Reflection and reasoning in moral judgment

While there is much evidence for the influence of automatic emotional responses on moral judgment, the roles of reflection and reasoning remain uncertain. In Experiment 1, we induced subjects to be more reflective by completing the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) prior to responding to moral dilemmas. This manipulation increased utilitarian responding, as individuals who reflected more on the CRT made more utilitarian judgments. A follow-up study suggested that trait reflectiveness is also associated with increased utilitarian judgment. In Experiment 2, subjects considered a scenario involving incest between consenting adult siblings, a scenario known for eliciting emotionally driven condemnation that resists reasoned persuasion. Here, we manipulated two factors related to moral reasoning: argument strength and deliberation time. These factors interacted in a manner consistent with moral reasoning: A strong argument defending the incestuous behavior was more persuasive than a weak argument, but only when increased deliberation time encouraged subjects to reflect.     

The role of moral commitments in moral judgment

Traditional approaches to moral psychology assumed that moral judgments resulted from the application of explicit commitments, such as those embodied in consequentialist or deontological philosophies. In contrast, recent work suggests that moral judgments often result from unconscious or emotional processes, with explicit commitments generated post hoc. This paper explores the intermediate position that moral commitments mediate moral judgments, but not through their explicit and consistent application in the course of judgment. An experiment with 336 participants finds that individuals vary in the extent to which their moral commitments are consequentialist or deontological, and that this variation is systematically but imperfectly related to the moral judgments elicited by trolley car problems. Consequentialist participants find action in trolley car scenarios more permissible than do deontologists, and only consequentialists moderate their judgments when scenarios that typically elicit different intuitions are presented side by side. The findings emphasize the need for a theory of moral reasoning that can accommodate both the associations and dissociations between moral commitments and moral judgments.     

Culture and the quest for universal principles in moral reasoning

The importance of including cultural perspectives in the study of human cognition has become apparent in recent decades, and the domain of moral reasoning is no exception. The present review focuses on moral cognition, beginning with Kohlberg's model of moral development which relies heavily on people's justifications for their judgments and then shifting to more recent theories that rely on rapid, intuitive judgments and see justifications as more or less irrelevant to moral cognition. Despite this dramatic shift, analyses of culture and moral decision-making have largely been framed as a quest for and test of universal principles of moral judgment. In this review, we discuss challenges that remain in trying to understand crosscultural variability in moral values and the processes that underlie moral cognition. We suggest that the universalist framework may lead to an underestimation of the role of culture in moral reasoning. Although the field has made great strides in incorporating more and more cultural perspectives in order to understand moral cognition, theories of moral reasoning still do not allow for substantial variation in how people might conceptualize the domain of the moral. The processes that underlie moral cognition may not be a human universal in any simple sense, because moral systems may play different roles in different cultures. We end our review with a discussion of work that remains to be done to understand cultural variation in the moral domain.     

Adaptive variation in judgment and philosophical intuition

Our theoretical understanding of individual differences can be used as a tool to test and refine theory. Individual differences are useful because judgments, including philosophically relevant intuitions, are the predictable products of the fit between adaptive psychological mechanisms (e.g., heuristics, traits, skills, capacities) and task constraints. As an illustration of this method and its potential implications, our target article used a canonical, representative, and affectively charged judgment task to reveal a relationship between the heritable personality trait extraversion and some compatabilist judgments. In the current Reply, we further clarify major theoretical implications of these data and outline potential opportunities and obstacles for this methodology. Discussion focuses on (1) the need for theoretically grounded a priori predictions; (2) the use of precise process level data and theory; (3) the possibility of convergent validity as personality is known to predict life experiences and outcomes; and (4) the fundamentally adaptive nature of cognition.     

道德直觉分析：内涵、形成机制与加工判断机制

自Haidt 提出道德判断的社会直觉模型后,道德直觉便成为道德心理研究中的重要课题。本文围绕这三方面的问题就最近10多年来道德直觉的相关理论与实证研究进行了评述,得到如下结论：（1）道德直觉作为社会直觉的一种,它既有一般社会直觉的一些共性特点,又有其特殊性。从目前道德的神经认知研究结果来看,与一般社会直觉的神经机制相比,道德直觉过程还涉及到眶额皮层、颞顶联合区以及前额叶的更多脑区。相关研究表明这些脑区涉及到情绪刺激的再评价、以及对行为动机、意图、心理理论等认知成分的联合处理。（2）对于道德直觉的起源与形成问题,尽管道德直觉表现出跨文化的普遍性,但是目前还没有充分的证据支持道德直觉的先天论;同时,本研究认为基于“进化-文化-个人”的具身隐喻过程可能是道德直觉形成的重要机制。（3）目前道德判断研究的有关理论与实证研究仍然难以回答道德直觉加工的情理之争问题,但有几点发现值得注意：一是从加工的水平差异角度来看,道德直觉可能存在不同的亚类形式,且不同类型的道德直觉可能有着不同的学习获得机制与加工机制;二是道德直觉判断不完全是情绪直接作用的结果,而与道德情境中的情绪认知以及情绪背后的道德规则（信念）之间有着重要联系。     

