Causal illusion as a cognitive basis of pseudoscientific beliefs

Causal illusion has been proposed as a cognitive mediator of pseudoscientific beliefs. However, previous studies have only tested the association between this cognitive bias and a closely related but different type of unwarranted beliefs, those related to superstition and paranormal phenomena. Participants (n = 225) responded to a novel questionnaire of pseudoscientific beliefs designed for this study. They also completed a contingency learning task in which a possible cause, infusion intake, and a desired effect, headache remission, were actually non-contingent. Volunteers with higher scores on the questionnaire also presented stronger causal illusion effects. These results support the hypothesis that causal illusions might play a fundamental role in the endorsement of pseudoscientific beliefs.     

Realization for Causal Nondeterministic Input-Output Systems

There are two well-developed formalizations of discrete time dynamic systems that evidently share many concerns but suffer from a lack of mutual awareness. One formalization is classical systems and automata theory. The other is the logic of actions in which the situation and event calculi are the strongest representatives. Researchers in artificial intelligence are likely to be familiar with the latter but not the former. This is unfortunate, for systems and automata theory have much to offer by way of insight into problems raised in the logics of action. This paper is an outline of how the input-output view of systems and its associated solution of state realization may be applied to the formalization of dynamics that uses a situation calculus approach. In particular, because the latter usually admits incompletely specified dynamics, which induces a non-deterministic input-output system behavior, we first show that classical state realization can still be achieved if the behavior is causal. This is a novel systems-theoretic result. Then we proceed to indicate how situation calculi dynamic specifications can be understood in systems-theoretic terms, and how automata can be viewed as models of such specifications. As techniques for reasoning about automata are abundant, this will provide yet more tools for reasoning about actions.     

Problems and solutions for a hybrid approach to grounding practical normativity

Source Hybridism about practical reasons is the position that facts that constitute reasons sometimes derive their normative force from external metaphysical grounds, and sometimes from internal. Although historically less popular than either Source Internalism or Source Externalism, hybridism has lately begun to garner more attention. Here, I further the hybridist's cause by defending Source Hybridism from three objections. I argue that we are not warranted in rejecting hybridism for any of the following reasons: that hybridists cannot provide an account of normative weight, that hybridists are committed to implausible results concerning practical deliberation, or that Source Hybridism is objectionably unparsimonious.     

Causal cognitive architecture 1: Integration of connectionist elements into a navigation-based framework

The brain-inspired Causal Cognitive Architecture 1 (CCA1) tightly integrates the sensory processing capabilities found in neural networks with many of the causal abilities found in human cognition. Causality emerges not from a central controlling stored program but directly from the architecture. Sensory input vectors are processed by robust association circuitry and then propagated to a navigational temporary map. Instinctive and learned objects and procedures are applied to the same temporary map, with a resultant navigation signal obtained. Navigation can similarly be for the physical world as well as for a landscape of higher cognitive concepts. There is good explainability for causal decisions. A simulation of the CCA1 controlling a search and rescue robot is presented with the goal of finding and rescuing a lost hiker within a grid world. A simulation of the CCA1 controlling a repair robot is presented that can predict the movement of a series of gears.     

The marked item technique: a practical procedure for litter control

Unobtrusively marked items of litter were placed among existing trash on the grounds of a federal youth correctional facility. Inmates voluntarily collected trash and deposited it at a central location, where they were given money or special privileges for each piece of marked litter found. A multiple-baseline design with litter counts in three areas revealed successive reductions of 55%, 88%, and 71% after 17, 22, and 36 days of baseline, respectively. A fourth area served as a baseline-only control, and revealed no systematic changes. Advantages of the procedure over previously devised techniques were discussed and applications in other areas of pollution control suggested.     

Stories as indicators of practical knowledge: Analysing project workers' talk from a study of participation in a youth inclusion programme

The paper deals with the issue of practical knowledge for enabling participation. Participation as a strategy for change is widespread in community, health and human service contexts. Research to date has focused on the mechanisms of beneficiaries' participation (e.g. identity, empowerment, activity, gender, space). However, participation as an engagement strategy is action oriented and requires high levels of interaction between those creating the conditions for participation and those participating. These conditions need to be continuously adjusted and outcomes are often unpredictable. This process of ‘working with’ is often dealt with as a technical issue and captured in metaphorical language. Less emphasis has been given to the type of knowledge modalities that might be necessary in order to enable participation. Drawing on an ethnographic case study of participation in a youth inclusion programme the paper explores the role of stories as potential indicators of practical knowledge. The paper argues that enabling young people's participation requires intuition and imagination, patience and perseverance, and judgement for acting under uncertainty. It concludes that stories only partially fulfil their potential as indicators of such knowledge modalities. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Causal knowledge and imitation/emulation switching in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens)

