The contemporary development of a Neo‐Confucian epistemology

Until recently epistemology in the Western sense was never a central issue in Chinese philosophy. Contemporary Chinese neo‐Confucian philosophers, however, realize that in order to reconstruct some of the important traditional philosophical insights and make them meaningful in the present time, certain methodological and epistemological considerations are indispensable. The present paper undertakes to examine some of these efforts. Since most neo‐Confucian philosophers today have been influenced by Hsiung Shih‐li, in one way or another, his epistemological theory is presented first. Then the further development of a neo‐Confucian epistemological system in Mou Tsung‐san's thought is discussed. Hsiung Shih‐li has made an important distinction between what he calls the hsing‐ehih and the liang‐chih. The former may be translated as the original wisdom and is what we rely upon to grasp ontological reality; the latter may be translated as the measuring wisdom and includes both our commonsensical and scientific ways of understanding which postulate a real, external world. A dialectical relation holds between the two. Mou Tsung‐san further develops a comprehensive epistemological system which confirms the basic insights of Hsiung Shih‐li. He has attempted a synthesis of the philosophical insights which he learns from Kant in the West and the Confucian tradition in China.     

Philosophy Upside Down?

Philip Kitcher recently argued for a reconstruction in philosophy. According to him, the contemporary mainstream of philosophy (in the English‐speaking world, at least) has deteriorated into something that is of relevance only to a few specialists who communicate with each other in a language nobody else understands. Kitcher proposes to reconstruct philosophy along two axes: a knowledge axis (with a focus on the sciences) and a value axis. The present article discusses Kitcher's diagnosis as well as his proposal of a therapy. It argues that there are problems with both, and it ends with an alternative view of what some core problems of the profession currently are.     

KNOWLEDGE AND IMAGINATION IN FICTION AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Abstract: Autobiographies are particularly interesting in the context of moral philosophy because they offer us rare and extended examples of how other people think, feel and reflect, which is of crucial importance in the development of phronesis (practical wisdom). In this article, Martha Nussbaum's use of fictional literature is shown to be of limited interest, and her arguments in Poetic Justice against the use of personal narratives in moral philosophy are shown to be unfounded. An analysis of Aristotle's concept of mimesis shows that Nussbaum's claims for fictional literature also apply to personal narratives. A case is then made for the importance of personal narratives in developing practical wisdom, and three sub‐genres of autobiography are discussed: (1) the confession, (2) the apology and (3) the testimonial. These sub‐genres exemplify some of the unique features of personal narratives.     

Law and eschatology in Wittgenstein's early thought

The paper investigates the role played by ethical deliberation and ethical judgment in Wittgenstein's early thought in the light of twentieth‐century German legal philosophy. In particular the theories of the phenomenologists Adolf Reinach, Wilhelm Schapp, and Gerhart Husserl are singled out, as resting on ontologies which are structurally similar to that of the Tractatus: in each case it is actual and possible Sachverhalte which constitute the prime ontological category. The study of the relationship between the states of affairs depicted, e.g., in the sentences of a legal trial and prior fact‐complexes to which these may correspond suggests one possible connecting link between the logical and ontological sections of the Tractatus and the ethical reflections appearing at the end. It is argued that the latter can best be understood in terms of the idea of a ‘last judgment’ (with its associated ethical rewards and punishments) which would relate to the world as a whole as a penal trial relates to individual complexes of facts.     

Combining Value‐focused Thinking and Balanced Scorecard to Improve Decision‐making in Strategic Management

Goal orientation is key to strategic management. In this field, the Balanced Scorecard is one of the most widely used management tools. It structures a company's main objectives from different perspectives based on the strategy of the firm and uses performance indicators to measure the achievement of objectives and strategy. However, its method of creation is not theoretically sound. Value‐focused thinking is a decision‐making philosophy that fits perfectly with Balanced Scorecard creation. It provides methods and techniques for the identification and structuring of objectives that are suitable to systematically derive a scorecard from a means‐ends network. However, such a means‐ends network is often too complex for enduring use in strategic management. By adapting the network's structure to the Balanced Scorecard's layout, the profound and clear set of derived objectives and their measures serve as a reasonable basis for applying methods of multi‐criteria decision‐making in an organization. This paper aimed to outline a procedure that merges the Balanced Scorecard and value‐focused thinking by preserving each concept's strengths while eliminating their weaknesses. A six‐step process was developed theoretically and employed empirically in a case study. This process included (1) identifying objectives; (2) structuring objectives; (3) characterizing clusters of objectives; (4) formulating mission, vision, and strategy; (5) designing the scorecard; and (6) monitoring and adapting to change. On the basis of this approach, a Management Scorecard was produced that enabled strategy development and execution, put forth a clear and comprehensive means‐ends network, and visualized a company's most important objectives and their relationships structured through perspectives roughly following the Balanced Scorecard. It acts as a foundation for research to generalize and compare findings regarding goals of organizations. Our procedure demonstrates how scientific methods, such as value‐focused thinking, can yield benefits to practitioners' instruments, like the Balanced Scorecard, and how management tools can likewise improve scientific methods. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

IDENTITY,RELATION R,AND WHAT MATTERS

This paper offers a challenge to Derek Parfit's thesis that one ought to have no preference between these two otherwise identical situations: 1. I continue to go on living as before, and 2. I do not survive, but am replaced by a duplicate, psychologically continuous to my present self (i.e. an R-related duplicate). I point out that virtually all psychologically normal persons regard some inanimate objects as being ‘irreplaceable’ (such that no copy could adequately substitute). I then propose that in every such case, this judgment is based on the subject's regarding some person as likewise irreplaceable. It would follow that any such subject would have to reject Parfit's thesis.     

