Process, Content, and Feminist Reflexivity: One Researcher's Exploration

This article explores the unraveling of the relationship between research methodology, process, and content as revealed through my own feminist research project. I examine the evolution of my research process with one participant from a larger study, as I sought to better understand a story she told about racism. First, I address the theoretical underpinnings of feminist reflexivity and research, which challenge traditional paradigms. Next, I present the participant's (a white family day care provider's) story about racism in her practice which was revealed during an interview process. Subsequently, I present a second dialogue around the story in which we (researcher and participant) later engaged. In the process, I analyze my struggles, as a researcher trained in positivist methods, to engage in reflexive research methods. Finally, I evaluate the gains made for me as a researcher in the process and content of research conducted with a feminist reflexive frame and suggest their utility in deconstructing White racism.     

THE VIEW FROM DOWN HERE

In this article, graduate students and one faculty member respond to the innovative methods presented in this issue. We identify three theoretical and methodological tensions that shape our interest in and willingness to work with these methods. The first questions whether the strengths of doing qualitative research outweigh the limitations. The second involves feminist research ideals and how attainable they are. The third explores epistemological tensions between qualitative and quantitative research. Although intrigued by the data these methods generated and by their underlying epistemology, we question the status of certain qualitative research in psychology. We contend that the criteria by which qualitative research is evaluated must be made more explicitly before quantitatively trained researchers will incorporate these methods into their own work.     

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

Abstract: In this article, I propose one way of understanding the expression "feminist epistemology." I begin from the premise that improper philosophical attention has been paid to the implications of what I call The Fact of Preconditions for Agency: that moral and rational agents become such only through a long, deliberate, and intensive process of intervention and teaching, a process that requires commitments of time, effort and emotion on the part of other agents. I contend that this is a sufficiently important aspect of what it is to be a person that accounting for its philosophical implications may have repercussions not only for moral and political theory, but for epistemology as well. I contend further that, given the current configuration of social possibilities, a theory that acknowledges this Fact might appropriately be deemed "feminist."
My argument is presented in four segments. In Section II, I show how such a theory could be feminist by providing a discussion of categories of social identity; in Section III, I show how such a theory could be epistemology by describing a strategy of argument from parity. In Section IV, I apply this strategy to a case from political philosophy to show why its counter-intuitive implications do not provide good grounds for rejecting the suggested redistricting. And in Section V, I apply the same strategy to a case from epistemology to bring out how it might lead to a theory that might legitimately claim to be feminist epistemology.     

FEMINIST RESEARCH METHODS A Content Analysis of Psychology and Social Science Textbooks

This research examined the extent to which research methods textbooks in psychology and general social science discuss feminist challenges and approaches to social science (N = 40 textbooks). Two dimensions were examined. First, within the "nonsexist" dimensions, textbooks were analyzed to determine if they used nonsexist language and if they discussed ways to avoid sexist bias in research. The second dimension was "profeminist." Within this dimension four subdomains receiving considerable attention from feminist researchers were explored: (a) epistemology (or "ways of knowing"); (b) objectivity and subjectivity; (c) the relationship between the researcher and the researched; and (d) qualitative versus quantitative methodologies. Results demonstrated that although the majority of the textbooks did not use sexist language, they did not move much beyond this standard. There was little discussion of feminist challenges to these research issues. When the textbook authors did mention these topics, their analyses were most often inconsistent with feminist approaches.     

Female Adolescents, Sexual Empowerment and Desire: A Missing Discourse of Gender Inequity

In this commentary, I offer a response to Lamb & Peterson (2011). I base these comments on the feminist scholarship on adolescent girls’ healthy sexuality that Lamb (2010a) critiqued in the first of this series. I address and redress several of her concerns by providing the context and history of my own research and recovering the meanings of desire, pleasure and subjectivity as they appeared in this body of work. I then engage Lamb and Peterson’s points of consensus about the role of sexual empowerment in adolescent girls’ healthy sexuality by 1) positioning sexualization as more than a context; 2) identifying a missing discourse of gender inequity as a central issue in their discussion; and 3) explaining how the use of theory and interpretation in feminist research methods is necessary for and distinct from a surface reading of narratives of lived experience. Finally, I will provide examples of some alternative paths for supporting healthy adolescent women’s sexuality that extend beyond school-based sex education and media literacy into alternative engagements with girls through technology, media activism and participatory practices.     

Responsibility and Rhetoric

In this paper I offer a retrospective rereading of my work on epistemic responsibility in order to see why this inquiry has found only an uneasy location within the discourse of Anglo-American epistemology. I trace the history of the work's production, circulation and reception, and examine the feminist implications of the discussions it has occasioned.     

Role Development

SUMMARY

In this chapter, I first explain my research stance, which reflects how I became interested in this study, as well as the personal perspective and professional background that I bring to the study, which may clarify how I may hear and listen to the participants and face biases that emerge (Ely et al., 1997; Tedlock, 1995; Van Manen, 1990). Next, I describe the research setting, the participants, and the methods for recruiting the participants. Finally, I outline the research procedures, data collection, data management, analysis, methods to achieve trustworthiness, presentation of the findings, negative analysis, and preparatory study.     

