Arbitrary reference,numbers, and propositions

Reductionist realist accounts of certain entities, such as the natural numbers and propositions, have been taken to be fatally undermined by what we may call the problem of arbitrary identification. The problem is that there are multiple and equally adequate reductions of the natural numbers to sets (see Benacerraf, 1965), as well as of propositions to unstructured or structured entities (see, e.g., Bealer, 1998; King, Soames, & Speaks, 2014; Melia, 1992). This paper sets out to solve the problem by canvassing what we may call the arbitrary reference strategy. The main claims of such strategy are 2. First, we do not know which objects are the referents of proposition and numerical terms since their reference is fixed arbitrarily. Second, our ignorance of which object is picked out as the referent does not entail that no object is referred to by the relevant expression. Different articulations of the strategy are assessed, and a new one is defended.     

Regress,unity, facts,and propositions

The problem, or cluster of problems, of the unity of the proposition, along with the cluster of problems that tend to go under the name of Bradley’s regress, has recently again become a going concern for philosophers, after having for some time been regarded as primarily of historical interest. In this paper, I distinguish between the different problems that tend to be brought up under the heading of the unity of the proposition, and between different related regress arguments. I present my favored solutions to these problems.

     

Functionalism and propositions

Conclusion Some have argued, following Stalnaker, that a plausible functionalist account of belief requires coarse-grained propositions. I have explored a class of functionalist accounts, and my argument has been that, in this class, there is no account which meetsall of the following conditions: it is plausible, noncircular, and allows for the validity of the argument to coarse-grained propositions. In producing this argument, I believe that I have shown that it might be open to a functionalist to adopt fine-grained propositions; thus, one might be a functionalist without holding that all mathematical beliefs are about strings of symbols (and that the belief that all bachelors are unmarried men is a belief about words).My project in this paper has been minimal in the following sense. I havenot argued thatno functionalist account of belief which meets the three conditions can be produced; rather, I have simply explored the inadequacies of certain sorts of accounts. I think that this is useful insofar as it makes clear the challenges to be met by an account of belief which can play the required role in the argument to coarse-grained propositions. It is compatible with my position that such an account is forthcoming, insofar as I have not produced a functionalist theory of belief which is clearly non-circular, plausible, and which yields fine-grained propositions. Of course, it is also compatible with my position that no plausible, non-circular functionalist account of belief of any sort can be produced. My argument has been that,if one construes such mental states as belief as functional states, no convincing argument has yet been produced that they require coarse-grained objects.     

Situation models,propositions, and the fan effect

According to theories of language comprehension, people can construct multiple levels of representation: the surface form, the propositional text base, and the situation model. In this study, I looked at how the referential nature of memory probes affects the experience of retrieval interference. All the subjects memorized sentences about objects in locations (e.g., “The potted palm is in the hotel”). When memory probes were sentences and, therefore, referential and most closely associated with the situation model level, no interference was observed during retrieval for information that could be integrated into a common situation model. In contrast, interference was observed in such cases when the memory probes were concept pairs (POTTED PALM-HOTEL) and hence not directly referential. This is interpreted to mean that nonreferential memory probes involve surface form and text base representations more than do referential sentence probes.     

Processing differences between nouns,adjectives, and verbs

Summary Processing differences were investigated for nouns, adjectives, and verbs in Serbocroatian, a language that depends strongly on inflection to convey grammatical information. Four lexical decision experiments were run. Two of them inspected processing of inflected forms of nouns, demonstrating analogous processing for both singular and plural forms. Processing of the nominative case was faster for both grammatical numbers. Reaction times for the various case forms were not related to their respective frequencies of occurrence. Adjectival processing, on the other hand, gave no privileged role to the nominative case and the inflected form frequency had a strong influence. Similarly, verbs also showed frequency-based processing. An explanation was proposed, suggesting that the organization of inflectional processing is dependent on the number of inflectional alternatives available to a given word.This research was supported by National Institute of Health (USA) grants HD-08495 to the University of Belgrade and HD-01994 to the Haskins Laboratories.     

Necessitarian propositions

The eternalist holds that all propositions specify the needed time information, and so are eternally true if true at all. The necessitarian holds the parallel view for worlds: she holds that all propositions specify the needed world information, and so are necessarily true if true at all. I will argue that the considerations for both views run parallel: the necessitarian can mimic the whole case for eternalism.     

Cognitive propositions

Soames's new theory of "cognitive propositions" is presented and several prima facie objections are presented to it.     

Imagery,propositions, and the form of internal representations

This paper has four major sections: First, we review the basic arguments offered by Pylyshyn (Psychological Bulletin, 1973, 80, 1–24) and others against using imagery as an explanatory construct in psychology. Second, we consider each of these points and find none that speak against any but the most primitive notions of imagery. Third, we review the results of various experiments on imagery. In each case, we compare two explanations of the findings: one which assumes the existence of a surface image manifesting emergent properties, and one which assumes that all internal representations are coded in terms of “abstract propositions.” We find imagery hypotheses to be at least as adequate as those based on propositional representation. Finally, we conclude that debate about the ultimate foundations of internal representation is fruitless; the empirical question is whether images have properties that cannot be derived directly from more abstract propositional structures.     

Broca's aphasia, verbs and the mental lexicon

Verb production is notoriously difficult for individuals with Broca's aphasia, both at the word and at the sentence level. An intriguing question is at which level in the speech production these problems arise. The aim of the present study is to identify the functional locus of the impairment that results in verb production deficits in Broca's aphasia. Levelt's (1989) model is used as a theoretical framework for this study. Two experiments have been conducted, one on verb movement and one on verbs with alternating transitivity. The results suggest that the functional impairment in Broca's aphasia should be located in Levelt's "grammatical encoder."