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1.
Markus Schmitz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2001,32(2):271-305
The epistomology of the definition of number and the philosophical foundation of arithmetic based on a comparison between
Gottlob Frege's logicism and Platonic philosophy (Syrianus, Theo Smyrnaeus, and others). The intention of this article is to provide arithmetic with a logically and methodologically valid definition of number for
construing a consistent philosophical foundation of arithmetic. The – surely astonishing – main thesis is that instead of
the modern and contemporary attempts, especially in Gottlob Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic, such a definition is found in the arithmetic in Euclid's Elements. To draw this conclusion a profound reflection on the role of epistemology for the foundation of mathematics, especially
for the method of definition of number, is indispensable; a reflection not to be found in the contemporary debate (the predominate
‘pragmaticformalism’ in current mathematics just shirks from trying to solve the epistemological problems raised by the debate
between logicism, intuitionism, and formalism). Frege's definition of number, ‘The number of the concept F is the extension
of the concept ‘numerically equal to the concept F”, which is still substantial for contemporary mathematics, does not fulfil
the requirements of logical and methodological correctness because the definiens in a double way (in the concepts ‘extension
of a concept’ and ‘numerically equal’) implicitly presupposes the definiendum, i.e. number itself. Number itself, on the contrary,
is defined adequately by Euclid as ‘multitude composed of units’, a definition which is even, though never mentioned, an implicit
presupposition of the modern concept ofset. But Frege rejects this definition and construes his own - for epistemological
reasons: Frege's definition exactly fits the needs of modern epistemology, namely that for to know something like the number
of a concept one must become conscious of a multitude of acts of producing units of ‘given’ representations under the condition
of a 1:1 relationship to obtain between the acts of counting and the counted ‘objects’. According to this view, which has
existed at least since the Renaissance stoicism and is maintained not only by Frege but also by Descartes, Kant, Husserl,
Dummett, and others, there is no such thing as a number of pure units itself because the intellect or pure reason, by itself
empty, must become conscious of different units of representation in order to know a multitude, a condition not fulfilled by Euclid's conception. As this is Frege's
main reason to reject Euclid's definition of number (others are discussed in detail), the paper shows that the epistemological
reflection in Neoplatonic mathematical philosophy, which agrees with Euclid's definition of number, provides a consistent
basement for it. Therefore it is not progress in the history of science which hasled to the a poretic contemporary state of
affairs but an arbitrary change of epistemology in early modern times, which is of great influence even today.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
2.
Elena Pulcini 《Science and engineering ethics》2010,16(3):447-461
The first thesis of this article is that the concept of responsibility takes on an unprecedented meaning in the twentieth
century resulting from the emergence of a new dimension of the other: to be responsible comes to mean not just to account for oneself in relation to the other, but also to take the other into
account, to take care of the other—what I call responsibility towards (the other). The main reason for this change consists in the emergence of global risks and the necessity, as underlined by Hans Jonas, to be responsible for the destiny of the world and future generations. The
problem, as explored in the article’s second thesis, is that this implies the existence of a subject who is capable of responsibility. Jonas’s insights on this point are insufficient, since he only recognizes duty as the fundament for his ethics of responsibility and thus neglects the problem of motivation. This is a particularly crucial problem today as we are witnessing the presence of a pathological subject, characterized by a split in his faculties (between doing and imagining, knowing and feeling). To underline this fact, this article makes use of Günther
Anders’s reflections, which provide a psycho-anthropological analysis of the subject, showing his pathologies and the necessity,
from a moral perspective, to overcome his scission. Finally, this author suggests, as the article’s third thesis, that this
overcoming is the necessary fundament for the perception of risk, which in turn reinstates the subject’s perception of his own vulnerability. Responsibility thus finds a motivation, which is neither altruistic nor duty-centred, in the awareness of our own vulnerability
and the bond with the destiny of humankind as a whole. 相似文献
3.
