Psychic reality and the nature of consciousness

In this paper we make the case for a psychoanalytically informed reconsideration of the phenomena of consciousness. Classically, following Freud, who viewed consciousness as merely a reflection or perception of unconscious mental activity, psychoanalysts have tended to regard a focus on conscious experience as potentially reductionistic and at risk of overlooking the mind's deeper structures. We describe the case of Mr K, a patient who experienced disturbances of consciousness that forced us to consider the possibility that the capacity to experience ourselves as conscious, intentional agents in a coherent world of objects is not merely a modality of perception but rather a maturational and developmental achievement that to some degree depends on adequate experiences of caregiving and is vital in ensuring the possibility of human communication. As such, it is a capacity that is vulnerable to experiences of neglect and maltreatment. We suggest that as well as compromising the capacity to think about one's own and other people's feelings, such experiences may have the further adverse consequence of leading the individual to experience and risk becoming conscious of certain dangerously maladaptive, destructive states of mind which in normal development remain inaccessible to conscious experience. Phenomenologically, such states of mind are experienced as fragmentation and disturbances of consciousness. We discuss the clinical implications of these reflections and the limitations they place on psychoanalytic work in the context of their impact on the work with Mr K.     

Infants' understanding of occlusion of others' line-of-sight: Implications for an emerging theory of mind

Infants' gaze following provides information about their understanding of others' perception and attention. Gaze following when the other looks in the presence (and absence) of visual obstacles can be especially informative. In the present study the gaze-following behaviour of 14- and 18-month-old infants was examined in opaque barrier, clear barrier, and non-barrier situations in order to investigate whether infants at this age understand the referential nature of looking. A hypothesis positing that infants grasp the referential nature of gaze would predict that infants would not follow gaze when the looker's gaze is blocked (as in an opaque barrier situation), but would follow gaze in both non-barrier and clear barrier situations. This hypothesis was contrasted with two other “leaner” interpretations predicting contrasting patterns of looking in the same situations. Results showed that both 18- and 14-month-old infants followed gaze as predicted by the richer, referential account.     

威胁相关面孔表情对眼睛注视方向知觉的影响

以往研究发现眼睛注视方向知觉受面孔表情的影响,愤怒面孔相较于恐惧面孔更倾向被判断为看着观察者。虽然研究者对此提出了不同的解释,但目前尚不清楚愤怒和恐惧表情在注视方向知觉中的这种差异影响到底来自于面孔的结构信息还是物理特征信息。本研究采用注视方向辨别任务,计算直视知觉范围（The Cone of Direct Gaze,CoDG）为因变量,分别以直立,倒置及模糊图片为实验材料,试图通过分离面孔结构信息和物理特征信息,对以上问题进行探讨。结果发现在保留面孔全部信息的情况下（实验1）愤怒面孔的CoDG大于恐惧面孔;在破坏结构信息加工,只保留特征信息加工的情况下（实验2））愤怒和恐惧表情在直视知觉范围上的差异消失了;在削弱物理特征信息加工,保留结构信息加工的情况下（实验3）二者在CoDG上的差异又复现。本研究结果说明不同威胁性面孔表情对眼睛注视知觉的影响主要来自于二者在与情绪意义相关的结构信息加工上的不同,而二者非低级的物理信息上的差异,支持信号共享假说和情绪评价假说对威胁性面孔表情与注视方向整合加工解释的理论基础。     

Seeing minds in others: Mind perception modulates low-level social-cognitive performance and relates to ventromedial prefrontal structures

In social interactions, we rely on nonverbal cues like gaze direction to understand the behavior of others. How we react to these cues is affected by whether they are believed to originate from an entity with a mind, capable of having internal states (i.e., mind perception). While prior work has established a set of neural regions linked to social-cognitive processes like mind perception, the degree to which activation within this network relates to performance in subsequent social-cognitive tasks remains unclear. In the current study, participants performed a mind perception task (i.e., judging the likelihood that faces, varying in physical human-likeness, have internal states) while event-related fMRI was collected. Afterwards, participants performed a social attention task outside the scanner, during which they were cued by the gaze of the same faces that they previously judged within the mind perception task. Parametric analyses of the fMRI data revealed that activity within ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was related to both mind ratings inside the scanner and gaze-cueing performance outside the scanner. In addition, other social brain regions were related to gaze-cueing performance, including frontal areas like the left insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and inferior frontal gyrus, as well as temporal areas like the left temporo-parietal junction and bilateral temporal gyri. The findings suggest that functions subserved by the vmPFC are relevant to both mind perception and social attention, implicating a role of vmPFC in the top-down modulation of low-level social-cognitive processes.     