The role of dissimulation and social desirability in the measurement of moral reasoning

A series of studies investigating the psychometric and conceptual properties of the Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA), a paper-and-pencil measure of moral reasoning, is reported. The results of these studies indicate that the scale is clearly susceptible to the influence of response dissimulation in the form of both role-playing and impression management, and is also confounded with sources of stylistic variance in the form of social desirability. Previous proposals concerning the relationships among moral development, moral reasoning, and personality structure are reviewed in light of these findings, and an alternative conceptualization of the measure in terms of political and social attitudes is offered.     

Reasons or rationalizations: The role of principles in the moral dumbfounding paradigm

Moral dumbfounding occurs when people maintain a moral judgment even though they cannot provide reasons for it. Recently, questions have been raised about whether dumbfounding is a real phenomenon. Two reasons have been proposed as guiding the judgments of dumbfounded participants: harm-based reasons (believing an action may cause harm) or norm-based reasons (breaking a moral norm is inherently wrong). Participants in that research (see Royzman, Kim, & Leeman, 2015), who endorsed either reason were excluded from analysis, and instances of moral dumbfounding seemingly reduced to non-significance. We argue that endorsing a reason is not sufficient evidence that a judgment is grounded in that reason. Stronger evidence should additionally account for (a) articulating a given reason and (b) consistently applying the reason in different situations. Building on this, we develop revised exclusion criteria across three studies. Study 1 included an open-ended response option immediately after the presentation of a moral scenario. Responses were coded for mention of harm-based or norm-based reasons. Participants were excluded from analysis if they both articulated and endorsed a given reason. Using these revised criteria for exclusion, we found evidence for dumbfounding, as measured by the selecting of an admission of not having reasons. Studies 2 and 3 included a further three questions relating to harm-based reasons specifically, assessing the consistency with which people apply harm-based reasons across differing contexts. As predicted, few participants consistently applied, articulated, and endorsed harm-based reasons, and evidence for dumbfounding was found.     

Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment

In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person’s life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent’s intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively “direct” or “personal”. Here we integrate these two classes of findings. Two experiments examine a novel personalness/directness factor that we call personal force, present when the force that directly impacts the victim is generated by the agent’s muscles (e.g., in pushing). Experiments 1a and b demonstrate the influence of personal force on moral judgment, distinguishing it from physical contact and spatial proximity. Experiments 2a and b demonstrate an interaction between personal force and intention, whereby the effect of personal force depends entirely on intention. These studies also introduce a method for controlling for people’s real-world expectations in decisions involving potentially unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas.     

Describing and testing a moderator of the moral judgment and action relationship

The relationship between moral judgment development and action for Ss who differ in the degree to which justice-based moral judgments influence moral decision making was investigated. First, a method for quantifying Ss' use of justice-based moral judgments in moral decision making (the utilizer variable) is described. Second, 5 moral judgment and action studies are reanalyzed to assess the moderating effect of the utilizer variable information. Results indicate that the relationship between moral judgment scores and action intensifies as utilization increases. Moreover, the utilizer effect appears uniform across different age and educational levels and behavioral domains. These findings support the validity of the utilizer variable and are consistent with recent multiprocess models of moral action that suggest that moral judgements are a necessary, but insufficient, factor in the production of moral action.     

Moral judgement in adolescents: Age differences in applying and justifying three principles of harm

This study investigated the application and justification of three principles of harm in a cross-sectional sample of adolescents in order to test recent theories concerning the source of intuitive moral judgements. Participants were 46 early (M _age = 14.8 years) and 40 late adolescents (M _age = 17.8 years). Participants rated the permissibility of various ethical dilemmas, and provided justifications for their judgements. Results indicated participants aligned their judgements with the three principles of harm, but had difficulty explaining their reasoning. Furthermore, although age groups were consistent in the application of the principles of harm, age differences emerged in their justifications. These differences were partly explained by differences in language ability. Additionally, participants who used emotional language in their justifications demonstrated a characteristically deontological pattern of moral judgement on certain dilemmas. We conclude adolescents in this age range apply the principles of harm but that the ability to explain their judgements is still developing.     