Michael Arribas-Ayllon Srikant Sarangi Angus Clarke 《Journal of genetic counseling》2009,18(2):173-184
Childhood genetic testing raises complex ethical and moral dilemmas for both families and professionals. In the family sphere,
the role of communication is a key aspect in the transmission of ‘genetic responsibility’ between adults and children. In
the professional sphere, genetic responsibility is an interactional accomplishment emerging from the sometimes competing views
over what constitutes the ‘best interests’ of the child in relation to parental preferences on the one hand, and professional
judgements on the other. In the present paper we extend our previous research into parental accounts of childhood genetic
testing and explore the ethical accounts of professionals in research interviews. Interviews (n = 20) were conducted with professional practitioners involved in the genetic diagnosis and management of children and their
families. We first identify four inter-related themes—juxtaposition of parental rights vis-à-vis child’s autonomy, elicitation
of the child’s autonomy, avoidance of parental responsibility and recognition of professional uncertainty. Then, using Rhetorical
Discourse Analysis, we examine the range of discourse devices through which ethical accounts are situationally illustrated:
contrast, reported speech, constructed dialogue, character and event work. An overarching device in these ethical accounts
is the use of extreme case scenarios, which reconstruct dilemmas as justifications of professional conduct. While acknowledging ambivalence, our analysis suggests
that professional judgement is not a simple matter of implementing ethical principles but rather of managing the practical
conditions and consequences of interactions with parents and children. We conclude that more attention is needed to understand
the way professional practitioners formulate judgements about ethical practice. 相似文献
4.
We argue that the practice of engineering does not exist outside the domain of societal interests. That is, the practice of
engineering has an inherent (and unavoidable) impact on society. Engineering is based upon that relationship with society
(inter alia).
An engineer’s conduct (as captured in professional codes of conduct) toward other engineers, toward employers, toward clients,
and toward the public is an essential part of the life of a professional engineer, yet the education process and professional
societies pay inadequate attention to the area. If one adopts Skooglund’s definition of professional ethicsI (how we agree to relate to one another), then the codes of professional conduct lay out a road map for professional relationships.
As professionals, engineers need to internalize their codes and to realize that they have a personal stake in the application
of codes as well as the process of developing the codes. Yet, most engineers view professional codes as static statements
developed by “others” with little (or no) input from the individual engineer. Complicating the problem, questions of professionalism
(such as ethics) are frequently viewed as topics outside the normal realm of engineering analysis and design. In reality,
professional responsibility is an integral part of the engineering process. 相似文献
5.
This article explores the role of personal responsibility in dysfunctional relations. The premise is that the stances one or both partners take with regard to their relationship responsibilities predict the success or failure of that relationship. The four parts of this article include a definition of responsibility, a delineation of four crucial areas of relationship responsibility, a listing of irrational beliefs that block responsibility, and an outline of irresponsibility treatment.Responsibility is a unique concept. It can only reside and inhere in a single individual. You may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished. You may delegate it, but it is still with you. You may disclaim it, but you cannot divest yourself of it. Admiral Hyman Rickover 相似文献
6.
This paper starts from the presupposition that moral codes often do not suffice to make agents understand their moral responsibility.
We will illustrate this statement with a concrete example of engineers who design a truck’s trailer and who do not think traffic
safety is part of their responsibility. This opinion clashes with a common supposition that designers in fact should do all
that is in their power to ensure safety in traffic. In our opinion this shows the need for a moral philosophy that helps engineers
to interpret their responsibility and think more critically about it. For this purpose we will explore the moral philosophy
of Alasdair MacIntyre, which is particularly interesting because he locates the beginning of moral thinking in the daily practice
of a profession. This is consistent with the history of moral codes, for codes are also the product of moral reflection by
professionals. We will use MacIntyre’s philosophy to (1) explain what is wrong with the designers’ understanding of their
responsibility and (2) show a possible way to bring their reflection to a more self-critical level. We will also inspect MacIntyre’s
proposal critically. 相似文献
7.
Perceived risk is a complex concept that influences the genetic counseling process and can affect client coping and behavior.
Although the association between family history and risk perception is well recognized in the literature, no studies have
explored this relationship specifically in those seeking genetic susceptibility testing for a common chronic condition. REVEAL
is a randomized trial assessing the impact of APOE disclosure and genetic risk assessment for Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Using
baseline REVEAL data, we hypothesized that there would be a significant association between the degree of AD family history
and risk perception of AD, and that this relationship would be stronger in those who believed that genetics is a very important
AD risk factor. In our sample of 293 participants, we found that a higher self-perceived risk of AD was associated with strength
of family history of AD (p < 0.001), belief in genetics as an important AD risk factor (p < 0.001), being female (p < 0.001) and being Caucasian (p = 0.02). These results are the first to demonstrate the association between family history and risk perception in persons
volunteering for genetic susceptibility testing for a common complex disease. 相似文献
8.