Watching Eyes effects: When others meet the self

The perception of direct gaze—that is, of another individual’s gaze directed at the observer—is known to influence a wide range of cognitive processes and behaviors. We present a new theoretical proposal to provide a unified account of these effects. We argue that direct gaze first captures the beholder’s attention and then triggers self-referential processing, i.e., a heightened processing of stimuli in relation with the self. Self-referential processing modulates incoming information processing and leads to the Watching Eyes effects, which we classify into four main categories: the enhancement of self-awareness, memory effects, the activation of pro-social behavior, and positive appraisals of others. We advance that the belief to be the object of another’s attention is embedded in direct gaze perception and gives direct gaze its self-referential power. Finally, we stress that the Watching Eyes effects reflect a positive impact on human cognition; therefore, they may have a therapeutic potential, which future research should delineate.     

From Indian philosophy to cognitive neuroscience: two empirical case studies for Ganeri's <Emphasis Type="Italic">Self</Emphasis>

In this commentary, I confront Ganeri’s theory of self with two case studies from cognitive neuroscience and interdisciplinary consciousness research: mind wandering and full-body illusions. Together, these case studies suggest new questions and constraints for Ganeri's theory of self. Recent research on spontaneous thought and mind wandering raises questions about the transition from unconscious monitoring to the phenomenology of ownership and the first-person stance. Full-body illusions are relevant for the attenuation problem of how we distinguish between self and others. Discussing these examples can help refine key transitions in Ganeri’s theory of self and ensure its empirical plausibility. This discussion also identifies points of contact between Ganeri's self and cognitive neuroscience, raising new questions for future research, both philosophical and empirical.     

The act of interpretation1

The author understands the interpreting act as an attempt to perceive what happens in the transference/countertransference fi eld and not just what happens in the patient's mind. Interpretation transcends mere intellectual communication. It is also an experience in which analysts’ emotions work as an important instrument in understanding their patients. Interpretation is seen to possess manifest as well as latent content; the latter would contain the analysts’ feelings, emotions and personality. The unconscious content of an interpretation does not inconvenience or preclude the development of the analytic process, but, on the contrary, it allows new associative material to emerge, and it transforms the analytic session into a human relationship. Analysts’ awareness of this content derived from patients’ apperceptions is a signifi cant instrument for understanding what is happening in the analytic relationship, and what transpires in these sessions provides fundamental elements for analysts’ self‐analysis. Some clinical examples demonstrate these occurrences in analytic sessions, and how they can be apprehended and used for a better understanding of the patient. The author also mentions the occurrence of diffi culties during the analytic process. These diffi culties are often the result of lapses in an analyst's perception related to unconscious elements of the relationship.     

Functional consequences of perceiving facial expressions of emotion without awareness

A substantial body of research has established that even when we are not consciously aware of the faces of others we are nevertheless sensitive to, and impacted by their facial expression. In this paper, we consider this body of research from a new perspective by examining the functions of unconscious perception revealed by these studies. A consideration of the literature from this perspective highlights that existing research methods are limited when it comes to revealing possible functions of unconscious perception. The critical shortcoming is that in all of the methods, the perceived facial expression remains outside of awareness. This is a problem because there are good reasons to believe that one important function of unconsciously perceived negative faces is to attract attention so that they are consciously perceived; such conscious perception, however, is never allowed with existing methodologies. We discuss recent studies of emotional face perception under conditions of visual search that address this issue directly. Further, we suggest that methodologies that do not examine cognitive processes as they occur in more natural settings may result in fundamental misunderstandings of human cognition.     

