尊重医学的自身规律,尊重人民的选择

本刊今年第四期,集中发表了一组关于在当今形势下如何看待中医的文章,就中医的方方面面做了讨论,其中包括张功耀教授的"告别中医中药"一文,以期引起中医界和整个社会对中医的关切.     

从废医历史看中医的昨天、今天和明天

是针对张功耀《告别中医中药》一文的序言部分所作的辩驳性文章。是以中国文化的历史演变为背景,对照观察中医学的发展历程,从过去、现在和未来三个方面进行了探讨,从而分析“废除中医”的思想对中医不同发展阶段的影响。     

不可告别中医药

中南大学张功耀教授的一篇《告别中医中药》,其内容着实不能令吾等信服,故借此文以抒拙见,以飨同道. 在20世纪20年代,以余云岫、胡适、鲁迅、梁启超为首的历史人物掀起了一股"废医热潮",但中医前进的脚步并未停止,而是相继涌现了范文虎、陆仲安等名医.     

尊重医学的自身规律，尊重人民的选择

本刊今年第四期,集中发表了一组关于在当今形势下如何看待中医的文章,就中医的方方面面做了讨论,其中包括张功耀教授的“告别中医中药”一文,以期引起中医界和整个社会对中医的关切。和我们预料的一样,这组关于中医的文章,特别是“告别中医药”一文,引发一场热烈而广泛的争论,中医又一次面临是不是科学的,其前途和命运如何的考问。     

从废医历史看中医的昨天、今天和明天

是针对张功耀<告别中医中药>一文的序言部分所作的辩驳性文章.是以中国文化的历史演变为背景,对照观察中医学的发展历程,从过去、现在和未来三个方面进行了探讨,从而分析"废除中医"的思想对中医不同发展阶段的影响.     

不可告别中医药

中南大学张功耀教授的一篇《告别中医中药》,其内容着实不能令吾等信服,故借此文以抒拙见,以飨同道。在20世纪20年代,以余云岫、胡适、鲁迅、梁启超为首的历史人物掀起了一股“废医热潮”,但中医前进的脚步并未停止,而是相继涌现了范文虎、陆仲安等名医。1920年,主张废医的胡适     

驳《告别中医中药》

张功耀《告别中医中药》,在《医学与哲学》2006年第4期刊出前后,许多网站以“废除中医中药”为主题词,大肆传播,已是满城风雨。     

不能告别中医中药

<医学与哲学·人文社会医学版>2006年4期,刊载了张功耀<告别中医中药>一文(以下简称<告别>),作者以文化进步、尊重科学、维护生物多样性及人道主义的名义,提出告别中医药的主张.虽然名义很庄严,旗帜很鲜明,但却表现出以偏概全、以旧概新、全面否定的错误,严重违背科学精神.     

告别中医中药

从文化进步的角度看,中医中药没有寻求到自我进步的道路,约束了人们对病理和生理的理解;从尊重科学的角度看,中医中药既缺乏经验基础又缺乏逻辑基础;从维护生物多样性的角度看,中医中药在倡导不科学施治的同时,破坏了生物的多样性;从人道主义的角度看,中医中药蕴含着装腔作势的医理解释,推行毒物、异物、污物入药.因此,我们有充分的理由告别中医中药.     

面对"告别中医药"

1 历史问题只能历史的分析 张功耀在《告别中医中药》一文中说:"古代的医起源于巫,我国今天流行的中医依然保留着巫的痕迹.人类文化多次长足的进步,居然没有触动中国传统医学的任何方面."[1]需要澄清的是:对于历史久远的医学起源问题,现在仍然很难下一个简单的结论,但"医源于巫"却是个其来有自的荒谬观点,它从时间顺序上颠倒了原始社会早期的医疗经验积累与巫医兴起这两个阶段.     