Holly Etchegary Fiona Miller Sonya deLaat Brenda Wilson June Carroll Mario Cappelli 《Journal of genetic counseling》2009,18(3):252-264
Since genetic information has implications for family members, some choices about genetic risk may be influenced by perceptions
of responsibility to relatives. Drawing upon 25 semi-structured interviews with test recipients in Canada, this study explored
decisions about inherited breast-ovarian and colon cancer. Qualitative data analysis revealed the pervasive significance of
genetic responsibility in test decisions. We highlight three dimensions of genetic responsibility: 1) to know about the self
for self; 2) to know about the self for others; 3) to know about the self to oblige others to know. It is argued that these
dimensions of genetic responsibility have implications for test decisions, family relationships and other family members’
desire to know (or not know) and to act (or not act) with respect to their own genetic risk. In particular, genetic responsibility
may play out as a framing of a relative’s moral obligation to know their risk that could obviate any interest they might have
in not knowing. We conclude that perceptions of responsibility to—and of−other family members be thoroughly explored in genetic
counseling sessions. 相似文献
9.
Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem reveals a conflict between the possible-world-based content-definition and the possible-world-based likeness-definition of verisimilitude. In Sect. 2 we show that the possible-world-based content-definition violates four basic intuitions of Popper’s consequence-based content-account to verisimilitude, and therefore cannot be said to be in the spirit of Popper’s account, although this is
the opinion of some prominent authors. In Sect. 3 we argue that in consequence-accounts, content-aspects and likeness-aspects of verisimilitude are not in conflict with each other, but in agreement. We explain this fact by pointing towards the deep difference between possible-world- and the consequence-accounts, which
does not lie in the difference between syntactic (object-language) versus semantic (meta-language) formulations, but in the
difference between ‘disjunction-of-possible-worlds’ versus ‘conjunction-of-parts’ representations of theories. Drawing on
earlier work, we explain in Sect. 4 how the shortcomings of Popper’s original definition can be repaired by what we call the
relevant element approach. We propose a quantitative likeness-definition of verisimilitude based on relevant elements which provably agrees
with the qualitative relevant content-definition of verisimilitude on all pairs of comparable theories. We conclude the paper
with a plea for consequence-accounts and a brief analysis of the problem of language-dependence (Sect. 6). 相似文献
10.
We investigate the notion of relevance as it pertains to ‘commonsense’, subjunctive conditionals. Relevance is taken here
as a relation between a property (such as having a broken wing) and a conditional (such as birds typically fly). Specifically,
we explore a notion of ‘causative’ relevance, distinct from ‘evidential’ relevance found, for example, in probabilistic approaches.
A series of postulates characterising a minimal, parsimonious concept of relevance is developed. Along the way we argue that
no purely logical account of relevance (even at the metalevel) is possible. Finally, and with minimal restrictions, an explicit
definition that agrees with the postulates is given.
This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
11.
Bruno Thomann 《Behavior research methods》2001,33(3):339-348
In a sequence from a videotaped dialogue between two persons (e.g., psychotherapist and patient), observers are given the task of searching for, marking, and commenting on conspicuous events. The observers receive no information on where to look for conspicuous events and no information on what events are worth marking. Moreover, nothing is known about the observers’ marking preferences. Marking is therefore very spontaneous and subjective. This marking freedom leads to the problem that a superimposition of all observers’ markings yields complicated configurations of mutually overlapping intervals. To address this difficulty, a new definition of the concept of marking agreement is proposed that is based upon relational considerations. According to this definition, a set ofagreeing marking subsets of various sizes can be found in marking configurations. A significance concept is proposed to allow comparison of different configurations, and standardization on the basis of random configurations is performed using Monte Carlo simulations. 相似文献
12.