"Reflexive Embodied Empathy": A Phenomenology of Participant-Researcher Intersubjectivity

In this article, I advocate a research process that involves engaging, reflexively, with the embodied intersubjective relationship researchers have with participants. I call this practice reflexive embodied empathy. First, I explicate the concept of empathy through exploring ideas from the philosophical phenomenological literature. I then apply this theory to practice and offer examples of reflexive analysis of embodied empathy taken from various hermeneutic phenomenological research projects. Three interpenetrating layers of reflexivity are described, each involving different but coexisting dimensions of embodied intersubjectivity. The 1st layer-connecting-of-demonstrates how people can tune into another's bodily way of being through using their own embodied reactions. The 2nd layer-acting-into-focuses on empathy as imaginative self-transposal and calls attention to the way existences (beings) are intertwined in a dynamic of doubling and mirroring. The 3rd layer-merging-with-involves a "reciprocal insertion and intertwining" of others in oneself and of one in them (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1968, p. 138), where self-understanding and other-understanding unite in mutual transformation. Through different examples of reflexive analysis from my research, I have tried to show how intersubjective corporeal commonality enables the possibility of empathy and how, in turn, empathy enables understanding of the Other and self-understanding. I discuss how the coexisting layers of empathy and the resultant understandings can be enabled through hermeneutic reflection and collaborative research methods.     

Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane,Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson

In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience.     

ETHICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL TENSIONS IN APPLYING A POSTMODERN PERSPECTIVE TO FEMINIST RESEARCH

We examine tensions that arise in applying postmodernism to feminist research. First, we consider epistemological tensions generated in the process of deconstructing existing knowledge and constructing new knowledge that benefits women. Second, we examine six ethical issues that reflect the tensions in feminist practice as we attempt to justify the dialectic between knowledge and power. In keeping with a postmodernist perspective, we pose these six issues as questions: Is feminist post-modernism "postfeminist"? Does postmodernist language mystify feminist practice and goals? Are qualitative methods more feminist than quantitative ones? Must feminists have a liberatory purpose in their research? Is the personal too personal? Whose aims are served, feminists or their collaborators? We conclude that by adopting a postmodern feminist perspective, we can embrace the struggle between knowledge and practice rather than privilege one over the other.     

RESPONSE TO CRITIQUES OF RELIGION IN AN AGE OF SCIENCE

Abstract. In replying to the four thoughtful critiques of my first Gifford volume I try to clarify the differences among us. I defend my use of Kuhn's concept of paradigms against Nancey Murphy's use of Lakatos's concept of research programs and then compare both of us with advocates of the “strong program” in the social construction of science. Sallie McFague identifies me with the empiricist, objectivist, “modernist” tradition and contrasts it to her own “postmodernist” acceptance of cultural relativism and the social construction of science, but I argue that I am seeking an intermediate position that redefines objectivity rather than rejecting it. Some themes common to feminist and process theology are also examin ed. In dialogue with Bob Russell I discuss the metaphysical and theological implications of the unity of space and time in relativity, the beginning of time in recent cosmology, and the thesis that God acts by determining events in indeterminate quantum systems. Finally I compare John Cobb's indebtedness to Whitehead with my own and suggest that I am more willing to adapt or modify process thought in the interpretation of scientific theories and religious experience.     

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AND THE PROBLEM OF EPISTEMIC PRIVILEGE

There have been a number of developments within religious epistemology in recent years. Currently, the dominant view within mainstream philosophy of religion is, arguably, reformed epistemology. What is less well known is that feminist epistemologists have also been active recently within the philosophy of religion, advancing new perspectives from which to view the link between knowledge and religious experience. In this article I examine the claim by certain feminist religious epistemologists that women are both epistemically oppressed and epistemically privileged, and I consider whether or not this justifies the specific re‐conceptualisations of religious terms that such epistemologists have proposed.     

Feminist bioethics: toward developing a "feminist" answer to the surrogate motherhood question.

Although a wide variety of feminist approaches to bioethics presently share a common feminist methodology (sometimes referred to as "raising the woman question"), they do not all share the same feminist politics, ontology, epistemology, and ethics. As a result of their philosophical differences, feminist bioethicists do not always agree on which biomedical principles, practices, and policies are best suited to serving women's interests. In other words, some feminist bioethicists insist that so-called "assisted reproduction" enhances women's procreative liberty, while others claim that it does nothing of the sort. Although such disagreement among feminist bioethicists reassures the general public that the feminist "program" for bioethics is not ideologically monolithic, it also confuses the public, especially women. In order to overcome this confusion, feminist bioethicists should work toward developing the kind of shared theoretical base that will foster frequent consensus on the biomedical principles, practices, and policies most likely to serve the interests of most women in the U.S. today.     

