When the going gets tough: Grit predicts costly perseverance

In this research, we investigate how grittier individuals might incur some costs by persisting when they could move on. Grittier participants were found to be less willing to give up when failing even though they were likely to incur a cost for their persistence. First, grittier participants are more willing to risk failing to complete a task by persisting on individual items. Second, when they are losing, they expend more effort and persist longer in a game rather than quit. Gritty participants have more positive emotions and expectations toward the task, which mediates the relationship between grit and staying to persist when they are losing. Results show gritty individuals are more willing to risk suffering monetary loss to persist.     

Effort-based decision-making in major depressive disorder: A translational model of motivational anhedonia

Anhedonia is a core feature of major depressive disorder (MDD), but the precise nature of anhedonic symptoms is unknown. Whereas anhedonia has traditionally been viewed as a deficit in the experience of pleasure, more recent evidence suggests that reduced anticipation and motivation may also be a core feature of this symptom. Here, we provide data from a study in MDD patients and healthy controls using a translational measure of reward motivation, the Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT or "effort"). This task offers subjects a series of trials where they may choose to expend more or less effort for the opportunity to win varying amounts of monetary rewards. We found that MDD patients were less willing to expend effort for rewards than controls. Additionally, we observed that patients were less able to effectively use information about magnitude and probability of rewards to guide their choice behavior. Finally, within the MDD patient group, duration of the current episode was a significant negative predictor of EEfRT task performance. These findings offer novel support for theoretical models proposing that anhedonia in MDD may reflect specific impairments in motivation and reward-based decision-making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

The Case for Markets in Citizenship

A number of countries sell citizenship rights to foreign buyers. Gary Becker makes an economic case for the state's sale of citizenship; more recently, Javier Hidalgo has offered a moral defence. However, the private sale of citizenship on a market remains largely unexplored and undefended. This article argues that under certain conditions states ought to permit their citizens to swap citizenship rights with foreigners in exchange for payment. I begin by offering two defeasible reasons to legalize citizenship markets: they would enable mutually beneficial exchange and increase the labour market opportunities of the global poor. I consider a number of counterarguments and conclude that none are dispositive, leaving the case for citizenship markets undefeated.     

Problems for Effort-Based Distribution Principles

Many have argued that individuals should receive income in proportion to their contribution to society (i.e. their productivity). Others have believed that it would be fairer if people received income in proportion to the effort they expend in so contributing, since people have much greater control over their level of effort than their productivity. I argue that those who believe this are normally also committed, despite appearances, to increasing the social product — which undermines any sharp distinction between effort- and productivity-based distributive proposals. However, effort-based proposals do emphasise more the importance of people having control over factors affecting their income. The second set of problems I consider is how to implement policies which hold true to this emphasis. I show that there are major problems with the accuracy of using any objective criteria to measure the level of effort a person is expending. Moreover, once any such criteria are employed the problem of 'moral hazard'arises because people modify their behaviour in such a way as to maximise their income while minimising their effort. This violates the original motivation for using effort. Because of this and other empirical considerations, I argue that productivity may well be a better criterion on which to distribute income even if one is motivated by the same concerns which have prompted effort-based proposals.     

Individual differences in ego depletion: The role of sociotropy-autonomy

In his cognitive theory of depression, Beck (1987) suggested that highly sociotropic individuals have a strong need for social acceptance whereas highly autonomous individuals have an excessive need for achievement. Research by Baumeister (2000) has suggested that a phenomenon known as ego depletion, the weakening of performance on tasks following active self-control, occurs because it depletes a limited inner resource. The present study examined whether individuals who are highly sociotropic or autonomous would respond differently when faced with tasks requiring self-control. Participants completed the Sociotropy-Autonomy Scale (Clark et al. 1995) and engaged in two active self-control tasks. The results revealed that sociotropy levels were negatively correlated with persistence on tasks that require self-control whereas autonomy was positively correlated to persistence on the same task. In addition, the results suggested that, following a task requiring self-control, highly sociotropic individuals expend less effort, whereas highly autonomous individuals expend more effort on subsequent tasks requiring self-control.     

