6—10岁儿童对几种常见的自然现象和对象的认识的实验研究

一、问题理解自然现象和形成自然科学概念是思维发展的重要方面,是掌握自然科学基本知识的重要环节,也是儿童逐步形成科学世界观的非常重要的因素。关于这方面的研究,国外已有一些,特别是皮亚杰在其早期工作中,曾对儿童在不同发展阶段理解自然现象和对象的水平、特点进行过探究,并在其《儿童的世界概念》和《儿童的物理因果概念》两书中作了较详细的阐述。而我国在这方面的研究则较少。1980年,中国科学院心理研究所提出了探讨儿童对自然现象认识的发展的问题,并拟定了实验研究方案(草案)。本研究即     

试谈辩证思维规律的特殊表现

辩证逻辑是关于思维方面的科学,它主要研究辩证思维及其规律。那么什么是辩证思维规律?辩证思维规律同一般辩证法规律有何不同?笔者想谈谈一点看法,以就教于诸位专家,诸位同志。     

谈谈心理学的任务

任何科学都有它自己的任务。任何科学的任务就其共同性来说都是研究事物的规律性。但世界上的事物是各种各样的,不同的科学研究不同事物的规律。心理学是研究人的心理活动规律的科学。这是一种通俗的讲法。用另一种说法,心理学是研究人自己的一种科学。人为什么是万物之灵、是世界上最可宝贵的东西呢?主要是因为人有发展到最高水平的心理活动。感觉、知觉、意志、性感等在其他动物也是有的。在人的心理中有哪些东西为人所特有从而使人成其为人呢?首要的一点是人有思想,尤其是思维,因而能有意识。人如果没有思想,就不会有意识。再一点是人有言语,会讲话,人与人之间可以通过言语交换意见,     

论中医认识方法的发展

“从科学哲学的角度看 ,构成科学的并非是事实本身 ,而是整理事实的方法。”[1] 可以说 ,作为认识主体和客体之间相互作用的重要中介之一 ,中医认识方法对中医的发展有着举足轻重的作用。而中医的认识方法 ,又是不断发展变化的 ,也只有当方法有了新的发展 ,中医的发展才能取得质的飞跃。但中医认识方法的发展是随机的还是有规律可循的呢 ?人们是被动和偶然地被方法选择 ,还是可以主动地选择方法 ?主动选择的依据何在 ?寻找中医认识方法发展的规律和主动选择方法的依据 ,对于中医的发展无疑有着重大的意义。由于认识方法是主体把握客体的主观…     

医理决定论还是语言决定论

人生活在一个语言的世界中 ,而语言的力量是神奇的 ,我们不仅用语言来表达我们的思想和知识 ,更为重要的是通过语言来学习和掌握我们未知的东西 ,可以说人对外在物质世界的感知和认识无不反映在语言世界中。所以伽达默尔认为 ,可以被领悟的存在就是语言。以中医为例 ,我们要学中医就首先要学习《内经》 ,而学习《内经》首先要解决的是对《内经》表述的理论的理解 ,即对语言的理解。于是 ,问题出来了。众所周知 :一部《内经》 ,注者如云 ,歧解叠出。原因何在 ?理解不同。为何理解不同 ?语言本身具有不同理解的可能性。我们且看这样一个例子 :…     

谁来告诉我?(续完)——有神论与无神论的对话

宗教信仰如此糟糕,怎么还会有这么多信徒? 一种信仰的流行跟它是否正确,或是否有效,没有关系。想想看,星相学、算命、伪科学……同样非常流行。传染病也很容易流行。信神只是人性的弱点。在许多原始部落,宗教信仰使其成员能够解释他们无法明白的自然现象。即使是在文明社会,科学已能够解释许多自然现象了(比如用     

论信仰中的理性、非理性及其相互转化

论信仰中的理性、非理性及其相互转化上海财经大学陈新汉信仰是人类特有的一种精神活动。流行的观点往往把信仰理解为人们把握世界的非理性形式。其实,信仰的结构中既有非理性因素也有理性因素。两者在信仰中的不同地位,构成了宗教信仰和科学信仰的分野;两者的相互转化...     

