International Employment Discrimination and Implicit Social Cognition: New Directions for Theory and Research

This article contends that a complete understanding of employment discrimination should consider conscious and unconscious sources of bias. Research on implicit social cognition has described how prejudice and stereotypes operate at an unconscious level. These processes are believed to be fundamental properties of human cognition and universal across cultures; although specific targets of discrimination may vary by culture. Within an employment framework, implicit social cognitions can be measured to determine the extent to which unconscious prejudices influence organisational behavior. Human resource practices designed to minimise unfair employment discrimination may require interventions that operate at conscious and unconscious levels.
Cet article soutient que la compréhension complète de la discrimination à l'embauche devrait prendre en compte les sources conscientes et inconscientes de ce phénomène. La recherche sur la cognition sociale implicite a décrit comment les préjugés et les stéréotype opèrent à un niveau inconscient. Ces processus sont pensés comme étant des propriétés fondamentales de la cognition humaine et universels du point de vue des cultures; bien que les cibles spécifiques de la discrimination puissent varier selon ces dernières. Dans le cadre d'une embauche, les cognitions sociales implicites peuvent être mesurées pour déterminer l'importance avec laquelle les préjugés inconscients influencent le comportement organisationnel. En matière de ressources humaines, les pratiques prévues pour réduire au minimum l'injuste discrimination à l'embauche peuvent exiger des interventions agissant aux niveaux conscient et inconscient.     

Personality Interacts With Implicit Affect to Predict Performance in Analytic Versus Holistic Processing

Both theoretical approaches and empirical evidence suggest that negative affect fosters analytic processing, whereas positive affect fosters holistic processing, but these effects are inconsistent. We aim to show that (a) differences in affect regulation abilities (“action orientation”) and (b) implicit more so than self‐reported affect assessment need to be considered to advance our understanding of these processes. Forty participants were asked to verify whether a word was correctly or incorrectly spelled to measure analytic processing, as well as to intuitively assess whether sets of three words were coherent (remote associates task) to measure holistic processing. As expected, implicit but not explicit negative affect interacted with low action orientation (“state orientation”) to predict higher d' performance in word spelling, whereas implicit but not explicit positive affect interacted with high action orientation to predict higher d' performance in coherence judgments for word triads. Results are interpreted according to personality systems interaction theory. These findings suggest that affect and affect changes should be measured explicitly and implicitly to investigate affect‐cognition interactions. Moreover, they suggest that good affect regulators benefit from positive affect for holistic processing, whereas bad affect regulators benefit from negative affect for analytical processing.     

On the Inadmissibility of Some Historical Information

I argue—from a Humean perspective—for the falsity of what I call the “Admissibility of Historical Information Thesis” (AHIT). According to the AHIT, propositions that describe past events are always admissible with respect to propositions that describe future events. I first demonstrate that this thesis has some counter‐intuitive implications and argue that a Humean can explain the intuitive attractiveness of the AHIT by arguing that it results from a wrong understanding of the concept of chance. I then demonstrate how a Humean “best system” analysis of chance predicts the existence of inadmissible historical information and discuss the implications of this conclusion to the debate between Humeans and non‐Humeans.     

Embodied Simulations Are Modulated by Sentential Perspective

There is considerable evidence that language comprehenders derive lexical‐semantic meaning by mentally simulating perceptual and motor attributes of described events. However, the nature of these simulations—including the level of detail that is incorporated and contexts under which simulations occur—is not well understood. Here, we examine the effects of first‐ versus third‐person perspective on mental simulations during sentence comprehension. First‐person sentences describing physical transfer towards or away from the body (e.g., “You threw the microphone,” “You caught the microphone”) modulated response latencies when responses were made along a front‐back axis, consistent with the action‐sentence compatibility effect (ACE). This effect was not observed for third‐person sentences (“He threw the microphone,” “He caught the microphone”). The ACE was observed when making responses along a left‐right axis for third‐person, but not first‐person sentences. Abstract sentences (e.g., “He heard the message”) did not show an ACE along either axis. These results show that perspective is a detail that is simulated during action sentence comprehension, and that motoric activations are flexible and affected by the pronominal perspective used in the sentence.     