Overworked and underpaid: on the nature of gender differences in personal entitlement

This research investigated gender differences in feelings of personal entitlement with respect to monetary payment for work performed. Two experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that women's internal standards of fair pay for their work are lower than men's and to examine possible causes of this difference. In Experiment 1, men and women were asked to pay themselves in a private situation what they thought was fair pay for a fixed amount of work. Social comparison information was varied. As predicted, women paid themselves less money than men in the absence, but not the presence, of social comparison information. In Experiment 2, men and women were asked to do as much work as they thought was fair for a fixed, prepaid, amount of money. Subjects believed that their work was either monitored or unmonitored. Women worked significantly longer, did more work, and did more correct work than men in both public and private work settings. Furthermore, women, but not men, worked longer when they believed their work was monitored than when they believed it was unmonitored. Possible explanations for these gender differences are discussed.     

I don’t care about others’ approval: Dysphoric individuals show reduced effort mobilization for obtaining a social reward

Past research on reduced reward responsiveness in depression and dysphoria has mainly focused on monetary rewards. However, social rewards are important motivators and might be especially impaired in depression. The present study tested the hypothesis that nondysphoric individuals would mobilize more effort during a memory task without a clear performance standard when anticipating social approval for good performance. In contrast, dysphoric individuals were expected to be less sensitive to this reward and to mobilize less effort. Effort mobilization in this 2 (dysphoric vs. nondysphoric) × 2 (no reward vs. social approval) between-persons study was operationalized by participants’ cardiovascular reactivity. Results confirmed that nondysphorics had higher reactivity of systolic blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure, and heart rate when expecting to enter their name in the alleged “best list”, whereas dysphorics had lower cardiovascular reactivity. The present study expands evidence for reduced reward responsiveness in depression and dysphoria from an effort mobilization perspective by demonstrating reduced effort-related cardiovascular reactivity to social rewards.     

Effect of failure/success feedback and the moderating influence of personality on reward motivation

While motivation to pursue goals is often assumed to be a trait-like characteristic, it is influenced by a variety of situational factors. In particular, recent experiences of success or failure, as well as cognitive responses to these outcomes, may shape subsequent willingness to expend effort for future rewards. To date, however, these effects have not been explicitly tested. In the present study, 131 healthy individuals received either failure or success feedback on a cognitive task. They were then instructed to either ruminate or distract themselves from their emotions. Finally, they completed the Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task, a laboratory measure of reward motivation. Results indicate that participants who received failure feedback relied more strongly on the reward magnitude when choosing whether to exert greater effort to obtain larger rewards, though this effect only held under conditions of significant uncertainty about whether the effort would be rewarded. Further, participants with high levels of trait inhibition were less responsive to reward value and probability when choosing whether to expend greater effort, results that echo past studies of effort-based decision-making in psychological disorders.     

Outsourcing self-regulation

Three studies demonstrate a novel phenomenon--self-regulatory outsourcing--in which thinking about how other people can be instrumental (i.e., helpful) for a given goal undermines motivation to expend effort on that goal. In Experiment 1, participants who thought about how their partner helped them with health goals (as opposed to career goals) planned to spend less time and effort on health goals in the upcoming week. This pattern was stronger for depleted participants than for nondepleted participants. In Experiment 2, participants who thought about how their partner helped them with academic-achievement goals procrastinated more, leaving themselves less time for an academic task, than did participants in two control conditions. This pattern was stronger for participants who were told that procrastinating would drain their resources for the academic task than for participants who were told that procrastinating would not drain their resources for that task. In Experiment 3, participants who decreased their effort after thinking of an instrumental significant other reported higher relationship commitment to that individual than did participants who did not decrease their effort. The possibility for shared (or transactive) self-regulation is discussed.     

