Carroll’s Regress and the Epistemology of Logic

On an internalist account of logical inference, we are warranted in drawing conclusions from accepted premises on the basis of our knowledge of logical laws. Lewis Carroll’s regress challenges internalism by purporting to show that this kind of warrant cannot ground the move from premises to conclusion. Carroll’s regress vindicates a repudiation of internalism and leads to the espousal of a standpoint that regards our inferential practice as not being grounded on our knowledge of logical laws. Such a standpoint can take two forms. One can adopt either a broadly externalist model of inference or a sceptical stance. I will attempt, in what follows, to defend a version of internalism which is not affected by the regress. The main strategy will be to show that externalism and scepticism are not satisfying standpoints to adopt with regard to our inferential practice, and then to suggest an internalist alternative.     

The Humean problem of induction and Carroll’s Paradox

Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have reasons for believing what she believes. I defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke’s theory of concepts: possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include (fallible) dispositions to project them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns.

Carroll’s Infinite Regress and the Act of Diagramming

Topoi - The infinite regress of Carroll’s ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’ is interpreted as a problem in the epistemology of mathematical proof. An approach to the problem...     

It’s Not You,It’s Me…No,Actually It’s You: Perceptions of What Makes a First Date Successful or Not

Early communication plays an important role in influencing the perceptions one has of an individual. The first form of in-person communication individuals often have with potential romantic partners is during the first date. This date tends to take on the form of a “dance” involving carefully orchestrated conversation and self-disclosures. What is said is certainly important, as are the behaviors exhibited by each member of the dyad. This study examined how individuals interpreted what potential romantic partners say and do during, or immediately following, the first date to get a sense of how they perceive these actions and words. Special attention was placed on the participants’ interpretations of whether or not their date was attracted to them. A survey was given to 390 participants, and many interesting differences were found between the genders. Certain behaviors, such as steering the conversation to the topic of sex signaled to men that their date was attracted to them. However, women looked for different behaviors to infer attraction on the part of their partner, such as mentioning future plans and kissing them goodbye. With a better understanding of how certain phrases and actions influence others, people can be more aware of the signals sent to others upon their pivotal initial encounters.     

Note on Florensky’s Solution to Carroll’s ‘Barbershop’ Paradox: Reverse Implication for Russell?

Pavel Florensky solves Lewis Carroll??s ??Barbershop?? paradox to support his reasoning in a previous chapter. Our discussion includes a) the problem (which we also refer to as the p paradox), b) Carroll??s solution, c) Bertrand Russell??s solution, d) Florensky??s solution and then e) a material example proffered by Florensky. Both Russell and Florensky disagree with Carroll??s solution, yet, (ostensibly) unbeknownst to themselves they offer the same solution, which is ??p implies not-q??. Given Florensky??s material example, the solution seems to tell us something about the logic of belief. We ask whether Florensky??s example has reverse implications for Russell??s solution.     

Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology: What’s the Question?

Alvin Plantingas Warranted Christian Belief is without questionone of the central texts of the Reformed epistemology movement. Critiques of Plantingas defence have been both multiple and varied. As varied as these responses are, however, it is my contention that many of them amount to the same thing. It is the purpose of this paper to offer an overview of the main lines of attack that have been directed as Plantingas project, and thereafter to show how many, if not most, of these objections can be understood as versions or aspects of the same criticism, what I call the Inadequacy Thesis.     

What the experimenter’s prime tells the observer’s brain

The presentation of a stimulus below the threshold of conscious awareness can exert an influence on the processing of a subsequent target. One such consequence of briefly presented “primes” is seen in the negative compatibility effect. The response time (RT) to determine the left—right orientation of an arrow (i.e., the target) is relatively slow if a prime is also an arrow whose direction corresponds to that of the target. When the direction of the arrow is opposite that of the prime, RTs are relatively fast. In four experiments, we examined whether the prime shifts attention from the location of the subsequent target and whether this attention shift influences target processing. Results showed that the prime does indeed move attention. The consequence of this attention movement is that the representation of direction is affected. Specifically, RTs to process an arrow are shorter if the arrow’s direction is compatible with the last shift of attention. Furthermore, this interference occurs at a conceptual level concerning the representation of left and right rather than at the motor planning level. We argue that a shift in attention brought about by the prime can create a negative compatibility-like effect.     

Coping with Family Conflict: What’s Helpful and What’s Not for Low-income Adolescents

Family conflict is exacerbated by poverty-related stress and is detrimental to adolescent mental health. Adolescent coping with family conflict has the potential to buffer or exacerbate the negative effects of family conflict on internalizing symptoms. We examined coping with family conflict among 82 low-income adolescents (53.7% female, mean age = 13.5 years at Time 1, SD = 1.98; range 11–18), and their primary caregivers (95% female, mean age = 34.9 years, SD = 7.45). Adolescents were 25.9% Caucasian, 28.4% African American, 38.3% Hispanic, and 7.4% Other (Multi-racial, Native American, or Asian). Results show that family conflict is more strongly associated with internalizing symptoms for adolescents under high levels of poverty-related stress. Regression analyses indicate that secondary control coping moderates the effects of family conflict on internalizing symptoms. In addition, analyses reveal that disengagement coping exacerbates symptoms across time for both adolescent girls and boys. Regression analyses also suggest that primary control coping is helpful for coping with family conflict, but only for girls. Results highlight the importance of examining coping concurrently and across time as well as including moderating effects of gender. Intervention efforts targeting low-income adolescents should incorporate the instruction of secondary control strategies for coping with family conflict.     