The felt presence of other minds: Predictive processing,counterfactual predictions,and mentalising in autism

The mental states of other people are components of the external world that modulate the activity of our sensory epithelia. Recent probabilistic frameworks that cast perception as unconscious inference on the external causes of sensory input can thus be expanded to enfold the brain’s representation of others’ mental states. This paper examines this subject in the context of the debate concerning the extent to which we have perceptual awareness of other minds. In particular, we suggest that the notion of perceptual presence helps to refine this debate: are others’ mental states experienced as veridical qualities of the perceptual world around us? This experiential aspect of social cognition may be central to conditions such as autism spectrum disorder, where representations of others’ mental states seem to be selectively compromised. Importantly, recent work ties perceptual presence to the counterfactual predictions of hierarchical generative models that are suggested to perform unconscious inference in the brain. This enables a characterisation of mental state representations in terms of their associated counterfactual predictions, allowing a distinction between spontaneous and explicit forms of mentalising within the framework of predictive processing. This leads to a hypothesis that social cognition in autism spectrum disorder is characterised by a diminished set of counterfactual predictions and the reduced perceptual presence of others’ mental states.     

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds-a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering-that is, interpersonal harm-even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.     

Self-experience as a mechanism for learning about others: a training study in social cognition

Using a gaze-following task, the authors assessed whether self-experience with the view-obstructing properties of blindfolds influenced infants' understanding of this effect in others. In Experiment 1, 12-month-olds provided with blindfold self-experience behaved as though they understood that a person wearing a blindfold cannot see. When a blindfolded adult turned to face an object, these infants gaze followed significantly less than control infants who had either (a) seen and felt the blindfold but whose view had not been obstructed by it or (b) experienced a windowed blindfold through which they could see. In Experiment 2, 18-month-olds experienced either (a) a trick blindfold that looked opaque but could be seen through, (b) an opaque blindfold, or (c) baseline familiarization. Infants receiving trick-blindfold experience now followed a blindfolded adult's gaze significantly more than controls. The authors propose 3 mechanisms underlying infants' capacity to use self-experience as a framework for understanding the visual perception of others.     

Neuroscience and the Embodiment of Psychoanalysis—With an Appreciation of Damasio’s Contribution

ABSTRACT

This article contends that psychoanalysis benefits from a neurobiological perspective. It is suggested that Antonio Damasio’s view on the neurobiology of mind and self is particularly useful in this regard. The article presents a review and discussion of Damasio’s basic assumptions on body, emotion, feeling, unconscious and conscious mind, and embodied self. It explains how Freud’s hypotheses that ego is first and foremost a bodily ego is underpinned by contemporary neurobiological research and theory. A clinical illustration highlights that changes in sense of self encompasses changes throughout the whole body, as felt from the inside and as observed from the outside.     

Momentary Return of the Cosmic Unconscious: The Nature of Zen/Chan Enlightenment

Zen/Chan, which used to be a Far Eastern philosophy-cum-religion, has evolved into a global cultural phenomenon. Despite the many views expressed by numerous thinkers in the world, the consensus on Chan and Chan enlightenment remains an agnostic Oriental mysticism. By exploring Chan and enlightenment from a combined perspective of history, philosophy, psychology, religion and linguistics, this article proposes a hitherto unexpressed view. Chan enlightenment is a prenatal physico-psychological existence, which grows out of a fetal subject’s perception of the womb. Although this primordial mode of perception is unconscious, it is cosmic in nature because for the fetal subject the womb is the whole world with which it feels to be at one. This unconscious oneness may be termed the ‘cosmic unconscious’. Once born, no one can return to the prenatal mental state, but through personal cultivation and Chan practice one can experience a fleeting moment of the cosmic unconscious. In the final analysis, the essence of Chan enlightenment is a momentary return of the cosmic unconscious. It is, therefore, not a great wisdom which enables one to have a profound understanding of the self and the world, but a non-wisdom induced by a return to the prenatal primal being of life.     