中医是科学吗?

中医是否科学的争论由来已久,科学观不同,答案各异.肯定者认为它是东方传统科学,否定者则视之为传统文化、实用技术或巫术.正确认识这一问题具有科学、文化与产业三方面的意义.应以求实的态度、历史的观点和系统的方法探讨之,其结果不仅有利于中医的发展,也有助于对科学本质的理解.     

“世界是物质的”提法不科学吗?——与李胜光、朱恩池同志商榷

李胜光、朱恩池二同志在《“世界是物质的”还是“世界统一于物质”?》(见《国内哲学动态》1983年第2期)一文中认为:“世界是物质的”提法是不科学的,它违背了辩证唯物主义的“世界统一于物质”的基本原理。我认为,不是“世界是物质的”提法本身不科学,而是李、朱二同志在理解“世界是物质的”科学命题时,违背了矛盾同一律,把“世界是物质的”这个命题的两层含义各所指的不同使用对象混淆了。“世界是物质的”这个科学命题,说的是世界是物质的世界而不是精神的世界。物质是一切事物和现象的总根源。具体说它有两个不同层次的含义:一是世界的唯一本原是物质,二是世界的共同本质是物质。由于这两个不同层次的含义,才决定了人们能把整个世界分为物质和精神两大现象。也就是物质现象和精神现象就是分别在这两个不同层次上的不同表现。     

浅议中西绘画中的色彩艺术

"色彩"这个词对我们来说并不陌生,在生活中常常出现诸如五光十色.五彩缤纷等用来形容色彩的词语.那么,如何理解"色彩"呢?首先,色彩的产生是一种自然现象,由于物体受到光线的照射而形成色彩,又因为物体的形状,体积、质量的不同,吸收的光线和反射的光线也不同,便形成了自然界美丽的色彩.     

科学是中医的“紧箍咒”吗？——中医与科学相关问题的思考

中医的科学属性近年来备受争论,从辩证哲学、科学观念、中医的人文哲学特色等角度剖析中医的哲学内涵和科学隶属,澄清观念,得出结论,中医本身就是一门人文与科学交融的古代科学,传统文化与现代科技的互融互动,合而不同,新世纪发展中医的认识观需要与时俱进。     

中医学能得到学理上的合法性辩护吗？——重估中国传统医学的科学价值

医学并不简单地就是自然科学。医学的方法是综合的,利用其他任何科学的成就。中医是经验医学,而且主要是临床医学。在广义的科学概念下,可以说中医是科学。中医基本理论没有根本改变其自然哲学形态,评价中医药学应主要着眼于其实践活动,也不可忽视中医药学理论与实践的复杂关系。关注中医药学可以启发我们,知识的发展可能以多元、曲折的方式进行,重估中医药学价值既可以对医疗实践也可以对科学发展做出某种贡献。     

Two Key Differences between Science and Philosophy

C. S. Peirce made the following claim: If science reveals truth, then consensus among scientists can be expected in the limit. This article does not dispute this claim; it simply assumes it. On the basis of this assumption, the following question is asked: Is it possible to extend Peirce's claim to philosophy in a natural way? It is argued that two important differences between science and philosophy strongly militate against such an extension. Does this mean that there is no truth to be found in philosophy? Are there, perhaps, different kinds of truth (scientific, philosophical, religious, and so on)? But such questions, though related to the present investigation, are nevertheless well beyond the scope of this article.     

Basic and applied research in developing countries: The search for an evaluation strategy

Although activities in basic and applied research in developing countries (DCs) are guided by universal scientific principles, there are important differences in the way in which science is practiced from that of the industrialized world. Isolation from the mainstream of scientific activity, the need for the development of an indigenous scientific capacity, the lack of a critical mass of researchers with respect to most fields of knowledge, and the urgency of developing better and more efficient communication channels, are some of the aspects that set apart the scientific activity of the developing world. In particular, the need to develop local "new" science aimed at solving pressing problems of a local nature suggests the existence of a different set of conditions from those found in scientifically-advanced countries. In the present article we look at the ways the special circumstances of science in DCs will affect the application of evaluation criteria, using bibliometric data on research in Mexico as an example.     

