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Natika Newton 《Topoi》1988,7(1):25-30
Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspection, unlike perception, provides no identification information about the self, and that knowledge of one's mental states should be conceived as arising in a direct and unmediated fashion from one's being in those states. I argue that while one does not identify aself as the subject of one's states, one does frequently identify and misidentify thestates, in ways analogous to the identification of objects in perception, and that in discourse about one's mental states the self plays the role of external reality in discourse about physical objects. Discourse about any sort of entity or property can be viewed as involving a domain or frame of reference which constrains what can be said about the entities; this view is related to Johnson-Laird's theory of mental models. On my approach evidence, including sensory evidence, may be involved in decisions about one's mental states. I conclude that while Shoemaker may well be right about different roles for sense impressions in introspection and perception, the exact differences and their significance remain to be established. 相似文献
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Nicholas Silins 《Philosophical Studies》2013,163(2):291-315
In this paper I develop the idea that, by answering the question whether p, you can answer the question whether you believe that p. In particular, I argue that judging that p is a fallible yet basic guide to whether one believes that p. I go on to defend my view from an important skeptical challenge, according to which my view would make it too easy to reject skeptical hypotheses about our access to our minds. I close by responding to the opposing view on which our beliefs themselves constitute our only source of first-person access to our beliefs. 相似文献
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Introspection and subliminal perception 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Subliminal perception (SP) is today considered a well-supported theory stating that perception can occur without conscious awareness and have a significant impact on later behaviour and thought. In this article, we first present and discuss different approaches to the study of SP. In doing this, we claim that most approaches are based on a dichotomic measure of awareness. Drawing upon recent advances and discussions in the study of introspection and phenomenological psychology, we argue for both the possibility and necessity of using an elaborated measure of subjective states. In the second part of the article, we present findings where these considerations are implemented in an empirical study. The results and implications are discussed in detail, both with reference to SP, and in relation to the more general problem of using elaborate introspective reports as data in relation to studies of cognition. 相似文献
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It is argued that the work of Husserl offers a model for self-knowledge that avoids the disadvantages of standard introspectionist accounts and of a Sellarsian view of the relation between our perceptual judgements and derived judgements about appearances. Self-knowledge is based on externally directed knowledge of the world that is then subjected to a cognitive transformation analogous to the move from a statement to the activity of stating. Appearance talk is (contra Sellars) not an epistemically non-committal form of speech, but talk to which we are fully committed. However, it is a commitment to a certain kind of claim about our experiences, viewed as cognitive phenomena, after a process of transformation. Such reductive and hypostatizing transformations can exhibit the intentional structure of consciousness. Phenomenology thus gives a form of knowledge about our mental states that is first personal but not introspective knowledge in any philosophically problematic sense. The account offered is also, in key respects, dissimilar to Sellars's outer directed view of the origin of self-knowledge. 相似文献
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Introspection and Authoritative Self-Knowledge 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Cynthia Macdonald 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):355-372
In this paper I outline and defend an introspectionist account of authoritative self-knowledge for a certain class of cases,
ones in which a subject is both thinking and thinking about a current, conscious thought. My account is distinctive in a number
of ways, one of which is that it is compatible with the truth of externalism—the view that the contents of subjects’ intentional
states are individuation-dependent on factors external to their minds. It is thus decidedly anti-Cartesian, despite being
introspectionist. My argument proceeds in three stages. A virtue of the position I develop is that the epistemic features
on which it is based also apply to sensations and to non-episodic intentional states, to the extent that one has authoritative
knowledge of them. However, despite the appeal to analogies with observable properties of objects of perception, the account
is not a ‘perceptual’ model of such knowledge in the sense that those such as Shoemaker, Burge and others have in mind. Because
the features on which the analogy is based are abstract and general, they are not tied to cases of observation alone. Those
who appeal to such phenomena as ‘intellectual experience’ (Burge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96, 91–116, 1996) or ‘intellectual intuition’ (Bealer, Philosophical perspectives, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 29–55, 1999) in their accounts of authoritative self-knowledge may well appeal to such features. This, amongst other factors, distinguishes
the position from other introspectionist ones in a way that makes it immune to standard objections to perceptual models of
self-knowledge.