健康城市建设的新理念及其导向

健康城市的理论与实践的发展以及人类对健康及其决定因素认知的深入使健康城市的内涵和理念不断扩充,吸纳了健康的社会模式及健康决定因素的理念,为健康城市建设注入了新的机制,并成为健康城市建设发展的新导向。我国建设健康城市的实践,从基线评估、规划制定到建设推进,已着力体现国际上健康城市的新理念和导向。     

Driver performance, rewards and motivation: A simulator study

It has been suggested that effort invested in a task may be moderated by the perception of the nature of reward offered, e.g., whether social or financial in nature. If levels of payment for empirical work meaningfully influence the effort invested in tasks by participants, the implications may be serious and wide-ranging for the reliability and validity of published data. The study reported in this paper, examines this thesis in a driving context. Thirty-six participants were allocated to either a No payment, Low payment or Medium payment condition in a driving simulator. They undertook both easy and difficult driving scenarios in which performance was measured. Subjective workload and performance results indicated that task difficulty was successfully manipulated with the study. However, in contrast to the previous research in non-driving contexts, participants not receiving rewards were found to perform more poorly and experience increased time pressure.     

A feeling for finance: Motivations for trading on the stock exchange

Emotions have long been associated with financial markets. For traders trying to make money by profiting from market fluctuations, the uncertainties and risks of involvement loom large, and the outcomes of participation are instantly measurable. Much research has therefore focused on the role that emotions – such as fear, greed, trust, confidence and hope – play in motivating traders to try and anticipate what the market is doing. But there is a different kind of emotional experience that is equally important in motivating financial trading and which research has hitherto neglected. The development of communications technology has generated new kinds of objects (represented in visual formats displayed on computer screens) with which people interact, forming emotionally-laden relationships comparable, in some ways, to more traditional social relationships. This paper focuses on individual online share traders who use a style known as Technical Analysis. It examines how they become emotionally engaged in and attached to their trading practices, in ways that motivate them, independently of any concern with financial outcomes. The paper then provides a broader conceptualisation of the roles of reason and emotion in financial markets.     

Markets in Votes and the Tyranny of Wealth

A standard objection to a market in political votes is that it will enable the rich politically to dominate the poor. If a market in votes was allowed then the poor would be the most likely sellers and the rich the most likely buyers. The rich would thus accumulate the votes of the poor, and so the candidates elected and the policies passed would represent only their interests and not those of the electorate as a whole. To ensure that the poor do not become de facto disenfranchised, then, markets in votes should be disallowed. This objection seems so straightforward and compelling that it has received almost no critical scrutiny. This is unfortunate, for close examination reveals that this argument is not as straightforward as it initially appears. Indeed, there are (at least) four different ways of understanding this objection. It could be understood as expressing: (1) the concern that markets in votes would enable candidates to win elections who would otherwise lose them; (2) the concern that they would enable the election of candidates opposed by the majority of the electorate; (3) the concern that they would lead to the poor having disproportionately low political influence; and (4) the concern that they would lead to the rich having disproportionately high political influence. I will argue in this paper that only (3) and (4) could plausibly ground objections to markets in votes. Moreover, these will only plausibly ground objections to unrestricted markets in votes; they will not ground objections to markets in votes per se. Thus, if we are to continue to object to markets in political votes we will have to do this on grounds other than that were they to be allowed the rich will politically dominate the poor.     

Weight as an Embodiment of Importance

ABSTRACT— Four studies show that the abstract concept of importance is grounded in bodily experiences of weight. Participants provided judgments of importance while they held either a heavy or a light clipboard. Holding a heavy clipboard increased judgments of monetary value (Study 1) and made participants consider fair decision-making procedures to be more important (Study 2). It also caused more elaborate thinking, as indicated by higher consistency between related judgments (Study 3) and by greater polarization of agreement ratings for strong versus weak arguments (Study 4). In line with an embodied perspective on cognition, these findings suggest that, much as weight makes people invest more physical effort in dealing with concrete objects, it also makes people invest more cognitive effort in dealing with abstract issues.     