Childhood Deafness:

The primary self postulated by Fordham draws upon both psychic and bodily structures to unfold needs and potentials in the external world. In this paper I have presented some thoughts on the role of the ear and of hearing in bringing the neonate into relationship with its mother and broader environment in early deintegrative processes. The ear serves as an important organ not only in receiving sound, but also in orientating the neonate in relation to the world and to its mother's body, and perceiving and sustaining a sense of self. When in infancy the sense of hearing is lost, the spontaneous activities of the self appear to operate in a compensatory way, enhancing the operations of viable organs of perception. This speculation was drawn from a series of observations of a deaf baby girl. The most significant negative result of deafness is the way it affects body image. Deaf children feel not only different about not being able to hear and speak like others, but, far more profoundly, also excluded from the intercourse between others, living on an everyday basis with the primal scene predominant in the mind. The nature of this experience, as I have tried to show, was illustrated by material from work with a profoundly deaf girl.     

Indeterminacy and consciousness in the creative process: What quantum physics has to offer

The quantum view of creativity, based on Goswami's idealistic interpretation of quantum physics, is presented. It provides a resolution for two controversial areas of creativity theory and research: the “aha”; experience and the role of consciousness. According to the quantum model, the mind‐brain consists of classical and quantum functions and structures. The source for creative ideation lies in the quantum realm in the form of unlearned coherent superpositions or states of simultaneous multiple possibilities. While access of coherent superpositions (CohS) are susceptible to interference from classical domain functions, such as attention, the CohS itself is experienced as an altered state, facilitating creative ideation. The relationships among attention, self‐awareness, context, ambiguity, uncertainty, and conscious and unconscious perception in creative ideation are proposed to be experienced discontinuously due to an indeterminate element inherent in nature. Theoretical and empirical investigation of the above propositions is possible through quantum physics.     

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.     

线索类型对阈下注视线索效应的影响

实验结合连续闪烁抑制范式和线索化范式, 通过操纵直视面孔和斜视面孔的呈现方式, 考察了动静线索类型对注视线索效应的影响。结果表明：两种线索在阈上条件都能产生注视线索效应, 且动态线索诱发的效应更大; 无意识条件下有且仅有动态注视线索能诱发注视线索效应。这说明眼睛运动是产生阈下注视线索效应的必要条件; 眼睛运动会增强阈上注视线索效应, 静态注视线索效应依赖于意识。研究结果支持了社会知觉与心理理论交互模型。     

Selbst das selbst ist nicht selbst

EVEN SELF IS WITHOUT SELF. The Buddhist triad of body, speech and mind and the concept of self as their function are analysed from an analytic philosopher;s point of view. Buddhism is seen as an empirical religion with intersubjective operationalisations of its concepts. The mind is not observable but can be found by empirical methods in the traces of its actions, which can be found in the utterances of speech. Semantical and other paradoxes do not permit the location of mind within the hierarchy of languages. Mind has an active aspect by choosing a suitable frame of reference for every activity of the aspect of speech and is thus irreducible to that aspect. Mind is the space, the essence, indescribable by language, of possible frames of reference for perception and cognition. This absolute aspect of the mind corresponds to an absolute aspect of the self, unique by identitas indiscernibilium, which cannot be perceived, but can be found by the exercise of awareness; while the relative self corresponds to the individual form of cognition and does not therefore presuppose a semantical regress of ever richer metalanguages.     

The day the earth stood still: The presence of trauma in time experience

The experience of time is commonly perceived as developing within the context of the early relationship between mother and infant. The beginning of life occurs in an adapted environment, aimed to protect the child from internal and external disruptions. Through healthy development, the mind acquires a feeling of continuity that gradually becomes a cohesive sense of personal identity. However, in cases of traumatic interruptions to the primary environment, the defensive shield of the self is penetrated and the individual becomes prematurely aware and adapted to the external reality. This forced acknowledgement of time and reality could be manifested in various types of time disturbances, such as disorientation about time or difficulties in following a schedule. In therapeutic relationships, this drama would be enacted in a struggle against the psychoanalytic setting, which disrupts the continuity of being with the therapist. Importantly, these patients express a deep conscious or unconscious fantasy to live in a timeless world, in which they would not be forced to adapt themselves to others’ expectations or needs. Clinical examples are used to illustrate how traumatic history is evident in the patient’s time experience and in the psychoanalytic dialogue.