This study explored whether the tendency of chimpanzees and children to use emulation or imitation to solve a tool-using task was a response to the availability of causal information. Young wild-born chimpanzees from an African sanctuary and 3- to 4-year-old children observed a human demonstrator use a tool to retrieve a reward from a puzzle-box. The demonstration involved both causally relevant and irrelevant actions, and the box was presented in each of two conditions: opaque and clear. In the opaque condition, causal information about the effect of the tool inside the box was not available, and hence it was impossible to differentiate between the relevant and irrelevant parts of the demonstration. However, in the clear condition causal information was available, and subjects could potentially determine which actions were necessary. When chimpanzees were presented with the opaque box, they reproduced both the relevant and irrelevant actions, thus imitating the overall structure of the task. When the box was presented in the clear condition they instead ignored the irrelevant actions in favour of a more efficient, emulative technique. These results suggest that emulation is the favoured strategy of chimpanzees when sufficient causal information is available. However, if such information is not available, chimpanzees are prone to employ a more comprehensive copy of an observed action. In contrast to the chimpanzees, children employed imitation to solve the task in both conditions, at the expense of efficiency. We suggest that the difference in performance of chimpanzees and children may be due to a greater susceptibility of children to cultural conventions, perhaps combined with a differential focus on the results, actions and goals of the demonstrator.     

The observer-relative velocity field as the basis for effective motion parallax

Earlier studies of motion parallax found unambiguous relative depth perception when random dot patterns were systematically translated in accordance with either motion of the observer's head or motion of the display scope. The need for such relative motion between an observer and a flow field was examined by placing a flow field in a limited area (window) in a large scope and translating the window relative to the observer. Accuracy in judging surface orientation and quantitative depth estimates were determined by the velocity field relative to the observer and were not measurably affected by whether this field was produced with a stationary or a moving window. Accuracy was consistently higher for smaller ratios of maximum to minimum projected velocities, reaching 100% in one experiment with a 1.12:1 ratio. We conclude that fully effective motion parallax does not require relative motion between the observer's head and the contours of a flow field.     

Context-specific attentional sampling: Intentional control as a pre-requisite for contextual control

Recent work suggests that environmental cues associated with previous attentional control settings can rapidly and involuntarily adjust attentional priorities. The current study tests predictions from adaptive-learning and memory-based theories of contextual control about the role of intentions for setting attentional priorities. To extend the empirical boundaries of contextual control phenomena, and to determine whether theoretical principles of contextual control are generalizable we used a novel bi-dimensional stimulus sampling task. Subjects viewed briefly presented arrays of letters and colors presented above or below fixation, and identified specific stimuli according to a dimensional (letter or color) and positional cue. Location was predictive of the cued dimension, but not the position or identity. In contrast to previous findings, contextual control failed to develop through automatic, adaptive-learning processes. Instead, previous experience with intentionally changing attentional sampling priorities between different contexts was required for contextual control to develop.     

Reminding as a basis for temporal judgments

In the normal course of events, some events bring to mind earlier events. This reminding or, in the context of list learning experiments, study-phase retrieval can serve as a basis for the accurate judgment of the relative recencies of the two events in question. In this article, evidence for this position is presented in three experiments. By manipulations of encoding using visual imagery instructions and word associations, appropriate conditions were arranged for reminding to occur. The results of all three studies support the position that reminding provides a direct basis for later judgments of the relative recency of events.     

Bullshit as a practical strategy for self-deceptive narrators

This paper argues that bullshit is a practical resource for self-deceiving individuals, or those who merely prefer to avoid self-examination, insofar as it is able to provide a mask for poor doxastic hygiene. While self-deception and bullshit are distinct phenomena, and bullshit does not cause self-deception, bullshit disrupts the capacity to interrogate the motivational biasses that fuel deception. The communicative misdirection engaged in by ordinary social bullshitters is applied reflexively by the self-deceiver to distort, evade, and obfuscate the self-deceiver's self-accounting. This discussion presupposes a broadly narrative approach to self-awareness and discusses how a motivated susceptibility to bullshit offers an explanation how our reports about ourselves can be frequently at odds with reality, and suggests that a complacency about rational validation of belief outside of self-certainty, i.e., the prevalence of bullshit, is even more of a threat than Frankfurt thought it to be.     

Ad hominem arguments in practical argumentation

This paper is ultimately about the nature of argumentation in general and about the nature of practical argumentation in particular. (Practical argumentation is the form of argumentation which aims at answering the question: ‘What is to be done?’) The approach adopted here is an indirect one. I analyze one traditional form of argumentive fallacyargumentum ad hominem and try to show that in some argumentative situations it is an intuitively legitimate move. These intuitions can be explained if we accept that practical argumentation is also governed by the general rules of practical rationality.     

Arguments in the practical reasoning underlying constructed probability responses

Reasoning is an important cognitive activity in probability assessment, and one that has been understudied. This proposition motivates the paper's three general aims. First, based on research in rhetoric, we present a theoretical means of analyzing the arguments constructed during the reasoning that occurs in probability assessment. Second, from verbal protocol data, we establish that subjects constructed arguments in forming beliefs and assessing the associated probabilities. Third, we analyze the data for the structure of subject's arguments, including argument content and form. Subjects used a limited amount of relevant evidence and used a variety of argument forms that could be characterized by the nature of the knowledge that subjects brought to bear in forming the arguments. Subjects predominantly used causal reasoning, but also employed hierarchical category knowledge, resemblance relationships, and arguments from authority. These findings form a basis for expanding our accounts of probability assessment and for improving assessment practice.