Impartial Morality and Practical Deliberation as First‐Personal

Bernard Williams questioned whether impartial morality “can allow for the importance of individual character and personal relations in moral experience.” Underlying his position is a distinction between factual and practical deliberation. While factual deliberation is about the world and brings in a standpoint that is impartial, practical deliberation is, he claims, radically first‐personal; it “involves an I that [is] intimately the I of my desires.” While it may be thought that Williams's claim implies an unpalatable Humean subjectivism, the present article argues that this does not follow: That first‐person practical deliberation is directed both by the “I of my desires” and by the world. Drawing on Peter Winch's argument against the universalizability of moral judgments and D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover, the article argues that practical deliberations involve discovering value in the world, but that what is revealed about the world depends constitutively on the first‐person deliberations and decisions of particular agents.     

Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception

This paper focuses on the contents of perception in Kant's first Critique and Husserl's later writings. Both Kant and Husserl are known for their appeal to synthesis in their transcendental accounts of perceptual experience and objective judgment. Especially regarding Kant, the precise nature of perceptual synthesis has recently been the cause of much debate. Whereas some argue that for Kant perception must have nonconceptual content, others believe he is a conceptualist. After offering an alternative solution to this interpretative problem in Kant's philosophy, I turn to Husserl's later theory of perception. My main claims here are that Husserl departs from Kant specifically regarding (i) the sort of synthetic contents that govern affective perception and (ii) the role of conceptual capacities in the contents of attentive perception.     

Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice

The central question examined in this address is, “Do children's crimes make them adults?” I begin by focusing on the concept and history of adolescence in our society, I then examine the development and philosophy of the juvenile justice system. Adolescent development and juvenile justice are brought together around the concepts of maturity, judgment, and competence, followed by a brief introduction to some current research that we are engaged in regarding the issues of adjudicatory and culpability competence. I conclude with suggested directions for future work.     

FUTILITY AND THE VARIETIES OF MEDICAL JUDGMENT

Pellegrino has argued that end-of-life decisions should be based upon the physician's assessment of the effectiveness of the treatment and the patient's assessment of its benefits and burdens. This would seem to imply that conditions for medical futility could be met either if there were a judgment of ineffectiveness, or if the patient were in a state in which he or she were incapable of a subjective judgment of the benefits and burdens of the treatment. I argue that a theory of futility according to Pellegrino would deny that latter but would permit some cases of the former. I call this the “circumspect” view. I show that Pellegrino would adopt the circumspect view because he would see the medical futility debate in the context of a system of medical ethics based firmly upon a philosophy of medicine. The circumspect view is challenged by those who would deny that one can distinguish objective from subjective medical judgments. I defend the circumspect view on the basis of a previously neglected aspect of the philosophy of medicine -- an examination of varieties of medical judgment. I then offer some practical applications of this theory in clinical practice.     

Philosophy and 'The Life of the Law'

abstract   Focusing on the criminal law, I discuss three ways in which analytical philosophers might contribute to the development or health of the law (and of legal theory). The first is as humble under-labourers, who seek only to clarify legal rules and doctrines, but not to criticise them. This modest conception of the role of philosophy, however, proves to be untenable: clarification must become rational reconstruction — an attempt to make rational sense of the law; and rational reconstruction must involve at least an internal critique, which appraises the law in terms of ends, values or principles that the reconstruction discovers within the law. Such an internal critique must then also point beyond itself, to an external critique that appraises law in terms of the broader and deeper political and moral values by which states should be structured; the paper ends by noting some of the problems that such an external critique faces, and some of the problems that philosophers must face in trying to engage with the world of public policy .     

PHILOSOPHY,MYTH, AND THE “SIGNIFICANCE” OF SPECULATIVE THOUGHT

Abstract: A close examination of the relation between philosophy and myth reveals important functional parallels in some of their basic means of operation that helps shed some light on philosophy's overall task. A crucial aspect of the structural similarity between philosophy and myth is the generation of what Hans Blumenberg calls “significance.” I argue that the preservation and enhancement of significance (through a strong affinity to myth) is an essential and overlooked aspect of philosophy's task, one best accomplished through the world‐orienting work of speculative philosophy. By weaving the fragmented insights, criticisms, lessons, and methods of the more “specialized” analytic, pragmatic, critical, postmodern, deconstructivist, and other methods of thought together in a systematic way, speculative philosophy may be able to provide us with the kind of world orientation needed for developing a healthier, richer, more profound understanding of ourselves and our proper place within the world.     

