Why purists should be infallibilists

Philosophical Studies - Two of the most orthodox ideas in epistemology are fallibilism and purism. According to the fallibilist, one can know that a particular claim is true even though one’s...     

Why scientists should cooperate with journalists

Despite a widespread impression that the public is woefully ignorant of science and cares little for the subject, U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) surveys show the majority are very interested and understand that they are not well informed about science. The data are consistent with the author’s view that the popularity of pseudoscience does not indicate a rejection of science. If this is so, opportunities for scientists to communicate with the public promise a more rewarding result than is commonly believed among scientists. In fact, the increasing visibility of science in the mass media correlates with a slow, steady improvement in public understanding of science in recent years.     

Why philosophers should offer ethics consultations

Considerable debate has occurred about the proper role of philosophers when offering ethics consultations. Some argue that only physicians or clinical experienced personnel should offer ethics consultations in the clinical setting. Others argue still further that philosophers are ill-equipped to offer such advice, since to do so rests on no social warrant, and violates the abstract and neutral nature of the discipline itself.I argue that philosophers not only can offer such consultations but ought to. To be a bystander when one's discipline does offer insights and methods of value discernment is pusillanimous. But this position requires a view of clinical medical ethics as one that arises out of the clinical practice of medicine, and not just from an application of general ethical principles to the practice of medicine. I conclude with some skills that trained philosophers can bring to the consultation service, and note that all consultations are in the form of recommendations that the patient, family, and physician are still free to accept or reject. Philosophers in the clinical setting do not make decisions.     

Why physicians should not do ethics consults

Increasing complexities facing physicians negotiating the bedside decision continue to fuel the debate over who is the appropriate party to offer ethics consults, should one be needed, during the decision-making process. Some very good arguments have been put forth on behalf of clinical ethicists as being the proper and best party to engage in ethics consultations. However, serious questions remain about the role of the clinical ethicist and his ability to provide the necessary level of objectivity called for in an ethics consult. I argue that the clinician's professional psyche, or mode of thinking as a professional, leaves him little room to maneuver as an objective and detached third party ethics consultant. Several factors are cited and discussed that greatly influence the analyses applied to a case problem by physicians. The most formidable of these factors are habits and the practice of defensive medicine. I conclude that clinical ethicists are less suited for the overall tasks required of an objective consultant in medical cases that appear to involve insurmountable ethical issues.     

Why liberals should accept financial incentives for organ procurement

Free market libertarians have long supported incentives to increase organ procurement, but those oriented to justice traditionally have opposed them. This paper presents the reasons why those worried about justice should reconsider financial incentives and tolerate them as a lesser moral evil. After considering concerns about discrimination and coercion and setting them aside, it is suggested that the real moral concern should be manipulation of the neediest. The one offering the incentive (the government) has the resources to eliminate the basic needs that pressure the poor into a willingness to sell. It is unethically manipulative to withhold those resources and then offer payment for organs. Nevertheless, the poor have been left without basic necessities for 20 years since the passage of the prohibition on incentives. As long as the government continues to withhold a decent minimum of welfare, liberals should, with shame, cease opposing financial incentives for organ procurement.     

Why should we abandon the mental logic hypothesis?

Two hypotheses on deductive reasoning are under development: mental logic and mental models. It is often accepted that there are overwhelming arguments to reject the mental logic hypothesis. I revise these arguments and claim that they are either not conclusive, or point at problems which are troublesome for the mental model hypothesis as well.     

On representation hungry cognition (and why we should stop feeding it)

Despite the gaining popularity of non-representationalist approaches to cognition, it is still a widespread assumption in contemporary cognitive science that the explanatory reach of representation-eschewing approaches is substantially limited. Nowadays, many working in the field accept that we do not need to invoke internal representations for the explanation of online forms of cognition. However, when it comes to explaining higher, offline forms of cognition, it is widely believed that we must fall back on internal-representation-invoking theories. In this paper, I want to argue that, contrary to popular belief, we don’t yet have any compelling reason for assuming that non-representationalist theories are, as a matter of necessity, limited in scope. I will show that Clark and Toribio’s influential argument in terms of ‘representation-hungry’ cognition is, for various reasons, flawed. On closer inspection, we’ll see that the argument from representation-hunger (ARH) is, on the one hand, built on an inconsistent notion of representation and, on the other hand, on a conflation of the explanandum with the explanans. I will suggest that, on closer inspection, the ARH seems to be getting its appeal mainly from the unscientific principle that “like causes like”.

     

Spirituality versus Individualism: Why we should nurture relational consciousness

This paper proposes an approach to spiritual education which transcends the religious-secular boundary by conceiving of spirituality as a natural human predisposition labelled 'relational consciousness'. Evidence drawn from recent research demonstrates that this predisposition is universally identifiable in young children and expresses itself in many forms apart from the religious. Nevertheless it is this which allows the possibility of religious belief. As a result of the cultural construction of an extreme individualism which is particularly evident in the Western world, there has been a 'forgetting' of relational consciousness/spirituality resulting in damaging effects to the texture of human community. Some major sources of individualism are identified as having particularly serious effects on relational consciousness. These are reflected upon in the light of empirical research on children as well as contemporary philosophical and political critiques. Spiritual education is seen as a major means of resistance to the damaging effects of possessive individualism.     