Galen Joseph Mary S. Beattie Robin Lee Dejana Braithwaite Carolina Wilcox Maya Metrikin Kate Lamvik Judith Luce 《Journal of genetic counseling》2010,19(5):447-462
The Cancer Risk Education Intervention Tool (CREdIT) is a computer-based (non-interactive) slide presentation designed to educate low-literacy, and ethnically and racially diverse
public hospital patients at risk of Hereditary Breast and Ovarian Cancer (HBOC) about genetics. To qualitatively evaluate
participants’ experience with and perceptions of a genetic education program as an adjunct to genetic counseling, we conducted
direct observations of the intervention, semi-structured in person interviews with 11 women who viewed CREdIT, and post-counseling
questionnaires with the two participating genetic counselors. Five themes emerged from the analysis of interviews: (1) genetic
counseling and testing for breast/ovarian cancer was a new concept; (2) CREdIT’s story format was particularly appealing;
(3) changes in participants’ perceived risk for breast cancer varied; (4) some misunderstandings about individual risk and
heredity persisted after CREdIT and counseling; (5) the context for viewing CREdIT shaped responses to the presentation. Observations
demonstrated ways to make the information provided in CREdIT and by genetic counselors more consistent. In a post-session
counselor questionnaire, counselors’ rating of the patient’s preparedness before the session was significantly higher for
patients who viewed CREdIT prior to their appointments than for other patients. This novel educational tool fills a gap in
HBOC education by tailoring information to women of lower literacy and diverse ethnic/racial backgrounds. The tool was well
received by interview participants and counselors alike. Further study is needed to examine the varied effects of CREdIT on
risk perception. In addition, the implementation of CREdIT in diverse clinical settings and the cultural adaptation of CREdIT
to specific populations reflect important areas for future work. 相似文献
13.
This essay will build on Emmanuel Levinas’s rejection of ontology as foundational and draw out the implications for psychotherapy.
We will explore Levinas’s concept of substitution (in both his more Jewish writings and his philosophical treatises) and consider
its meaning in relationship to the role of a psychotherapist. Levinas understands the Other as a calling for substitution
of the self and of a taking on of responsibility. We explore the notion of surrender in the work of the psychoanalyst Emmanuel
Ghent and argue that his position is ultimately lacking in ethical injunction; requiring nothing of the self in relationship
to the Other. It remains within the confines of the conventional, self-reflexive models that Levinas critiques. Following
Levinas, we suggest that the therapist bear the burden of ethical responsibility by being exposed to the client’s ethical
call and by responding out of a kenotic self-emptying.
相似文献
Alvin DueckEmail: |
14.
In this essay I critique a particular reading of Bergson that places an excessive weight on the concept of the ‘virtual’. Driven by the popularity of Deleuze’s use of the virtual, this image of Bergson (seen especially through his text of 1896,
Matter and Memory, where the idea is introduced) generates an imbalance that fails to recognise the importance of concepts of actuality, like space or psychology, in his other works. In fact, I argue that the virtual is not the key concept for Bergsonism and
that there is a good deal of evidence in Bergson’s other writings, especially those connected with his actualist notion of
‘refraction’, to think of him as a perspectivist philosopher. Moreover, it will be seen that Virtualism resides within an economy of
reflection that is subsumed within the broader paradigm of Actualist refraction. Taking these optical metaphors seriously, the virtual
becomes a perspectival image seen from an actual position, or rather, an interacting set of actual positions. This interaction
is termed ‘virtualization’, denoting the substitution of a substantive conception with a processual one. In the first two parts of the essay, I direct
my remarks more towards Deleuzian readings of the actual rather than Deleuze himself (Deleuze is so open about the biases
he brings to his reading of Bergson as to be beyond criticism). In the second two sections, I pursue a philosophical argument
for the probity of a non-Virtualist position as such within philosophy, based upon the concept of refraction. This is done
not only because it is important that we remain open to other readings of Bergson that are not so heavily mediated in one
direction, but also in view of the power of refraction as a new concept for reconciling actual modes such as molar identity,
the present, and extension, with their virtual opposites. 相似文献
15.