Psychological Essentialism at the Explicit and Implicit Levels: The Unique Status of Social Categories

Psychological essentialism refers to a naive theory concerning fundamental elements that bring a category into its existence. The present study examined the structure of this lay theory as well as its implicitness, with a special focus on social categories. In Study 1, Japanese college students rated a number of categories that were natural‐kind, social, or human artifacts, in terms of different elements of essentialist beliefs. A factor analysis revealed that entitativity and naturalness are the common underlying dimensions across these category domains. We also identified some natural‐kind and human artifact categories that can be used as two extreme referent points for the examination of naturalness perceived in a whole array of social categories. Study 2 assessed implicit and automatic judgments on naturalness using a go/no‐go task, and compared them to explicit judgments. Unlike natural kinds and artifacts, social categories were essentialized to a greater extent at the implicit level. These results suggest a dual process of intuitive and deliberate cognition, particularly involving social categories, with implications concerning the bases of stereotypes and prejudices.     

Sex stereotypes and implicit personality theory: Toward a cognitive—Social psychological conceptualization

Progress in understanding sex stereotypes has been impeded by the failure of researchers to address two critical conceptual questions: What is a sex stereotype? How do sex stereotypes function in social cognition and behavior? As a step toward answering the first question, the meaning of the term “sex stereotype” was considered. On the basis of points of agreement among extant conceptual definitions of the construct “stereotype” (in both the female-male and ethnic relations literatures), a generic definition of “sex stereotypes” is proposed: the structured sets of beliefs about the personal attributes of women and of men. In order to relate sex stereotypes more closely to research and theory on “normal” psychological processes, this basic definition is recast in terms of the person perception construct, “implicit personality theory”: the structured sets of inferential relations that link personal attributes to the social categories female and male. Two studies are presented to illustrate the utility of this translation. The remainder of the article addresses the second question. Here we offer preliminary ideas regarding a more general cognitive—social psychological framework for the study of sex stereotypes. Stereotype and stereotyping are distinguished, and each is discussed in light of relevant research in cognitive and social psychology.     

Possible Implicit Mechanisms of Minority Representation

Minority representation is an important topic for political science—how do members of a racial majority group identify with the political goals of a minority, even when research documents widespread anti‐Black bias? Does pro‐Black policy support require an individual to be unbiased, or can such support emerge despite internalized anti‐Black bias? This paper draws a distinction between two types of implicit racial attitude measures based on functionalist theories of attitudes ( Katz, 1960 ; Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956 ) and research regarding automatic empathic processes ( Decety & Jackson, 2004 ; Preston & de Waal, 2002 ). According to this distinction, some attitudes evaluate racial groups as attitude objects (evaluative associations), while others involve automatic identification with them as people (relational associations). I use subliminal racial priming for evaluative associations and a measure of implicit closeness to Blacks ( Craemer, 2008 ) for relational associations. The evaluative measure captures association strength between a racial stimulus and race‐unrelated positive or negative target words. The relational measure assesses association strength between the respondent's self‐concept and the mental representation of a racial group based on implicit “self‐other overlap” ( Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991 ). Implicit measures are obtained in a well powered online reaction time study (n = 1,341). Online results are evaluated against a representative telephone survey (n = 1,200). Consistent with the extant literature, a significant anti‐Black bias emerges in evaluative associations. In contrast, a significant pro‐Black effect emerges in relational associations and the two implicit measures are statistically unrelated. Both measures predict pro‐Black policy support independently of one another and net of other factors. Implicit closeness to Blacks predicts pro‐Black policy support even among White respondents suggesting that minority representation based on relational associations may be possible despite widespread anti‐Black evaluative bias.     