Wofür sprechen die Daten?

What Do the Data Tell Us? Justification of scientific theories is a three-place relation between data, theories, and background knowledge. Though this should be a commonplace, many methodologies in science neglect it. The article will elucidate the significance and function of our background knowledge in epistemic justification and their consequences for different scientific methodologies. It is argued that there is no simple and at the same time acceptable statistical algorithm that justifies a given theory merely on the basis of certain data. And even if we think to know the probability of a theory, that does not decide whether we should accept it or not.     

建立符合中医特色的科研体系

比较了中西医产生的社会背景,论述了中医理论的体系具有整体性、重功能、动态性的特点,因而中医科研不能完全套用还原论的方法,必须建立符合中医特色的科研体系,同时还提出中医科研体系具有多维化、信息化、系统化的特点。     

On the Historicity of Scientific Objects

The historical variation of scientific knowledge has lent itself to the development of historical epistemology, which attempts to historicize the origin and establishment of knowledge claims. The questions I address in this paper revolve around the historicity of the objects of those claims: How and why do new scientific objects appear? What exactly comes into being in such cases? Do scientific objects evolve over time and in what ways? I put forward and defend two theses: First, the ontology of science is so rich and variegated that there are no universally valid answers to these questions. Second, we need a pluralist account of scientific objects, a pluralist metaphysics that can do justice to their rich diversity and their various modes of being and becoming. I then focus on hidden objects, which are supposed to be part of the permanent furniture of the universe, and I discuss their birth and historicity: They emerge when various phenomena coalesce as manifestations of a single hidden cause and their representations change over time. Finally, I examine the conditions under which an evolving representation may still refer to the same object and I illustrate my argument drawing upon the early history of electrons.     

The morality of scientific openness

The ideal of scientific openness — i.e. the idea that scientific information should be freely accessible to interested parties — is strongly supported throughout the scientific community. At the same time, however, this ideal does not appear to be absolute in the everyday practice of science. In order to get the credit for new scientific advances, scientists often keep information to themselves. Also, it is common practice to withhold information obtained in commissioned research when the scientist has agreed with his or her employer to do so. The secrecy may be intended for ever, as in the military area, but also temporarily until a patent application has been made. The paper explores to what extent such secrecy is undesirable, as seems to be suggested by the ideal of scientific openness. Should this ideal be interpreted as having certain exceptions which make the above-mentioned practices acceptable? Are there, on closer inspection, good arguments for the ideal of scientific openness, and for officially upholding it? Possible versions of the ideal of scientific openness are explored and the issue is found to be rather complex, allowing for wide variations depending on the acting parties, beneficiaries, types of information and moral requirements involved. We conclude that the arguments usually given in favour of this ideal are weaker than what seems to be generally believed, and that, on closer inspection, they leave plenty of room for exceptions to it. These exceptions only partly cover the actual practice of withholding scientific information, and there may still be good reason to advocate, teach and enforce the ideal of scientific openness within the scientific community.     

WHY I AM AN ACCOMMODATIONIST AND PROUD OF IT

There is a strong need of a reasoned defense of what was known as the “independence” position of the science–religion relationship but that more recently has been denigrated as the “accommodationist” position, namely that while there are parts of religion—fundamentalist Christianity in particular—that clash with modern science, the essential parts of religion (Christianity) do not and could not clash with science. A case for this position is made on the grounds of the essentially metaphorical nature of science. Modern science functions because of its root metaphor of the machine: the world is seen in mechanical terms. As Thomas Kuhn insisted, metaphors function in part by ruling some questions outside their domain. In the case of modern science, four questions go unasked and hence unanswered: Why is there something rather than nothing? What is the foundation of morality? What is mind and its relationship to matter? What is the meaning of it all? You can remain a nonreligious skeptic on these questions, but it is open for the Christian to offer his or her answers, so long as they are not scientific answers. Here then is a way that science and religion can coexist.