The effects of moral judgment and moral identity on moral behavior: an empirical examination of the moral individual

Recognizing limitations in classic cognitive moral development theory, several scholars have drawn from theories of identity to suggest that moral behavior results from both moral judgments and moral identity. The authors conducted 2 survey-based studies with more than 500 students and managers to test this argument. Results demonstrated that moral identity and moral judgments both independently influenced moral behavior. In addition, in situations in which social consensus regarding the moral behavior was not high, moral judgments and moral identity interacted to shape moral behavior. This interaction effect indicated that those who viewed themselves as moral individuals pursued the most extreme alternatives (e.g., never cheating, regularly cheating)--a finding that affirms the motivational power of a moral identity. The authors conclude by considering the implications of this research for both theory and practice.     

Social influence on group moral decisions: the interactive effects of moral reasoning and sex role orientation

In this study, we examined the effects of moral reasoning level and sex role orientation on social influence in group decision making. We predicted that these two individual difference constructs would have an interactive effect such that people who are compatible or nonconflicted on the two dimensions would have more influence on a group task with moral implications than would people who are conflicted. All subjects individually completed a distributive decision task that required ranking terminally ill patients for access to a life-saving kidney machine. They then met in small groups and reached a group decision on the same task. The subjects' moral reasoning level and sex role orientation--assessed via the Rest Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979) and the Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem, 1974), respectively--were used to predict influence on the group decision. Influence was measured in three ways: similarity between individual and group ranks, self-rated influence, and selection of the most influential group member. The results of all three influence measures provided support for the interactive hypothesis. In the discussion we consider the implications of the data for individual difference models of moral reasoning, the need for further understanding of goal competition and personality conflict, and the importance of considering the impact of moral factors on group decision-making proceses.     

道德相对主义和厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响

社会直觉模型认为有意识的道德推理过程发生在道德直觉判断之后。那么, 道德直觉判断又是怎么形成的, 是否受认知推理和情绪的影响?实验1首先验证道德直觉判断的存在; 实验2考察了道德相对主义对道德直觉判断的影响; 实验3考察了厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响。结果发现: (1)道德绝对主义比道德相对主义条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受认知推理影响。(2)厌恶情绪比中立情绪启动条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受情绪影响。因此, 道德直觉判断会受认知推理和情绪的影响。     

Deliberation versus intuition: Global versus local processing in judgment and choice

Decisions and judgments made after deliberation can differ from expert opinion and be more regretted over time than intuitive judgments and decisions. We investigated a possible underlying process of this phenomenon, namely global versus local processing style. We argue that deliberation induces a local processing style. This processing style narrows conceptual attention and can have detrimental effects on judgment and decision-making. Study 1 showed that intuitive judgments of quality of modern paintings were more accurate than were more deliberate, reasoned judgments. Study 2 showed that local versus global processing style is associated with accuracy of quality judgments of paintings, and Study 3 replicated this finding with an experimental manipulation of processing style. Finally, Study 4 showed that the effect of intuitive versus deliberative decision mode on quality judgments of poems is mediated by processing style.     

The moral reasoning of juvenile delinquents: A meta-analysis

To test the hypothesized immaturity of juvenile delinquents' moral reasoning, the results of 15 studies of the moral reasoning of juvenile delinquents were integrated quantitatively using meta-analysis. Hedges and Olkin (1985) methods were used to (a) compute effect sizes, (b) test the homogeneity of the obtained effect sizes, and (c) test the statistical significance of the pooled mean effect size. The results supported the hypothesis that the moral reasoning of juvenile delinquents is immature. It was concluded that several other issues are in need of investigation.     

Young Humeans: the role of emotions in children's evaluation of moral reasoning abilities

Three experiments investigated whether children in grades K, 2, and 4 (n = 144) view emotional comprehension as important in solving moral dilemmas. The experiments asked whether a human or an artificially intelligent machine would be best at solving different types of problems, ranging from moral and emotional to nonmoral and pragmatic. In Experiment 1, children in all age groups indicated that a human would be superior to a computer not only at comprehending emotions, but also at solving moral dilemmas. In Experiment 2, older children also indicated that a human could solve moral dilemmas better than a 'robot' with human-like perceptual and physical abilities. Experiment 3 further demonstrated that these effects were not solely due to a bias towards humans. Thus, children as young as age 5 view emotional understanding as an important element for moral, but not for nonmoral, reasoning, suggesting that the basis for Humean intuitions emerges early in life.