Sandra Lapointe 《Synthese》2010,174(2):263-281
This paper is aimed at understanding one central aspect of Bolzano’s views on deductive knowledge: what it means for a proposition
and for a term to be known a priori. I argue that, for Bolzano, a priori knowledge is knowledge by virtue of meaning and that Bolzano has substantial views about meaning and what it is to know the
latter. In particular, Bolzano believes that meaning is determined by implicit definition, i.e. the fundamental propositions
in a deductive system. I go into some detail in presenting and discussing Bolzano’s views on grounding, a priori knowledge and implicit definition. I explain why other aspects of Bolzano’s theory and, in particular, his peculiar understanding
of analyticity and the related notion of Ableitbarkeit might, as it has invariably in the past, mislead one to believe that Bolzano lacks a significant account of a priori knowledge. Throughout the paper, I point out to the ways in which, in this respect, Bolzano’s antagonistic relationship to
Kant directly shaped his own views. 相似文献
16.
Stieb JA 《Science and engineering ethics》2009,15(1):11-18
It has been claimed that (1) computer professionals should be held responsible for an undisclosed list of “undesirable events”
associated with their work and (2) most if not all computer disasters can be avoided by truly understanding responsibility.
Commentators of “A Critique of Positive Responsibility in Computing” argue that this is not Donald Gotterbarn’s view (Gotterbarn,
JSEE 14(2):235–239, 2008) but that a critique of the view nevertheless raises significant moral issues within computing such
as the ethical goals of a computing profession, the appropriate ethical stance toward bugs, and the public good with respect
to computing (Miller, JSEE 14(2):245–249, 2008). Commentators also argue that “A Critique”’s “profitable misreading” demonstrates
the “moral ecology” of organizations “dedicated narrowly to financial success” and that other “moral ecologies” that are customer
or quality driven can be shown to be more important or preeminent (Huff, JSEE 14(2):241–244, 2008). It is argued here that
(1) the hyper-inflated reading of Gotterbarn’s and Ladd’s views on positive responsibility persists despite Gotterbarn’s explicit
rejection of it, and that (2) such a reading of positive responsibility cannot be placed within a single moral ecology, nor
can a single moral ecology be shown to be any more important or preeminent than others.
Stieb, J. A. (2008). A critique of positive responsibility in computing. Science and Engineering Ethics,
14(2), 219–233. 相似文献
17.
In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I
treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the
fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of
this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function
as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that
such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’
presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally
flawed.
For their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the
following: Clare Chambers, Roger Crisp, Cécile Fabre, Paul Kelly, David Lloyd-Thomas. Thanks also go to Res Publica’s two anonymous referees. 相似文献
18.
19.
Timothy Chan 《Synthese》2010,173(3):211-229
One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who
asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are
contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper
I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, according to which Moorean beliefs are absurd
because Moorean sentences are instances of pragmatic paradox; that is to say, the propositions they express are necessarily false-when-believed. My conclusion is that while a Moorean
belief is a pragmatic paradox, it is not
just another pragmatic paradox, because this diagnosis does not explain all the puzzling features of Moorean beliefs. In particularly,
while this analysis is plausible in relation to the puzzle posed by characteristic (i) of Moorean sentences, I argue that
it fails to account for (ii). I do so in the course of an attempt to formulate the definition of a pragmatic paradox in more
precise formal terms, in order to see whether the definition is satisfied by Moorean sentences, but not by their third-person
transpositions. For only an account which can do so could address (ii) adequately. After rejecting a number of attempted formalizations,
I arrive at a definition which delivers the right results. The problem with this definition, however, is that it has to be
couched in first-person terms, making an essential use of ‘I’. Thus the problem of accounting for first-/third-person asymmetry
recurs at a higher order, which shows that the Pragmatic Paradox Resolution fails to identify the source of such asymmetry
highlighted by Moore’s Paradox. 相似文献
20.
This study is an adaptation and extension of Apfel and Seitz’s (Family Relations, 40(4), 421–429, 1991) models of adolescent parenting and adolescent-grandmother relationships to a sample of 148 African American,
first-time adolescent mothers and their 6-month-old infants. The Parental Supplemental model, in which adolescent mothers
and grandmothers shared caregiving, described 63% of Apfel and Seitz’s (1991) sample and 66% of the current sample. Shared
caregiving was not associated with conflict in the adolescent mother–grandmother relationship. Adolescent mothers who had
caregiving responsibilities and a supportive adolescent-grandmother relationship also reported competence in their parenting
role. Findings provide support for Apfel and Seitz’s Parental Apprentice model, in which young mothers gain competence through
direct caregiving experience in the context of a supportive relationship. 相似文献