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Cynthia MacdonaldEmail: |
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Andreas Elpidorou 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2016,97(4):474-500
Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature of their referents in a partial and incomplete manner, a posteriori physicalism is safe. 相似文献
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Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative
introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be transitive and euclidean. Correlatively, Williamson’s
margin for error semantics for inexact knowledge invalidates axioms 4 and 5. We present a new semantics for modal logic which
is shown to be complete for K45, without constraining the accessibility relation to be transitive or euclidean. The semantics corresponds to a system of
modular knowledge, in which iterated modalities and simple modalities are not on a par. We show how the semantics helps to
solve Williamson’s luminosity paradox, and argue that it corresponds to an integrated model of perceptual and introspective
knowledge that is psychologically more plausible than the one defended by Williamson. We formulate a generalized version of
the semantics, called token semantics, in which modalities are iteration-sensitive up to degree n and insensitive beyond n. The multi-agent version of the semantics yields a resource-sensitive logic with implications for the representation of common
knowledge in situations of bounded rationality. 相似文献
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PETER CARRUTHERS 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2010,80(1):76-111
This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. It won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the latter exists while arguing that the former doesn't (or not in the case of judgments and decisions, at least). Section 1 makes some preliminary points and distinctions, and outlines the scope of the argument. Section 2 presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result. Section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren't introspectable. Section 4 then replies to a number of objections to the argument, the most important of which is made from the perspective of so-called "dual systems theories" of belief formation and decision making. The upshot is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection, in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude. 相似文献
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We argue that episodic remembering, understood as the ability to re-experience past events, requires a particular kind of
introspective ability and understanding. It requires the understanding that first person experiences can represent actual
events. In this respect it differs from the understanding required by the traditional false belief test for children, where
a third person attribution (to others or self) of a behavior governing representation is sufficient. The understanding of
first person experiences as representations is also required for problem solving with images. In support of this argument
we review developmental evidence that children’s episodic remembering is independent of and emerges after mastery of the false
belief task but emerges together with the use of imagery for solving visual rotation tasks. 相似文献
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Recent advances in the field of metacognition have shown that human participants are introspectively aware of many different cognitive states, such as confidence in a decision. Here we set out to expand the range of experimental introspection by asking whether participants could access, through pure mental monitoring, the nature of the cognitive processes that underlie two visual search tasks: an effortless “pop-out” search, and a difficult, effortful, conjunction search. To this aim, in addition to traditional first order performance measures, we instructed participants to give, on a trial-by-trial basis, an estimate of the number of items scanned before a decision was reached. By controlling response times and eye movements, we assessed the contribution of self-observation of behavior in these subjective estimates. Results showed that introspection is a flexible mechanism and that pure mental monitoring of cognitive processes is possible in elementary tasks. 相似文献
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Patrick Allo 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2013,42(1):91-124
In this paper I present a more refined analysis of the principles of deductive closure and positive introspection. This analysis uses the expressive resources of logics for different types of group knowledge, and discriminates between aspects of closure and computation that are often conflated. The resulting model also yields a more fine-grained distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, and places Hintikka’s original argument for positive introspection in a new perspective. 相似文献
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Anthony Ian Jack 《Consciousness and cognition》2013,22(2):670-671
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Necessity and Apriority 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Gordon Prescott Barnes 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(3):495-523
The classical view of the relationship between necessity and apriority, defended by Leibniz and Kant, is that all necessary
truths are known a priori. The classical view is now almost universally rejected, ever since Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam
discovered that there are necessary truths that are known only a posteriori. However, in recent years a new debate has emerged
over the epistemology of these necessary a posteriori truths. According to one view – call it the neo-classical view – knowledge
of a necessary truth always depends on at least one item of a priori knowledge. According to the rival view – call it the
neoempiricist view – our knowledge of necessity is sometimes broadly empirical. In this paper I present and defend an argument
against the neo-empiricist view. I argue that knowledge of the necessity of a necessary truth could not be broadly empirical. 相似文献
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Ross P. Cameron 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(3):401-415
In this paper I argue that there are some sentences whose truth makes no demands on the world, being trivially true in that their truth-conditions are trivially met. I argue that this does not amount to their truth-conditions being met necessarily: we need a non-modal understanding of the notion of the demands the truth of a sentence makes, lest we be blinded to certain conceptual possibilities. I defend the claim that the truths of pure mathematics and set theory are trivially true, and hence accepting their truth brings no ontological commitment; I further defend the claim that the truths of applied mathematics and set theory do not demand the existence of numbers or sets. While the notion of a demand must not be reduced to anything modal, I nonetheless argue that sentences that are trivially true must also be necessary, lest we violate a very weak version of the principle that truth depends on the world. I further argue that all necessary truths are trivially true, lest we admit unexplained necessities. I end by showing one important consequence of this: I argue that if there are truthmakers for intrinsic predications, they must be states of affairs rather than tropes. 相似文献