Do negative implicit associations indicate negative attitudes? Social explanations moderate whether ostensible “negative” associations are prejudice-based or empathy-based

The present work challenges the idea that implicit evaluative associations with outgroups necessarily provide information about negative or prejudiced attitudes. We argue that the manner in which one explains outgroup status and action shapes whether one's implicit “negative” associations are prejudice-based or empathy-based. Four studies are consistent with this possibility. Study 1 suggests that whereas implicit “negative” associations are predictive of negative explicit attitudes among those who reject external explanations for African American status and action, such implicit “negativity” predicts positive explicit attitudes among those who endorse external explanations. Study 2 provides experimental evidence that the provision of external explanations results in the formation of implicit “negative” associations that are predictive of compassionate responding. Study 3 provides more direct support for the idea that implicit “negative” associations are empathy-based among external explainers by showing that such “negative” associations are positively correlated with a measure of dispositional empathy-proneness. Finally, Study 4 demonstrates that IAT “negativity” is associated with automatic activation of empathy-related associations among those who strongly endorse external explanations. Discussion centers on the importance of considering factors—such as social explanations—that may moderate whether implicit “negativity” is prejudice-based or empathy-based.     

心理疾病污名内隐测评的类别标签初探

采用单一类型内隐联想测验,考察以往研究中常用的概括化心理疾病词和具体心理疾病词作为心理疾病内隐污名间接测量概念词或类别标签的有效性。结果发现,相较于与积极词配对的任务,两类概念词与消极词（心理疾病态度词）配对的任务反应时更快,正确率更高。研究表明概括化概念和具体疾病与反映人们对心理疾病患者真实态度的消极词存在更紧密的自动联结,是人们头脑中表征心理疾病的概念词或类别标签,可作为内隐测量中的心理疾病概念词用于污名评估。     

Self-esteem revisited: Performance on the implicit relational assessment procedure as a measure of self- versus ideal self-related cognitions in dysphoria

Although depression is characterised by low self-esteem as measured by questionnaires, research using implicit measures of self-esteem has failed to reveal the expected differences between depressed and non-depressed individuals. In this study, we used an implicit measure which enables the differentiation of ideal self- and actual self-esteem, through the introduction of propositions: “I am” versus “I want to be”. We measured implicit relational associations about actual and ideal self in low (N=27) versus high dysphoric (N=29) undergraduates. Our data revealed that dysphoric individuals have a higher ideal self-esteem, and lower actual self-esteem in comparison to healthy participants. The results underscore the need to go beyond simple associations and suggest that the use of individual–specific propositions could enhance our understanding of the implicit measurement of self-esteem. Furthermore, these results underscore the importance of actual versus ideal self-discrepancy theories, which might guide the content of therapeutic interventions.     

Decomposing implicit associations about life and death improves our understanding of suicidal behavior

The Death/Suicide Implicit Association Test (IAT) is effective at detecting and prospectively predicting suicidal thoughts and behaviors. However, traditional IAT scoring procedures used in all prior studies (i.e., D-scores) provide an aggregate score that is inherently relative, obfuscating the separate associations (i.e., “Me = Death/Suicide,” “Me = Life”) that might be most relevant for understanding suicide-related implicit cognition. Here, we decompose the D-scores and validate a new analytic technique called the Decomposed D-scores (“DD-scores”) that creates separate scores for each category (“Me,” “Not Me”) in the IAT. Across large online volunteer samples (N > 12,000), results consistently showed that a weakened association between “Me = Life” is more strongly predictive of having a history of suicidal attempts than is a stronger association between “Me = Death/Suicide.” These findings replicated across three different versions of the IAT and were observed when calculated using both reaction times and error rates. However, among those who previously attempted suicide, a strengthened association between “Me = Death” is more strongly predictive of the recency of a suicide attempt. These results suggest that decomposing traditional IAT D-scores can offer new insights into the mental associations that may underlie clinical phenomena and may help to improve the prediction, and ultimately the prevention, of these clinical outcomes.     