Does “Making a Difference” Still Make a Difference?: A Textbook Author’s Reflections

Drawing on my experiences with teaching Psychology of Women and writing three editions of a textbook across two decades starting in 1990, I reflect on the core feminist call to make the personal political. By tracing the chronology and interplay of my textbook writing with my teaching, research, and editing, I speculate about an apparent disconnection between my experiences and research with students (who embrace the feminist call to make a difference) and the textbook market to veer toward less women-centeredness and activism in the pursuit of gender studies. I make my case that the activist goal of making a difference continues to make a difference in individual women’s lives, in women’s relationships, and in a social justice agenda.     

Phenomenology and Critical Social Psychology: Directions and Debates in Theory and Research

There has been significant growth in critical approaches to social psychology in recent years. Phenomenological, discursive and psychoanalytically informed perspectives, amongst others, have become increasingly popular alternatives to ‘mainstream’ cognitive social psychology. This paper describes the fundamental philosophy and methodology underpinning phenomenological psychology along with discussion of a number of key issues in qualitative research in social psychology. In particular, I discuss the role of interpretation, the turn to language and need for political engagement within critical social psychology. More recently, there has been a growth in phenomenologically informed narrative theories and methodologies and in this paper I introduce my own development of a critical narrative analysis. In the process I discuss some of the most pressing debates about research within the phenomenological tradition and provide rebuttals, solutions and possible future directions for phenomenological theory and research that may lead to yet greater recognition for this social psychological perspective.     

The Identity Status Approach: In Need of Fundamental Revision and Qualitative Change

This article is a response to the commentaries of Waterman (this issue) and Berzonsky and Adams (this issue) on my review of the identity status field (van Hoof, this issue). The commentaries illustrate that the identity status researchers attribute different meanings to the identity statuses and identity status research; while Waterman finds it difficult to recognize the field in my review, Berzonsky and Adams agree with several of my conclusions. The two commentaries represent two pillars on which the status approach rests. The difference between the review and the commentaries is that the first includes both pillars, whereas each commentary consists primarily of a selective presentation of assumptions and data. This response focuses on two main points of the commentaries: (a) are the statuses sufficiently validated? and (b) to what extent are they suitable for testing developmental identity hypotheses? Using specific examples I show that the line of reasoning in the commentaries and the data proposed in support of these arguments in fact often support the conclusions of my review, for I demonstrate that the statuses are insufficiently validated and that the statuses are unsuitable for measuring identity development. These conclusions call for a fundamental revision of the identity status approach and a qualitative change in identity theory and research. Finally, the alternative approaches presented by Berzonsky and Adams are evaluated with respect to their contribution to an indispensable qualitative change in the identity status field.     

REASONS AND REASON REVISITED: ANOTHER REPLY TO MORRISON

In a previous article, Katherine Morrison (1999) argued that in my book Back to Reality: A Critique of Postmodern Theory in Psychotherapy (Held, 1995) I failed to accept the "strictly epistemological" aim of the narrative therapy movement. In the present article she reiterates the same objections, and adds the new criticism that I perceive epistemological oscillations in the writings of narrative therapists where there are none. In my present response I summarize my prior response to Morrison's (1999) critique (Held, 1999a), and I then respond to her new objections by showing how the conflation between epistemology and ontology that she attributes to me reflects her own confusion rather than mine.     

Embodied female experience through the lens of imagination

Abstract: In 1971, I made a film entitled Self Portrait of a Nude Model Turned Cinematographer in which I explore the objectifying ‘male’ gaze on my body in contrast to the subjective lived experience of my body. The film was a radical challenge to the gaze that objectifies woman – and thus imprisons her – which had hitherto dominated narrative cinema. Since the objectification of women has largely excluded us from the privileged phallogocentric discourses, in this paper I hope to bring into the psychoanalytic dialogue a woman's lived experience. I will approach this by exploring how remembering this film has become a personally transformative experience as I look back on it through the lens of postmodern and feminist discourses that have emerged since it was made. In addition, I will explore how this process of imaginatively looking back on an artistic creation to generate new discourses in the present is similar to the transformative process of analysis. Lastly, I will present a clinical example, where my embodied countertransference response to a patient's subjection to the objectifying male gaze opens space for a new discourse about her body to emerge.     

Feminist Epistemology, Contextualism, and Philosophical Skepticism

Abstract: This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context constitutes an attempt to exercise unearned social and epistemic power and that it should be resisted on epistemic and pragmatic grounds. I conclude that skepticism is a problem that feminists can and should take up as they address the social aspects of traditional epistemological problems.     

Galileo perceptionist

The present paper focuses on Galileo's conception of perception. I take as my starting point the interpretation of the Galilean text by Piccolino and Wade (2008, Perception 37 1312-1340): Galileo's eye: a new vision of the senses in the work of Galileo Galilei. Three points are discussed: the criticism of naive realism, the theoretical role of perceptual laws, and the distinction between different qualities of experience. The conclusions support an alternative interpretation which underscores the crucial role of phenomenology of perception in Galileo's epistemology.