“语义P600”的实质及其影响机制

总结并分析了影响语义 P600 效应产生与否的五个主要因素及其作用机制：关键词和论元之间的语义关联性;语义-主题关系的潜在可修正性;有生性违例;语境;实验任务。在此基础上,概述了由语义 P600 效应发展而来、或验证了的两个主要理论观点,即“两种并行神经加工流”的观点和扩展论元依附模型。最后还对语义 P600 效应今后的研究方向提出了看法：各种影响因素间的综合性研究;跨语言研究;工作记忆的影响;表面相似 ERP 成分之间的区别研究。     

Translating Toulmin Diagrams: Theory Neutrality in Argument Representation

The Toulmin diagram layout is very familiar and widely used, particularly in the teaching of critical thinking skills. The conventional box-and-arrow diagram is equally familiar and widespread. Translation between the two throws up a number of interesting challenges. Some of these challenges (such as the relationship between Toulmin warrants and their counterparts in traditional diagrams) represent slightly different ways of looking at old and deep theoretical questions. Others (such as how to allow Toulmin diagrams to be recursive) are diagrammatic versions of questions that have already been addressed in artificial intelligence models of argument. But there are further questions (such as the relationships between refutations, rebuttals and undercutters, and the roles of multiple warrants) that are posed as a specific result of examining the diagram inter-translation problem. These three classes of problems are discussed. To the first class are addressed solutions based on engineering pragmatism; to the second class, are addressed solutions drawn from the appropriate literature; and to the third class, fuller exploration is offered justifying the approaches taken in developing solutions that offer both pragmatic utility and theoretical interest. Finally, these solutions are explored briefly in the context of the Araucaria system, showing the ways in which analysts can tackle arguments either using one diagrammatic style or another, or even a combination of the two.     

Reconstructing and Evaluating Genetic Arguments in Judicial Decisions

Although the genetic argument is a widely used interpretative argument, what it amounts to does not seem to be altogether clear. Basic forms of the genetic argument that are distinguished are often too rough to provide an adequate basis for the evaluation of an interpretative decision. In this article I attempt to provide a more detailed analysis of the genetic argument by making use of pragma-dialectical insights. The analysis clarifies the character and the structure of different forms of the genetic argument and thus the elements that are relevant for the evaluation of the argument.* * An earlier version of this paper was presented at 21st IVR World Congress (Lund, 2003).     

On Argumentation Schemes and the Natural Classification of Arguments

We develop conceptions of arguments and of argument types that will, by serving as the basis for developing a natural classification of arguments, benefit work in artificial intelligence. Focusing only on arguments construed as the semantic entities that are the outcome of processes of reasoning, we outline and clarify our view that an argument is a proposition that represents a fact as both conveying some other fact and as doing so wholly. Further, we outline our view that, with respect to arguments that are propositions, (roughly) two arguments are of the same type if and only if they represent the same relation of conveyance and do so in the same way. We then argue for our conceptions of arguments and argument types, and compare them to alternative positions. We also illustrate the need for, and some of the strengths of, our approach to classifying arguments through an examination of aspects of two prominent and recent attempts to classify arguments using argumentation schemes, namely those of M. Kienpointner and D. Walton. Finally, we clarify how our conception of arguments and of argument types can assist in developing an exhaustive classification of arguments.     

Should inter-collegiate football be eliminated? Assessing the arguments philosophically

Recently, there have been discussions about whether or not inter-collegiate football should be eliminated in the US. This article philosophically assesses the arguments for its elimination as well as the arguments proffered against its elimination. While a variety of arguments are discussed, a new one is brought into the foray of philosophical investigation, one that combines the unfairness and economic arguments: the health care and medical costs to others argument. It is believed that this argument is sufficient to justify the elimination of inter-collegiate football.     

