Reply to David Kemmerer's "a critique of Mark D. Allen's 'the preservation of verb subcategory knowledge in a spoken language comprehension deficit'"

Allen [Allen, M. D. (2005). The preservation of verb subcategory knowledge in a spoken language comprehension deficit. Brain and Language, 95, 255-264] presents evidence from a single patient, WBN, to motivate a theory of lexical processing and representation in which syntactic information may be encoded and retrieved independently of semantic information. In his critique, Kemmerer argues that because Allen depended entirely on preposition-based verb subcategory violations to test WBN's knowledge of correct argument structure, his results, at best, address a "strawman" theory. This argument rests on the assumption that preposition subcategory options are superficial syntactic phenomena which are not represented by argument structure proper. We demonstrate that preposition subcategory is in fact treated as semantically determined argument structure in the theories that Allen evaluated, and thus far from irrelevant. In further discussion of grammatically relevant versus irrelevant semantic features, Kemmerer offers a review of his own studies. However, due to an important design shortcoming in these experiments, we remain unconvinced. Reemphasizing the fact the Allen (2005) never claimed to rule out all semantic contributions to syntax, we propose an improvement in Kemmerer's approach that might provide more satisfactory evidence on the distinction between the kinds of relevant versus irrelevant features his studies have addressed.     

Psychology and "ordinary language"—a critique of Smedslund

This article takes up methodological issues of the kind raised by Jan Smedslund in earlier issues of this journal, concerning the status of psychological enquiry as a discipline. Arguments are presented which aim to show that Smedslund has failed to establish the thesis that all generally valid theoretical statements in psychology are explications of conceptual relationships embedded in ordinary language, i.e., analytic statements. Some specific examples of what Smedslund takes to be "ordinary language theorems" are examined. Doubts are expressed concerning the validity of the proof procedure Smedslund employs in the "demonstration" of a number of his alleged theorems. Finally, it is argued that the results produced by the situation-bound and culture-bound empirical research of the psychologist need not be viewed as "arbitrary" in Smedslund's sense of that term.     

答复D.布鲁尔的《反拉图尔论》

本文是拉图尔就布鲁尔的批评（参见本刊今年第3期）作出的回应。他强调科学实践是主客体区分不发生作用的唯一领域,并反驳了布鲁尔对他混淆了自然与关于自然的信念或说明之问的区别的批评,指出这种区别仿佛是割断本想连接在一起的东西,即在原本为一个整体的树干中插入楔子,然后再把它们粘合起来,从而给联系制造了麻烦,而这也就是现代主义哲学难题的根源所在。拉图尔认为,布鲁尔等人没有资格对科学作出评价,他的强纲领已经变成了科学元研究的一个障碍。     

A feminist critique of family therapy

This paper is a feminist critique of traditional family therapy considering the cybernetic epistemology underpinning it as a particular way of seeing the family. The political implications of this way of seeing d be considered in tern of structural inequalities with a preference for, the intergroup perspective. There will be a close examination and discussion of the one parent family structure. The discussion will then move one a practical evaluation of the ecosystemic view of helping families, in particular single parent families.     

Reply to Fudin and Lembessis's critique of Malik and Paraherakis's commentary regarding the capacity of the unconscious

In an earlier paper, we had suggested that the research examining the capacity of the unconscious cannot be interpreted unambiguously to make the claim that the unconscious is limited in scope. Fudin and Lembessis challenged our conclusion, and we address their concerns.