ANALYTIC MIND USE AND INTERPSYCHIC COMMUNICATION: DRIVING FORCE IN ANALYTIC TECHNIQUE,PATHWAY TO UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL LIFE

Developed from established psychoanalytic knowledge among different psychoanalytic cultures concerning unconscious interpsychic communication, analysts' use of their receptive mental experience—their analytic mind use, including the somatic, unconscious, and less accessible derivatives—represents a significant investigative road to patients' unconscious mental life, particularly with poorly symbolized mental states. The author expands upon this tradition, exploring what happens when patients unconsciously experience and identify with the analyst's psychic functioning. The technical implications of the analyst's “instrument” are described, including the analyst's ego regression, creation of inner space, taking mind as object, bearing uncertainty and intense affect, and self‐analysis. Brief case vignettes illustrate the structure and obstacles to this work.     

Personal attitudes toward time: The relationship between temporal focus,space‐time mappings and real life experiences

What influences how people implicitly associate “past” and “future” with “front” and “back?” Whereas previous research has shown that cultural attitudes toward time play a role in modulating space‐time mappings in people's mental models (de la Fuente, Santiago, Román, Dumitrache & Casasanto, 2014), we investigated real life experiences as potential additional influences on these implicit associations. Participants within the same single culture, who are engaged in different intermediate‐term educational experiences (Study 1), long‐term living experiences (Study 2), and short‐term visiting experiences (Study 3), showed their distinct differences in temporal focus, thereby influencing their implicit spatializations of time. Results across samples suggest that personal attitudes toward time related to real life experiences may influence people's space‐time mappings. The findings we report on shed further light on the high flexibility of human conceptualization system. While culture may exert an important influence on temporal focus, a person's conceptualization of time may be attributed to a culmination of factors.     

Stigma towards psychosis: Cross‐cultural differences in prejudice,stereotypes, and discrimination in White British and South Asians

Public stigma towards people with mental health problems has been demonstrated in Western societies. Little is known about non‐Western cultures and whether cultures differ in their perceptions of people with mental health problems. Aim of this study was to examine cultural differences in prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination towards people with psychosis. Participants were from White British and South Asian backgrounds (N = 128, aged 16–20 years) recruited from two schools and colleges in the United Kingdom. They completed a cross‐sectional survey on affective, cognitive, and behavioural dimensions of stigma. Results revealed significant cultural differences on all three stigma dimensions. South Asians attributed higher anger (prejudice) and dangerousness (stereotypes) to people with psychosis than White British. They also reported lower willingness to help, greater avoidance, and higher endorsement of segregation (discrimination). The effects of ethnic group on helping intentions, avoidance, and segregation endorsement were mediated by anger and by dangerousness. Understanding cultural differences in stigma towards psychosis will be important for designing stigma interventions as well as treatments for people with different cultural backgrounds.     

Can Culture Influence Body‐Specific Associations Between Space and Valence?

People implicitly associate positive ideas with their dominant side of space and negative ideas with their non‐dominant side. Right‐handers tend to associate “good” with “right” and “bad” with “left,” but left‐handers associate “bad” with “right” and “good” with “left.” Whereas right‐handers' implicit associations align with idioms in language and culture that link “good” with “right,” left‐handers' implicit associations go against them. Can cultural conventions modulate the body‐specific association between valence and left‐right space? Here, we compared people from Spanish and Moroccan cultures, which differ in the strength of taboos against the use of the left hand, and therefore in their preference for the right. Results showed stronger explicit associations between space and valence in Moroccan participants than in Spaniards, but they did not show any increased tendency for right‐handed Moroccans to associate “good” with “right” implicitly. Despite differences in cultural conventions between Spaniards and Moroccans, we find no evidence for a cross‐cultural difference in the implicit association between space and valence, which appears to depend on patterns of bodily experience.     

