The body as laboratory: Prediction-error minimization,embodiment, and representation

In his (2014) paper, Jakob Hohwy outlines a theory of the brain as an organ for prediction-error minimization (PEM), which he claims has the potential to profoundly alter our understanding of mind and cognition. One manner in which our understanding of the mind is altered, according to PEM, stems from the neurocentric conception of the mind that falls out of the framework, which portrays the mind as “inferentially-secluded” from its environment. This in turn leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. Focusing on this aspect of Hohwy’s argument, we first outline the key components of the PEM framework such as the “evidentiary boundary,” before looking at why this leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. We will argue that although Hohwy may be correct to reject specific theses of embodied cognition, others are in fact implied by the PEM framework and may contribute to its development. We present the metaphor of the “body as a laboratory” in order to highlight what we believe is a more significant role for the body than Hohwy suggests. In detailing these claims, we will expose some of the challenges that PEM raises for providing an account of representation.     

对话心智与身体：具身认知的内感受研究转向

具身认知观念试图强调心智是根植于身体的,身体经验会对认知过程产生重要影响。但对于心智与身体的对话是如何进行的？身体通过何种渠道如何影响心智？等问题困扰着具身认知的支持者。传统的具身认知研究遭遇可重复性危机,身体状态改变影响高级认知的结论受到质疑。近年来,越来越多的证据表明内感受与身体表征、具身情绪以及社会认知等存在着密切的联系,因而内感受很有可能在身体加工和高级认知过程中起着重要的调节作用。     

Embodied Cultural Cognition: Situating the Study of Embodied Cognition in Socio‐Cultural Contexts

Embodiment research has demonstrated that cognition is grounded in bodily interactions with the environment and that abstract concepts are tied to the body’s sensory and motor systems. Building upon this embodiment perspective and advancing our understanding, we discuss the extension of embodied cultural cognition. We propose that some associations between bodily experiences and abstract concepts are not randomly formed; rather, the development of such associations is situated in a socio‐cultural context, informed by cultural imperatives, values, and habits. We draw evidence supporting this view of embodied cultural cognition in body–mind linkages manifested in construal of emotions, time perception, person perception, social power, and moral reasoning. To further extend this research avenue that synthesizes the studies of embodied cognition and culture, we also suggest potential future research directions inspired by this view. This embodied cultural cognition account is useful in understanding and organizing accumulating discoveries of cultural variations in embodiments; it also highlights the social situatedness of embodied cognition and is, therefore, highly compatible with theorizing and research in social and cultural psychology.     

生成认知：理论基础与实践走向

生成认知是具身认知思潮中的一个新取向。它主张认知是通过身体活动“生成的” (enacted)。认知的起点不是一个怎样精确表征世界的信息加工问题, 而是行动者在情境中怎样利用知觉来指导自己的行动。认知不是通过精确的心理表征“恢复”世界, 而是通过知觉引导的行动“生成”或“造就”一个自己的世界。认知是具身的行动, 认知结构形成于经常和反复出现的感觉运动模式, 与身体构造和身体活动具有深刻连续性。梅洛·庞蒂的身体现象学对生成认知具有深刻影响。同时, 詹姆斯、杜威等人的实用主义哲学对于实践行动的强调也深刻影响了生成认知。这种认知观强调了“行动”对心智的意义, 引发许多争议, 也促进了心理学研究范式的转变。     

身心二元论的困境与具身认知研究的兴起

摘要 由笛卡尔开创的身心二元论一直制约着人们对身心关系的认识。但是近年来兴起的具身认知研究却从理论和实证的角度系统论证了二元论的不可能性,指出了心智对身体的依赖性,并据此提出了身心一体的身心关系学说。最初,有关具身认知的讨论仅仅是哲学领域有关身心关系问题的形而上学思考,随后开始成为心理学中的一种理论思维,并逐步进入实验心理学领域。如今,ERP、FMRI等认知神经科学的手段在具身认知的研究中得到了广泛使用。具身认知已成为心理学和认知科学中的一股汹涌澎湃的实证研究思潮。     

中国古代儒道思想中的具身认知观

身心合一论是中国古代思想的基本观念。身是以“气”为根基, 并通过“修身-修心”与“修心-修身”可至天人合一的身体。本文选取中国古代思想中最有代表性的儒道两家思想, 融合现象学视角来诠释中国古代儒道思想中的身体观对身体主体性的生动凸显, 以及从“身-心-世界”三者互为交涉的层次上所建构的特有的认知观。随着国内外学者对具身认知观的日益关注, 结合中国古代思想视角开展的具身认知研究可在促进中国心理学发展的同时促进具身认知研究范式的成熟。     