Completing the square of opposition

In this paper a set of categorical sentences called an antilogistic tetrad is presented as a perspective on Aristotle's square of opposition. An antilogistic tetrad is formed by collecting the premises of a pair of valid syllogisms the conclusions of which are contradictory categorical sentences. A set of such premises serves to bring together Aristotle's concern with debate and the syllogism, and as such may be seen as a way of completing Aristotle's analysis of the square of opposition.The debate context is characterized by opposing views for which arguments are offered. The square of opposition captures that contending of opposing views; and is also basic to the presentation of categorical sentences, a necessary condition for the syllogism. By using C. S. Peirce's notion of abductive argument to produce the middle term, and hence to construct deductive syllogistic arguments, antilogistic tetrads may be formed on any contended subject. For that reason, the process sketched above for forming antilogistic tetrads is called completing the square of opposition.     

A semantics-based approach to the "no negative evidence" problem

Previous studies have shown that children retreat from argument-structure overgeneralization errors (e.g., * Don't giggle me ) by inferring that frequently encountered verbs are unlikely to be grammatical in unattested constructions, and by making use of syntax-semantics correspondences (e.g., verbs denoting internally caused actions such as giggling cannot normally be used causatively). The present study tested a new account based on a unitary learning mechanism that combines both of these processes. Seventy-two participants (ages 5–6, 9–10, and adults) rated overgeneralization errors with higher (* The funny man's joke giggled Bart ) and lower (* The funny man giggled Bart ) degrees of direct external causation. The errors with more-direct causation were rated as less unacceptable than those with less-direct causation. This finding is consistent with the new account, under which children acquire—in an incremental and probabilistic fashion—the meaning of particular constructions (e.g., transitive causative = direct external causation) and particular verbs, rejecting generalizations where the incompatibility between the two is too great.     

Japanese preschoolers’ evaluation of circular and non-circular arguments

Observational and experimental data have revealed that preschoolers possess some argumentation skills, both in the production and the evaluation of arguments. However, these skills might have been fostered by the particular cultural context of Western middle- and upper-classes families, to which most children studied belong. Some data suggests that children in other cultures possess at least some of these skills, but no experimental data had been gathered in Eastern cultures. These cultures are supposed to frown on argumentation, and might thus be less conducive to the early development of argumentation skills. We test the emergence of argument evaluation skills in Japanese 5-year-olds by presenting them with a choice between endorsing a strong, perceptual argument, and a weak, circular argument. A first experiment revealed a trend in the direction of the strong argument. A second experiment that addresses some methodological concerns of the first demonstrates a significant tendency to follow the strong argument. These results are similar to those previously gathered in two other cultures (Swiss and Maya), and suggest that some basic argumentation skills are early developing across cultures.     

Critique of an epistemic account of fallacies

An epistemic account of fallacies is one which takes it as a necessary condition for a fallacy that it has a tendency to produce false or unwarranted beliefs. The most sophisticated form of this account occurs in an article by Robert J. Fogelin and Timothy J. Duggan (Fallacies,Argumentation 1, 1987, pp. 255–262). I criticize the Fogelin and Duggan proposal, in particular, and epistemic accounts, more generally. Though an epistemic approach is attractive, it enlarges the class of fallacies, beyond what would be permitted by traditional accounts. I also question thenecessity of fallacies leading to unwarranted beliefs. Some fallacies are fallacious due to their expected harm to argument practices. This position touches on a theme in the work of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, though I criticize their notion of rules of argument as too broad.     

Argument as a formulation-decision-decision... sequence

Problems with regard to the analysis of argumentative partly discourse arise from definitorial disconformity. In this article, Informal argument is taken as the primary definition to study the basic structure of argument from a fragment of an Agatha Christie novel. Bilmes' account of the notions of Formulation (F) and Decision (D+/D-) are adapted to describe the relations of opposition which are displayed in informal argument. The minimal structure of argument is represented by the formula F/D-/D-, in which F is a speaker's personal composition of a fact, the first D- is the disconfirming uptake of it by another speaker and the second D- is the completing disconfirming uptake by the initial speaker. Some of the speaker's possibilities to initiate an argument by expressing a Formulation are explored, as well as the social and cultural norms which play a role in argument-initiation and the concepts of win and loss.