The Powerlessness of Necessity

This paper concerns anti‐Humean intuitions about connections in nature. It argues for the existence of a de re link that is not necessity. Some anti‐Humeans tacitly assume that metaphysical necessity can be used for all sorts of anti‐Humean desires. Metaphysical necessity is thought to stick together whatever would be loose and separate in a Hume world, as if it were a kind of universal superglue. I argue that this is not feasible. Metaphysical necessity might connect synchronically co‐existent properties—kinds and their essential features, for example—but it is difficult to see how it could also serve as the binding force for successions of events. That is, metaphysical necessity seems not to be fit for diachronic, causal affairs in which causal laws, causation, or dispositions are involved. A different anti‐Humean connection in nature has to do that job. My arguments focus mainly on a debate which has been the battleground for Humean vs. anti‐Humean intuitions for many decades—namely, the analysis of dispositional predicates—yet I believe (but do not argue here) that the arguments generalise to causation and causal laws straightforwardly.     

Even More Than the “Something More”: Tronick’s Dyadic Expansion of Consciousness Model and the Expansion of Child Psychoanalytic Technique

Contemporary psychoanalysis considers itself to be a discipline fundamentally concerned with meaning and meaning-making processes. Ed Tronick’s research provides scientific support for the theoretical position that meaning making is a central process in psychological development and in mental health/illness. His work collaborating with psychoanalysts has made major contributions to the psychoanalytic literature on therapeutic action, with a special emphasis on the means by which implicit meanings are activated and modified in analytic treatment—the something more than interpretation. This article is about a different something more, the even more that psychoanalytic theory and technique can evolve through further incorporating Tronick’s important findings. Tronick’s Dyadic Expansion of Consciousness Model will be briefly reviewed—emphasizing his conceptualization of meanings as being composed of multiple commingling layers (biological, psychological, relational, and social) coming together in a nonlinear “messy” mixture of mutually influencing (both bottom-up and top-down) currents. This multilayered model of meaning opens up the reconsideration of an exciting array of technical options—traditionally considered nonanalytic—to be reunderstood as truly psychoanalytic in that they address one or more of the implicit or explicit levels of meaning that a patient makes of his or her self and world. Examples of these interventions include parent work, work with teachers and schools, as well as interventions adapted from other disciplines such as Occupational Therapy. These technical possibilities are illustrated using case material from the psychoanalytic treatment of a nine-year-old boy.     

Hard Determinism,Humeanism, and Virtue Ethics

Hard determinists hold that we never have alternative possibilities of action—that we only can do what we actually do. This means that if hard determinists accept the “ought implies can” principle, they must accept that it is never the case that we ought to do anything we do not do. In other words, they must reject the view that there can be “ought”‐based moral reasons to do things we do not do. Hard determinists who wish to accommodate moral reasons to do things we do not do can instead appeal to Humean moral reasons that are based on desires to be virtuous. Moral reasons grounded on desires to be virtuous do not depend on our being able to act on those reasons in the way that “ought”‐based moral reasons do.     

Implicit ambivalence of significant others: Significant others trigger positive and negative evaluations

Despite the rich literature on implicit partner evaluations, there has been scant attention to a defining feature of significant other mental representations—their affective complexity. Recent findings (Zayas & Shoda, 2015), however, provide an empirical demonstration that significant others automatically and simultaneously activate positive and negative evaluations—a phenomenon we refer to as implicit ambivalence. A primary aim of this paper is to extend extant theory by elaborating on the features of the dyadic context that may contribute to the formation of implicit ambivalence. Particularly, drawing from research from relationship science, social cognition, and social neuroscience, we focus on the ability of significant others to dynamically and simultaneously confer rewards and threats, the attunement of perceivers to potential social rewards and social threats, and aspects of sense‐making of another person's mind that may give rise to implicit ambivalence. From this new perspective, implicit ambivalence is not a pathological or rare state. Quite the opposite, implicit ambivalence may be a normative, typical process, that is triggered even by people who are highly positive in one's network. We identify future directions for social cognition and relationship science.