Excessive use of reminders: Metacognition and effort-minimisation in cognitive offloading

People often use external reminders to help remember delayed intentions. This is a form of “cognitive offloading”. Individuals sometimes offload more often than would be optimal (Gilbert et al., 2020). This bias has been linked to participants’ erroneous metacognitive underconfidence in their memory abilities. However, underconfidence is unlikely to fully explain the bias. An additional, previously-untested factor that may contribute to the offloading bias is a preference to avoid cognitive effort associated with remembering internally. The present Registered Report examined evidence for this hypothesis. One group of participants received payment contingent on their performance of the task (hypothesised to increase cognitive effort, and therefore reduce the bias towards offloading); another group received a flat payment for taking part, as in the earlier experiment. The offloading bias was significantly reduced (but not eliminated) in the rewarded group, suggesting that a preference to avoid cognitive effort influences cognitive offloading.     

Generating and sharing of market intelligence in sales teams: an economic social network perspective

In this research, we take a multimethod approach to shed light on the potential costs to sales teams that generate and share market intelligence (MI). First, we introduce an analytical model to propose the respective levels of effort that sales managers, experts, and team members spend generating and sharing MI. To test our propositions, we utilize social network data from 40 independent, business-to-business (B2B) sales teams, representing 287 salespeople. Interestingly, our results support the premise that team members become dependent (reduce MI efforts) when their sales manager or team expert shares MI among the team. We term this a “sharing tax” that sales managers and team experts pay when they share MI. Consequently, sales managers demonstrate greater MI-generation efforts the more they share MI. We also find that experts who share more (less) also show greater (lesser) MI-generation efforts, but only for teams where sales managers share low (high) levels of MI. In summary, our research innovatively conducts an empirical test of the Nash Equilibrium pattern of sales team effort to show that two critical team members, the sales manager and expert, are at a disadvantage when they share valuable MI.     

文化价值观是一种特殊货币形式

金钱是一种经人们约定的用来测量商品价值的独特测量工具。同样地, 文化价值也是能让人对自身价值做出一致评价的一种独特的测量工具。本文在综述有关研究的基础上提出一个观点：文化价值和金钱价值在人类的发展史上、神经机制、行为以及认知方面是重叠的。作者认为, 文化价值和货币都是基于类似的进化功能而产生的。其次, 当进行与社会价值观一致的活动(如捐赠和合作)时, 其行为所激活的脑区和获得金钱时所激活的脑区是相同的。同样地, 当进行违反社会价值观的活动(如欺骗和攻击)时, 其行为所激活的脑区和失去金钱所激活的脑区是相同的。第三, 相对于亲社会行为和获得金钱, 我们对社会背叛和失去金钱会更敏感(如厌恶损失)。第四, 全球化对金钱体系和价值体系的影响是相似的。     

When Sharing Is Not Caring: Does (un)Certainty About Bill Payment Method Lead Diners to Consume More and Spend More Money?

Previous work has demonstrated that unacquainted participants in an experimental, restaurant‐like setting consume more when they know in advance that the bill will be split evenly rather than paid according to individual consumption. Real life, however, often differs from these experimental settings in two important ways. First, unlike random groups of participants, diners who eat together are frequently friends or colleagues. Second, payment method (even vs. individual payment) is usually unknown (i.e. uncertain) at the time people place their orders, and is determined when the check arrives. The current research tests the ecological validity of the association between consumption amount and payment method. Study 1 was conducted in a natural setting with organic groups of diners. Some were asked to state their desired payment method before ordering (Certain condition); others did so only after asking for the check (Uncertain condition). In both conditions, even payment (as opposed to individual payment) was associated with greater consumption amount. However, overall, consumption amount was lower among diners in the Uncertain condition than among those in the Certain condition. Study 2 presents a controlled follow‐up experiment showing that eliminating diners' prior expectations regarding the payment method—by informing them that the payment method will be randomly determined after the consumption decision—eliminates the relationship between payment method and consumption amount. This study further indicates that when diners are uncertain what the payment method will be, even bill‐splitting has negative implications for their subsequent social interactions, expressed in retribution tendencies. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.