Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism

This paper looks at whether it is possible to unify the requirements of rationality with the demands of normative reasons. It might seem impossible to do because one depends upon the agent's perspective and the other upon features of the situation. Enter Reasons Perspectivism. Reasons perspectivists think they can show that rationality does consist in responding correctly to reasons by placing epistemic constraints on these reasons. They think that if normative reasons are subject to the right epistemic constraints, rational requirements will correspond to the demands generated by normative reasons. While this proposal is prima facie plausible, it cannot ultimately unify reasons and rationality. There is no epistemic constraint that can do what reasons perspectivists would need it to do. Some constraints are too strict. The rest are too slack. This points to a general problem with the reasons‐first program. Once we recognize that the agent's epistemic position helps determine what she should do, we have to reject the idea that the features of the agent's situation can help determine what we should do. Either rationality crowds out reasons and their demands or the reasons will make unreasonable demands.     

Intention and Permissibility: T. M. Scanlon

It is clearly impermissible to kill one person (or refrain from giving him treatment that he needs in order to survive) because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does not justify an exception to the prohibition against killing or the requirement to give aid. The difference between this explanation and one appealing to intention is easily overlooked if one fails to distinguish between the prospective use of a moral principle to guide action and its retrospective use to appraise the way an agent governed him or herself. Even if this explanation is accepted, however, it remains an open question whether and how an agent's intention may be relevant to the permissibility of actions in other cases.     

"道德"和"平等" --哈佛大学斯坎伦教授在华访问演讲录

美国哈佛大学斯坎伦(T.M.Scanlon)教授是目前西方最著名、最活跃和最具影响的道德哲学家之一.20世纪60年代,他和内格尔(Thomas Nagel)等人创办了<哲学和公共事务>(Philosophy and Public Affairs)杂志,该杂志已成为国际上最权威的哲学期刊之一.1982年,他发表了在西方学术界影响极为广泛的论文--<非自利契约论和功利主义>(Contractualism and Utilitarianism),使他成为继罗尔斯之后非自利契约论的主要代表人物.事实上,自这篇文章发表后,"Contractualism"一词已成了他理论的专有名词.该文也成为许多道德哲学论文集和研究生教科书必选的经典论文.2005年3月30日至4月5日,斯坎伦分别访问了南京师范大学公共管理学院、清华大学哲学系和中国社会科学院应用伦理研究中心,围绕着"何为道德"和"平等何时变得重要"的主题做了四场演讲.     

John D. Caputo,Mark Dooley,and Michael J. Scanlon (eds.), Questioning God

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Misinformation Versus Facts About the Contributions of Richard A. Gardner,M.D.

This document has been prepared to provide corrections for certain misrepresentations and misperceptions of some of my contributions. Some of these originated from conflicts in the legal arena, where attorneys frequently select out-of-context material in order to enhance their positions in courts of law. This is the nature of the adversary system, and it is one of the causes of the controversy that sometimes surround my contributions. Some of these misperceptions and misrepresentations have become so widespread that I considered it judicious to formulate this statement.