有关具身认知的三种理论模型

具身认知强调了身体在认知中的关键作用,主张身体的构造和状态、身体的物理属性及其大脑与身体的特殊感觉—运动通道对认知的形成产生了根本影响。具身认知的相关理论虽然直接或者间接承认身体对心智的塑造关系,但是存在一些观点的不一致,导致具身认知理论难以统一到相同的框架上来,具身认知大致可以归结为三种模型:概念隐喻理论,知觉符号理论和感知运动模拟隐喻理论。     

认知与身体:理论心理学的视角

文章站在理论心理学的立场,从具身的维度,探讨了认知与身体的可能关系。文章指出,自古希腊以来的西方文化中,二元论思想一直占据主导地位。柏拉图是二元论思想的最早代表,笛卡尔从认识论上确证了心、物二元世界的存在。传统认知心理学承袭了身心分离的二元论传统,视心智为独立于身体感觉运动系统的抽象符号信息加工。但是具身认知的兴起对二元论提出了挑战。从具身的维度来看,认知是身体的认知,身体是认知的主体。认知在以下三个方面表现出对身体的依赖性:a.身体限制着认知的特征与范围。有机体的身体结构、身体的活动能力限制了认知表征的性质和内容;b.身体不仅限制着认知加工,而且可以作为认知加工的一个组成部分,在大脑和身体之间分配认知任务,发挥着一种类似于分销商的作用;c.身体调节着认知,影响着思维、判断、情绪和动机等心智过程。上述事实说明,身心并非对立的二元,而是一体,身体与环境的互动造就了心智和认知。心智、身体、环境是一体化过程。     

具身视角下的社会认知

摘 要：由于第一代认知科学存在着身心剥离的缺憾,具身化作为第二代认知科学的主要特征得到研究者的广泛关注,并且得到了来自神经科学领域的支持。随着研究的深入,具身学派提出,社会认知是否也应是具身的。现有研究发现具身性对个体评价、反应速度、言语理解、人际交往等方面都有不小的作用。但上述以身体模拟为主的证据仍不足以证明社会认知是具身的,具身学派还需解决诸如明确具身的定义、实验论证、明显区别于传统认知观等问题。     

EMBODIED COGNITION,CHARACTER FORMATION,AND VIRTUE

The theory of embodied cognition makes the claim that our cognitive processes are, at their core, sensorimotor, situated, and action‐relevant. Our mental system is built primarily to control action, and so mind is formed by the nature of the body and its interactions with the world. In this paper we will explore the nature of virtue and its formation from the perspective of embodied cognition. We specifically describe exemplars of the virtue of compassion (caregivers of individuals with developmental disabilities in L'Arche communities), speculating as to what might have been the formative influences in their character development. Embodied formation is understood in the context of the openness of human cortical systems to formation by social interactions, and in terms of the openness to reorganization and change of complex dynamical systems. Specific formative influences explored include interpersonal imitation, social attachment, language, and story.     

杜威反射弧概念中的具身认知思想

伴随第二代认知科学的兴起,大量研究者开始在具身认知这一主张上达成共识,即有机体的身体运动以及与身体运动相关的特征和感觉经验（或称身体经验）在认知过程中扮演重要角色,而有机体的身体又嵌入到其所处的动态环境之中,从而形成一个不可分割的整体。杜威在《心理学中的反射弧概念》一文中的论证蕴含了上述具身认知思想的雏形,主要体现在：（1）身体运动协调构成了感觉运动回路。（2）在身体运动协调基础上形成的身体经验在感觉运动回路中具有连续性。（3）感觉运动回路中的身体运动与经验以环境为背景,最终目的是为了适应环境。未来的具身认知研究可以借鉴杜威所论证的反射弧概念,对上述三个方面作出进一步探索。     

抽象概念表征的具身认知观

抽象概念是否通过感知经验来表征以及如何被感知经验表征是具身认知面临的一大问题.在抽象概念表征是否具有感知经验基础的问题上,具身认知理论认为抽象概念通过情境模拟或隐喻与感知经验发生联系.在抽象概念如何与感知经验表征发生联系的问题上,概念模拟理论强调情景或运动模拟在抽象概念表征中的直接作用;概念隐喻理论则侧重具体经验或具体经验与抽象概念之间的共同结构关系在抽象概念表征中的间接作用.未来研究应改变概念表征的稳定的心理实体观,从语言和抽象表征的关系、正常儿童和特殊群体的抽象概念表征差异入手,整合不同的具身认知观点.     

具身框架下的自我研究

具身认知理论主张自我认知是机体与环境的互动过程,基于具身认知的身体生物学特点、活动特征及自我身体表征等方面的实证性研究,不断明晰了自我经验中具身的重要作用.这些研究弥补了传统心理学关于自我-世界之间身心交互性研究的不足.具身认知作为自我认知的一种新兴解释视角,在自我研究上存在一些局限性,主要涉及具身化的对称性、双向性、自动化,以及自我研究的定性等问题.自我的具身研究应结合建构水平理论和隐喻理论来思考认知加工机制问题,并吸纳进化动机以及文化假说等观点的解释力度.     

