together with a non-cognitivist
account of acceptance of a moral proposition. Indeed, it is clear that any fictionalist is going to have to postulate more
than one kind of acceptance attitude. We argue that this double-approach to acceptance generates a new problem – a descendent
of Frege–Geach – which we call the acceptance–transfer problem. Although we develop the problem in the context of Kalderon’s
version of non-cognitivist fictionalism, we show that it is not the non-cognitivist aspect of Kalderon’s account that generates
the problem. A closely related problem surfaces for the more typical variants of fictionalism according to which accepting
a moral proposition is believing some closely related non-moral proposition. Fictionalists of both stripes thus have an attitude
problem.
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Graham OddieEmail: |
14.
In this article we defend the inferential view of scientific models and idealisation. Models are seen as “inferential prostheses”
(instruments for surrogative reasoning) construed by means of an idealisation-concretisation process, which we essentially
understand as a kind of counterfactual deformation procedure (also analysed in inferential terms). The value of scientific
representation is understood in terms not only of the success of the inferential outcomes arrived at with its help, but also
of the heuristic power of representation and their capacity to correct and improve our models. This provides us with an argument
against Sugden’s account of credible models: the likelihood or realisticness (their “credibility”) is not always a good measure
of their acceptability. As opposed to “credibility” we propose the notion of “enlightening”, which is the capacity of giving
us understanding in the sense of an inferential ability.
相似文献
Xavier de Donato RodríguezEmail: |
Jesús Zamora Bonilla (Corresponding author)Email: |
15.
Gert Biesta 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2007,26(5):467-479
In this paper I ask whether the University has a special role to play in democratic societies. I argue that the modern University
can no longer lay claim to a research monopoly since nowadays research is conducted in many places outside of the University.
The University can, however, still lay claim to a kind of knowledge monopoly which has to with the central role Universities
play in the definition of what counts as scientific knowledge. The problem is, however, that the University’s knowledge monopoly
is predominantly understood in epistemological terms. This leaves only one role for the University in a democratic society,
viz., that of the expert. Based on ideas from John Dewey and Bruno Latour I suggest a different way to understand the distinction
between ‘scientific’ and ‘everyday’ knowledge. Against this background I argue that the University can contribute towards
the democratisation of knowledge if it articulates the difference between scientific and everyday knowledge in non-epistemological
terms.
相似文献
Gert BiestaEmail: |
16.
Peter Baumann 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(2):189-200
One of the most recent trends in epistemology is contrastivism. It can be characterized as the thesis that knowledge is a
ternary relation between a subject, a proposition known and a contrast proposition. According to contrastivism, knowledge
attributions have the form “S knows that p, rather than q”. In this paper I raise several problems for contrastivism: it lacks
plausibility for many cases of knowledge, is too narrow concerning the third relatum, and overlooks a further relativity of
the knowledge relation.
相似文献
Peter BaumannEmail: |
17.
The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments.
Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons.
We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of
moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative
mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions.
We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.
相似文献
Jeanette KennettEmail: |
18.
Daniel E. Flage 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):379-380
This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”
相似文献
Daniel E. FlageEmail: |
19.
Anna Mahtani 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):171-180
Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is
unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through.
The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject
two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.
相似文献
Anna MahtaniEmail: |
20.
Sarah Bachelard 《Sophia》2009,48(2):105-118
A central theme in the Christian contemplative tradition is that knowing God is much more like ‘unknowing’ than it is like
possessing rationally acceptable beliefs. Knowledge of God is expressed, in this tradition, in metaphors of woundedness, darkness,
silence, suffering, and desire. Philosophers of religion, on the other hand, tend to explore the possibilities of knowing
God in terms of rational acceptability, epistemic rights, cognitive responsibility, and propositional belief. These languages
seem to point to very different accounts of how it is that we come to know God, and a very different range of critical concepts
by which the truth of such knowledge can be assessed. In this paper, I begin to explore what might be at stake in these different
languages of knowing God, drawing particularly on Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology of Christian belief. I will argue that his
is a distorted account of the epistemology of Christian belief, and that this has implications for his project of demonstrating
the rational acceptability of Christian faith for the 21st century.
相似文献
Sarah BachelardEmail: |