What’s Wrong with Joyguzzling?

Our thesis is that there is no moral requirement to refrain from emitting reasonable amounts of greenhouse gases (GHGs) solely in order to enjoy oneself. Joyriding in a gas guzzler (joyguzzling) provides our paradigm example. We first distinguish this claim that there is no moral requirement to refrain from joyguzzling from other more radical claims. We then review several different proposed objections to our view. These include: the claim that joyguzzling exemplifies a vice, causes or contributes to harm, has negative expected value, exceeds our fair share of global emissions, and undermines political duties. We show why none of these objections succeeds and conclude that no good reason has yet been proposed that shows why joyguzzling violates a moral requirement.     

Understanding What’s Good for Us

The ancient question of what a good life consists in is currently the focus of intense debate. There are two aspects to this debate: the first concerns how the concept of a good life is to be understood; the second concerns what kinds of life fall within the extension of this concept. In this paper, I will attend only to the first, conceptual aspect and not to the second, substantive aspect. More precisely, I will address the preliminary, underlying question of how to understand what it is in general for something to be good for someone, from which an understanding of the more particular concept of a good life may be derived.

What’s wrong with vote buying

Philosophical Studies - Almost everyone would agree that vote buying is morally wrong, and that prohibitions on vote buying are morally justified. Yet, recently, several philosophers have argued...     

What’s to be done?

All of culture, philosophy included, is a huge trick on nature, and nature will eventually catch on and reassert itself. But for right now, if one lives in a free society, it's a wonderful time to be a philosopher: so much to read, so much to think and write about.     

What’s in a Purse? Maybe a Woman’s Reputation

Does a woman’s reputation suffer when others discover condoms in her possession? Fifty-two male and female predominantly white undergraduates from a small, private, Catholic university in the northeast USA examined the contents of a purse to formulate an impression of its owner. Unflattering inferences were drawn about the character of the target when her purse contained condoms. A follow-up study with 55 comparable participants confirmed that these inferences were indeed uncomplimentary. The results are discussed in terms of the multi-dimensional price women pay when assuming responsibility for their sexual health.     

What’s wrong with Moorean buck-passing?

In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of value, and has the means to avoid the wrong kind of reasons problem. Further, I counter the common suspicion that a Moorean account cannot make sense of deontological views such as Ross’s, and that it generally leaves no room for agent-relative reasons. In order to do this, I appeal to the idea that a Moorean account does not dictate the substantive view that values have to be maximized. In some cases, expressing them might be a better response. Finally I lay out and reply to a potentially devastating argument to the effect that a Moorean account makes oughts and reasons non-normative. I also criticize Scanlon’s attempt to favour his own buck-passing account via consideration of the open question argument. MBP thus emerges as a live option in the buck-passing debate.     

What’s so Transparent about Transparency?

Representationalists often use intuitions about the transparency ofexperience to defend their view that qualitative content isrepresentational content. According to these intuitions, wecannot attend to our experience except by attending to theobject of that experience. Although the transparency intuitionappears to be widely shared, even among non-representationalists,in this paper I suggest that there are two ambiguities inherent indiscussions of transparency. One concerns the strength of thetransparency intuition, while the other concerns its scope. Oncewe bring these two ambiguities to the surface, we can see that therepresentationalists claim that experience is transparent turnsout to be considerably more controversial than ordinarily supposed.While the phenomenological data may support some kind of experientialtransparency, I argue that it does not support the kind of transparencyneeded for representationalism.     

What’s Ignored in Itō Jinsai’s Interpretation of Mencius?

This article discusses the 17^th century Japanese Confucian Itō Jinsai’s interpretation of Mencius. It is argued that Itō Jinsai grinds the Mencius with an axe of Japanese “practical learning.” In his representation of Mencius, the government of “Kindly Way” is upheld as the core value in Mencius’ thought. Although there is a clear spirituality in his own philosophy, he stressed the political aspect of Mencius’ thought at the expense of the transcendental aspect of his theory of human mind and nature.     

What’s up in mental rotation?

We report two experiments on the influence of head tilt on mental rotation. In Experiment I, subjects decided whether dot patterns were or were not repeated about a line. Their reaction times (RTs) were consistent with the interpretation that they mentally rotated the patterns so that the line was subjectively vertical before making their decisions. When the subjects tilted their heads, the RT functions shifted in the direction of the tilt, indicating that the subjective vertical lay closer to the retinal than to the gravitational vertical. In Experiment II, subjects decided whether singly presented alphanumeric characters in various orientations were standard or backward (mirror-reversed). Again, analysis of their RTs suggested mental rotation to the standard upright, but the function was unaffected by head tilt; in this case, the subjects operated in subjective gravitational rather than retinal coordinates. The choice of retinal or gravitational coordinates may depend on whether the stimuli are interpreted egocentrically or as part of the external world.