Can the mind be embodied,enactive, affective, <Emphasis Type="Italic">and</Emphasis> extended?

In recent years, a growing number of thinkers have begun to challenge the long-held view that the mind is neurally realized. One strand of critique comes from work on extended cognition, a second comes from research on embodied cognition, and a third comes from enactivism. I argue that theorists who embrace the claim that the mind is fully embodied and enactive cannot consistently also embrace the extended mind thesis. This is because once one takes seriously the central tenets of enactivism, it becomes implausible to suppose that life, affectivity, and sense-making can extend. According to enactivism, the entities that enact a world of meaning are autonomous, embodied agents with a concerned point of view. Such agents are spatially situated, differentiated from the environment, and intentionally directed towards things that lie at a distance. While the extended mind thesis blurs the distinction between organism and environment, the central tenets of enactivism emphasize differentiations between the two. In addition, enactivism emphasizes that minded organisms are enduring subjects of action and experience, and thus it is implausible to suppose that they transform into a new form of life whenever they become intimately coupled to some new element in their environment. The proponent of enactivism and embodied cognition should acknowledge that life and affectivity are relational and environmentally embedded, but resist the further claim that these phenomena are extended.     

EMBODIED COGNITION AND RELIGION

It is argued that there are good scientific grounds for accepting that cognition functions in a way that reflects embodiment. This represents a more holistic, systemic way of thinking about human beings, and contributes to the coordination of scientific assumptions about mind and body with those of the faith traditions, moving us beyond sterile debates about reductionism. It has been claimed by Francisco Varela and others that there is an affinity between Buddhism and embodied cognition, though it is argued here that they are less closely aligned than is sometimes assumed. Embodied cognition also accords well with the holistic strand of thinking about human nature in Judeo‐Christian thinking. While accepting the persuasiveness of the general case for cognition being embodied it is suggested here that some forms of cognition are more embodied than others, and that it may be one of the distinctive features of humans that they have developed a capacity for relatively nonembodied forms of cognition.     

感知运动信息在概念表征中的作用

研究概念的表征问题对理解概念的本质非常重要,传统认知和具身认知视角下的概念表征理论争议的焦点在于感觉运动信息在表征中的作用。传统认知视角下的离身认知认为感知觉运动信息会转化成抽象的符号,概念表征不包含感知觉运动信息。概念表征的具身观点认为感知觉运动信息是概念表征的基础。对感知运动信息在概念表征中起作用这一命题已经达成共识。未来研究应该关注感知运动信息起作用的机制,以及抽象概念表征等问题,进一步完善发展概念表征理论。     

具身概念表征的研究及理论述评

具身认知强调认知在本质上是具身的, 身体在认知的实现中发挥着关键作用。传统的符号加工理论认为, 概念表征独立于主体的知觉运动系统并以抽象符号的形式储存于语言记忆中。概念表征的具身理论则认为, 概念表征与知觉运动系统具有共同的神经基础, 概念在本质上是主体经验客体时知觉与运动体验的神经记录, 而概念加工的基本形式则是身体经验的模拟与还原。关于该理论的实证研究主要集中于概念加工引发的知觉动作变化、身体动作对概念加工的影响、抽象概念加工的具身特征等领域。今后的研究应关注符号加工理论与具身理论的整合等。     

道德具身认知的理论研究*

具身认知作为一种新兴思潮,强调身体经验及身体与环境的相互作用对于个体抽象概念及认知的作用。从具身认知的角度出发,考察身体和道德认知加工的关系已成为现今道德心理学和神经科学的研究热点。本文结合以往道德具身认知研究,介绍了概念隐喻理论、知觉符号理论、模拟感觉运动隐喻理论和进化理论四种道德具身认知理论,讨论并分析了现有理论研究中存在的矛盾与问题。未来的研究可在多文化背景下进行,并依靠认知神经科学技术对道德的具身认知机制进行更深入的探究。     

具身认知研究述评

具身认知是以身体为解释核心的新的研究视角。来自具身认知实证研究的证据表明,身体的生理属性、运动经验和现实环境影响认知的形成与发展。目前的具身认知实证研究主要采用传统认知的实验范式,集中于研究身体的结构属性和静态动作对认知的影响。未来,具身认知与传统认知将会相互吸收和融合,更多关注身体的机能属性和动态属性。     

Moving arms: the effects of sensorimotor information on the problem-solving process

Embodied cognition postulates a bi-directional link between the human body and its cognitive functions. Whether this holds for higher cognitive functions such as problem solving is unknown. We predicted that arm movement manipulations performed by the participants could affect the problem-solving solutions. We tested this prediction in quantitative reasoning tasks that allowed two solutions to each problem (addition or subtraction). In two studies with healthy adults (N?=?53 and N?=?50), we found an effect of problem-congruent movements on problem solutions. Consistent with embodied cognition, sensorimotor information gained via right or left arm movements affects the solution in different types of problem-solving tasks.