现代语境中的伦理学和伦理学家

Ethics in the modern context is under the dual pressure of scientific-technological rationality and market commercialization, which has led to breakthroughs in the original boundaries of knowledge and academic methodology. The gradual separation of the domain of public life and that of private life in modern society and the former’s increasing pressure on the latter, in addition to the above dual pressure on ethics, is causing a dramatic transformation of the structure of ethical knowledge itself. All of these raise new theoretical problems for ethics and ethicists in the modern context. Answering and solving these problems makes sense for the future development of ethics as one of the classic humanities, and tests modern ethicists’ ability to realize their moral and theoretical duties. Translated by Yan Xin from Daode yu wenming 道德与文明 (Morality and Civilization), 2007, (4): 4–9     

Why historians (and everyone else) should care about counterfactuals

There are at least eight good reasons practicing historians should concern themselves with counterfactual claims. Furthermore, four of these reasons do not even require that we are able to tell which historical counterfactuals are true and which are false. This paper defends the claim that these reasons to be concerned with counterfactuals are good ones, and discusses how each can contribute to the practice of history.     

Why brands should fear fearful consumers: How attachment style predicts retaliation

In two surveys of adult consumers, we find that attachment styles predict consumers' reactions after brand relationships end. Specifically, ‘fearful’ consumers—those high in both attachment anxiety and avoidance—are most likely to complain to third parties, to obsess about harming the brand, and to report seeking payback against brands. Two factors mediate the effect of attachment on reactions: threats to consumers' self-image and the loss of benefits from their relationship. This is consistent with the explanation we propose: specifically, fearful individuals invest in and depend more on consumption relationships and, therefore, lose more when such relationships end.     

Why and how we should care about the General Data Protection Regulation

Abstract

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the new European Union-wide (EU) law on data protection, which is a great step towards more comprehensive and more far-reaching protection of individuals' personal data. In this editorial, we describe why and how we – as researchers within the field of health psychology – should care about the GDPR. In the first part, we explain when the GDPR is applicable, who is accountable for data protection, and what is covered by the notions of personal data and processing. In the second part, we explain aspects of the GDPR that are relevant for researchers within the field of health psychology (e.g., obtaining informed consent, data minimisation, and open science). We focus on questions that researchers may ask themselves in their daily practice. Compliance with the GDPR requires adopting research practices (e.g., data minimisation and anonymization procedures) that are not yet commonly used, but serve the fundamental right to protection of personal data of study participants.     

Why behavior analysts should study emotion: the example of anxiety.

Historically, anxiety has been a dominant subject in mainstream psychology but an incidental or even insignificant one in behavior analysis. We discuss several reasons for this discrepancy. We follow with a behavior-analytic conceptualization of anxiety that could just as easily be applied to emotion in general. Its primary points are (a) that language-able humans have an extraordinary capacity to derive relations between events and that it is a simple matter to show that neutral stimuli can acquire discriminative functions indirectly with no direct training; (b) that private events can readily acquire discriminative functions; (c) that anxiety disorders seem to occur with little apparent direct learning or that the amount of direct learning is extraordinarily out of proportion with the amount of responding; and (d) that the primary function of anxious behavior is experiential avoidance. We conclude that the most interesting aspects of anxiety disorders may occur as a function of derived rather than direct relations between public events and overt and private responses with avoidance functions. Implicit in this conclusion and explicit in the paper is the assertion that anxiety is a suitable subject for behavior-analytic study.     

Why the United States should adopt a single-payer system of health care finance

Although nothing could be less fashionable today than talk of comprehensive health care reform, the major problems of American health care have not gone away. Only a radical change in the way the U.S. finances health care--specifically, a single-payer system--will permit the achievement of universal coverage while keeping costs reasonably under control. Evidence from other countries, especially Canada, suggests the promise of this approach. In defending the single-payer approach, the author identifies several political and cultural factors that make it difficult for Americans to obtain a clear view of this option. Finally, the author argues that much discussion of rationing is vitiated by bracketing more systemic questions to which the issue of rationing is inextricably linked.     

No more psychiatric labels: Why formal psychiatric diagnostic systems should be abolished

This article argues that psychiatric diagnoses are not valid or useful. The use of psychiatric diagnosis increases stigma, does not aid treatment decisions, is associated with worsening long-term prognosis for mental health problems, and imposes Western beliefs about mental distress on other cultures. This article reviews the evidence base focusing in particular on empirical findings in relation to the topics of: aetiology, validity, reliability, treatment and outcome, prognosis, colonialism, and cultural and public policy impact. This evidence points toward diagnostic based frameworks for understanding and intervening in mental health difficulties being unable to either improve our scientific knowledge or improve outcomes in clinical practice and suggests that we need to move away from reliance on diagnostic based approaches for organising research and service delivery. Alternative evidence-based models for organising effective mental health care are available. Therefore formal psychiatric diagnostic systems such as the mental health section of the International Classification of Diseases Tenth Edition (ICD-10) and Diagnostic Statistical Manual Fifth Edition (DSM 5) should be abolished.