道德困境中的规范性难题

现代社会出现了很多道德困境,这导致以解决道德难题为使命的应用伦理学的产生。依据道德困境产生的原因,可以把道德难题区分为三类,即相关事实不清而导致的事实性难题;道德规范缺失和冲突而导致的规范性难题;以及道德范畴和道德推理的有效性难以确证而导致的元伦理难题。规范性难题是应用伦理学研究和实践中碰到的最普遍的道德难题,主要表现为三类:规范缺失性难题、规范冲突性难题和角色冲突性难题。其中,规范缺失性难题和对抗性的规范冲突性难题,是应用伦理学关注的重点。我们还通过对代际正义、环境伦理学、安乐死以及医生角色冲突的具体分析,揭示了这些道德难题的具体内涵,为我们解决这些难题提供了指引。     

"道德资本"研究的意义及其学科定位——王小锡教授"道德资本"研究述评

"道德资本"概念的提出及研究是我国伦理学理论发展中的一个创新,它顺应了当代中国社会发展变化对道德进步提出的客观要求,对帮助人们破解道德与经济"二元对立"的时代难题、丰富和发展伦理学的道德价值学说,具有重要的启迪意义.这一问题的研究,需要在科学界说"道德资本"的内涵,对其进行学科定位的基础上予以拓展.     

现代性道德困境及其解决 ——一种可能的康德伦理学路径

随着现代性的发展,社会经历着社会结构的现代转型,逐渐由传统社会向现代社会转变,但在这种转变的过程中,带来的却是现代性道德困境问题.面对现代性道德困境,现代正义自由理论主张正当先于德性;而德性伦理学则主张德性先于正当,倡导返回“亚里士多德”.但实践证明二者均未能很好地解决现代性道德困境.一种可能的思路或许在于走近康德,倡导正当与德性的现代融合.     

应用伦理学视阈中的三类道德推理

应用伦理学以解决当代社会出现的道德难题为己任。由于道德难题本身就反映了道德判断的复杂性和不确定性,意味着道德推理是一项必要而艰巨的任务,因此,有必要从解决道德难题的具体道德推理活动中归纳出具有典型意义的推理形式,以利于完成在道德概念、道德判断基础上进行的创造性工作。通观应用伦理学中的道德推理形式,可以概括出演绎的道德推理、类比的道德推理和辩证的道德推理三种基本形式。     

道德困境的博弈分析

在无法避免的道德困境面前,各种伦理学理论和道德选择技术似乎都显得无能为力.博弈分析方法以及"自存一存人"道德哲学构想的引入,在一定程度上为理解和摆脱各种道德困境提供了一种可操作性的行为选择技术和较为合理的理论设想.     

西方道德代价思想史论纲

对西方道德代价思想史进行梳理,能为分析当代社会道德困境的根源、明晰解决道德难题的理路提供重要的理论借鉴.古希腊、罗马思想家着力从德性伦理出发探讨了私有财产制度对个人道德素养的侵害；中世纪的经院哲学家在神学的外衣下分析了社会的“恶”出现的根源以及规避恶的方式；近代的思想家自觉探讨了社会发展中的道德代价,论证了道德代价是社会发展进程中的推动力；现当代思想家批判反思了工业文明、资本主义、经济发展、科学技术等现代性要素的发展给道德带来的负面效应,促使伦理道德成为考量发展实践的重要维度.     

以道德责任为着眼点，彰显伦理学的理论反思与实践品格——评郭金鸿的《道德责任论》

伦理学作为一门实践性较强的哲学分支学科,它既需要关注"道德形上学",又需要直面现实社会发展过程中的伦理道德问题,科学地解决影响社会发展的质量和水平的伦理道德难题.     

重视对现实道德问题的理论研究

伦理学既是一门理论的科学,又是一门实践的科学。作为一种理论的科学,伦理学研究必须揭示道德产生、发展和变化的客观规律,科学地探讨与道德有关的各种理论问题。作为一种实践的科学,伦理学所研究的课题不仅来源于人们的社会实践,而且,它还应该面对整个社会所关心的各种道德问     

关于道德主体和道德主体性问题

道德主体和道德主体性问题,不仅是伦理学说史上多所论及的问题,关系到对道德的本质、功能等一系列根本问题的理解;而且是当前社会生活中的热点问题,关系到对人的价值、社会进步等一系列重大问题的解决。近几年我国伦理学界关于道德主体和道德主体性问题的争论,对我国伦理学的发展具有积极的意义,从中透示出社会主义现代化建设对于伦理学研究的客观要求。当然,对于其中表现出的一些倾向性问题,则应该从辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义的理论高度加以综合的分析和评判。本文就此略陈己见,以求教于学界同仁。     

伦理学研究的新视角——评《道德选择研究》

伦理学作为一门实践性较强的哲学分支学科,它既需要关注"道德形上学",又需要直面现实社会发展过程中的伦理道德问题,科学地解决影响社会发展的质量和水平的伦理道德难题.也就是说,伦理学的研究应该是形上与形下、体与用的统一.同时,人类社会进入现代社会发展阶段以来,人文社会科学相互渗透、交融汇合的趋势越来越明显,客观上需要相关学科的学人打破门户之见,采取积极主动的应对态度.王敬华博士的<道德选择研究--以价值论为视角>(中国社会科学出版社2008年出版)一书正是从一个侧面体现了伦理学研究的这个鲜明特色.     

Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs

Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.     

Moral Realism,Moral Disagreement,and Moral Psychology

Abstract

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.     

Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics

When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences (“X is wrong”/“X is not wrong”), it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences (i.e., that it has to be the case that at least one of them is incorrect). This inference then plays a key role in a now‐standard argument against certain theories in moral semantics. In this paper, we introduce new evidence that bears on this debate. We show that there are moral conflict cases in which people are inclined to say both (a) that the two speakers disagree and (b) that it is not the case at least one of them must be saying something incorrect. We then explore how we might understand such disagreements. As a proof of concept, we sketch an account of the concept of disagreement and an independently motivated theory of moral semantics which, together, explain the possibility of such cases.     

Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge

To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory (whatever it is); it also needs to be motivated in the right way. I argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action; they are motivated by an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right. Call this the Rightness Condition. On the Rightness Condition moral motivation involves both a conative and a cognitive element—in particular, it involves moral knowledge. I argue that the Rightness Condition is both necessary and sufficient for moral worth. I also argue that the Rightness Condition gives us an attractive account of actions performed under imperfect epistemic circumstances: by agents who rely on moral testimony or by those who, like Huckleberry Finn, have false moral convictions.     

Moral Accountancy and Moral Worth

People do good or bad things, and get or do not get good or bad credit for their actions, depending (in part) on knowledge of their actions. I attempt to unfold some of the interconnections between these matters, and between them and the achievement of moral worth. The main conclusion is that the heights of moral worth seem to appear in the oddest places.