Saving for a Rainy Day? Comparative Optimism About Disability in Old Age

This study examined young (n = 40) and middle‐aged (n = 30) adults' susceptibility to comparative optimism and comparative pessimism regarding disability in old age and their willingness to save for long‐term care. Participants rated their risk of diverse levels of disability in old age, compared to another similar person, and indicated the amount of money they would be willing to save for future long‐term care. While middle‐aged participants showed the same level of comparative optimism for diverse disability levels, younger participants showed increasing levels of comparative optimism with increasing disability. Participants' comparative optimism levels and age both predicted their intentions to save. The findings are discussed in terms of theories of judgment and behavioral decision making.     

The Theme and Logical Construction of the Taoist Philosophy

Fully embracing previous achievements in the research of Taoist philosophy, this paper attempts to create a sound analysis and investigation of the value concern of Taoism and reconstruct a new set of Taoist philosophy conforming to the requirement of modern science from the perspective of modern philosophy. The author sincerely wishes that the preliminary understanding of the Taoist philosophy presented in this paper would contribute to the construction of the Taoist philosophy. Translated from Structures of World Religion by Yan Xin     

The Place of Philosophy in Africa

Recently there has been a strong movement towards reflections about the “geography of reason,” especially among philosophers who deal with postcolonial thinking. There is also a renewed interest among different schools of thought, both analytical and continental, in the ways our “life world,” or “embodiment,” or “situated cognition,” shape our minds and eventually the philosophy we do. As a result, we have seen some recent publications on the nature and import of the concept of “place” by authors such as Edward Casey, Jeff Malpas, and Bruce Janz. In Philosophy in an African place, Bruce Janz introduces the concept of “philosophy‐in‐place” with the question as to what it is to do philosophy in a particular context of lived experience or, more specifically, what it is to do philosophy in an African place. This paper expands on Janz's “philosophy‐in‐place” by developing what will be called a “philosophy through place.” It starts with Janz's discussion of the problem of placing philosophy and a philosophy‐in‐place. Then it attempts to develop an argument for a “philosophy through place” and its implications for considering the place of philosophy in Africa and the challenge it poses to philosophy.     

On preferring God's non-existence

For many centuries, philosophers have debated this question: ‘Does God exist?’ Surprisingly, they have paid rather less attention to this distinct – but also very important – question: ‘Would God's existence be a good thing?’ The latter is an axiological question about the difference in value that God's existence would make (or does make) in the actual world. Perhaps the most natural position to take, whether or not one believes in God, is to hold that it would be a very good thing if such a being were to exist. After all, God is traditionally thought to be perfectly powerful and good, and it might seem obvious that such a being's existence would make things better than they would otherwise be. But this judgment has been contested: some philosophers have held that God's existence would make things worse, and that, on this basis, one can reasonably prefer God's non-existence. We first distinguish a wide array of axiological positions concerning the value of God's existence which might be held by theists, atheists, and agnostics alike. We next construe these positions as comparative judgments about the axiological status of various possible worlds. We then criticize an important recent attempt to show that God's existence would make things worse, in various ways, than they would otherwise be.     

BAKHTIN ON HEARING GOD'S VOICE

Bakhtin's dialogical (not dialectical) philosophy of the everyday, double‐voiced prosaic and poetic discourse of asymmetrically interrelated, embodied selves, each answerable to others and the world, found liberating wisdom in modern novelizing texts, notably those of Rabelais and Dostoevsky, with the Chalcedonian Christ prototype as background. He suggests how language is used in Christian contexts by attending to different voices in confessional utterances that may include God's voice/an interlocutory infinite “third”—heard in and through others’ voices—without collapsing perspectival pluralism into relativism. Current work on comparative theology, contrasted with old‐style comparative religion, echoes his insights.     

The elimination‐plus lineup: Testing a modified lineup procedure with confidence

The present study examined whether a modified form of a preidentification confidence rating would provide evidence of a suspect's guilt in addition to the identification decision confidence. Participants (N  = 241) viewed a videotaped mock crime and were presented with a target‐present or target‐absent simultaneous, sequential, elimination, or elimination‐plus lineup procedure; both elimination procedures required 2 separate judgments from the witness (i.e., relative and absolute). The elimination‐plus procedure was identical to that of the elimination procedure with the addition of the confidence rating in between judgment 1 and judgment 2. Confidence after judgment 1, confidence after judgment 2, and the average of the 2 confidence ratings with the elimination‐plus procedure significantly predicted accuracy for choosers. Given that confidence has been recognised by the Supreme Court of the United States, these results shed light on a novel way of utilising confidence in the investigative process.     

MINDING OTHERS' BUSINESS

What do we do when a loved one is seriously messing up her life? While Kantianism describes the predicament nicely as a tension between love and respect, it is not well‐suited to resolving it. Kantian respect prevents minding another's business in cases where love demands it. Virtue ethics can readily explain the predicament as a tension between the virtues of sympathy and humility. Moreover, by changing the focus away from the other as a setter of ends and toward the would‐be‐benefactor's own degree of practical wisdom, virtue ethics permits a more nuanced set of loving responses to self‐destructive people.