Against Second‐Order Reasons*

A normative reason for a person to φ is a consideration which favours φing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person φs. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second‐order normative reasons (not) to φ for or on the basis of certain first‐order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second‐order reasons so understood. I then show that prominent views in contemporary epistemology are committed to the existence of second‐order reasons, specifically, views about the epistemic norms governing practical reasoning and about the role of higher‐order evidence. If there are no second‐order reasons, those views are mistaken.     

Fallibilism,Contextualism and Second‐Order Skepticism

Fallibilism is ubiquitous in contemporary epistemology. I argue that a paradox about knowledge, generated by considerations of truth, shows that fallibilism can only deliver knowledge in lucky circumstances. Specifically, since it is possible that we are brains‐in‐vats (BIVs), it is possible that all our beliefs are wrong. Thus, the fallibilist can know neither whether or not we have much knowledge about the world nor whether or not we know any specific proposition, and so the warrant of our knowledge‐claims is much reduced and second‐order skepticism is generated. Since this is the case in both skeptical and everyday contexts, contextualism cannot resolve the paradox.     

Children's Understanding of Second‐Order False Belief: Comparisons of Content and Method of Assessment

This research examined children's performance on second‐order false belief tasks as a function of the content area for the belief and the method of assessing understanding. A total of 70 kindergarten and first‐grade children responded to four second‐order stories. On two stories, the task was to judge a belief about a belief, and on two, the task was to judge a belief about an emotion. On one trial within each group, the task was to predict the target's belief, and on one trial, the task was to explain the belief. Older children outperformed younger children on the prediction measure. Differences as a function of content area and method of assessment were limited; when they did occur, performance was generally better with belief than with emotion as the target, and better with prediction than with explanation as the response criterion. Finally, there was no relation between number of siblings and performance.     

Eye‐tracking Social Preferences

We hypothesize that if people are motivated by a particular social preference, then choosing in accordance with this preference will lead to an identifiable pattern of eye movements. We track eye movements while subjects make choices in simple three‐person distribution experiments. We characterize each choice in terms of three different types of social preferences: efficiency, maxi‐min, and envy. For the characterization, we use either the choice data or the eye movement data. The evidence indicates that distributional choices are broadly consistent with the choice rule implied by eye movements. In other words, what subjects appear to be interested in when you look at their choices corresponds to what they appear to be interested in when you look at their eye movements. This correspondence lends credibility to the behavioral relevance of social preferences models. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Knowing Other People: A Second‐Person Framework

What does it mean to know another person, and how is such knowledge different from other kinds of knowledge? These questions constitute an important part of what I call ‘second‐person epistemology’ – the study of how we know other people. I claim that knowledge of other people is not only central to our everyday lives, but it is a kind of knowledge that is unlike other kinds of knowledge. In general, I will argue that second‐person knowledge arises from repeated interactions with another person, and that it also requires employment of certain cognitive abilities and a unique kind of second‐order knowledge. This paper provides the framework for a second‐person epistemology by examining some of our ordinary claims about what it means to know another person. I describe four conditions that typically characterize knowing another person. Then I describe the psychological grounds of knowing a person. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about the unique symmetries of second person knowledge and the role of such knowledge in our broader epistemological endeavours.     

An Online Process Model of Second‐Order Cultivation Effects: How Television Cultivates Materialism and Its Consequences for Life Satisfaction

Two studies investigated the interrelations among television viewing, materialism, and life satisfaction, and their underlying processes. Study 1 tested an online process model for television's cultivation of materialism by manipulating level of materialistic content. Viewing level influenced materialism, but only among participants who reported being transported by the narrative, supporting a process model in which cultivation effects for value judgments occur online during viewing. Study 2 further investigated television's cultivation of materialism and its consequences for life satisfaction. A survey of U.S. respondents found cultivation effects for materialism and life satisfaction, and materialism mediated the cultivation effect for life satisfaction, suggesting that television's specific cultivation of materialism (proximal effect) mediates a more general cultivation effect for life satisfaction (distal effect).     

Two Second‐Personal Conceptions of the Dignity of Persons

In spite of the burgeoning philosophical literature on human dignity, Stephen Darwall's second‐personal account of the dignity of persons has not received the attention it deserves. This article investigates Darwall's account and argues that it faces a dilemma, for it succumbs either to a problem of antecedence or to the wrong kind of reasons problem. But this need not mean one should reject a second‐personal account. Instead, I argue that an alternative second‐personal conception, one I will call relational, promises to solve the dilemma by avoiding both the problem of antecedence and the wrong kind of reasons problem. More generally, distinguishing these two second‐personal conceptions of the dignity of persons is important to enrich the available philosophical accounts of human dignity.     

On the Rationality of Vow‐making

I offer a philosophical account of vowing and the rationality of vow‐making. I argue that vows are most productively understood as exceptionless resolutions that do not have any excusing conditions. I then articulate an apparent problem for exceptionless vow‐making: how can it be rational to bind yourself unconditionally, when circumstances might change unexpectedly and make it the case that vow‐keeping no longer makes sense for you? As a solution, I propose that vows can be rational to make only if they are implicitly conditional on a personal identification or social role that is itself escapable.     

Higher‐Order Defeat is Object‐Independent

Higher‐order defeat occurs when one loses justification for one's beliefs as a result of receiving evidence that those beliefs resulted from a cognitive malfunction. Several philosophers have identified features of higher‐order defeat that distinguish it from familiar types of defeat. If higher‐order defeat has these features, they are data an account of rational belief must capture. In this article, I identify a new distinguishing feature of higher‐order defeat, and I argue that on its own, and in conjunction with the other distinguishing features, it favors an account of higher‐order defeat grounded in non‐evidential, ‘state‐given reasons’ for belief.     

Effects of Deception on Children's Understanding of Second‐order False Belief

This research examined two questions: effects of deception on children's understanding of second‐order false belief, and possible effects of number of siblings on second‐order performance. Kindergarten children responded to 3 second‐order problems that varied in the presence and the nature of deception. Performance was better on the problems with deception, but significantly so only when the target for the belief attribution produced the deception. This finding helps to clarify differences between the two main paradigms for assessing second‐order false belief. There was no relation between number of siblings and performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preferences for colours and colour‐‐emotion combinations in early childhood

Previous research has shown that, by the age of 3 to 4 years, children rely not only on perceptual similarity but also on shared category or other underlying structures to draw analogies. The present study extends this work by showing that children as young as 3 years old detect consistent relationships between colours and facial expressions of emotions – two phenomena that share no physical characteristics, violate conventional categories and have no obvious environmental contiguity. Two explanatory hypotheses are put forward: (a) learning by convention, which is explored against the standard of adults’ and older children’s matching patterns, and (b) reliance upon a common underlying but perceptually unavailable dimension – operationalized in terms of emotion and colour preferences in the context of the present study. Both explanatory approaches are discussed and avenues for future work are suggested.     

Decisions and Higher‐Order Knowledge

A knowledge‐based decision theory faces what has been called the prodigality problem (Greco, 2013): given that many propositions are assigned probability 1, agents will be inclined to risk everything when betting on propositions which are known. In order to undo probability 1 assignments in high risk situations, the paper develops a theory which systematically connects higher level goods with higher‐order knowledge.